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Part I
“The highest proof of virtue is to possess boundless power without abusing it.”
Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay

I Introduction
1 Preliminary remarks
1.1 The power to resolve disputes
The power to settle disputes between parties is exceptional. Historically reserved for gods
or kings,1 in modern democracies it remains an exclusive domain of a judiciary in
accordance withMontesquieu’smodel for the separation of powers. It means, in turn, that
it constitutes the reflection of sovereignty. It is truly remarkable that arbitral tribunals can
be granted such a vast authority. However, as Justice Kagan once quoted: “in this world,
with great power there must also come – great responsibility.”2
Without a doubt, the power to resolve a dispute constitutes a great responsibility. It
therefore comes with an obligation not to exceed the authority. If such a power is abused,
parties will have a legitimate reason to challenge the decision. In a traditional court system,
it is evidenced with a review of court judgments by the courts of higher instance (appeal
mechanism). Importantly, the scrutiny of the reviewing court may also involve the lower
court’s findings on the facts and on the law.
In arbitration, however, the system operates differently. It is based on a limited court
intervention in the arbitral process and the tribunal’s findings. In principle, the post-award
court review is narrow and allowed only in a listed number of cases. This is why it may be
tempting for the parties to apply the grounds for recourse ever so broadly.
The ground directly relevant to the tribunal’s dispute resolution power is the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge. In principle, every legal systemwill guarantee a post-award
recourse against an alleged “excess of mandate” even though they do not, in principle,
define what the “mandate” itself entails. This, in turn, attracts a broad interpretationmade
by the aggrieved parties and may frustrate the fundamental value of arbitration – the
finality of the arbitral award.
It is therefore essential to determine how the national courts review arbitral awards on
the basis of “excess of mandate” and consequently in what instances they accept the
argument that the tribunal acted in violation of itsmandate. This study aims at recognizing
the similarities and differences of the “excess of mandate” type of challenges in selected
1 (Clay, L’arbitre, 2001) pp.33-35.
2 Albeit in a different context. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415, 192 L. Ed. 2d 463
(2015).
3
legal systems (namely theUNCITRALModel Law,3 France, England, theU.S. and theNew
York Convention4).
It is expected that looking through the spectacles of what selected legal systems (and
their national courts) consider to be an “excess” of the elusive “mandate” and identifying
the common features of the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge in reviewed jurisdictions
may contribute to a better understanding of the concept of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate
itself. Accordingly, this research’s objective is to add a building block to a definition of the
tribunal’s mandate.
1.2 The role of legal theories on arbitration
Historically there have been some attempts to produce legal theory explaining the concept
of arbitration.5 The practical significance of these developments, however, has been rather
limited.6 A brief introduction of competing theoretical frameworks will be helpful in the
context of the “excess of mandate” debate, because the same characteristics of arbitration
are being balanced during the assessment when the tribunal exceeds its “mandate”.
Sanders observed that: “[o]n the one hand, arbitration must be based on an agreement
to arbitrate. This could lead to underlining the contractual nature of arbitration. On the
other hand, the jurisdictional nature could be stressed because arbitral proceedings lead to
an award, binding upon the parties and enforceable in the same way as a final court
judgement.”7 One may therefore easily deduct that those two features of arbitration stand
out clearly: the first one is a contractual basis for arbitration to go forward, and the second
one is the adjudicative function with which the tribunal is entrusted. These elements
provide, in turn, the basis for the two competing theories of arbitration: the contractual
and the jurisdictional theory. There is also a third theory, the mixed one that focuses on
the arbitration’s hybrid nature, namely it underlines that both aspects of arbitration are
important.8
3 The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985) (hereafter “UNCITRAL
Model Law” or “ML”).
4 The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) (hereafter “New
York Convention” or “NYC”).
5 See (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.214 and the literature therein.
6 (Sanders, Arbitration, 1996) p.5 (“Dealing with arbitration theories, in my opinion, therefore is a fascinating
exercise, but for the solution of practical problems, these theories are hardly of any assistance to a legislator”),
and (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.214 (“Although the practical implications of this
debate are often unclear there is little academic agreement on these various theories.”).
7 (Sanders, Arbitration, 1996) p.5.
8 For further reading, see (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.215-216.
4
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
As elegantly put byMotulsky: “[t]here is always, in arbitration, an intrusion/interference
of the contractual component in the judicial function, whichmakes its difficulty and appeal.”9
In evaluating whether the tribunal exceeded its mandate, the same two elements – the
contractual nature and the adjudicative function – are at stake. Since, as explained above,
no precise definition of mandate is available, the outstanding question is which of these
aspects of themandate is being tested for its excess or, in the alternative, what is the relation
of these two aspects whenever the mandate is being tested.
1.3 The discourse over “the excess of mandate” type of challenge
The legal discourse on the concept of “mandate” is rather limited and it usually refers to
the contractual paradigm of the mandate.10 When a reference is made to the “excess of
mandate”, authors usually do refer to the same grounds for recourse although they might
not have (exactly) the same meaning11 or the analysis focuses on one jurisdiction only.12
One should note that there are only three commonly known examples where the
legislator allowed for a challenge of an award on the basis of the “excess of mandate”,
namely France, the Netherlands and Sweden.13 In each system, it seems to be recognized
that this ground can be overly capacious. Recent studies of the French system14 confirmed,
however, that the French courts are in favor of a restrictive interpretation. Similarly, the
Dutch legislator in a newly introduced legislative reform qualified the use of this ground
upon the seriousness of a violation.15 Most recently, Swedish legislator followed this
approach, limiting the scope of the “excess of mandate” challenge to those instances that
affect the outcome of the case.16
9 (Motulsky, 2010) p.289 (“Il y a toujours, dans l’arbitrage, une immixtion, qui fait sa difficulté et son attrait,
de la composante contractuelle dans la fonction juridictionnelle.”). An alternative translation of the same
text would read as follows “in arbitration, there is always an intrusion of the contractual component in the
judicial function, which makes its [arbitration] difficulty and attractiveness.”
10 See, e.g., (Schöldstrom, 1998). As such it falls outside of the scope of this research. For further reading, see
also (Poudret & Besson, 2007) pp.367-376.
11 Thus, referring for example to Art. 1520(3) of the French Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter “FCCP”) and
Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC.
12 See (Giraud, 2017).
13 See Art. 1520(3) of the FCCP, Art. 1065(1)(c) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter “DCCP”),
Section 34(3) of the Swedish Arbitration Act (hereafter “SAA”). For the translations used see accordingly,
http://www.iaiparis.com/pdf/FRENCH_LAW_ON_INTERNATIONAL_ARBITRATION.pdf [last accessed
23April 2018], http://www.nai-nl.org/downloads/Text%20Dutch%20Code%20Civil%20Procedure.pdf [last
accessed 23 April 2018] https://sccinstitute.com/media/408924/the-swedish-arbitration-act_1march2019
_eng.pdf [last accessed 23 April 2019].
14 See (Giraud, 2017).
15 Art. 1065(4) of the DCCP.
16 See https://sccinstitute.com/media/408924/the-swedish-arbitration-act_1march2019_eng.pdf [last accessed
23April 2019]; also http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/10/17/time-to-upgrade-review-of-the-swedish-
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In other jurisdictions, one may observe twomodels that can be qualified as the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge. In the first model, most likely stemming from the English
arbitration system, the recourse against the arbitral award can bemadewhen a party alleges
that the tribunal “exceeded its powers”. This argument is available, for example, in England,
theU.S., but also in SouthAfrica amongst others.17 The secondmodel has been universally
introduced by the New York Convention and allows for a recourse when “the award deals
with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration […]”.18 In the similar shape, it has been offered in the Model Law and
implemented as a national legislation by a number of jurisdictions (even though the way
countries implement the Model Law does differ).19
It is necessary to reflect further if those three models do refer to the same concept or
in what instances they do differ.
1.4 The concept of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate and potential problems
in testing its excess
As suggested above, there is no legal definition of the “arbitral tribunal’s mandate”. Yet it
is a central element in the functioning of arbitration itself and essential to evaluate the
scope of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce
a working definition for the concept (section 1.5), followed by a brief reflection on the
relevant aspects of the mandate (section 1.6). Finally, one should stress the importance of
the exceptional character of the post-award review (section 1.7) and the place of the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge among other grounds for recourse (section 1.8).
1.5 Working definition of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate
For the purpose of the study at hand it is suggested that the arbitral tribunal’s mandate is
a relationship between arbitrators and parties where arbitrators accept to finally and
arbitration-act/ [last accessed 23 April 2018] and http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com.eur.
idm.oclc.org/2018/04/09/the-swedish-government-revives-efforts-to-modernise-the-arbitration-act/ [last
accessed 23 April 2018].
17 See Section 68(2)(b) of the English Arbitration Act (hereafter “EAA”), Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal
Arbitration Act (hereafter “FAA”), and Section 33(1)(b) of the South African Arbitration Act (hereafter
“SAAA”). The South African system is in the eve of a grand reform, aligning South African Arbitration
Law with the Model Law system. See http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=fc348a1b-
cd0a-41e0-8802-bd3fc886e76b [last accessed 23 April 2018].
18 See Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC.
19 See Chapter II.
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effectively resolve the dispute(s) between the parties. At the same time, they (arbitrators)
accept restrictions, rights and obligations imposed on them by the parties’ agreement to
arbitrate, the parties’ submissions and the mandatory provisions of applicable law. The
tribunal’s mandate entails what it can and cannot do within the limits imposed to fulfill
its adjudicatory function, thus resolving the dispute between the parties. Consequently,
the mandate gives autonomy to the tribunal in fulfilling its adjudicative function which
creates a layer of inherent powers necessary to complete its prescribed role.
1.6 Two dimensions of the mandate and their competing characteristics
There is no doubt that the adjudicative function of the tribunal remains a central concept
defining the mandate of the arbitral tribunal. At the same time, however, it is necessary to
recognize that the tribunal has an authority to adjudicate only because the parties themselves
commission it.
These two concepts become essential when the scope of the mandate is being assessed.
As highlighted above,20 both concepts address a different aspect of the tribunal’s mandate,
and both are vital in evaluating which of the tribunal’s undertakings can be found to be
beyond the tribunal’s mandate. At the same time, one should note that, potentially, they
may also compete. On the one hand, party autonomy is of paramount importance in
international arbitration. On the other hand, the tribunal should have its own autonomy
to properly fulfill its adjudicative function. Whenever two dimensions of the mandate
compete, it might be necessary to evaluate which notion should be given priority.
Consequently, it raises a problem for the tribunals that wish to ensure the enforceability
of their decisions.
1.7 The exceptional character of the post-award procedure
As suggested above, the setting-aside procedure is an extraordinary means of recourse
against the award.21 Therefore, it should never be equated with the review of the merits of
the case. Nevertheless, since the “excess of mandate” type of challenge inevitably relates
to the tribunal’s performance of its judicial function, the question is how far it can be used
by the parties displeased with the tribunal’s conclusions. As long as the mandate itself is
not defined, the “excess of mandate” type of challenge may serve as a capacious vehicle
for challenges of different types of tribunal’s decisions.
20 See section 1.2.
21 The exceptional character of the recourse equally applies to the enforcement procedure pursuant to the
New York Convention.
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1.8 The place of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge within other
grounds for review of the arbitral award
One should note that not only is the “excess of mandate” type of challenge potentially
broad, it is also problematic because it competes with other grounds for review. It may
happen, when the same factual circumstances give rise to different challenges at the
post-award stage. In principle, there are two layers of frictions: firstly, it might be
occasionally difficult to distinguish whether the tribunal exceeded its “mandate” or
“jurisdiction”; secondly, it might be equally troublesome in assessing what ground should
be raised in the case of the tribunal’s procedural wrongdoing. In other words, one should
reflect if the “excess of mandate” type of challenge or rather due process violation should
be a basis for an allegedly excessive tribunal’s undertaking. Further, it raises the question
regarding what the added value is for the (elusive) “excess of mandate” type of challenge
in the post-award review system if the potential violation of the tribunal’s authority can
be addressed under other grounds.
2 Research question(s) and objectives/problem statement
The previous section was devoted to highlighting in which areas the application of the
“excess of mandate” type of challenge gives rise to potential obstacles. It has led to the
formulation of the following central research question:
How is the tribunal’s “mandate” being reviewed under the selected systems and does
this test constitute an essential element of the post-award review architecture?
This question, in turn, triggers a number of subquestions:
1. What is the court standard of review when faced with an “excess of mandate” type of
challenge?What are the court’s remedies tomitigate the potential “excess ofmandate”?
2. What are the limits to the “tribunal’smandate” that can be exceeded, and do they differ
depending on the system?
3. What concepts are being used in the different systems to address the “excess ofmandate”
type of challenge?
4. How does the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge fit as an element of the post-award
review mechanism of selected legal systems?
and finally
5. What are the issues that might fall outside the scope of the tribunal’s mandate?
6. How does the principle of party autonomy and the tribunal’s autonomy compete in
the context of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge? What dimension of the
mandate is being challenged under the “excess of mandate” type of challenge?
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This research focuses on the concept of the tribunal’s “mandate” from the perspective of
the post-award review of its alleged violation. It is expected that the study will provide the
actors active in international arbitration (i.e. judges, arbitrators, parties) with a better
understanding ofwhatmight be considered as a tribunal’smandate andwhat its dimensions
are.
The objective of this research is to fill lacunae in international arbitration scholarship
and to contribute to the important debate regarding the tribunal’s “mandate” and its
autonomy, by analyzing in what instances challenge against its excess is allowed.
Additionally, the research addresses how the “excess of mandate” type of challenge may
potentially evolve should it remain available as a ground for recourse.
Importantly, the study is limited to the analysis of the “excess” of the “tribunal’s
mandate”. Therefore, it does not focus on the legal nature of the “mandate” itself. Instead,
it concentrates on the post-award review of its excess. At the same time, however, it is
distinguished from the issues of the “excess of the tribunal’s jurisdiction” and that of due
process, which fall outside of the scope of a detailed analysis.
3 Methods and methodology
3.1 Methods and legal sources
The research at hand constitutes a classical legal research. It means that it was conducted
with the use of the traditional legal research method. Consequently, the statutory text and
case law are of primary importance. Whenever possible the travaux préparatoires are also
consulted.22 Finally, scholarly writings and commentaries provide a useful insight in
understanding and conceptualizing the scope of the post-award review against the alleged
“excess of mandate”.
This study is of comparative character. Therefore, the analysis focuses on different
“excess of mandate” type challenges as introduced in three national legal regimes (i.e.
France, England, and the U.S.) and two international legal systems (i.e. the Model Law
and the New York Convention).
In principle, however, the analysis does not follow the classical comparative law divide
between common law and civil law systems, because it is not as useful as in other areas of
law. Instead, arguably, a line should be drawn between the Model Law jurisdictions (that
includes both civil and common law countries i.a. Canada, Germany, Poland, Singapore
etc.) and jurisdictions which do not follow theModel Law structure (i.a. France, England,
22 Namely in the case of England, the Model Law, and the New York Convention.
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the U.S., the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, etc.). One may observe that the states
which do not follow the Model Law scheme are the major arbitration centers with
established arbitration practice.23 The rationale for not following the Model Lawmight be
explained with the goal of preserving their competitive edge, providing for a unique set of
tools sought by the users of international arbitration. Selected representatives of these
countries (i.e. France, England and the U.S.) constitute a sample for the comparison at
hand.
The comparison has to bemade at two levels. At the first level, the comparison between
differentmechanisms to challenge the alleged excess needs to be carried out at the national
level. It means that, one should examine the Model Law, which, as explained, constitutes
the framework that national legislators (from both civil and common law countries) may
rely upon while drafting their arbitration acts. The Model Law approach, in turn, needs
to be contrasted with the rules applicable to the setting-aside procedure in France,24
England25 and the U.S.26 These four legal systems may be evaluated at the same level.27
The second level, which is the enforcement stage, requires an analysis of the application
of the New York Convention. Mostly, national courts, while interpreting the Convention,
do so in a uniform and consistent manner.28 In principle, they also resist the temptation
of transplanting the national concepts to the international level. It does not change the
fact, however, that the challenging parties often keep insisting on relying on those alluring
(national) notions. Therefore, the vertical comparison might also be relevant.
3.2 The functional comparison
Since the concepts introduced in the systems slightly differ, it is only reasonable to undertake
a functional comparison. As suggested elsewhere,29 the selected legal systems are each an
example of one of the three models of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
According to the first model, the award may be challenged if the “tribunal’s ruling
without complying with the mandate conferred upon it.”30 This model operates in France.
23 (De Ly, Paradigmatic Changes – Uniformity, Diversity, Due Process and Good Administration of Justice:
The Next Thirty Years, 2016) p.23 (“Notwithstanding the major breakthrough brought by the Model Law,
the picture remains one of divergence in the western world with major arbitration centres in London, Paris,
New York, Zurich or Geneva having arbitration laws based on different traditions, assumptions, approaches
and rules.”).
24 See Chapter III.
25 See Chapter IV.
26 See Chapter V.
27 A horizontal comparison.
28 See Chapter VI.
29 See section 1.3.
30 See Art. 1520(3) of the FCCP.
10
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
The second model is employed in the English and the U.S. arbitration regimes. In these
systems, in principle, the recourse is available when the tribunal “exceed[s] its powers”.31
The last model is introduced by the New York Convention and theModel Law.32 It allows
for the challenge of a tribunal deciding on “differences not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration” and on “matters beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration”.
All in all, the study aims at highlighting similarities and differences between these three
models for the review of the tribunal’smandate and assesseswhat dimension of themandate
proves to be relevant for the review.
4 The structure of the research
As explained above, the research is conducted on a comparative basis. Therefore, in Part
I of the research, each of the reviewed legal systems is analyzed independently. In turn, in
Part II, the comparative assessment and general conclusions will be offered.
Additionally, it should be noted that each substantive chapter has a similar structure
which is also two-fold. It means that the first sections of the chapter are dedicated to more
general (procedural) elements related to the challenge against the award at the post-award
stage (such as court standard of review of the award and remedies available to the parties),
whereas the subsequent sections aim to identify (i) the limits to the arbitral tribunal’s
mandate and (ii) how the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge applies to different decisions
taken by the tribunal throughout the arbitral process.
The latter part of the studies indicated above (i.e. application of the “excess ofmandate”
type of challenge to selected tribunal’s decisions) is essential for the study at hand, because
it has been dedicated to the application of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge to
selected issues that arguably may fall outside the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s powers.
The selection of the issues that may fall outside the scope of the tribunal’s mandate has
been divided thematically into four parts: the first is devoted to the arbitral tribunal’s
decisions on parties’ claims (including i.a. contractual claims, set-off claims and tort claims);
the second explains the process of application of law by the arbitral tribunal (starting from
the application of the relevant choice of law rules through decision on the applicable law
and finishing with ascertaining the content of the applicable law by the arbitral tribunal);
the third part focuses on the excess of the arbitral tribunal’s powerswhen awarding different
types of remedies (such as damages, punitive damages, specific performance, contract
31 See Section 68(2)(b) of the EAA and Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. The exact wording slightly differs. It will
be discussed in detail in the next chapters.
32 See Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) of the ML and Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC.
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adaptation and filling the gaps); the fourth and final part is contributed to the arbitral
tribunals’ decisions on interest and costs which are decisions accessory to the parties’main
submissions. Decisions on the procedure are also taken into account.
Chapters II and VI deal with the important international instruments, namely the
Model Law and the New York Convention. Both include a similar, rather descriptive
provision that requires a burdensome interpretation. It is therefore necessary to closely
examine it and explain its scope of application.
Chapters III, IV and V introduce national reports on (subsequently) France, England
andWales and theU.S.Notably, the French regime is the only system that in its setting-aside
mechanism makes a reference to the tribunal’s mandate. Yet, the English and the U.S.
references to the “excess of powers” also require further analysis.
Part II (Chapters VII to VIII) reflects the comparative assessment of all the reviewed
systems (Chapter VII) and general conclusions of the research (Chapter VIII). The
comparative chapter mirrors the structure of the chapters introduced in Part I (Chapters
II to VI), therefore it first deals with more general elements of the post-award challenge
and subsequently reflects on the application of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge
to the different tribunal’s decisions.
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II The UNCITRALModel Law on
International Commercial Arbitration
1 Introduction
Undoubtedly theUNCITRALModel Lawon International Commercial Arbitration (1985)
(“Model Law” or “ML”) is amilestone in the history of international arbitration.As observed
by Born: “[the Model Law] is the single most important legislative instrument in the field of
international commercial arbitration. It has been adopted in a substantial (and growing)
number of jurisdictions and served as a model for legislation and judicial decisions in many
others.”1 The question at hand is, however, whether (and if so how) the drafters of this
legal instrument defined the challenge for the alleged “excess of the tribunal’s mandate”.
Although theModel Law itself does refer to themandate of the arbitral tribunal, it does
so in a different context than with a reference to the post-award recourse. For the purpose
of the setting-aside provision, the system operates with the concept that can be broadly
summarized as a violation of the scope of the submission to arbitration. Consequently, in
this chapter the analysis will primarily focus on Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law.
According to this provision, the court may test whether an arbitral award deals with a
dispute not contemplated by or not fallingwithin the terms of the submission to arbitration,
or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. If, in
turn, the court finds that any of the objections above are justified, it may set aside the
arbitral award.
At the outset it is necessary to briefly outline the underlying principles of the courts’
review at the post-award stage. In principle, one should discuss the “pro-arbitration” stand
of the courts, the scope of their scrutiny regarding the award and the remedial tools they
have at their disposal when faced with challenge.
In turn, the limits to the “arbitral tribunal’smandate” will be explained. Put differently,
when faced with the “excess of mandate” type of challenge, the reviewing court will have
to look at three important elements structuring the tribunal’s authority to adjudicate:
(i) what is the scope of the parties’ consent to arbitration, (ii) whether the party or parties
requested the arbitral tribunal to decide a particular dispute or a matter, and finally
(iii) whether the applicable law allows a particular decision of the arbitral tribunal to be
made (thus whether the decision accords with the public policy rules of the country of the
seat). Those reflections will lead to the introduction of the “three keyholes test” which the
1 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.134.
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court should undertake when determining whether the arbitral tribunal “exceeded its
mandate” or not.
Furthermore, in order to explain theModel Law’s approach to the “excess of the arbitral
tribunal’s mandate”, it is important to closely analyze the language that is being used in
Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. It is so, because the text of the provision is rather
descriptive and repetitive. Pursuant to this article an award may be set aside when “the
award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration, or contains decisions onmatters beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration […].” Consequently, it raises some interpretative difficulties which should
be tackled. In particular, themeaning of “the submission to arbitration” and the difference
between “the terms of the submission to arbitration” and “the scope of the submission to
arbitration” need to be determined. For a better understanding, the travaux préparatoires
of the original Model Law from 1985 and its amended 2006 version will be studied.
Following the textual study, it is also necessary to reflect on the place of the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge within the framework of the post-award review system.
The final – and the most important – part of this chapter will focus on the application
of the “three keyholes test” to the particular situations. The analysis will be based on case
law and hypothetical cases which together shouldmake up for the comprehensive catalogue
of instances when the mandate can be potentially exceeded. The first type of tribunal
decisions that needs to be tested targets the parties’ claims. It other words, one should
consider if torts, counterclaims, cross-claims and the like will fall within the scope of the
arbitral tribunal’s mandate in the Model Law jurisdictions. Secondly, it is necessary to
examine if the process of application of law by an arbitral tribunal (including i.a.
determination of the applicable law and the application of mandatory rules of law) can be
reviewed under the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. Similar considerations relate
to the tribunal’s power to decide ex aequo et bono. Thirdly, the tribunal’s remedial power
will be analyzed. Final reflections relate to the tribunal’s decisions that are of an accessory
character to the main claims, namely decisions on interest, costs and even the procedural
decision of the arbitral tribunal. These should also be tested for their availability against
the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
In the Model Law structure the same type of ground is included not only as a basis for
setting aside (see Article 34(2)(a)(iii)) but also as a basis to refuse recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award (see Article 36(1)(a)(iii)). Both grounds differ only in
the timing when they can be invoked. Thus, the only difference is that Article 34(2)(a)(iii)
of the Model Law can be used as an offensive tool against the arbitral award (in the
setting-aside proceedings), whereas Article 36(1)(a)(iii) of the Model Law is a defensive
mechanism protecting the losing party at the enforcement stage of the arbitral award.
Arguably, however, the instances where these grounds can be successfully invoked remain
the same. For this reason, although the focus in this chapter is on the setting-aside
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mechanism, the sources (especially the case law) dealing with Article 36(1)(a)(iii) of the
Model Law will also be used.
2 Court standard of review at the post-award stage
The initial inquiry should commence with a brief analysis of the court’s approach to the
post-award challenge in the Model Law jurisdictions. Three aspects of the review need to
be highlighted: the “pro-arbitration” attitude of the courts (section 2.1), the deferential
standard of the judicial scrutiny (section 2.2) and the availability of the remedial tools
given to the courts (section 2.3).
2.1 The universal “pro-arbitration” approach
What can be considered as a hallmark of the Model Law is its pro-arbitration philosophy.
Essentially it means that national courts should endorse the parties’ choice to arbitrate
their disputes and refrain from intervening in the process. Additionally, they should
recognize the exceptional character of the setting-aside proceedings and the limited nature
of their control over the award.
According to the UNCITRAL analytical commentary on the draft text of the Model
Law, the Article 34 recourse is designed to be an exclusive means of recourse available
against the award, available only shortly after it is rendered and only for a limited
(exhaustive) number or reasons.2 This philosophy has been adhered to by the countries
adopting the Model Law. For example, in Germany, it has been recognized that Article
1059 of theGermanCode ofCivil Procedure (“GCCP”) “has a limiting function” eliminating
the possibility of the review on the merits and allowing the review on the closed list of
internationally recognized grounds instead.3 Similarly in Belgium, “the procedure for setting
aside is the exclusive recourse by which a party may challenge an arbitral award before a
State court.”4 Also in Singapore “[i]t is to be emphasized that the ability to challenge the
award is limited to jurisdictional, procedural and public policy issue[s] […]”.5
2 A/CN.9/264 pp.71-72.
3 See (Kröll & Kraft, Chapter VII: Recourse against the Award, § 1059 – Application for Setting Aside, 2015)
p.386. See also (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.335.
4 (Verbruggen, Commentary on Part VI of the Belgian Judicial Code, Chapter VII: Article 1717, 2016) p.461.
5 (Merkin & Hjalmarsson, Singapore Arbitration Legislation Annotated, 2009) p.116.
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National courts in the Model Law jurisdictions follow the pro-arbitration principle.
Consequently, they affirmed the exhaustive character of grounds for setting aside.6 The
same goes for the presumptive finality of the award,7 and the minimal and restrictive
character of the judicial intervention at the setting-aside stage.8
2.2 The scope of the court’s review
As already hinted above, the fundamental idea of the Model Law is to limit the scope of
intervention of the courts in the arbitration itself. It has, in turn, consequences for the
attitude the courts should exercise when faced with the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge. These consequences, explained in details below, are two-fold: (i) the courts are
not allowed to review the merits of the case and, arguably and (ii) they should only allow
the most grievous instances of the alleged “excess of mandate”.
The first aspect is rather clear.9 Already at the drafting stage of the Model Law, it has
been observed that “[t]here was very wide support for the view that an award rendered in
international commercial arbitration should not be subject to court review on its merits.”10
6 CRW Joint Operation v. PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] SGCA 33, [2011] 4 SLR 305 at
[25] (“The court’s power to set aside an arbitral award is limited to setting aside based on the grounds provided
under Art 34 of the Model Law and s 24 of the IAA.[…].”).
7 See, e.g., Bayview Irrigation District #11 v. United Mexican States, 2008 CanLII 22120 (ON SC), par. 63,
<http://canlii.ca/t/1wwtf#par63> [last accessed on 27 April 2018] (“While the decisions of international
arbitral tribunals are not immune from challenge, any challenge advanced is confronted with the “powerful
presumption” that the tribunal acted within its authority. An arbitral decision is not invalid because it wrongly
decided a point of fact or law. [Corporacion Transnacional, at p. 192]. The grounds cited by the Applicants
under Article 18 and Article 34(2)(a)(ii), 34(2)(a)(iii) and 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law must therefore be
construed narrowly and the Applicants must satisfy a high threshold to succeed in having the Award set
aside.”).
8 See, e.g., CRW Joint Operation v. PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] SGCA 33, [2011] 4 SLR
305 at [25] (“As declared by this court in Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v. Fairmount Development Pte Ltd
[2007] 3 SLR(R) 86 (“Soh Beng Tee”) at [59], the current legal framework prescribes that the courts should
not without good reason interfere in the arbitral process. This policy ofminimal curial intervention by respecting
finality in the arbitral process acknowledges the primacy which ought to be given to the dispute resolution
mechanism that the parties have expressly chosen.”). Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corporation, 1991
CanLII 5708 (BCCA), par. 32, <http://canlii.ca/t/231lq#par32>, [last accessed on 27April 2018] (“It is meet
therefore, as amatter of policy, to adopt a standardwhich seeks to preserve the autonomy of the forum selected
by the parties and tominimize judicial intervention when reviewing international commercial arbitral awards
in British Columbia. That is the standard to be followed in this case.”).
9 See, e.g., (Lew, Mistelis, & Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, 2003) pp.673-674
(“The grounds listed in Article 34 Model Law unequivocally suggest that judicial review in the context of an
application to challenge an award can only be based on natural justice and legality grounds. There can be no
review on the merits.”). See also (Roth, 2009) p.1116: (“The selection of the grounds in both sub-paragraphs
avoids court review ‘on themerits’”), (UNCITRAL2012Digest of Case Lawon theModel Lawon International
Commercial Arbitration, 2012) pp.140-141.
10 A/CN.9/216 paras 107-108.
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This vision of the system has been consequently adopted by the Model Law countries.11
For example, in Germany, “[t]he exhaustive character of s 1059 para 2 ZPO distinguishes
setting aside application from appeals as it in particular excludes the incorrect decision of
the dispute as a ground for setting aside (no révision au fond).”12 The same standard is also
recognized i.a. in Belgium13 and in Singapore.14 TheModel Law case law repeatedly confirms
that the courtsmay not reevaluate themerits of the dispute during the setting-aside stage.15
The second characteristic of the standard for the review requires perhaps a bit more
explanation. Although the leading guideline for the setting-aside court is the principle of
“no review on the merits”, “[t]he content of the award may […] be relevant in connection
with an alleged excess of authority [that is the “excess of mandate” type of challenge].”16 It
is so because the review of the “mandate” is closely intertwined with themerits of the case.
Consequently, it has been observed that “[w]hile it is uncontroversial that a reviewing court
must not re-examine the merits of an arbitral award when it determines whether a tribunal
has exceeded its powers, there is currently no uniform approach regarding the degree of
deference that courts are willing to accord to the arbitral tribunal’s interpretation of its
competence, as set out in the Parties’ submissions or the arbitration agreement.”17
There are two explanations for the difficulties with the scope of the review and, arguably,
both relate to the way theModel Law is adopted. The first reason relates to the very nature
11 Notably, Roth reported that “Tunisia empowers the court which sets aside the award to decide on the merits,
if necessary and upon the application of all parties.” See (Roth, 2009) p.1110.
12 (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.335, see also (Kröll & Kraft,
Chapter VII: Recourse against the Award, § 1059 – Application for Setting Aside, 2015) p.397.
13 (Verbruggen, Commentary on Part VI of the Belgian Judicial Code, Chapter VII: Article 1717, 2016) p.461
(“The court will not review the merits of the case but only examine the criticism made by claimant against
the award in light of the limited grounds for setting aside.”).
14 (Merkin &Hjalmarsson, Singapore Arbitration Legislation Annotated, 2009) p.116 (“It is to be emphasized
that the ability to challenge an award is limited to jurisdictional, procedural and public policy issues: there is
no basis for a challenge based on error of law, and there is a need to ensure that challenges are genuinely made
on the permitted grounds rather than amounting to disguised attempts to attack awards on their merits.”).
15 See, i.a., ABC Co. v. XYZ Ltd., High Court, Singapore, 8 May 2003], [2003] 3 SLR 546: (“The Court also
noted that an application under article 34 MAL is not a process designed for purposes of seeking review of a
pre-existing judicial decision by way of appeal […] A setting aside application is not a process whereby facts
which have been already established in the arbitration are being reassessed.”),Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon
Steel Corporation, 1991 CanLII 5708 (BC CA), par. 32, <http://canlii.ca/t/231lq#par32>, [last accessed
27 April 2018] (“It is meet therefore, as a matter of policy, to adopt a standard which seeks to preserve the
autonomy of the forum selected by the parties and to minimize judicial intervention when reviewing
international commercial arbitral awards in British Columbia. That is the standard to be followed in this
case.”); Nearctic Nickel Mines Inc. c. Canadian Royalties Inc., 2012 QCCA 385 (CanLII),
<http://canlii.ca/t/fqcwz>, [last accessed 27 April 2018]; see also (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on
the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012) p.134.
16 (Kröll & Kraft, Chapter VII: Recourse against the Award, § 1059 – Application for Setting Aside, 2015)
p.397.
17 (Pulkowski, 2010) p.127.
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of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. The second one is associated with the
(discretionary or not) power of the court to set aside the arbitral award.
As to the first reason, onemay observe, that in some jurisdictions the ground introduced
in Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law is perceived as a jurisdictional ground relating
directly to the scope of the parties’ consent. If this is the case, the courts may reasonably
expect that they are allowed to have a closer look at the tribunal’s findings, because the
allegations that the tribunal’s conclusions fall outside the scope of the underlying arbitration
consensus requires careful judicial control in order to safeguard legitimacy of the system.
The opposite view is that the “excess of mandate” type of challenge “simply” concerns the
assessment of the tribunal’s decision in the light of the parties’ submissions, but without
any objections to the existence or scope of the original consent to arbitrate (thus to the
original jurisdiction of the tribunal).18
The second reason relates to the opening sentence of Article 34(2) of the Model Law,
which reads that “an arbitral awardmay be set aside by the court […].” This wording raised
the question whether a setting-aside court is obliged (forced) to set aside the award
whenever satisfied that the challenge is justified or, rather, the court has a discretion to
save the award (notwithstanding the existence of some deficiencies in the award itself).
Unfortunately, there is no uniformity in the interpretation.
If one looks at the travaux préparatoires of the Model Law, one will observe that it was
taken under consideration by the working group to replace the permissive ‘may’ with the
peremptory “shall’ “for the sake of certainty and predictability.”19 In the end, however, the
“may be refused” wording has been reinstated.20 The rationale for keeping “may” can be
described as follows: it was designed as a sifting mechanism that would allow the court to
accept only serious and material challenges. Holtzman and Neuhaus explained that: “[a]s
noted by the Commission Report, a non-material error can give rise to grounds for setting
aside the award, but, as noted during the debates, a setting-aside court has discretion not to
set aside the award when such grounds are present.”21 Importantly, also other official
translations of UNCITRAL Model Law use permissive language.22
18 For further reading see also section 3.2 and section 5.
19 A/CN/233 para 140.
20 (Holtzmann &Neuhaus, 1989) p.1058, with reference to (A/CN.9/245) paras 139, 141: (“at its next meeting
the Working Group rejected this change, and reinstated the ‘may be refused’ wording. Its Report offers no
explanation, but it may be inferred that, in addition to the general desire to align article 36 with the New
York Convention, it was thought preferable to provide a general power of “flexibility”with respect to granting
or refusing recognition or enforcement.”).
21 (Holtzmann & Neuhaus, 1989) p.922. Similarly, (Roth, 2009) p.1102 (“[…], as indicated by the word ‘may’
in the opening sentence of para (2), the court has discretion not to set aside the award”). For further reading
see also A/CN.9/SR.318 para 65.
22 See, for example, the French translation: “La sentence arbitrale ne peut être annulée par le tribunal visé à
l’article 6 que si […]” or the Spanish translation “El laudo arbitral sólo podrá ser anulado por el tribunal
indicado en el artículo 6 cuando […]”. It is an important linguistic argument in favor of discretion considering
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That being said, one should note, however, that the understanding of the (allegedly)
discretionary power may differ among the Model Law jurisdictions. Arguably the
application is different in countries of civil and common law tradition.
For example, German commentators have observed that “[i]n the light of the general
approach of German procedural law to discretionary powers of the courts, the ‘may be set
aside’ in §1059 (2) ZPO has to be read as ‘shall be set aside’. Whenever a ground for setting
aside exists, courts have no discretionary power to refuse the setting aside of the award.”23
Kröll and Kraft argue, however, that “[i]n practice, the need for such discretionary powers
is limited due to the broad interpretation of the ‘effects on the award’ requirement and of
the grounds for preclusion. As a consequence, in most cases where courts in Model Law
countries have made use of their discretion to refuse the setting aside of the award, German
courts would already deny the existence of a ground for setting aside or find that a party is
precluded from relying on a certain ground.”24
Conversely, courts from common law countries (that have adopted the Model Law)
tend to accept the idea that they have discretionary power (and not the obligation) to set
aside the arbitration award. In one case, the Canadian court noted that: “[…] the seriousness
of the defect in the arbitral procedure should be considered when this Court is deciding
whether to exercise its discretion to either set aside an award under s. 34 or refuse to enforce
an award under s. 36. Like s. 36(1), s. 34(2) is permissive in nature because it states that an
arbitral award may be set aside if one of the conditions contained in clauses (a) or (b) is
met.”25 Equally, the New Zealand court observed that “[a] finding of a breach of the rules
of natural justice does not mean that the arbitral award must be set aside. As already noted,
the power of the court to set aside an award under art 34 is discretionary and will not be
exercised automatically in every case.”26
The aim of this section was to highlight differences that might potentially affect the
challenge against the “excess of mandate” type of challenge depending on how the Model
Law is adopted. As a general conclusion, one should argue that notwithstanding the details,
the courts do follow the same “pro-arbitration” philosophywhich encourages them to save
the analogous discussion that takes place in the context ofArt. V of theNewYorkConvention onRecognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention” or “NYC”). For further reading see
Chapter VI.
23 (Kröll & Kraft, Chapter VII: Recourse against the Award, § 1059 – Application for Setting Aside, 2015)
p.398.
24 (Kröll & Kraft, Chapter VII: Recourse against the Award, § 1059 – Application for Setting Aside, 2015)
p.398.
25 UnitedMexican States v.Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664 (CanLII), para 129, http://canlii.ca/t/4xfw#par129
[last accessed 27 April 2018].
26 Kyburn Investments Limited v. Beca Corporate Holdings Limited [2015] NZCA 290 para 41,
http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZCA/2015/290.html [last accessed 27 April 2018]. Brunswick Bowling &
Billiards Corporation v. Shanghai Zhonglu Industrial Co. Ltd. and Another [2009] HKCFI 94 at [29-39],
http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/cases/hkcfi/2009/94.html [last accessed 27 April 2018].
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the arbitral awards whenever possible; they do so either by accepting discretionary powers
to set aside the award or by heightening the standard for the challenge. The effect is, in
principle, the same. In any event, it is advocated that on the Model Law level (i) no review
of themerits should ever be allowed, (ii) the discretionary power of the courts was intended
and (iii) the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge should not be classified as a jurisdictional
objection.27
2.3 Remedies at the court’s disposal
When faced with a setting-aside challenge, courts have an array of tools that are tailored
to protect the arbitral award.28 As already observed above, the first mechanisms that
reinforce the finality of the award are the absence of the merits review and high onus for
bringing a successful challenge. Notably, however, theModel Lawprescribes two additional
tools, namely (i) partial enforcement and (ii) remission that allows the court to protect the
healthy part of the arbitral award while setting aside its defective section (if any).
Pursuant to the second part of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law: “if the decisions
on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that
part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be
set aside.”29 The proviso is quite clear.30 This mechanism should be considered as another
element of the pro-arbitration policy behind the Model Law. It safeguards the finality of
the arbitral awards, allowing the part of the decision that is within the scope of submission
to survive the challenge against the part that goes beyond the agreed scope. The possibility
to sever the arbitral award has been used by courts in Model Law jurisdictions.31
27 This will be explained further in this chapter. See section 3.2 and section 5.
28 Arguably, the award can be considered as a glare of the parties’ bargain to arbitrate their disputes.
29 The question whether the partial enforcement can be granted in the case of grounds other than Art
34(2)(a)(iii) of theModel Law, falls outside the scope of this study. Usually it is considered as a general rule
applicable to all setting-aside grounds. For further reading, see, e.g., (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law
on theModel Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012) p.141, (Born, International Commercial
Arbitration, 2014) pp.3180-3181, (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016)
p.333, (Kröll & Kraft, Chapter VII: Recourse against the Award, § 1059 – Application for Setting Aside,
2015) p.418.
30 (Kröll & Kraft, Chapter VII: Recourse against the Award, § 1059 – Application for Setting Aside, 2015)
p.463 (“[a]s explicitly stated, the court may only set aside that part of the award which is not covered by the
submission to arbitration or beyond the arbitral tribunal’s power”).
31 See United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/4xfw>, [last
accessed 27 April 2018], and as reported in (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration, 2012) p.154: Jaral Decoración, S.L v. Peñasco Rodilla, SL, Madrid
Court of Appeal, Spain, 2 February 2007, case No. 94/2007—7/2005; decision on enforcing part of the
arbitral award but on the basis of public policy, see also CLOUT case no 687 [J. J. Agro Industries (P) Ltd.
v. Texuna International Ltd., Supreme Court of Hong Kong, High Court, 12 August 1992], [1992] 2 HKLR
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The additional power to remit is available under Article 34(4) of theModel Law which
reads that “[t]he court, when asked to set aside an award, may, where appropriate and so
requested by a party, suspend the setting aside proceedings for a period of time determined
by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings
or to take such other action as in the arbitral tribunal’s opinion will eliminate the grounds
for setting aside.” It shows that, in limited circumstances (“where appropriate”) and upon
the request of a party, the court is permitted “to allow the arbitrators an opportunity to
take further steps or decisions, which might render the annulment application unnecessary
or inappropriate.”32 Importantly, not allModel Law jurisdictions have adopted the remission
provision.33 Some have adopted it in a slightly different form34 and others in verbatim.35
All in all, albeit not often used, it may be a useful tool to remedy the deficiencies of the
award.36
3 The concept of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate under the Model
Law
As it has been initially observed in the introduction, the Model Law does operate with the
concept of themandate, yet, it is used in a different context than the challenge of the award
itself. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly reflect on aspects of the “mandate” in the context
of the Model Law. Firstly, the temporal aspect of the tribunal’s adjudicative function will
be discussed (section 3.1). Secondly, what follows is the introduction of the concept of a
violation of the scope of the submission to arbitration (section 3.2).
402]. See also Oberlandesgericht Dresden, 3 Sch 3/12, 26 July 2012 as reported in (Kröll & Kraft, Chapter
VII: Recourse against the Award, § 1059 – Application for Setting Aside, 2015) p.407, fn.147.
32 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3153. See also AKN and another v. ALC and others
and other appeals [2015] SGCA 63.
33 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3153 with a reference to Art. 34 of the Russian
Arbitration Act, Art. 34 of the Ukrainian Arbitration Law, Art. 34(4) of the 2011 Costa Rican Arbitration
Law, 2011, Arts. 52-54 of the Egyptian Arbitration Law, Art. 78 of the Tunisian Arbitration Code.
34 See Art. 1059(4) of the GCCP. In principle, the remission would take place after setting-aside of the award.
35 See the Model Law as adopted in Singapore.
36 For further reading see, i.a., (Roth, 2009) pp.1108-1109, (Binder, 2010) p.385 and p.404. (UNCITRAL 2012
Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012) p.165, (Born,
International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3153-3154, (Kröll & Kraft, Chapter VII: Recourse against
the Award, § 1059 – Application for Setting Aside, 2015) pp.393-394, 418, (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder,
Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.352.
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3.1 Temporal aspect of the tribunal’s adjudicative function
If one looks at the text of theModel Law, onewill notice that the term “mandate” is repeated
seven times and, in all cases, it refers to the temporal characteristic of the tribunal’s
adjudicative function.37 Since the countries adopting the Model Law decided to use, in
principle, the same language, only the Model Law provisions will be discussed below.38
In Article 14(1) of the Model Law the reference to the mandate is used to express the
fact that the arbitrator’s (adjudicative) function is terminated the moment “he withdraws
from his office or if the parties agree on the termination.”39 In Articles 14(2) and 15 of the
Model Law it is used to explain the consequences that follow the termination of themandate.
Finally, pursuant to Article 32(3) “[t]he mandate of the arbitral tribunal terminates with
the termination of the arbitral proceedings, subject to the provisions of articles 33 and 34(4).”
This last Article deals, therefore, with the functus officio of the arbitral tribunal which is
“[…] the point when the arbitral tribunal has discharged its duty in full and can no longer
act.”40
Notably, Articles 14 and 15 of the Model Law make a reference to the mandate of an
arbitrator, whereas Article 32 of theModel Law deals with the mandate of a tribunal. One
may therefore wonder if there is any difference between the mandate of an arbitrator and
that of a tribunal. Arguably, however, this difference is of little significance for the research
at hand. What those Articles do have in common, however, is a reference to the point in
time when the tribunal is no longer able to decide on the dispute of the parties.
Similar conclusions may be drawn when looking at the official French version of the
Model Law. The term “mandat” is also used seven times and in the same circumstances
as in the English version. Interestingly, not only the reference to the tribunal’s mandate
has been made but also the one to the tribunal’s “mission” which has been placed instead
of the term “function” used in the English version.41
All in all, although the concept has been used in the Model Law, it is not employed as
a part of the ground for challenge. It is useful to the extent that it shows that the “mandate”
is related to the tribunal’s adjudicative function.
37 See Art. 14(1), Art. 14(2), Art. 15 and Art. 32(3) of the ML.
38 See, e.g., (the English translations of) theGerman Law (Art. 1038(1), Art. 1038(2), Art. 1039 andArt. 1056(3)
of the GCCP) or Belgian Law (Art. 1688 §1 and §3, Art. 1689 §1 and Art. 1714 §3 of the Belgian Judicial
Code (“BJC”)). See also Section 10(6)(b) of the Singaporean International ArbitrationAct (“SIAA”). Notably,
under Belgian Law, the notion of “mandate” is used along with the notion of “mission” (see Art. 1685 §7
and Art. 1713 §2 of the BJC).
39 Art. 14(1) of the ML.
40 (Fullelove, 2016) p.257.
41 Compare Art. 14(1) of the ML in the French version (“Lorsqu’un arbitre se trouve dans l’impossibilité de
droit ou de fait de remplir sa mission […]”) and the English version (“If an arbitrator becomes de jure or de
facto unable to perform his functions […]”). See also fn.38.
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3.2 Violation of the scope of the submission to arbitration
What can be concluded from the previous section is that the concept of the mandate is
used in theModel Law and that it does refer to the tribunal’s power to resolve the dispute.
Notably, however, at the post-award stage, a differentmechanism is introduced for testing
the tribunal’s decision. For the sake of convenience, it should be reiterated that the award
can be challenged if “[it] deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration […].”42
One may easily observe that no reference to the “mandate” or its potential “excess” is
made. Instead, the challenge is directed at what can be broadly described as a “violation
of the scope or terms of the submission to arbitration”.43 At the same time, however,
whenever the Article 34(2)(a)(iii) challenge is discussed reference is often made to the
“mandate”.
This was the case, for example, during the discussion on the early draft of Article
36(1)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. It read that the recognition and enforcement of the award
may be refused when “(c) [t]he award [deals with] [decides on] a dispute of matter [not
submitted to arbitration] [outside the scope of the arbitration agreement or not referred to
the arbitral tribunal].”44 In the explanatory note it was observed that: “[…] the second
alternative attempts to indicate […] that the question of the arbitrators’ exceeding their
authority has to be answered by using two standards: the arbitration agreement (in particular
an arbitration clause) and the often narrower mandate given to the arbitrators by way of
reference, submission of statement of claim.”45 Although the debate dealt with the ground
at the enforcement stage, it is, arguably, equally applicable to Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the
Model Law.46
Similarly, the UNCITRAL Digest reports that “the scope of [the] submission to
arbitration” is the same as “the scope of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal”.47
Consequently, these terms have been used interchangeably therein while discussing the
42 Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML.
43 Below it will be also categorized as an “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
44 See A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.42 p.92.
45 A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.42 p.92.
46 See the explanation above, section 1.
47 (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012)
p.151.
23
II The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
“excess of mandate” type of challenge.48 It is also frequently the case that the Article
34(2)(a)(iii) applicants describe their challenge as one against an “excess of mandate”.49
In conclusion, it seems that the general understanding of the tribunal’s “mandate” for
the purpose of the Article 34(2)(a)(iii) challenge is that of the parties’ submission to
arbitration. What it exactly entails will be discussed further in this chapter.50
4 Limits to the arbitral tribunal’s “mandate”
The power to resolve disputes between parties is exceptional and it is not given without
any constraints. Therefore, one should reflect on the traditionally defined limits to this
power, namely, the agreement to arbitrate (section 4.1), parties’ requests (section 4.2) and
public policy rules (section 4.3). Eventually, these three elements will constitute a useful
test applicable to the Article 34(2)(a)(iii) challenge (section 4.4).
4.1 Agreement to arbitrate
Any of the arbitral tribunal’s powers start with the parties’ consent. It means that a valid
agreement to arbitrate, which is a medium transmitting the parties’ consent, does shape
the scope of arbitral tribunals’ rights and obligations. At the same time, however, the
agreement to arbitrate itself is often broadly drafted and vague in defining the scope of the
tribunal’s adjudicative function. The reflections introduced below are two-fold. It means
that one should (i) highlight its relevance for the “excess of mandate” type of challenge
and (ii) identify the most important features of the agreement to arbitrate.
As has been observed in the previous section,51 theModel Law operates with the notion
of “the submission to arbitration” in the context of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) which is in stark
contrast with the explicit reference to the “arbitration agreement” underArticle 34(2)(a)(i).52
Yet, the importance of the agreement to arbitrate cannot pass unnoticed, since the parties’
consent to arbitrate is expressed through it. Consequently, one should conclude that the
agreement to arbitrate is important not only to establish the jurisdiction of the arbitration
tribunal, but also its “mandate” which is generally narrower53 but equally dependent on
48 See (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
2012) pp.151-154.
49 See, e.g., CRW Joint Operation v. PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] SGCA 33, [2011] 4 SLR
305 at [17], Blanalko Pty Ltd v. Lysaght Building Solutions Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 97 at [45].
50 See sections 4 and 5 of this chapter.
51 See section 3.2.
52 See also section 5.3.
53 Because it is limited to the dispute submitted to the tribunal by the parties.
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the underlying parties’ consent. The conclusion that the agreement to arbitrate is important
for the “excess of mandate” type of challenge can be supported by the French version of
the Model Law where the reference to both submission agreement and arbitration clause
is made.54
What is relevant for the research at hand is that both the arbitration clause (which is
the agreement to refer to arbitration future disputes) and the submission agreement (which
is the agreement between the parties to have an existing dispute resolved by the arbitral
tribunal) can be considered as an agreement to arbitrate. This is explicitly stated in Article
7 of the Model Law.55 Additionally, since the agreement to arbitrate is the contractual
framework of the parties’ consent, it needs to be drafted very carefully. It is particularly
true if parties intend to narrow the scope of the powers available to the tribunal. Finally,
one should also take into account that the choice of a certain set of institutional rules will
also impact the shape of the tribunal’s adjudicative powers.56
4.2 Parties’ (subsequent) submissions
Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Lawmakes a reference to the “scope” and the “terms” to
“submission to arbitration”. It gives a clear indication that it is not the agreement to arbitrate
alone that is relevant for this ground for challenge.57 Although a more detailed textual
analysis as to what “submission to arbitration” entails will be made in the next section,58
one should preliminarily conclude that the court when faced with the “excess of mandate”
type of challenge, apart from reviewing the agreement to arbitrate, should also take into
consideration the relief sought by the parties and other examples of the parties’
communications.
The parties’ subsequent submissions are of utmost importance because they might
explicitly or impliedly alter the original scope of the arbitral tribunal’s adjudicative function
prescribed initially in the agreement to arbitrate. In principle, isolated requests of the party
54 See the French version of Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML (“Que la sentence porte sur un différend non visé dans
le compromis ou n’entrant pas dans les prévisions de la clause compromissoire, ou qu’elle contient des décisions
qui dépassent les termes du compromis ou de la clause compromissoire, […].”). It does not change the fact,
however, that even the French version operates with a different terminology for the purpose of Art.
34(2)(a)(iii) and Art. 34(2)(a)(i) of the ML. Compare “le compromise” and “la clause compromissoire” (Art.
34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML) and “la convention d’arbitrage” (Art. 34(2)(a)(i) of the ML).
55 See Art. 7(1) of the ML (option I) and Art. 7 of the ML (option II).
56 Since the agreement to arbitrate is usually broad and addressedmostly to the parties themselves (as to what
disputes they may bring to arbitration), it does not provide sufficient explanation as to how the tribunal
should exercise its adjudicative function. Consequently, it is the institutional rules that serve as a guidance
as to what powers the parties consented to vest in arbitrators.
57 Compare with Art. 34(2)(a)(i) of the ML. See also section 4.1.
58 See section 5.2.
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in the arbitration (for example stated in a request for arbitration, memorial, or
counter-memorial) will usually define (and limit) the realm where the arbitral tribunal
maymake use of its adjudicative powers. Occasionally, however, a requestmay also expand
the adjudicative mandate beyond the parties’ initial consent expressed in the agreement
to arbitrate. It will all depend on the conduct of the other parties in arbitration. Their
silence to broadening the scope of the submission might constitute their acceptance.
The courts in the Model Law jurisdictions have confirmed, for example, that Article
34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law deals with the matters that have been actually submitted to
arbitration59 and that the scope of the submission is expressed in the request for arbitration.60
Similarly, the UNCITRAL Digest reports that “[s]everal courts have stated that, in
determining the “terms of the submission” to arbitration and “scope of the submission” in
paragraph (2)(a)(iii), the arbitration agreement and other relevant contractual provisions,
the notice of request for arbitration, and the pleadings exchanged between the parties are to
be taken into account.”61
Additionally, it is necessary to highlight the importance of Terms of Reference as a
characteristic feature of some institutional rules.62 By and large, the Terms of Reference
become a useful tool to delimit and define the scope of the dispute and consequently the
tribunal’s adjudicative function. In principle, all parties to arbitration shall participate in
drawing up the Terms of Reference, agree on their content and sign them. From the
perspective of the tribunal, the Terms of Reference give a clear indication as to the parties’
expectations in the process.
Finally, it is concluded that both the agreement to arbitrate and the parties’ subsequent
submissions are relevant to determine what the “submission to arbitration” entails in the
context of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. That being said, one should know,
however, that this ground is not adapted and is not applied the sameway in all of theModel
Law jurisdictions. It consequently means that the interpretation of “submission to
arbitration” may differ.63
59 CRW Joint Operation v. PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] SGCA 33, [2011] 4 SLR 305
at [31].
60 Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corporation, 1991 CanLII 5708 (BC CA), par. 33,
<http://canlii.ca/t/231lq#par33>, [last accessed 27 April 2018].
61 (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012)
p.151.
62 See, e.g., Art. 23 of the 2017 ICC Rules or Art. 22 of the 2013 CEPANI Rules.
63 For example, it has been suggested by Wolff in (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in
Germany, 2016) p.339 that Art. 1059(2)(1)(c) of the GCCP refers to the excess of the arbitration agreement.
Similarly, under the Polish arbitration regime, the reference is made only to the agreement to arbitrate.
Pursuant to Art. 1206(1)(3) of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure (“Polish CCP”) the award may be set
aside “if [it] deals with a dispute not contemplated by the agreement to arbitrate or goes beyond the scope of
the agreement to arbitrate […]” (“wyrok sądu polubownego dotyczy sporu nieobjętego zapisem na sąd
polubowny lub wykracza poza zakres takiego zapisu”).
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4.3 Mandatory rules of law of public policy character
According to Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law an award may be refused if the
setting-aside court finds that the award is in conflict with the public policy of the place of
the seat of the arbitral tribunal. These rules of public policy, albeit elusive, constitute the
most basic elements of any legal regime. As aptly explained byWolff, “public policy consists
of those rules that regulate crucial issues which affect the basis of public and economic life
due to specific political or economical visions or fundamental ideas of justice.”64
In the context of the research at hand, one should note that the public policy rules are
also an important element constraining the tribunal’s adjudicative function, because the
national court when reviewing an alleged excess of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate will
ultimately condition its analysis not only upon the parties’ consent but also upon the
conformity of the award with public policy rules. Importantly, it will do so on ex officio
basis.
Additionally, although it is mostly accepted that the public policy test should have a
narrow application,65 there is no uniformity in the way this provision is interpreted. There
are two aspects that need to be carefully reviewed when analyzing the public policy test in
the Model Law jurisdiction: first, whether a distinction is made between “national” and
“international” public policy (andwhich standard is applied in the setting-aside provision)
and, second, whether public policy includes both “procedural” and “substantive” public
policy.
The better view is to conclude that the Model Law in itself refers to the concept of
international public policy, because of the overarching pro-arbitration philosophy behind
the Model Law.66 As an illustration, however, one should point out that according to
German arbitration law, “[t]he public policy standard to be applied in s 1059 ZPO is that
of so-called national public policy.”67 Belgian law seems to be more nuanced. According to
commentators: “[w]hen Belgian law applies to the arbitration, the award may be annulled
for a violation of (Belgian) public policy. In the circumstances, however, where the arbitration
takes place in Belgium but the parties have opted to have their dispute governed by a foreign
law (i.e., not Belgian law), the reference to substantive Belgian public policy is not adequate.
It is generally considered that, in that case, annulment will only be justified if the award is
64 (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) pp.346-347.
65 (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012)
p.159.
66 See section 2.1.
67 (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.347, as opposed to the
international public policy standard at the enforcement stage. See also (Kröll &Kraft, Chapter VII: Recourse
against the Award, § 1059 – Application for Setting Aside, 2015) p.411 (“Awards can be set aside if their
enforcement would be contrary to German public policy”).
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contrary to the principles of substantive international public policy.”68 In Singapore, a court
held that “the concepts of public policy for setting aside a ‘domestic’ award under article 34
and for the enforcement of a foreign award are identical. The court saw no need to distinguish
between the two regimes as all awards falling within the ambit of the legislation on
international arbitration are considered to have an ‘international focus’.”69 Notably, however,
the Singaporean International Arbitration Act extends the catalogue of the ex officio
grounds. The court will be able to set aside the award if (i) the making of the award was
induced or affected by fraud or corruption or (ii) a breach of the rules of natural justice
occurred in connectionwith themaking of the award bywhich the rights of any party have
been prejudiced.70
The question whether public policy refers to procedural or substantive public policy
generally falls outside the scope of this research and again depends on how theModel Law
is adopted. In principle, both public policy grounds might be available for violations of
both types of public policy.71 As an example, violation of the procedural public policy
would usually entail non-compliance with the basic principles of procedural fairness,
whereas substantive public policy will be violated, e.g., when “[…] the compliance with the
award would constitute a criminal offence, violate price fixing provisions, […] or contravene
[…] antitrust law.”72
All in all, one should conclude that the rules of public policy are relevant in structuring
the arbitral tribunal’s adjudicativemandate and indirectly affect the review of the “mandate”
at the post-award stage.
4.4 The importance of the consent, the request and the law: the three
keyholes test
The previous three sections were intended to describe the essential limits to the tribunal’s
adjudicative function. In principle, the shape of the “mandate” depends on the parties,
save for the underlying values of each legal system.
Consequently, the three steps test has to be exercised in order to determine whether
the tribunal acted within its adjudicative authority: first and foremost the reviewing court
has to examine the agreement to arbitrate, i.e whether there was a consent of the parties
68 (Verbruggen, Commentary on Part VI of the Belgian Judicial Code, Chapter VII: Article 1717, 2016) p.480.
69 (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012)
p.160.
70 See Section 24(a) and Section 24(b) of the SIAA.
71 For general overview of approaches to the public policy challenge, see (Hwang & Lai, 2005).
72 (Kreindler,Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.348. See also (UNCITRAL 2012
Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012) pp.161-164.
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to arbitrate certain categories of disputes or matters;73 the next step is to establish whether
the parties’ requests, thus the parties’ (subsequent) submissions, allow one to assume that
an arbitral tribunal was truly asked to grant the relief sought.74 Finally, the court should
also take into account the impact of public policy rules which will inevitably affect both
the consent and the request of the parties in arbitration in the process of determining the
arbitral tribunal’s “mandate”.75
It is argued that in cases of the post-award review of the tribunal’s “mandate”, the award
should pass the three keyholes test.76 It means that the arbitral tribunal’s decision should
comply with the mandatory rules of law (of public policy character) and fit within the
scope of the agreement to arbitrate and the parties’ reliefs sought. It is important tomention,
however, that the level of deference employed by the court might depend on which step
(of the three keyholes test) the national court exercises.
5 The Model Law approach to the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge
The “excess ofmandate” type of challenge introduced in theModel Law is rather descriptive
in nature. For the sake of convenience it should be highlighted that, pursuant to Article
34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law, the award may be set aside if “[it] deals with a dispute not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted,
only that part of the award which contains decisions onmatters not submitted to arbitration
may be set aside.”
One should note that different authors refer to this provision in a way suggesting its
affiliation with an “excess of mandate” type of challenge (e.g. “the excess of authority”,77
“the excess of power”78 or even “excès de pouvoir”79). At the same time, however, it is
necessary to reflect if it is justified or else if by doing so they transpose the concept known
from other jurisdictions which does not necessarily fit with an intended scope of Article
34(2)(a)(iii). Consequently, it is necessary to conduct a textual analysis of the discussed
73 For further reading see section 4.1.
74 For further reading see section 4.2.
75 For further reading see section 4.3.
76 The notion of the “two keyholes test” was suggested by David Caron during the International Academy for
Arbitration Law in 2013 albeit in different context. Since it is evocative in nature it is also used in the context
of the research at hand.
77 See, e.g., (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3287-3309.
78 See, e.g., (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) pp.584-585.
79 See (Pulkowski, 2010) pp.119-134.
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provision (section 5.2) and explain its place in the system of the post-award review (section
5.3). Before going further into details, it is useful to highlight the main differences in
adopting theModel Law thatmight potentially influence the difficulty with the application
of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law (section 5.1).
5.1 Differences in the official language versions of the Model Law and the
implementation of the Model Law
Although there are many similarities between the systems that adopt the Model Law, one
should be careful in drawing general inferences from the way the system is applied in the
Model Law jurisdictions to the general Model Law level. This is particularly true for the
post-award review mechanism and the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. Therefore,
one should reflect on the different language versions of the Model Law and give examples
of the peculiarities of how the review mechanism has been adopted by the Model Law
jurisdictions. Some of the observations will also be introduced in the sections that follow,
yet it is reasonable to collect them and present them together in an orderly manner.
This study was based on three official language versions of the Model Law as available
on the official UNCITRAL website.80 For the sake of convenience, the relevant fragments
of the text of the provisions have been repeated below.
Table 1
The Spanish versionThe French versionThe English version
que el laudo se refiere a una
controversia no prevista en el
acuerdo de arbitraje
Que la sentence porte sur un
différend non visé dans le
compromis ou n’entrant pas
the award deals with a
dispute not contemplated by
or not falling within the
1.
dans les prévisions de la
clause compromissoire
terms of the submission to
arbitration
o contiene decisiones que
exceden los términos del
acuerdo de arbitraje
ou qu’elle contient des
décisions qui dépassent les
termes du compromis ou de
la clause compromissoire
or contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration
2.
One might observe that all three variations refer to two hypotheses in which the award is
susceptible to challenge.81 The differences are also noticeable, however. Whereas in the
most common English variation of the Model Law the reference is made to both “the
terms” and “the scope” of the “submission to arbitration” without further explanation on
80 The remaining three, the Arabic and the Chinese and the Russian, were not included due to the language
capacities of the author.
81 This division has also been presented and explained in section 5.2.2. For further reading, see that section.
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whether there is a difference between those terms, one will notice that the French text, in
both hypotheticals, refers explicitly to the submission agreement (“le compromis”) and to
the arbitration clause (“la clause compromissoire”) making it clear what the “submission
to arbitration” actually entails. The Spanish text in both instances refers to arbitration
agreement (“acuerdo de arbitraje”), notably in the same fashion as it is used in Article
34(2)(a)(i) of the (Spanish version) of the Model Law.82 Arguably, one might consider
these versions to support an argument that Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law would
be directed at the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction (and not at the “excess of mandate”
type of challenge).
Moreover, although the French and the Spanish texts do refer to the “terms” (Fr.
“termes” and Sp. “términos”) in the second hypothesis, they make no use of similar terms
in the first hypothesis. Put differently, the first hypothesis explains that the decision was
made on a dispute not included in the “arbitration agreement”, whereas the second
hypothesis allows for setting aside where the award contains a decision that goes beyond
the “terms” of the “arbitration agreement”. Arguably, it might be still difficult to distill the
difference between an “arbitration agreement” and the “terms” of an “arbitration
agreement”. Still, by not using the term “matters” (as in the English text “decisions on
matters”) and avoiding the distinction between “the terms” and “the scope”, the language
comes across simpler. Therefore the Model Law system may evolve differently when
adopted, depending on which language variation it is based on.
The underlying goal of the Model Law is to ensure the pro-arbitration philosophy
worldwide. This pursuit for harmonization and uniformity is to be praised. Yet, at the end
of the day, everything depends on the countries that adopt the Model Law. This is
particularly relevant in the case of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law, because this
remedy against the arbitral award is perceived differently in different jurisdictions.83
Careful analysis of each legal system will allow one to observe that sometimes Article
34(2)(a)(iii) of theModel Law is perceived only as the challenge of the scope of the tribunal’s
jurisdiction. It might depend, however, on the text used in the relevant arbitration statute,
which does not necessarily adopt the Model Law in verbatim. For example, according to
the Polish Code of Civil Procedure, the award may be set aside if “the award deals with a
dispute not contemplated by the agreement to arbitrate or it goes beyond the scope of this
agreement […]”.84 Therefore, the way the Model Law has been implemented in the Polish
82 The Spanish version of Art. 34(2)(a)(i) of the Model Law reads that: “que una de las partes en el acuerdo de
arbitraje a que se refiere el artículo 7 estaba afectada por alguna incapacidad, o que dicho acuerdo no es
válido en virtud de la ley a que las partes lo han sometido, o si nada se hubiera indicado a este respecto, en
virtud de la ley de este Estado”.
83 See examples in section 5.3.
84 See Art. 1206(1)(3) of the Polish CCP (“wyrok sądu polubownego dotyczy sporu nieobjętego zapisem na sąd
polubowny lub wykracza poza zakres takiego zapisu […]”).
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legal system, this ground for challenge refers only to the arbitration agreement, thus the
basic realm of the tribunal’s jurisdiction and not to the mandate. In Singapore, possibly
because of the influence of the English legal tradition, this ground is likely to also be
qualified as the jurisdictional one.85
Another issue that might be relevant for the analysis of the “excess of mandate” type
of challenge in theModel Law jurisdictions is whether they have included only the grounds
for recourse listed in the Model Law itself or, else, whether they adjusted the Model Law
to their national legal system. Two examples come to mind. One is Belgium, where the
Model Law has been recently implemented. Yet, it was decided that the concept of “excess
of powers” will remain a valid reason to challenge the award.86 It might give an additional
layer of difficulty in determining what ground for challenge is the most suitable for the
“excess of mandate” type of challenge. Similarly, in Singapore, the typical Model Law
post-award mechanism has been supplemented by recourse in cases where “the making
of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption” or when “a breach of natural
justice occurred”.87 Although these will be challenges on the level of public policy violations,
it might be necessary to remain cautious on how those concepts influence constraints on
the “tribunal’s mandate”.
Although there might be some discrepancies in the system, the Model Law’s “excess
of mandate” type of challenge is a suitable candidate for the comparison between the
French notion of the “tribunal’s failure to comply with its mandate” and generally the
Anglo-American model of the “excess of powers”.
5.2 Textual interpretation of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law
The working hypothesis is that the long and descriptive provision does not make the
application of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law easy. Because of the ambiguity of
some of the terms used, it is therefore necessary to discuss each expression separately. The
analysis will begin with the term “submission to arbitration” (section 5.2.1) and continue
with the closely related “terms of the submission to arbitration” and the “scope of the
submission to arbitration” (section 5.2.2). What follows are reflections on the meaning of
a “dispute” (section 5.2.3) and “matters” (section 5.2.4). Finally, the general conclusion
arising from the textual analysis will be presented (section 5.2.5).
85 In the English system, the question regarding “whatmatters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance
with the arbitration agreement” is identified in Section 30(1)(c) of the English Arbitration Act as one of the
questions of substantive jurisdiction. For further reading see Chapter IV.
86 See Art. 1717(3)(vi) of the BJC.
87 See Section 24(a) and Section 24(b) of the SIAA.
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One should observe that the provision has been designed to correspond to the same
provision of the New York Convention and to enhance the uniform application of the
UNCITRAL texts. Consequently, the linguistic analysis offered in the context of the New
York Convention might have persuasive value, also in the context of the Model Law.88
5.2.1 The importance of “the submission to arbitration”
If one considers that, in some cases, the term “submission to arbitration” is directly equated
with the mandate of the tribunal,89 one should conclude that determining the meaning of
“the submission to arbitration” constitutes the key to understanding what is covered by
the “excess of mandate” type of challenge under the Model Law regime.90
The general view is that “the submission to arbitration” is a broad term. Therefore, it
shouldnot be narrowly understood as a submission agreement i.e. the agreement to arbitrate
an already existing dispute.91 Similarly, it should not be limited only to the parties’
subsequent submissions with disregard of the agreement to arbitrate.92 Consequently, one
should conclude that both an agreement to arbitrate and the parties’ subsequent submissions
are relevant for testing the award against the Article 34(2)(a)(iii) matrix.93
Such a notion is supported by the draft provision of Article 36(1)(a)(iii) of the Model
Law [then Article 37(1)(c)] which reads that recognition and enforcement of the arbitral
award may be refused if: “[t]he award [deals with] [decides on] a dispute or matter [not
submitted to arbitration][outside the scope of the arbitration agreement or not referred to
the arbitral tribunal; […].”94 Although the provision did not survive in said shape, it shows
the intention of the drafters to invoke both the agreement to arbitrate and the parties’
references as a source reviewed under this post-award mechanism.95 According to the
explanatory note: “[w]hile the first alternative may be regarded as sufficient for all practical
purposes, the second alternative attempts to indicate more clearly that the question of the
arbitrators’ exceeding their authority has to be answered by using two standards: the
arbitration agreement (in particular arbitration clause) and the often narrower mandate
given to the arbitrators by way of reference, submission or statement of claim.”96
88 For further reading, see Chapter VI.
89 See (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
2012) p.151 (“The scope of [the] submission to arbitration, also referred to as the scope of the mandate of the
arbitral tribunal, is primarily determined by the parties.”).
90 For similar considerations at the enforcement stage, see Chapter VI.
91 For further reading see section 4.1 and section 4.2.
92 See fn.98.
93 For further reading see section 4.1 and section 4.2.
94 Second Draft A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.42 Art. 37(1)(c); the quotation follows the original wording (this also
applies to the square brackets).
95 The only reason why the provision did not survive in the said shape is because it was decided that it should
be harmonized with Art. V of the NYC; see A/CN.9/245 paras 139 and 141.
96 Second Draft A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.42 Article 37(1)(c), note 4.
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Equally, the UNCITRAL Digest reported that “[s]everal courts have stated that, in
determining the “terms of the submission” to arbitration and “scope of the submission” in
paragraph (2)(a)(iii), the arbitration agreement and other relevant contractual provisions,
the notice of request for arbitration, and the pleadings exchanged between the parties are to
be taken into account.”97
Also scholars seem to favor a broad interpretation of the submission to arbitration.
For example, Born argues that the “excess of mandate” type of challenge “[…] is directed
towards cases where a valid arbitration agreement existed, but the matters decided by the
tribunal either exceeded the scope of that agreement or the scope of the issues presented to
the tribunal by the parties in the arbitration.”98 Similarly, Kröll and Kraft when discussing
the Article of the German Code of Civil Procedure mirroring Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the
Model Law stated that “[a]n award may be set aside if the arbitral tribunal has exceeded
its authority, either because the dispute or parts of it were outside the scope of the arbitration
agreement or the arbitral tribunal has acted ultra petita, awarding more or something
different than the parties have requested.”99
Not all commentators agree, however. For example, Wolff argues that under German
law the ground corresponding to Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law is dedicated to
dealingwith the challenge of the scope of the arbitration clause and the provisionmirroring
Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of theModel Law or even Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of theModel Law can be
used for the setting aside of the ultra petita decisions.100 The better view, however, is to
accept ultra petita challenges also within the ambit of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model
Law. Arguably, had this ground referred to the agreement to arbitrate alone, it would have
so indicated in the same way as the reference to the agreement to arbitrate is made in
Article 34(2)(a)(i) of the Model Law.
Although it is concluded that both the agreement to arbitrate and the parties’ subsequent
submissions should be consulted in case of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge, one
should observe that certain interpretative difficulties arise because of the use of two different
references in the text of the analyzed provisions, namely (i) “the terms of submission to
arbitration” and (ii) “the scope of the submission to arbitration”. It requires therefore
further analysis which is presented in section 5.2.2 below. At the later stage, some reflections
need to also be added with respect to the terms “dispute” and “matters”.101
97 (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012)
p.151.
98 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3288.
99 (Kröll & Kraft, Chapter VII: Recourse against the Award, § 1059 – Application for Setting Aside, 2015)
pp.406-607.
100 (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) pp.339-340.
101 See section 5.2.3 and section 5.2.4.
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5.2.2 The difference between “the terms of the submission to arbitration” and
“the scope of the submission to arbitration”
As suggested above, the difficultywith interpreting the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge
under the Model Law system goes further than problems with interpreting what the
“submission to arbitration” entails. This is the case, because Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the
Model Law operates with two distinctive concepts, those of (i) “the terms of submission
to arbitration” and (ii) “the scope of the submission to arbitration”. Consequently, the use
of different wording (“the terms” and “the scope”) might suggest that there is a variation
between these two expressions.
If one were to accept that both terms constitute distinctive concepts, one would need
to recognize the following construction of Article 32(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law, where
the award can be set aside if:
Table 2
the terms of the submission
to arbitration
not contemplated by or not
falling within
[it] deals with a dispute1.
the scope of the submission
to arbitration
beyond[or] contains decisions on
matters
2.
It would entail two distinctive categories of challenges to be dealt with under the same
ground for recourse. Notably, it also ties the term “dispute” to the notion of “the terms of
the submission to arbitration” (see ad. 1 in Table 2) and the term “matters” (or even
“decisions on matters”) to the concept of “the scope of the submission to arbitration” (see
ad. 2 in Table 2). Such an interpretation is to be preferably avoided, because it might make
Article 34(2)(a)(iii) applicable to jurisdictional objections (ad. 1) and “mandate”-type
objections (ad. 2). These two categories of challenges, however, are distinct and might
result in a different scope of the court’s judicial control of the award.102
The preferred view, therefore, is to treat both terms (“the terms” and “the scope”) as
synonyms. This way it would be clear that Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of theModel Law is limited
to the “excess of mandate” type of challenges.103 If one looks, for example, at the former
version of Article 37(1)(c) of the Model Law, one would read that the arbitral award may
be refused if “[it] [deals with][decides on] a dispute or matter [not submitted to
arbitration][outside the scope of the arbitration agreement or not referred to the arbitral
tribunal]”.104 Arguably, it shows that both “dispute” and “matter” do refer to a single (broad)
102 See section 2.2.
103 This would leave the jurisdictional objectives to be fitted under Art. 34(2)(a)(i) of the ML.
104 SecondDraft A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.42Art. 37(1)(c); the quotation follows the original wording (it also applies
to the alternatives in square brackets).
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concept of the submission to arbitration. This argument would also be supported by the
French text of the Model Law, which in both counts (i.e. in the context of “dispute” and
“matter”) makes a reference to the same notion of a submission to arbitration.105
Notably, the UNCITRAL Digest also reports that “[s]everal court[s] have stated that,
in determining the “terms of the submission” to arbitration and “scope of the submission”
in paragraph (2)(a)(iii) [of Article 34 of the Model Law], the arbitration agreement and
other relevant contractual provisions, the notice of request for arbitration, and the pleadings
exchanged between the parties are to be taken into account.”106
To conclude, on the Model Law level, treating the “terms of the submission to
arbitration” and “the scope of the submission to arbitration” as synonyms will better serve
the consistent application of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law and the underlying
pro-arbitration philosophy behind of theModel Law.107 That being said, one should always
consult how the Model Law is adopted in the jurisdiction in question to determine the
suitable interpretation of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
5.2.3 The meaning of a “dispute”
Apart from some difficulties in establishing what the term “submission to arbitration”
entails, the two other notions “dispute” and “matters”108 also require a brief explanation.
As to the first concept, the general idea is that the “mandate” may be violated if the award
deals with a dispute that is not submitted to arbitrators, which means that it resolves a
disagreement between the parties that has neither been envisaged by the agreement to
arbitrate nor by the parties’ subsequent submissions.
Considering that the Model Law mirrors solutions introduced in the New York
Convention,109 one should observe that the use of the term “dispute” in Article 34(2)(a)(iii)
of the Model Law is one of the eminent deviations from the text of Article V(1)(c) of the
New York Convention (at least in the English version of the provision) which refers to
105 The French version of Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML reads: “Que la sentence porte sur un différend non visé
dans le compromis ou n’entrant pas dans les prévisions de la clause compromissoire, ou qu’elle contient des
décisions qui dépassent les termes du compromis ou de la clause compromissoire […].” One will, therefore,
notice that the reference is constantly made to both the submission agreement (“le compromis”) and the
arbitration clause (“la clause compromissoire”).
106 (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012)
p.151.
107 See section 2.1.
108 See section 5.2.4.
109 For further reading see Chapter VI.
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“difference”.110 Arguably, such amodification should be welcomed, because it offers more
coherence with the language used in the modern (model) arbitration clauses.111
Occasionally, the (rather jurisdictional) argument is raised that a “dispute” is needed
for the tribunal to exercise its adjudicative function.112 If such an argument is accepted, it
will have further consequences for the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.113 The better
view, however, is to follow Pryles and Weincymer’s argumentation that the dispute will
exist if “the claim has been made and has not been satisfied.”114 Additionally, one should
note that Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law operates with a reference not only to the
concept of a “dispute” but also “matters” which suggests that all issues (not only a “dispute”
in the narrow sense) brought to the tribunal within the limits of the “submission to
arbitration”115 deserve a tribunal’s decision.
5.2.4 The meaning of “matters”
The expression “matters” (or rather “decisions on matters”) referred to in the second part
of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law, which has been paired up with “the scope of
submission to arbitration”, complements the first part of the provision since it allows the
reviewing court to test not only an arbitral tribunal’s decisions on “disputes” but also on
“matters”.116
A decision on matters should be considered as a decision on issues that are not
necessarily disputed between the parties, but nonetheless have been brought before the
110 A modification can also be observed in the Spanish texts: in the Spanish text of the NYC the term “una
diferencia” is used, whereas the Spanish version of the ML operates with the term “una controversia”.
Notably, in the French version of the NYC and of the ML the same term is used (“un différend”).
111 See, for example, the ICCModel Clause, the LCIAModel Clause, theHKIACModel Clause, theUNICTRAL
Model Clause, the SIAC Model Clause). All of them use the term “disputes” instead of “differences”.
Interestingly, “dispute” for the purpose of the EnglishArbitrationAct (“EAA”) has been defined as including
“any difference”. See Section 82 of the EAA.
112 See as discussed e.g. in (Pryles & Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties,
2009) p.443 (“Even if the claims bear the necessary connection with the defined legal relationship and therefore
prima facie fall within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, it is sometimes contended that the claims cannot be
put forward because there is no “dispute” between the parties. For example if a claim is made for payment of
monies due under a contract and it is clear that the respondent has no defence and seeks to raise no defence
other than its impecuniosity, is there a “dispute” which can be referred to arbitration? In our opinion there is
a dispute because the claim has been made and has not been satisfied. In any event such esoteric arguments
can be avoided by drafting an arbitration clause to include a “claim” and a “difference” as well as a “dispute”.
Well drafted clauses allow for all disputes which could conceivably flow from the contract between the parties.
Nothing should turn on the distinction between terms such as “dispute” and “difference”.”).
113 For example, one may try to argue (invoking Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML) that “a dispute” is an essential
element of the “submission to arbitration”. Consequently, since there was no dispute, the tribunal is unable
to act (on a claim submitted by claimant).
114 (Pryles &Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.443.
115 No distinction is made between “the terms” and “the scope”. See section 5.2.1 and section 5.2.2.
116 The category of “matters”might be particularly useful, if one considers the concept of a “dispute” narrowly.
For further reading see fn.112 and section 5.2.3.
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arbitral tribunal for a determination.117 This might happen, for example, when the parties
concluded a long-term gas sales and purchase agreement which gives the parties right to
request the arbitral tribunal to review the price of the gas. Additionally, one might also
recognize instances when the parties envisage in the arbitration agreement that the arbitral
tribunal will have discretion to modify certain terms of the underlying contract. In these
cases, it is also plausible that without the existence of a “dispute” between the parties, an
arbitral tribunal will be asked to render a decision.
Notably, neither the French nor the Spanish versions of the Model Law make any
reference to “matters”. Instead, these texts operate only with the notion of the tribunal’s
“decision” going beyond the terms of the submission to arbitration.118 Arguably, such a
solution leaves less interpretative doubts than the English text, because one does need to
tie the term “dispute” with “terms of the submission to arbitration” and the term “(decision
on) matters” with the “scope of the submission to arbitration”.
All in all, arguably, not only “disputes” but also “matters” might be submitted to the
tribunal’s determination. Additionally, whenever the question arises whether “matters”
have been submitted to arbitration, one should consult both the agreement to arbitrate
and the parties’ subsequent submissions.119
5.2.5 Conclusion of the textual analysis
Following the analysis presented above, one should conclude that when the confines of
the submission to arbitration are tested by the court pursuant to Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of
theModel Law, the court should, firstly, disregard that two different expressions are being
used (i.e. “the terms of the submission to arbitration” and “the scope of the submission to
arbitration”) and consider that they have the samemeaning and, secondly, it should accept
that both decisions on disputed (i.e. “a dispute”) and “undisputed” (i.e. “matters”) issues
that fall outside the scope of the submission to arbitrationmight be successfully challenged
in light of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. All in all, the better view is not to accept
117 Distinction between the notion of a “dispute” and “matters” can be illustrated by reference to Art. 1020(1)
and Art. 1020(4) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. Whereas the former gives a general definition that
“[t]he parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes which have arisen or may arise between them out
of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not”, the latter explains that “Parties may also agree
to submit the followingmatters to arbitration […]”. Three distinctive items have been categorized as “matters”
in Art. 1020(4) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, namely: “(a) the determination only of the quality or
condition of goods; (b) the determination only of the quantum of damages or monetary debt; (c) the filling of
gaps, or modification of, the legal relationship between the parties [to an arbitration agreement]”.
118 See the relevant part of the French text of theML (“[…] qu’elle contient des décisions qui dépassent les termes
du compromis ou de la clause compromissoire […]”) or of the Spanish text (“[…] contiene decisiones que
exceden los términos del acuerdo de arbitraje […]”).
119 See also section 5.2.1 and section 5.2.2.
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jurisdictional challenges under “the excess of mandate” type of challenge to better ensure
the consistent application of this ground for challenge.
5.3 The interface between grounds for challenge prescribed by the Model
Law
The “excess of mandate” type of challenge is an element of the post-award review
mechanism. This means that it is closely intertwined with other grounds that could be
invoked by the parties in the process of challenging the arbitral award. Consequently, the
same factual underpinningmight trigger different grounds for recourse. Further, it is likely
that the parties intending to challenge the award will substantiate their objections on a
number of other competing grounds rather than raise them only on the basis of Article
34(2)(a)(iii) of theModel Law hoping that such an isolated claimwill suffice in the context
of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
The competition between challenges can be observed in two realms. In the first one,
which is closely related to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, parties might have difficulties on
deciding whether to invoke Article 34(2)(a)(i)120 or Article 34(2)(iii) of the Model Law. In
the second one, the friction exists between “excess of mandate” type of challenge and
“procedural” grounds for challenge (namely Article 34(2)(ii)121 and Article 34(2)(iv)122 of
the Model Law).
In the first dimension, it mayoccasionally be cumbersome to distinguish whether the
challenge stated in Article 34(2)(a)(i) of the Model Law (no valid arbitration agreement,
thus no jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal) or rather the challenge of Article 34(2)(a)(iii)
of the Model Law (i.e. going beyond the submission to arbitration, hence “exceeding the
mandate” of the arbitral tribunal) is an appropriate ground to invoke against the arbitral
tribunal’s actions. As an example, both grounds were raised when this challenge was
brought based on the argument that the award had been made against a non-signatory.
In these circumstances, as reported in one of the CLOUT cases, theGerman court accepted
120 Art. 34(2)(a)(i) of the ML states that the award may be set aside if the party furnishes proof that “a party
to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not
valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of
this State […]”.
121 Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) of the ML states that the award may be set aside if the party furnishes proof that “the party
making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case”.
122 Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) of the ML states that the award may be set aside if the party furnishes proof that “the
composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of
the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Law from which the parties cannot
derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Law”.
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the challenge of the tribunal’s jurisdiction based onArticle 34(2)(a)(i) of theModel Law.123
Conversely, in another reported case, the Canadian court seemed to agree that the award
affecting a third party goes beyond the scope of submission to arbitration.124 The better
view, however, is to apply Article 34(2)(a)(i) of the Model Law when the mere fact that
there was an arbitration agreement is being questioned, while Article 34(2)(a)(iii) should
serve strictly as a challenge against the tribunal’s decisions on the issues that go beyond
the issues that have been submitted. Separating these two issues is important to limit the
scope of the courts’ review under the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.125
The second realm is where the potential friction may exist between the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge and violation of due process challenge(s). For example, in
instances where the tribunal decides ex aequo et bono without explicit authorization, it
has been successfully argued that the tribunal “exceeded themandate” (Article 34(2)(a)(iii)
of theModel Law)126 or that the procedurewas not in accordancewith the parties’ agreement
(Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law).127 Additionally, it is not clear how to qualify a
tribunal’s decision on the merits that “surprises” parties with regard to the choice of
applicable law, choice of legal theories and the like. On the one hand, onemight argue that
the tribunal’s decision which relies on its independent research and does not follow the
parties’ views (thus their submissions), goes beyond what was expected from the tribunal.
On the other hand, surprise decisions can better be treated as a due process violation (e.g.
inability to present one’s case)128 or a violation of public policy.129
The general reflection is that parties need to be cautious with the application of the
“excess of mandate” type of challenge in the Model Law framework. It will always depend
on the way the Model Law has been adopted under national law. All in all, the same
123 See CLOUT caseNo. 562 [Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, Germany, 6 Sch 04/01, 8 November
2001].
124 CLOUT case No. 12 [D. Frampton & Co. Ltd. v. SylvioThibeault and Navigation Harvey & Frères Inc.,
Federal Court, Trial Division, Canada, 7 April 1988]. The argument was brought also in Singapore, albeit
at the enforcement stage, see Aloe Vera of America, Inc v. Asianic Food (S) Pte Ltd and Another [2006] 3
SLR 174; [2006] SGHC 78 at [64-69].
125 See section 2.2.
126 Cairo Court of Appeal, Egypt, 8 January 2002, case No. 72/117 as reported in (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of
Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012) p.153.
127 OberlandesgerichtMünchen,Germany, 34 Sch 10/05, 22 June 2005 as reported in (UNCITRAL2012Digest
of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012) p.157. See also (Kreindler,
Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.345.
128 See (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.341. See also Louis Dreyfus,
s.a.s. (SA Louis Dreyfus & Cie) c. Holding Tusculum, b.v., 2008 QCCS 5903 (CanLII),
<http://canlii.ca/t/21v03>, [last accessed 27 April 2018].
129 See, for example, Regional Court inKatowice judgment of 23November 2010, XIIIGC183/10 (not published)
as referred to in (Dziurda & Zielińska, 2015) p.327. For further reading see (Dziurda & Zielińska, 2015)
pp.315-329. See also Louis Dreyfus, s.a.s. (SA Louis Dreyfus & Cie) c. Holding Tusculum, b.v., 2008 QCCS
5903 (CanLII), http://canlii.ca/t/21v03 [last accessed 27 April 2018].
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tribunal’s wrongdoing might trigger different grounds for challenge and the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge might not be immediately available notwithstanding its
potentially broad application.
6 Application of the three keyholes test to selected issues that
might fall outside the arbitral tribunal’s “mandate”
In order to determine whether the three keyholes test serves its purpose, it should be
evaluated by applying it to different arbitral tribunal decisions. The division suggested in
this section aims to arrange in certain categories all issues (or at least themajority of them)
that may be decided by the arbitral tribunal during arbitration. The first group relates to
the general concept of the parties’ claims brought before the arbitral tribunal in their
submissions to arbitration and the tribunal’s powers over them (section 6.1). The common
feature of the second group of decisions is that they deal with the process of application
of law (section 6.2). The third group focuses on reliefs thatmight be granted by the arbitral
tribunal (section 6.3). Finally, the last group comprises decisions of an accessory character
to the award, such as decisions on interest or cost (section 6.4). The categories may
intertwine with each other.
6.1 Decisions on parties’ claims
The overarching feature of the subsections presented below is the nature of the claims
(thus whether they are contractual or not) and who brought it (whether is it submitted by
claimant or respondent). Therefore, the following section will focus on, i.a., the tribunal’s
decisions on parties’ contractual claims (sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2) and claims based on torts
(section 6.1.4). In addition, set-offs (section 6.1.3), potentialmodifications of claims during
the process (section 6.1.5) and decisions not covering all claims (section 6.1.6) will be
discussed.
6.1.1 Decision on contractual claims
Under this section, the focus will be directed only on contractual claims brought by the
claimant. According to the simplified meaning of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law,
the reviewing court should determine if the relief granted in the arbitration award was
higher or somewhat different from the relief sought in the parties’ submissions.130 In other
130 See, for example the wording of theMiami Draft which reads in Art. 5(3)(c) that the award shall be refused
recognition if “the relief granted in the award is more than, or different from, the relief sought in the
arbitration”. See also Chapter VI.
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words, in the core of said provisions lies the questionwhether the arbitral tribunal’s decision
on contractual claims mirrors what the arbitral tribunal has been requested to award.
The first step in the Article 34(2)(a)(iii) test is to review if the tribunal’s decision fits
well within the limits imposed by the agreement to arbitrate.131 In general, the (model)
agreements to arbitrate are drafted in broad fashion which would entail that most, if not
all, potential disputes that may arise between the parties are covered. The contractual
claims are certainly suitable to be resolved by the arbitral tribunal. In fact, resolving
contractual claims ismost likely an underlying reason for the parties to draft an agreement
to arbitrate. That is why, arguably, even if the agreement is narrower than usual, the decision
on contractual claims will have a high chance of surviving the post-award challenge.
Following the “one-stop arbitration” model132 parties will be presumed, for the reasons of
procedural efficiency and cost economy, to prefer the systemwhere all disputes are resolved
during a single proceedings rather than employing separate settlement mechanisms to
different categories of disputes.133 In turn, should the parties intend to constraint the
tribunal’s adjudicative powers they should do so in their agreement expressly.
In turn, one should review the claimant’s subsequent submissions initiating arbitration
(i.e. the request for arbitration, the statement of claim and eventually Terms of Reference)
as a source for a tribunal’smandate.134 The arbitral tribunal’s decision on contractual claims
(which are within the scope of the initial agreement to arbitrate) may be susceptible to the
“excess of mandate” type of challenge, if the decision grants a request beyond the one
sought by claimant. Importantly, the tribunal’s alleged mistakes in the interpretation of
claims might survive the challenge, because of the exclusive power given to the tribunal
to adjudicate the dispute. Therefore, for example, if the claim is vague and yet granted, it
should be enforced if no arguments against the scope of said claim were raised (by the
respondent) in the arbitration. Respondent’s reaction is also relevant if claimant seeks a
relief that goes beyond the original agreement to arbitrate. If respondent fails to contest
this relief during arbitration proceedings, it may be considered to impliedly agree to an
extension of the original agreement to arbitrate.
131 For further reading, see section 4.1.
132 The term is persuasively used in Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation & Ors v. Privalov & Ors. [2007] 1
C.L.C. 144 at [19] (“One of the reasons given in the cases for a liberal construction of an arbitration clause is
the presumption in favour of one-stop arbitration. It is not to be expected that any commercial man would
knowingly create a system which required that the court should first decide whether the contract should be
rectified or avoided or rescinded (as the case might be) and then, if the contract is held to be valid, required
the arbitrator to resolve the issues that have arisen. This is indeed a powerful reason for a liberal construction.”).
Although this is an English case the argument is equally valid in the Model Law context.
133 See, e.g., (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.66.
134 For further reading, see section 4.2.
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Lastly, it is important to determine if the claims can be brought in the arbitral
proceedings at all, i.e. whether they are arbitrable.135 Consequently, it means that any
decision granting claims that are not arbitrable will exceed the general notion of the arbitral
tribunal’s mandate by violating public policy.136
6.1.2 Decision on contractual counterclaims
By and large, a counterclaim is defined as a claim, “procedural lawmechanism or demand”137
brought by respondent which is independent from the claimant’s initial claim.
Consequently, it means that as a stand-alone claim it will survive withdrawal or any aspects
of invalidity of the primary claim.138
Similarly to the issue of (claimant’s) claims, the first question regarding counterclaims
relates to the parties’ consent. Generally, little controversy arises when the contractual
counterclaim is based on the same contract as the initial claim. Themere fact that the claim
is brought by respondent in response to the primary claim of claimant does not affect that
it shall be assessed as an independent relief sought by respondent. Thus, counterclaims
should fit within the scope of the “all claims” formula. In addition, some additional guidance
might be provided in the applicable arbitration rules and for this reason they should be
always consulted.139
Themore difficult issue, however, is to decide on counterclaims that are based on other
contracts than the one relevant for the claimant’s initial claim. As mentioned by Pryles
and Waincymer: “because a counterclaim remains alive even if the primary claim is
135 For further reading, see section 4.3.
136 As an illustrationDespetaux v. Éditions Chouette (1987) Inc.,QuebecCourt of Appeal, 18April 2001, [2001]
J.Q. No. 1510; JEL/2001-203 can be mentioned. As reported by (Alvarez, Kaplan, & Rivkin, 2003) p.211:
“The court held that by deciding on the legal status of D and H with respect to the Caillou character, a work
protected by the Copyright Act, the arbitrator had acted beyond his jurisdiction because, pursuant to article
2639 of the Quebec Civil Code and 946.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, questions regarding the status and
capacity of persons and other questions of public order could not be submitted to arbitration”; It is necessary
to stress that this decision has been reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada in its ruling; Desputeaux v.
Éditions Chouette (1987) inc., [2003] 1 SCR 178, 2003 SCC 17 (CanLII), <http://canlii.ca/t/1g2jh>, [last
accessed 27 April 2018].
137 See (Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates, 2013)
p.175.
138 (Pryles &Waincymer,Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.448. Additionally,
it may so occur that the arbitral tribunal will grant counterclaims and dismiss claimant’s claims. see, e.g.,
ABC Co. v. XYZ Ltd., High Court, Singapore, 8 May 2003], [2003] 3 SLR 546.
139 See Art. 19(3) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, with the strict requirement for counterclaims and claims for
the purpose of a set-off to be based on the same contract as the initial claims. Notably, this requirement has
been relaxed in Art. 21(3) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules (in the relevant part), which reads that “[…] the
respondent may make a counterclaim or rely on a claim for the purpose of a set-off provided that the arbitral
tribunal has jurisdiction over it.” The modified provision, therefore, does not set the requirement for the
claims to arise out of the same contract. See also, e.g., Art. 5(5) of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art. 5(5) of the 2012
ICC Rules.
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withdrawn or invalid, it must be based on its own independent evidence of consent. As
always, such consent should be found to emanate from the arbitration agreement itself, either
directly or through a lex arbitri that expressly allows for counterclaims. Even then the
counterclaim should be linked to the original arbitration agreement.”140 If, however, the
original arbitration agreement is sufficiently broad and allows the resolution of disputes,
e.g., in connection with the main contract, the counterclaims arising out of a closely
connected contract may still survive the post-award challenge. That being said, it is
concluded that this is amatter of the tribunal’s jurisdiction rather than of the “mandate”.141
Additionally, the parties must be reminded to raise the objections to the arbitral tribunal’s
jurisdiction on counterclaims in a timely manner to avoid instances where the tribunal
finds that there was an implied agreement of the parties on accepting counterclaims.142
Similarly to the previous section, in the process of review of the arbitral tribunal’s
decision, submissions of the parties domatter.143 It means that an arbitral tribunal needs
to address the relief sought by respondent. Consequently, under no circumstances may it
decide to grant a relief not requested. If the relief granted goes beyond the relief sought,
the award might be successfully exposed to the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
Again, one should note that the decision on counterclaims will be controlled for its
compliance with the public policy of the seat144 similarly to the decision on claimant’s
claims.145 Therefore, the award may be set aside if the counterclaim granted was not
arbitrable or violated substantive public policy rules of the seat (e.g. violated certain
provisions of competition law).
6.1.3 Decision on set-off
The issue of set-off in international commercial arbitration has attracted a notable amount
of attention over the years.146 Yet, it will continue to be a topic of a heated debate. The
140 (Pryles &Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.448.
141 See section 5.3.
142 See, e.g., Art. 21(3) of the 1976UNCITRALRules (“Aplea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction
shall be raised […] with respect to a counterclaim, in the reply to the counterclaim”), Art. 23(2) of the 2010
UNCITRAL Rules (“A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised […], with
respect to a counterclaim or a claim for the purpose of a set-off, in the reply to the counterclaim or to the claim
for the purpose of a set-off.”).
143 It goes without saying that it applies to both claimant’s and respondent’s submissions. As explained earlier
in this section, claimant’s submissions (namely its objections) would be relevant when the counterclaims
submitted exceed the scope of the initial agreement to arbitrate.
144 See section 4.3.
145 See section 6.1.1.
146 For the major studies see, in particular, (Fountoulakis, 2011) and (Pichonnaz &Gullifer, 2014). For articles
see also, i.a., (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999), (Karrer, Jurisdiction on set-off
defences and counterclaims, 2001), (Pavić, 2006), (Schöll, 2006), (Poudret & Besson, 2007) pp.274-280,
(Mourre, The Set-off Paradox in International Arbitration, 2008), (Fortún, 2010), (Carbonneau, The Rise
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initial problemwith set-offs arise when determining its legal character. Put differently, the
question is whether a set-off is a substantive mechanism of extinguishing claims or rather
a procedural tool.147
For the research at hand, set-off will be considered as a substantive law mechanism.148
As such, set-off is a defensive tool against the initial claim,149 which will share the fate of
the initial claim should the latter be withdrawn, found inadmissible or without merit.150
In addition, set-off, being closely linked to the initial claim, may not exceed the amount
of the initial claim.151 Finally, set-off, in principle, can be made only against monetary
claims.152
That being said, one should reflect if the decision on set-offs satisfies the requirements
of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. Three scenarios can be distinguished: (i) the
set-off is governed by the same agreement to arbitrate, (ii) in a multi-contract reality, the
set-off arises out of a different contract (falling outside the scope of the underlying
agreement to arbitrate), and finally (iii) the tribunal grants the set-off ex officio. All of these
scenarios assume that set-offs are properly objected to (by the opposing party).
in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates, 2013), and (Scherer, Chapter III: The
Award and the Courts, Set-Off in International Arbitration, 2015).
147 This might, in turn, trigger difficult applicable law questions and the scope of the post-award review. For
example, if the tribunal grants set-off as a substantive law mechanism based on its interpretation of the
applicable law (of country B), to what extent may its conclusion be reviewed by the reviewing court at the
seat (which is in country A) following the post-award challenge. See also another illustration offered by
Pryles andWaincymer in (Pryles &Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties,
2009) p.441: “[C]omplexities may arise if a set-off emanates from a different arbitration agreement which in
turn could call for a different applicable law. Even where the set-off emanates from the same agreement, if
the conflict of approach adopted is to look for the lawmost closely connected to the individual claim, that may
differ between claims and various forms of counterclaims. Some legal systems draw a distinction between
counterclaim and set-off and link substantive law of the set-off to the law of the primary claim on the basis
that the law of a defence should follow the law of the claim.”.
148 This limitation is also related to the fact that there no uniform answer could be given that applies to all
jurisdictions that apply the Model Law.
149 Be it as either the initial claim of claimant or the counterclaim of respondent. Carducci in (Carbonneau,
The Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates, 2013) p.176 argues, however,
that “[i]t seems that there is no reason to exclude from set-off the case where a respondent invokes the existence
of two mutual debts or obligations of the same kind between respondent and claimant even if the claimant’s
primary claim did not allege the existence of such respondent’s debt and rather sought a different remedy, for
instance specific performance, delivery of goods or other.”.
150 Counterclaims, on the other hand,may survive any deficiencies of the primary claims as they are considered
as independent claims. See section 6.1.2.
151 (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999) p.61.
152 Carducci in (Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates,
2013) p.175 suggests that “[s]et-off is obviously important and commonly used between mutual debtors of a
monetary obligation or of another obligation, for instance to deliver identical or equivalent goods, allowing
set-off to operate.”.
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The first scenario is rather clear-cut. If the set-off has been brought in a timely manner
and is covered by the same agreement to arbitration153 as the primary claim,154 there should
be no doubts that an arbitral tribunal can decide on the set-off defense without risking its
award being set aside under the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.155 In principle, it
might also cover multi-contract disputes where there is no controversy that the tribunal
has jurisdiction to hear claims arising out of different contracts.
The second hypothetical presupposes that the claim for the purpose of set-off arises
out of the contract that is not covered by the underlying agreement to arbitrate.
Consequently, the set-off cannot even be entertained by the broadwording of the agreement
to arbitrate.156 It triggers, yet again, the question of parties’ consent.157 On the one hand,
if the claim for the purpose of set-off goes beyond the initial scope of the agreement to
arbitrate, onemay question the tribunal’s jurisdiction over it.158 On the other hand, however,
the contractual bargain to arbitrate is to resolve the disputes that arise out of the parties’
legal relationship. It should, in turn, include also all available defenses.159 Otherwise, the
respondent might have inadequate opportunity to fully present its case. This, in turn, may
jeopardize the fate of the award,making it vulnerable to the due process violation claims.160
The better view is to allow the tribunal to decide on the admissibility of (substantive
law) set-offs without risking the award being set aside at the post-award stage under the
153 Similarly to counterclaims, one should always consult how the issue of set-offs is dealt with in applicable
institutional rules. See, e.g., Art. 19(3) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules (“the respondent may make a
counter-claim arising out of the same contract or rely on a claim arising out of the same contract for the
purpose of a set-off.”). Compare with Art. 21(3) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules (“[…] the respondent may
make a counterclaim or rely on a claim for the purpose of a set-off provided that the arbitral tribunal has
jurisdiction over it.”). Although not immediately relevant in theModel Law context, see, however, the broad
formulation of Art. 21(5) of the Swiss Rules (“The arbitral tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear a set-off
defence even if the relationship out of which the defence is said to arise is not within the scope of the arbitration
clause, or falls within the scope of another arbitration agreement or forum-selection clause.”).
154 Arguably, in this case it does not even matter whether the set-off is of substantive or procedural nature.
155 As mentioned in A/CN.9/264 pp.52-53, for the purpose of the set-off defense Art. 23 of theModel Law will
apply. It means that set-off should be raised in the Statement of Defense. Additionally, the commentary
explained that the set-off claim may be amended at the later stage of the proceedings in accordance with
Art. 23(2) of the ML assuming that amendment fits within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. The
Model Law jurisdictions approach the issue in a similarmanner. See, for example, Art. 1046(3) of theGCCP
and the commentary of (Sachs & Lörcher, 2015) p.276 and (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial
Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.197.
156 Therefore, it will not be allowed even if the agreement to arbitrate includes the “in connection with” formula
or the like.
157 And, again, one should be reminded that the protest against set-off is necessary to avoid the situationwhere
the tribunal considers that the initial consent has been impliedly broadened.
158 This might involve the Art. 34(2)(a)(i) challenge.
159 At this point the distinction of the legal nature (substantive or procedural) of set-off might be relevant.
Additionally, onemight argue that set-off is still made “in connection with” since it is aimed at distinguishing
claims raised by claimant.
160 See Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) of the ML or Art. 34(2)(b)(ii) of the ML.
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Model Law “excess ofmandate” type of challenge.161 For example, Karrer strongly advocates
that: “the parties must be presumed to prefer the dispute about the set-off defence to be
resolved by the arbitral tribunal already in place. After all, the claimant started the arbitration
before that arbitral tribunal, and the respondent who is setting off prefers to use the second
obligation the other way, as a defence in the existing arbitration, or the respondent would
not have raised it there and would have commenced arbitration elsewhere. All this makes
good sense to me, and the claimant’s insistence that the obligation used as a set-off defence
should be brought before a different arbitral tribunal that first must be set up appears abusive
of the legal process. The legal process should bring peace quickly and efficiently and should
not be an all-out battle.”162
Moreover, Berger concludes that “[…] there is a growing tendency to assume that, as a
rule, an international arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a set-off defence based on a
cross-claim that is subject to a different arbitration agreement or jurisdiction clause. This
view applies only to those set-offs that have a substantive nature, e.g. the ‘Aufrechnung’ or
‘Verrechnung’ under German or Swiss law, the ‘compensation légale’ under French law and
the equitable or ‘transaction’ set-off under English law. Being a substantive defence which
denies the existence of the claim, the set-off has the same quality as any other substantive
defence. The tribunal should therefore be authorized to decide on all defences which are
raised against the claim (‘le juge de l’action est le juge de l’exception’), and consequently also
on the merits of the set-off.”163
This view is not approved by all. Rieder and Kreindler observe, in the context of the
German legal regime, that “[w]here the counterclaims or claims subject to set-off are governed
by no or another arbitration agreement, the arbitral tribunal generally lacks jurisdiction
[…] The claims introduced byway of set-off need to be disregarded by the arbitral tribunal.”164
Even these authors, however, admit that if these claims are (i) undisputed, or (ii) based on
a final and binding judgment or award, then they might be entertained by the tribunal.165
Additionally, the authors acknowledge that “there is a strong view that set-off with claims
resulting from an agreement that is commercially closely connected to the agreement giving
rise to the main claims is to be accepted by the tribunal.”166
161 This is not to say that the risk is excluded with regard to other challenges, e.g., of jurisdictional character.
As has been discussed elsewhere, certain jurisdictions adopt Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML as a jurisdictional
(scope) objection. In these cases, this ground will be applicable. See also section 5, in particular, section
5.2.1 and section 5.3.
162 (Karrer, Jurisdiction on set-off defences and counterclaims, 2001) p.177. See also (Pichonnaz & Gullifer,
2014) p.59. For a useful set of “best practices” in dealing with set-off, see (Schöll, 2006) pp.131-136.
163 (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999) pp.72-73.
164 (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.73.
165 (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.73.
166 (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) pp.73-74.
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The last scenario relates to the tribunal invoking set-off ex officio. As always, the tribunal
is bound by the parties’ submissions. It entails that parties should educate the tribunal
about all relevant claims and defenses. It means that the tribunal may expose its award to
risk if it invokes (and asks for comments) that a certain set-off defense is available to a
party. By doing so, it might be considered to effectively plead for the party that did not
raise such a defense although it should have had. The situation may slightly differ if the
set-off would operate ipso iure and if one accepts that arbitrators should know the law.
Even then, however, it is perhaps more sensible for the well-being of the award for the
tribunal to refrain from raising a set-off issue on its own motion. Finally, raising set-off
ex officiowithout consulting parties will result in “surprising” them and, in turn, will likely
result in a successful post-award challenge.167
6.1.4 Decisionon claims/counterclaimsbasedon torts orpre-contractual liability
Occasionally, parties invoke the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge against the tribunal’s
decision that grants claims based on torts or pre-contractual liability. The issue once again
relates (mostly) to the scope and the wording of the arbitration agreement. Yet it also
triggers the question of the possibility for the tribunal to requalify claims. These two issues
will be discussed accordingly.
As to the first question, it is largely settled that the parties that use broad (model)
arbitration clauses168 wish to have all disputes (including those of non-contractual nature)
resolved before the same forum.169 The wording of the agreement to arbitrate would be
controlling, however. For example, Rieder and Kreindler concluded that: “[a]s a rule of
thumb, the formula “all disputes arising out of this agreement” is considered not to include
pre-contractual claims or at least to pass the burden of proof to the opposing party. By
contrast, the broader term “all disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement”
would generally cover pre-contractual claims.”170 The same authors also observed that “[a]n
167 Likely on a different ground than Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML. Possibly Art. 34(2)(b)(ii) of the ML. See in
(Dziurda & Zielińska, 2015) pp.315-329.
168 See, e.g., the UNCITRALModel Clause (“Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
contract, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration […].”), the SIAC
Model Clause (“Any dispute arising out of or in connectionwith this contract, including any question regarding
its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration […].”), the DIS
Model Arbitration Agreement (“All disputes arising in connection with this contract or its validity shall be
finally settled in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the German Institution of Arbitration (DIS) without
recourse to the ordinary courts of law.”), the ICC StandardClause (“All disputes arising out of or in connection
with the present contract shall be finally settled […].”).
169 The notion of “one-stop arbitration” as evocatively used by the English judges. See Fiona Trust & Holding
Corporation & Ors v. Privalov & Ors. [2007] 1 C.L.C. 144 at [19].
170 (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.73. See also (Lew, Mistelis, &
Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, 2003) p.151 (“The ICCmodel clause for example
covers “All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present contract.” It is generally recognised that
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arbitration agreement on disputes arising out of or in connection with a commercial contract
[…] typically covers tort claims to the extent tort claims result from the same facts that give
rise to breach of contract.”171 Similarly, Pryles and Waincymer consider that: “[…] now it
is accepted that such claims [claims based on tort or founded on statute] fall within an
arbitration clause provided that they bear a sufficient nexus to the contractual relationship
established between the parties.”172
Importantly, even if the agreement to arbitrate does not include an “in connection
with” formula, the tribunal’s decisions on claims based on torts might still survive the
challenge. As argued by Lew, Mistelis and Kröll: “[i]n the absence of clear intention to the
contrary “it would be illogical to suppose that the parties would have wanted a ‘split’
jurisdiction.” Therefore arbitration agreements without an express limitation should in
general be interpreted to cover all claims in connectionwith a contract, irrespective of whether
they are claims in contract, in tort or of statutory nature.”173 In one case when “[t]he
agreements between the parties […] both provide that any disputes between them shall be
“settled by” or “determined by” arbitration”,174 the Canadian court was satisfied to conclude
that “[…] the tribunal had power to award damages in tort.”175
As always, the national court reviewing the award in the context of the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge should analyze what the parties requested from the tribunal.
In any event, it should be argued that both counterclaims and set-off defenses deserve the
same standards of interpretation as the primary claims. Therefore, if the wording of the
arbitration agreement is broad enough, then claims based on torts can be brought not only
as initial claims but also as counterclaims or claims for the purpose of set-off. As suggested
by Berger: “[…] the set-off has to involve a claim concerning a ‘dispute which has arisen out
of or in connection with the contract’ that contains the arbitration agreement. The wording
covers not only contractual claims. Thus, from this procedural standpoint, the cross-claim
can also be of a tortious nature.”176
Another question may arise in cases where the arbitral tribunal admitted a set-off
defense based on pre-contractual liability arising out of a different contract. This
hypothetical would require further analysis of the scope of arbitration agreements governing
both contracts. If both arbitration agreements are broad (thus covering claims based on
this wording covers all differences and claims arising from a given contractual relationship and even to
non-contractual and tortious claims.”).
171 (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.73.
172 (Pryles &Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.441.
173 (Lew, Mistelis, & Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, 2003) p.153.
174 Dunhill Personnel System Inc. v. Dunhill Temps Edmonton Ltd., 1993 CanLII 7171 (AB QB), par. 6,
<http://canlii.ca/t/28p21#par6>, [last accessed 27 April 2018].
175 Dunhill Personnel System Inc. v. Dunhill Temps Edmonton Ltd., 1993 CanLII 7171 (AB QB), par. 6,
<http://canlii.ca/t/28p21#par6>, [last accessed 27 April 2018].
176 (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999) p.65.
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torts) and both contracts are closely related, it can be argued that both claims (i.e. the initial
claim and the set-off defense based on torts arising out of a different contract) may be
brought before one arbitral tribunal. It would be a reasonable solution tailored to avoid
parallel proceedings and conflicting judgments.177 As explained above, however, entertaining
set-off claims arising from a different contract might be controversial.
As to the second main question, the tribunal should rather refrain from requalifying
the parties’ claim. This is particularly the case when it relies on its own legal expertise
without asking parties for their opinion. “Surprising” the parties is always a bad idea as it
puts the award at risk.178 Even if the tribunal invites the parties to address its suggestion
of requalifying the claim, it should do so cautiously. Otherwise it might put the award at
risk for the allegation of the violation of the equal treatment of the parties. This, arguably,
will not be a question of the violation of the scope of submission anymore.
6.1.5 Decisiononnewclaims/counterclaims and changeof claims/counterclaims
The situation where a party decides to submit an additional claim or to change a relief
sought will invariably influence the “arbitral tribunal’s mandate”. The question herein,
however, focuses on the extent to which the tribunal’s decision on new or changed claims
may be subjected to the subsequent “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
At the outset, one should observe the unique feature of the Model Law. Article 23(2)
of the Model Law provides that “[u]nless otherwise agreed by the parties, either party may
amend or supplement his claim or defence during the course of the arbitral proceedings,
unless the arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow such amendment having
regard to the delay inmaking it.” This rule is an important power for the tribunal to control
an arbitral process. Notably, however, this rule has two limitations, namely (i) it can be
contracted out by the parties (“unless otherwise agreed” by the parties”) and, arguably, (ii)
it can only be used if the modification affects the duration of the proceedings (“unless the
arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow such amendment having regard to the
delay in making it”).179 Importantly, however, one should always consult the applicable
institutional rules, because they do differ in the context of the tribunal’s power over the
modifications of parties’ submissions.180
177 See section 6.1.3.
178 For further reading see, e.g., (Tan & Ahmad, 2014), (Dziurda & Zielińska, 2015).
179 Similar conclusions have been offered by Broches who explained that: “[d]elay in submitting an amendment
or supplement would then, along with non-observance of the equality of the parties, be the sole bases for
disallowing the amendment or supplement.” See (Broches, 1990) p.113.
180 See, e.g., Art. 20 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 22 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, Rule 20.5 of the 2016
SIAC Rules, Art. 23(4) of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art. 23(4) of the 2012 ICC Rules. Notably the DIS Rules do
not have a similar provision.
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In principle, anymodification to the initial submissions should fit within the underlying
agreement to arbitrate. Otherwise Article 34(2)(a)(iii) may be triggered similarly to the
other types of claims.181 Notably, Rieder and Kreindler, in the context of the German
arbitration regime, observe that: “[…] where the opposing party agrees to the amendment,
the principle of party autonomy prevails and there is no basis for rejection by the tribunal
based on delay. The same applies if the amended part exceeds the arbitration agreement but
the other party at least impliedly agrees to this extension of the arbitration agreement.”182 It
shows how important the parties’ conduct may be.
The parties’ conduct, thus their subsequent submissions, will be particularly relevant
if they wish to oppose the modification of the claims. If the additional claim goes beyond
the relief already sought before the tribunal (but not necessarily beyond the agreement to
arbitrate), one should not automatically assume that the tribunal could and should assume
jurisdiction over those claims. Instead, it might be indispensable for the parties to initiate
separate proceedings. Pryles and Weincymer rightly observe that: “the fact that the new
claims fall within the ambit of the arbitration agreement is not necessarily sufficient. It may
be contended that the new claims go beyond the dispute or difference referred to the arbitration
already commenced and thereby require the commencement of a new arbitration.”183 This
is when objections of the adversaries become essential.
It is important to note that the tribunal might not be willing to reject (new or changed)
claims if not properly objected to by the parties. As explained above, the tribunal may rely
on the power to reject the modifications to avoid potential delays in the process pursuant
to Article 23(2) of the Model Law.184 Yet, at the same time, any (substantial) delays might
not be readily obvious. Instead, the risk lies with the tribunal violating the parties’ right to
present their case. Consequently, the tribunal might refuse to use the powers available to
it.185 As suggested by Rieder and Kreindler: “[t]he only way for the arbitral tribunal to limit
an ever-increasing scope of the case is to exercise its discretion and impose a time limit beyond
which, in the absence of a valid excuse, such supplements are no longer admissible, in
particular new facts and offers of evidence.”186
All these lead to two conclusions. Firstly, rejecting amendments will not trigger Article
34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law, yet it might put the award at risk under a different ground
(namely violation of the right to present one’s case).187 Secondly, accepting the new or
181 See other subsections under section 6.1.
182 (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) pp.195-196.
183 (Pryles &Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.470.
184 Or its alternatives as provided by the institutional rules. For examples see fn.180.
185 Especially if the other party does not object to the extension. See also (Kreindler,Wolff, &Rieder, Commercial
Arbitration in Germany, 2016) pp.195-196.
186 (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.196.
187 Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) of the ML.
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modified claims will only be susceptible to the “excess of mandate” type of challenge in
traditional circumstances, therefore only if the (submitted) claims go beyond the agreement
to arbitrate or if the tribunal grants a claim that has not been requested.
6.1.6 Decision not covering all claims/counterclaims
If an arbitral tribunal fails to address all claims raised in the arbitration or decides to render
an award only on part of the claims, it will render an award infra petita. This scenario is
by far undesirable, because it leaves some of the issues unresolved between the parties. As
such, it goes against the parties’ expectations towards the tribunal’s adjudicative function.
As pointed out by some authors: “[t]he significance of the issues that were not dealt with
has to be considered in relation to the award as a whole. For example, it is not difficult to
envisage a situation in which the issues that were overlooked were of such importance that,
if they had been dealt with, the whole balance of the award would have been altered and its
effect would have been different. In such circumstances, it seems fair that the aggrieved party
should have a right of recourse against the entire award.”188 Yet, the infra petita decisions
are not included in the exhaustive list of grounds under Article 34 of the Model Law.189
This leaves the question whether the infra petita decisions can be covered by the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge (or any other ground for challenge).
In principle, thus on the level of the Model Law, the answer should be given in the
negative. One argument emanates from the drafting process of theModel Law, where infra
petita decisions were brought to the attention of theWorkingGroup as one of the separate
grounds for setting aside,190 but was eventually dismissed and not included in the final text
of the Model Law.191 Additionally, arguably, recourse against the award is unnecessary,
because theModel Law includes a differentmechanism, namely an additional award, which
is designed to mitigate shortcomings of the infra petita decision.
Pursuant to Article 33(3) of the Model Law: “[u]nless otherwise agreed by the parties,
a party, with notice to the other party, may request, within thirty days of receipt of the award,
the arbitral tribunal to make an additional award as to claims presented in the arbitral
proceedings but omitted from the award. If the arbitral tribunal considers the request to be
justified, it shall make the additional award within sixty days.” Onemay easily observe that
this provision can be contracted out by the parties. Notably, according to one interpretation
it means that an additional award could not have been designed as the sole way of dealing
with an infra petita decision.192 Even though the argument is not without merits, it should
188 (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern,&Hunter, 2015) p.585. See also (Born, International Commercial Arbitration,
2014) p.3294.
189 See also section 2.1.
190 See A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.42, Art. 41, note 27(a).
191 See A/CN.9/233, para 187.
192 (Tan & Ahmad, 2014) p.416.
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not automatically lead to the conclusion that infra petita decisions are covered by the
(limited) list of grounds under Article 34.193 It merely gives an opportunity to exclude
certain types of recourse against the award if the parties make a conscious decision to do
so, with all its consequences. In any event, it may also be adopted differently by theModel
Law jurisdictions.194
Although, as argued above, the Model Law does not allow recourse against the infra
petita decisions,195 one should (again) closely observe how the Model Law was adopted.
For example, inGermany196 or in Belgium197 infra petitawill escape the challenge pursuant
to Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. In Canada, one court refused to set aside the
award on the basis that the tribunal failed to address all questions.198 In Singapore, however,
infra petita decisions have been seriously considered as a reason to review the award under
Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of theModel Law. In one case, the court held that: “[…]Art 34(2)(a)(iii)
of theModel Law applies where an arbitral tribunal exceeds its authority by decidingmatters
beyond its ambit of reference or fails to exercise the authority conferred on it by failing to
decide the matters submitted to it, which in turn prejudices either or both of the parties to
the dispute.”199 Similarly, in two different court decisions the court reflected allegedly an
infra petita award on grounds of breach of natural justice and Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the
Model Law.200 Although the award in one case had been set aside,201 the court signaled that
a request for an additional award is better suited for dealing with infra petita decisions.202
193 See section 2.1.
194 See, for example, Art. 1715(3) of the BJC that follows the structure of the Model Law and Art. 1058(1)(3)
of the GCCP that does not use the “unless otherwise agreed by the parties” formula.
195 Apart from the request for an additional award under Art. 33(3) of the ML.
196 (Kröll & Kraft, Chapter VII: Recourse against the Award, § 1059 – Application for Setting Aside, 2015)
p.407 (“By contrast, awards ruling infra petita cannot, in principle, be set aside pursuant to (c).”). The authors
acknowledge that “[…] some authors have supported the analogous application of (c) to the incorrect denial
of jurisdiction by the arbitral tribunal […].” For further reading see (Kröll & Kraft, Chapter VII: Recourse
against the Award, § 1059 – Application for Setting Aside, 2015) p.407 and p.404.
197 (Piers, 2016) p.447 (“It is important to note that 1717, § 3(a)(iii) B.J.C. does no longer provide that an award
omitting to decide on one or more issue[s] of the dispute constitutes an annulment ground.”).
198 United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664 (CanLII), paras. 119-132,
<http://canlii.ca/t/4xfw#par119>, [last accessed 27 April 2018]. The argument discussed, however, did not
relate to the Model Law per se.
199 CRW Joint Operation v. PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] SGCA 33, [2011] 4 SLR 305 at
[33].
200 TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v. Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 186 at [41], BLB and
another v. BLC and others [2013] SGHC 196 at [94-99].
201 BLB and another v. BLC and others [2013] SGHC 196.
202 BLB and another v. BLC and others [2013] SGHC 196 at [103] (“I note, parenthetically, that this would have
been the type of case that Art 33(3) of the Model Law would have been intended to provide redress for. Art
33(3) permits parties to request (within a specified time period) the arbitral tribunal to make an additional
award as to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the award. It is to be hoped that
parties in future cases of a similar nature would first attempt to avail themselves of any available opportunities
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In conclusion, one should observe that the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge should
not be considered a fit for the infra petita decisions. Instead, one should consider a request
for an additional award. If it fails, one might examine if an infra petita decision violated a
party’s opportunity to present its case or public policy.203 The difficultywill remain, however,
with proving the tribunal’s failure to deal with the issue.204 Therefore a recourse might be
successful in truly exceptional circumstances.
6.2 Process of application of law by the arbitral tribunal
The common denominator of the (sub)sections that will follow is the process of
determination and application of law in the arbitral process. Therefore the process of
selection and decision on applicable law should be explained (sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2)
among the process of application of law including mandatory rules of law (sections 6.2.3
and 6.2.4). Finally, it is necessary to reflect on decisions reached ex aequo et bono (section
6.2.5).
6.2.1 Determining the method of selection of applicable law
This section focuses on the first of salient questions on applicable law, namely deciding
on the method of the selection of the applicable law. Because of the complexity of this
issue, it needs to be narrowly addressed.205 The study shall be thus limited to the problem
as to whether the tribunal’s choice of the method to select the applicable law is open for a
challenge under Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law.206 There are three hypothetical
scenarios in which each case may unwind, namely (i) the parties designate an applicable
law, (ii) the parties designate an applicable method of selection or (iii) the tribunal needs
to seek redress from the tribunal itself, before turning to the courts (assuming of course that this is possible in
the circumstances).”).
203 Raising the argument of public policy violationmight not be easy however. See (Tan&Ahmad, 2014) p.419
(“Further, it is unlikely that a breach of public policy has occurred if an arbitrator fails to rule on an issue or
head of claim. Although the phrase ‘public policy’ does cover fundamental principles of justice in substantive
and procedural respects, this requires a high threshold, with instances such as corruption, fraud, and bribery
as examples that could constitute breaches of public policy. Setting aside an award infra petita on the ground
of a breach of public policy is an unnatural fit.”).
204 Especially if the tribunal concludes its award with the formula “rejects any and all other claims” or the like.
205 For further reading, see for example (Ferrari & Kröll, Conflict of Laws in International Commercial
Arbitration, 2010).
206 The problem of finding applicable law is a difficult one and more recently it has been given an extra layer
of complexity due to the fact that different lawmay apply to the substantive law issues (validity or existence
in particular) surrounding the agreement to arbitrate and different law may apply to the substantive law
issues arising out ofmain contract (thus issues at the core of the dispute). This distinction, albeit important,
is not relevant for the analysis of this section. Consequently, this division will not be used. At the same time,
however, the conclusions would be equally valid in both instances.
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to determine an appropriate method for selecting the applicable law on their own (or by
using the opposing submissions of the parties).
An express choice of law clause should be an ideal solution. In consequence, a clear
intention of the parties would guide an arbitral tribunal through the process of determining
the law applicable to the merits.207 As explained by Ferrari and Silberman: “[…] an explicit
choice not only clarifies the appropriate choice of legal regime for application by the
arbitrators, but also manifests an expression of intention by the parties that should be
interpreted as a mandate to the arbitrators in respect of their scope of jurisdiction.”208 In
other words, it frames the basis onwhich the arbitral tribunal can decide.209 For this reason,
Ferrari and Silberman argued further that: “where partiesmake an express choice of national
law to govern the substance of their dispute and the arbitrators fail to honor that choice –
by applying general principles of commercial law or disregarding a choice to apply a particular
substantive legal regime – that action should be considered outside the scope of the arbitrators’
authority and regarded as an excess of power by the arbitrators.”210
Although Ferrari and Silberman submit that acting in violation of the express choice
of law should be open for the “excess of mandate” type of challenge,211 Wolff (albeit in
minority) suggests that: “application of an incorrect standard including of a national law
other than that chosen by the parties or a decision ex aequo et bono without express
authorization is considered a violation of procedure.”212 In the context of the Model Law,
the better view is to subsume such a tribunal’s wrongdoing as the flaw in the procedure
and challenge it under Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law.
When a choice of law clause has not been included in the contract, the parties may
jointly (and occasionally do) request an arbitral tribunal to determine the applicable law
207 Or the law applicable to the substantive law issues with regard to the agreement to arbitrate. See fn.206.
208 (Silberman & Ferrari, 2010) p.120.
209 With all its consequences. An example is ICC Case No.10625 as reported by Gaillard in (Gaillard, The Role
of the Arbitrator in Determining the Applicable Law, 2004) pp.188-189; in this case, an arbitral tribunal
respected the parties’ choice of Portuguese law, however, and noted that the solution they needed to follow
“was in contrast to most continental European law of the civil law type.”
210 (Silberman & Ferrari, 2010) p.120.
211 (Silberman & Ferrari, 2010) pp.117-118 (“For present purposes, our main concern is choice of law, and it is
the express choice of law clause that suggests an analogy to situations where arbitrators have exceed their
mandate or acted beyond the scope of their submission. Why do we think that the express choice of law
provision should be treated as a “scope” matter? Why do we say disregard of an “express choice” is different
from any other error on choice of law that violates the direction on choice of law given to arbitrators by an
arbitration statute or institutional rule – an error which we treat as a mere mistake – like any other error of
law made by arbitrators – and not subject to set aside or non-recognition?”).
212 See (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.345. See also (Jarvin,
Irregularity in the Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal and the Procedure, 2008) p.730 (“A tribunal’s
disregard of the parties’ instructions pertaining to the governing law does not, as a rule, fall within the scope
of procedural irregularity; it is an excess-of-power defence. But not all countries take this approach: in German
law the application of a different law from that chosen by the parties as been found to amount to an admissible
procedure.”).
55
II The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
in accordance with specific conflict of laws rules chosen after a dispute has arisen.213 If the
tribunal follows selected conflict of laws rules, but decides incorrectly, its decision is not
open for post-award review.214
If the parties did not designate any conflict of laws rules to be applicable, the Model
Law includes a fallback mechanism. Pursuant to Article 28(2) of the Model Law “failing
any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the
conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable.” It means that if the parties failed to
specify the applicable law or determine the method of selection of the applicable law, the
tribunal will be authorized to select the law it deems fit after undertaking a conflict of laws
analysis.215 In addition, it shows that a decision of the arbitral tribunal is released from the
duty to follow the conflict of laws rules applied by a national court at the seat of
arbitration.216 At the same time, however, the choice of applicable law needs to be supported
by the conflict of laws analysis.217 Consequently, the tribunal may not designate the law
directly without following said analysis.218 Yet again, such a violation is of (rather)
procedural nature and is as such better suited for an Article 34(2)(a)(iv) challenge.219
6.2.2 Decision on applicable law
Before the tribunal may decide the case on the basis of the applicable law, it must first
select it. It is undisputed that the determination of the applicable law by an arbitral tribunal
may have a substantial effect on a subsequent decision on the merits of the dispute.
213 ICC Award No.1250 (1964), ICC Award No.2680 (1977) as reported by Gaillard in (Gaillard, The Role of
the Arbitrator in Determining the Applicable Law, 2004) p.200.
214 No review on the merits. See section 2.2.
215 As always, the parties’ submissions are of relevance; even if no consensus had been reached as to the
applicable conflict of laws rules, the parties’ submissions may limit the arbitral tribunal’s deliberations to
the conflict of laws rules indicated by the parties.
216 ICC Case No.11264 (2002), unpublished, as reported by Gaillard in (Gaillard, The Role of the Arbitrator in
Determining the Applicable Law, 2004) p.196 (“In the absence of a designation of the applicable law of the
parties, article 28(2) [of the 1985UNCITRALModel Law on International Commercial Arbitration] authorizes
the Arbitral Tribunal to apply “the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable.”
This clearly frees the Arbitral Tribunal from having to follow the choice of law rules which would be applied
by a local court.”).
217 See, however, e.g.Art. 1051(2) of the GCCP which limits the tribunal’s freedom. It reads that “[f]ailing any
designation of the applicable rules of law by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law of the State
with which the subject-matter of the proceedings is most closely connected.” See also (Schmalz, 2015) p.304.
218 In principle, however, since the tribunalmay employ “conflict of laws rules which it considers appropriate”,
it will, arguably, be able to reach the same conclusions as if given full freedom to determine the applicable
law through voie directe.
219 See (International LawAssociation, 2008) pp.15-16 (“Since the determination of the contents of the applicable
law is by and large a matter of procedure, in the absence of pertinent mandatory rules of the law of the seat,
the arbitrators will have to deal with it as with any other proceduralmatter. According to the almost universally
accepted principle, this means that the arbitrators must have regard to the direct or indirect will of the parties,
absent which they should follow the rules or approach of their choice.”).
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Consequently, it is necessary to reflect if the tribunal’s decision on the applicable law may
be challenged under the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. This type of tribunal’s
decision has some common features with the tribunal’s decision on themethod of selecting
applicable law.220 For this reason, the reflections presented above would be equally valid
in this case. In any event, one should consider three hypotheticals, where (i) the parties
have included a valid choice of law provision in their contract; (ii) the parties, in the absence
of choice of law provision, have submitted their pleadings on applicable law to the arbitral
tribunal when the dispute arose; and (iii) the parties have not included any choice of law
provision nor have they pleaded what law they consider applicable for the arguments they
submit.
In principle, and as explained above, an explicit (and undisputed) choice of the parties
is controlling for the tribunal. It means that the tribunal’s decision that goes against the
parties’ choice should be susceptible to the post-award recourse. Since no review on the
merits is possible, however unintended mistake by the arbitral tribunal is beyond court’s
control at the setting-aside stage.221 Therefore, only a deliberate disregard of the parties’
directivesmight be considered. As explained above, this is usually considered to fall within
the category of “excess of authority”,222 whichwould suggest that it is reasonable to employ
Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of theModel Law.223 At the same time, an alternative view is to challenge
the award that blatantly disregards the choice of law selected by the parties as the procedural
violation that triggers Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law.224 Irrespective of the choice
made the threshold to successfully challenge the award would be extremely high.
In the second scenario, the parties will submit their views on the applicable law (either
in the absence of a contractually agreed choice of governing law or in case its validity is
contested). The parties may still reach a consensus as to what law applies or submit
220 See section 6.2.1.
221 See section 2.
222 (Silberman & Ferrari, 2010) p.120.
223 Lewis in (Lewis, 2016) p.161 reports that “[i]n Hong Kong in Brunswick it was submitted that [Article
34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law] was engaged because the underlying contract specified Illinois’ law and the
tribunal decided that PRC law applied. Lam J held that this was a simple decision on the interpretation of the
contract by the tribunal and was not within this ground.” A reference is given of Brunswick Bowling &
Billiards Corp. v. Shanghai Zhonglu Indus. Co., Ltd. & Another, [2011] 1 HKLRD 707 at [22]. This passing
of the judgment shows the rather unusual circumstances of the case, however. The court held therein that:
“[t]he last point can be disposed of shortly. The extent to which the choice of law clause is applicable to the
various disputes was a subject of arguments before the Tribunal. As shown above, the Respondents contended
in their closing submissions in the arbitration that the validity of the OIS was to be determined according to
PRC law (see para.382 of the closing quoted above). The Tribunal agreed with them. It does not lie in their
mouth to contend in the present proceedings that the validity of the OIS should be determined by Illinois law.
I therefore hold that there is no merit in the Respondents’ reliance on Article 34(2)(a)(iii) in this context.
Neither can the Respondents rely onArticle 34(2)(a)(iv) which deals with arbitral procedure. The determination
on the applicability of the choice of law clause to the validity of the OIS is not a matter of arbitral procedure.”
224 See (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.345.
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contrasting arguments regarding governing law. In case they are unanimous as to what
law should apply to their dispute, the same reflections from the first hypothetical would
apply. Therefore, the tribunal would have to follow their joint conclusion on the issue. If,
however, the parties cannot reach an agreement, it will be in the arbitral tribunal’s discretion
to follow one of the views presented to it. Arguably, it will also be in the arbitral tribunal’s
discretion to independently select the legal regime, provided that the tribunal will
communicate its intention to the parties and allow them to comment on the selection
before any decision is rendered. In this case, the tribunal’s conclusion should survive at
the post-award stage.
In the third and highly unusual scenario, and in the absence of an explicit choice of
law and without the legal framework of the arguments of the parties, the power of the
arbitral tribunal to determine the applicable law might be perceived as a state of necessity
and will be rooted in Article 28(2) of the Model Law.225 An arbitral tribunal’s decision, in
that case, should not be subject to challenge under Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law.
Importantly, in any event, the tribunal should give the parties the opportunity to comment
on its findings. In this case, the decision on applicable law is a better fit for challenge under
Article 34(2)(a)(ii), if any.
6.2.3 Ascertaining the content of applicable law by the arbitral tribunal
The dispute resolution function of the arbitral tribunal inevitably requires the tribunal to
apply and interpret the law.226 At the same time, following the underlying principle of the
finality of the arbitral tribunal’s conclusions, its legal findings should be immune to any
of the post-award recourse. This applies, in principle, also to the “excess of mandate” type
of challenge. It means that Article 34(2)(a)(iii) should not become a gateway for review of
the merits of the arbitral awards.227
Although the tribunal’s legal conclusions should escape the court’s scrutiny, one should
reflect whether the process of reaching these conclusions may generate a post-award
challenge under Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. Put differently, it is necessary to
observe if the tribunal is limited by the parties’ legal pleadings or it may independently
reach certain legal conclusions based on its own legal expertise.
225 Which still refers to the applicable choice of law rules. No direct application of substantive law is, thus,
possible under the Model Law.
226 The process of application of the law has been analyzed in a number of studies. For further reading, see,
i.a., (Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 1978), (Grigera Naón, 2001), and
(International Law Association, 2008).
227 See section 2.2. Additionally, it is submitted that the process of application of law or rules of law will not
fit comfortably in the three keyholes test. It is so because the test prescribed inArt. 34(2)(a)(iii) of theModel
Law is limited to the arbitral tribunal’s decisions on claims rendered beyond a request sought by the parties.
Therefore, one might argue that ascertaining law beyond the parties’ expectations can only be challenged
on the basis of the third step of the three keyholes test (i.e. public policy).
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In principle, the process of ascertaining law has two aspects: on the one hand, the
parties have a burden of educating the tribunal on the contents of the applicable law,228 on
the other hand, arbitrators are often chosen for their legal expertise and as such they should
be able to make use of it.229 Without going further into details,230 it should be highlighted
that it is the parties’ responsibility to present legal arguments and inform the arbitral
tribunal on the contents of applicable law. Irrespectively, an arbitral tribunal’s right to
investigate the applicable law on its own motion should be likewise endorsed. It is
particularly important if the applicability of the mandatory rules of law is at stake.231 In
this case the tribunal should be able to inspect any implication that mandatory rules may
have, even if it had not been raised by the parties.
All in all, one should observe that applying the law is one of the tribunal’s duties and
is important for fulfilling itsmandate.232 Consequently, it should be possible for the tribunal
to raise new legal issues, if considered relevant and subjected to a due process requirement.
As suggested by Dimolitsa: “[i]n contrast to the fundamental principles [i.e. right to be
heard, equal treatment of the parties and impartiality], the principle of ‘ne ultra petita
partium’ does not enter into play as much when arbitrators introduce ex officio new issues
of law. Indeed, introducing new issues of law does not equate with granting non-requested
remedies.”233 In other words, as long as an arbitral tribunal acts in due process, consults
the introduction of new legal rules or the requalification of claims with the parties and
gives them an opportunity to comment on its actions, the tribunal’s decision should survive
the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.234 If the tribunal, however, does not invite the
228 For further reading see (Kurkela, ‘JuraNovit Curia’ and the Burden of Education in International Arbitration
– A Nordic Perspective, 2003).
229 See, i.a., (Kurkela, ‘Jura Novit Curia’ and the Burden of Education in International Arbitration – A Nordic
Perspective, 2003), (Kaufmann-Kohler, “Iura Novit Arbiter” – est-ce bien raisonnable? Réflexions sur le
statut du droit de fond devant l’arbitre international, 2004), (Lew, Iura Novit Curia andDue Process, 2011).
230 The issue of an arbitral tribunal ascertaining law is a topic of ongoing debate and as such has been the
subject of many detailed studies. Of particular relevance is (International Law Association, 2008).
231 See also section 6.2.4.
232 See (International Law Association, 2008) p.19.
233 (Dimolitsa, The equivocal power of the arbitrators to introduce ex officio new issues of law, 2009) p.438;
the author qualifies her statement (albeit with reference to the Swiss case) by pointing out that: “[i]t is not
excluded, however, that a party challenges an award for violation of this very principle [i.e. ne ultra petita]
in situations where arbitrators have raised new issues or have recharacterized legal relationships; but such
challenge should normally fail as long as the arbitrators have ultimately adjudicated not more or other than
what was claimed.”.
234 (Landolt, 2012) p.192 (“The predominant tendency in arbitration is to treat as ultra petita only those awards
which decide beyond the relief sought by the parties, and not those in which the reasoning goes beyond the
parties’ submissions, if in fact the result of this is an award within the relief sought by the parties. By
consequence, arbitrators need not usually fear interference with their award on the basis of a challenge of
ultra petita”) also (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2009) p.2608 (“[…] an arbitral tribunal
does not exceed its authority under Article 34(2)(a)(iii) by relying on arguments or authorities not raised by
the parties to support their claims.”).
59
II The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
parties to comment on their legal findings and “surprises” themwith its legal conclusions,235
the award will likely to be set aside for violation of one’s right to present one’s case,236
which is better suited than the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.237
6.2.4 Application of mandatory rules of law (of public policy character) by the
arbitral tribunal
Mandatory rules have an exceptional status in each legal system, since they are its
backbone.238 The mandatory character also entails that parties may not contractually
derogate from their application. It is necessary, however, to distinguish two types of
mandatory rules.239 The most important are the rules of public policy character which
might be eventually reviewed at the post-award stage. The second category of (non-public
policy) mandatory rules might have, arguably, less significance, because parties in
international arbitration may effectively exclude their application by their choice of
governing law.240 In the analysis below, the rules of public policy will be predominantly
discussed.
For the purpose of this research, it is necessary to reflect if the tribunal that applies
mandatory rules of law puts its award at risk under the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge. Therefore, following the three keyholes test, one should consider whether an
arbitral tribunal’s application of mandatory rules of law can violate (i) the agreement (to
235 See, i.a., (Dziurda & Zielińska, 2015).
236 Louis Dreyfus, s.a.s. (SA Louis Dreyfus & Cie) c. Holding Tusculum, b.v., 2008 QCCS 5903 (CanLII), paras.
76-103, <http://canlii.ca/t/21v03#par76> [last accessed 27 April 2018]. For further reading on competition
between the grounds, see section 5.3.
237 Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp. v. Shanghai Zhonglu Indus. Co., Ltd. & Another [2009] HKCFI 94,
available at http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/cases/hkcfi/2009/94.html [last accessed 27 April 2018]. Notably,
in para 28 of the judgment, the court held that: “[…] the Tribunal should have canvassed with the parties
the particular provision in the PRC law on the topic and [given] them an opportunity to respond beforemaking
a decision on the same. The failure of the Tribunal in this regard furnished the Respondents a valid ground
of complaint under Article 34(2)(a)(ii). I prefer to rest my decision on this limb instead of Article 34(2)(a)(iii)
because I can contemplate cases where an arbitral tribunal may feel obliged in the interest of justice to canvass
issues not raised by the parties for the proper determination of the disputes submitted for arbitration. Provided
that the parties were given opportunity to present their case on the ‘new’ issues, the determination of the
tribunal would still be within the scope of submission.”.
238 For further reading on mandatory and public policy rules, see, i.a., (Mayer, Mandatory rules of law in
international arbitration, 1986), (Barraclough &Waincymer, 2005), (International Law Association, 2008)
Recommendation 13, p.23, (Paulsson J., Thinking Simply about Public Policy, 2011), (Radicati di Brozolo
L., 2012).
239 See, i.a., (Radicati di Brozolo L., 2012) p.50.
240 If parties from respectively country A and B decide that law from country C applies to their contract, such
a choice will be binding on the arbitrators. It would, in principle, prevent otherwise applicable mandatory
rules to apply (unless they are crucial to safeguard public interest, thus unless they are of public policy
nature).
60
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
arbitrate) between the parties, (ii) the parties’ requests, or (iii) mandatory rules of public
policy character.
Under the first hypothesis one would have to assume that the tribunal went beyond
the parties’ agreement to arbitrate by applying mandatory rules of law. This is rather
unlikely. In principle, it would require the parties to expressly narrow their consent to the
effect that the tribunal will not be able to invoke anymandatory rule of law.241 In fact, such
a qualification made in the agreement to arbitrate would make the tribunal’s decision
compliant with it open for a public policy challenge.242
In the alternative, one may also try to argue that the tribunal went beyond the parties’
agreement when it decided to apply (likely ex officio) mandatory rules of (substantive) law
that were not chosen by the parties as the governing law. In these circumstances it is possible
that the tribunal considered that the choice of the parties was made to circumvent an
application of otherwise applicable mandatory rules of law and decided to address them,
shielding the award from a potential public policy challenge. This is where the distinction
between public policy and non-public policy rules becomes useful. If the rules applied by
the tribunal are of public policy character, they would inevitably override any agreement
of the parties. If, however, the mandatory rules invoked by the tribunal are not of a public
policy nature, the tribunal might be (effectively) modifying a valid choice of law, which
might be open for a challenge, but, arguably, on another ground than the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge.243 As always, it is essential to allow the parties to address the
tribunal’s findings.244
The second hypothesis presupposes that the arbitral tribunal allegedly decided beyond
the request sought when it substantiates its findings with the mandatory rules of law ex
officio.245 This argument, as well, would not fit under Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model
Law.
Furthermore, as observed by Radicati di Brozolo: “[…] there is an expectation, perhaps
even a requirement, that arbitrators apply mandatory rules.”246 The author aptly concludes
that “[w]hile it is true that arbitrators are primarily at the service of the parties, it is now
recognized that they are not their mere servants and that in some way they are also under
241 It will make the arbitrator, as eloquently put by Paulsson in (Paulsson J., Thinking Simply about Public
Policy, 2011) p.477, “the slave of the contract” disallowing him to apply corrective measures prescribed by
the mandatory rules of law.
242 If the tribunal decides on contractual claims which would be found to be illegal, then its award would be
most probably successfully challenged on the public policy basis, not to mention the potential liability for
aiding and abetting illegal activities. See (Radicati di Brozolo L., 2012) pp.70-71.
243 See Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) of the ML. See also section 6.2.2.
244 See also section 6.2.3.
245 Conversely to the situation discussed in the preceding paragraph, under this scenario it is presumed that
the mandatory rules (not raised by the parties) constitute the part of the law chosen by them.
246 (Radicati di Brozolo L., 2012) p.66.
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a broader duty to see that justice is done.”247 Therefore, even if the parties forgot or
deliberately omitted to plead for the application of mandatory rules of law, it is still at a
tribunal’s discretion to investigate whether these (mandatory) rules apply.248 According
to the report of the International LawAssociation: “[i]n disputes implicating rules of public
policy or other rules from which the parties may not derogate, arbitrators may be justified
in taking measures appropriate to determine the applicability and contents of such rules,
including bymaking independent research, raising with the parties new issues (whether legal
or factual), and giving appropriate instructions or ordering appropriate measures insofar as
they consider this necessary to abide by those rules or to protect against challenges to the
award.”249 Yet again, the tribunal needs to give the parties the opportunity to present their
case.
The third hypothesis raises the question whether the application of (mandatory) rules
may violate the rules of public policy. In principle, indeed it might. At the same time,
however, one should consider that disregarding public policy rules and not their application
will give higher chances of the award being susceptible to theArticle 34(2)(b)(ii) challenge.250
Therefore, the tribunal will better ensure enforceability of the award by investigating
potentially applicable public policy rules rather than shying away from them.
All in all, the conformity with mandatory rules of law might play a decisive role in the
review process of the arbitral award. Taking into account that the tribunal should be
concerned with the fate of the award rendered,251 application of mandatory rules of law
by the arbitral tribunal might be justified if not indispensable. In principle, it should not
be, reviewable pursuant to Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law.
6.2.5 Decision reached ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur
The power to decide ex aequo et bono encompasses the ultimate trust the parties have in
arbitrators that they will render a just decision. It is reasonable therefore that it requires
explicit authorization. This rule is also prescribed in Article 28(3) of the Model Law.
247 (Radicati di Brozolo L., 2012) p.68.
248 See section 6.2.3.
249 (International Law Association, 2008) Recommendation 13, p.23.
250 The tribunal risksmore by not applyingmandatory rules rather than by applying them (even if not correctly);
see Desputeaux v. Éditions Chouette (1987) inc., [2003] 1 SCR 178, 2003 SCC 17 (CanLII),
<http://canlii.ca/t/1g2jh>, [last accessed 27 April 2018] (“An error in interpreting a mandatory statutory
provision would not provide a basis for annulling the award as a violation of public order, unless the outcome
of the arbitration was in conflict with the relevant fundamental principles of public order.”). See also CLOUT
case No. 639 as reported in A/CN.9/SER.C/ABSTRACTS/58 (failure to apply legal norms does not amount
to violation of the fundamental principles of Russian Law).
251 (Craig W. L., The arbitrator’s mission and the application of law in international commercial arbitration,
2010) p.285 (“Nevertheless, while the grounds for judicial review are narrow, a wise arbitrator will want to
make sure that his award correctly addresses any issue subject to review in a way to satisfy any court.”).
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Pursuant to said Article: “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable
compositeur only if the parties have expressly authorized it to do so.”
Importantly, however, even if this power is given, it might be subjected to certain
restrictions imposed by Article 28(4) of theModel Law. This Article gives clear indication
that: “[i]n all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the
contract and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.”
It has been concluded that “[t]he effect of this provision is largely limited to […] confirming
that agreements of the party and trade usages supersede even those decisions rendered ex
aequo et bono”252 Yet, Born submits compelling arguments that “[t]he better view, adopted
by a majority of commentators and other authorities, is that arbitrators may depart from
the terms of the parties’ contract in fashioning a fair and equitable result, provided that they
do not rewrite the structure of the agreement. Of course, arbitrators sitting ex aequo et bono
or as amiable compositeur may not ignore applicable mandatory law.”253
For the research at hand, however, it is important to determine whether the tribunal’s
decision ex aequo et bono is susceptible to the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. In
this case it is assumed that the tribunal departs from applying the law without the parties’
express authorization.254
252 (Schmalz, 2015) p.317.
253 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.2775-2776. For further reading on mandatory law
see section 6.2.4.
254 Occasionally, parties try to argue that the tribunals (effectively) usurp the power ex aequo et bono by the
way (usually, in the opinion of the applicants incorrect) they apply the applicable law. For example, in
American International Group and AIG Capital Corporation v. X Company [2016] HCCT 60/2015 [8],
<http://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=105848&QS=%2B&TP=JU>
[last accessed 27 April 2018], it was argued that: “[…] the Majority had (it is claimed) ignored or consciously
disregarded basic principles of NewYork law concerning the enforceability of liquidated damages clauses, and
the inadmissibility of parol[e] evidence to vary or contradict the express terms of a written contract, in order
to arrive at what the Majority considered to be the fair or equitable result. This, it was argued, goes beyond
mere erroneous application of New York law, but amounts to theMajority impermissibly deciding the dispute
ex aequo et bon[o] or as amiable compositeur.” These types of arguments, however, go dangerously close
to the review of the merits which is impermissible (see section 2.2). In the mentioned case, the application
to set aside was rejected and the court concluded that: “[i]f, as the Plaintiffs submit, the Majority had made
errors of law in their findings on the enforceability of the liquidated damages clause and in considering parole
evidence, they may simply have made these errors because they failed to understand the correct analyses of
the binding New York authorities, and this in my judgment is just as equally probable as the Majority having
made a conscious and deliberate choice to ignore the binding New York authorities, to come to a contrary
conclusion in order to arrive at what the Majority perceived to be the fair result in the Arbitration. The latter
inference involves a quantum leapwhich is not justified by a fair, objective reading of the Award.” SeeAmerican
International Group and AIG Capital Corporation v. X Company [2016] HCCT 60/2015 [26],
<http://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=105848&QS=%2B&TP=JU>
[last accessed 27April 2018] It shows that the burden of proving that the tribunal allegedly decided ex aequo
et bono while applying the law is rather high.
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Although it is clear that the tribunal’s decision based on powers it had never possessed
should be open for the (successful) post-award challenge,255 it is uncertain if the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge in the Model Law context is the best mechanism for doing
so. One should always have inmind the whole wording of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of theModel
Law, because it does not only refer to “the award going beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration”,256 but rather itmakes a reference to disputes not contemplated by ormatters
going beyond the terms (or scope)257 of the submission to arbitration. Deciding ex aequo
et bono is the way the tribunals decide on disputes or matters which may very well fall
within the scope of the submission. Consequently, as argued by Wolff: “[…] a decision ex
aequo et bono without express authorization is considered a violation of procedure.”258 As
such it would be better suited under Article 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model Law.259
6.3 Decisions on remedies
Resolving a dispute between parties inevitably means that the tribunal answers the relief
sought by granting (or rejecting) remedies requested by the parties. The study at hand
focuses on three basic categories of the remedies that may be potentially sought by the
parties. These are: damages (section 6.3.1), specific performance (section 6.3.2) and contract
adaptation (section 6.3.3).
6.3.1 Decision on damages
It is undisputed that damages are a traditional and important remedy sought. The types
of damages that the parties can seek depend, however, on the applicable law.260 Nonetheless,
in the context of theModel Law, without reference to a single legal system, no unequivocal
255 See, e.g., Cairo Court of Appeal, Egypt, 8 January 2002, case No. 72/117 (see (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of
Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012) p.153). In this case, a court
in Egypt set aside an awardwhere the arbitrator decided ex aequo et bono and disregarded the parties’ choice
of law. See also Louis Dreyfus, s.a.s. (SA Louis Dreyfus & Cie) c. Holding Tusculum, b.v., 2008 QCCS 5903
(CanLII), par. 107, <http://canlii.ca/t/21v03#par107>, [last accessed 27 April 2018], where the court held
that: “[t]he Tribunal erred in determining that it had the power to …fashion appropriate remedies and …to
find a just solution notwithstanding its dismissal of the parties’ respective claims,…irrespective of whether the
particular dispute in question or remedy requested fell within the ambit of Section 13 of the Agreement. In so
determining, the Tribunal took on the role of amiable compositeur, when it was never asked, mandated, or
permitted to do so. It failed to observe the applicable domestic and international arbitration procedure by
assuming this role without the requisite of the parties.”.
256 This could, arguably, entail also the matters on how the tribunal should decide.
257 See section 5.2.2.
258 See, e.g., (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.345).
259 See section 5.3.
260 Different legal systems may offer, for example punitive, exemplary or treble damages, liquidated damages,
moral damages, consequential damages, statutory damages, or incidental material damages.
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answer can be given as to the question whether an arbitral tribunal’s decision granting
damages can be successfully contested as being beyond the scope of submission to
arbitration.
In any case, there are several scenarios that need to be highlighted: (i) the arbitral
tribunal awarded more damages than claimed, (ii) the arbitral tribunal recharacterized
damages sought, and (iii) the arbitral tribunal granted damages that have been specifically
excluded by the parties in their agreement or (iv) granted damages that are unknown at
the seat of arbitration.
The first scenario is rather clear-cut and thus does not require further elaboration: in
the case when the arbitral tribunal grants more than the parties sought, it would clearly
render the decision ultra petita which would constitute a valid reason to challenge the
award on the basis of the second step of the three keyholes test. Therefore, the award will
be susceptible to the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
The second scenario is closely related to the process of ascertaining the content of the
applicable law.261 In principle, whenever the tribunal is convinced that the damages should
be granted, but on a somewhat different legal basis than the one presented by the parties,
it should always give the parties the right to address its findings.262
On the one hand, it has been reported that the domestic award has been set aside in
Poland in a case where: “the claimant demanded a contract should be declared invalid on
the grounds of exploitation pursuant to Article 388 §1 KC, and the arbitral tribunal accepted
this provision as a valid basis for the claim. Instead, however, of declaring the contract invalid
the arbitral tribunal awarded an alternative remedy available under Article 388 §1 KC,
namely a modification of the claimant’s consideration under the contract.”263 In addition,
the authors have questioned whether “[…] the annulment of the award could have been
avoided if the arbitral tribunal had notified the parties that it was considering applying
Article 388 §1 KC in extenso. The answer appears to be negative since an arbitral tribunal’s
discretional powers are limited by the parties’ dispositive right to define their claims (including
their scope).”264
On the other hand, a Singaporean court held that the tribunal did not “exceed its
mandate” when it issued an award on the basis of loss of revenue and set-off and not on
loss of profit as pleaded by the claimant.265 It further held that “[t]he issue of quantum is
261 See section 6.2.3.
262 Otherwise it might expose its award to a setting-aside challenge under Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) or Art. 34(2)(b)(ii)
of the ML.
263 (Dziurda & Zielińska, 2015) pp.327-328, with a reference to Regional Court in Katowice judgment of
23 November 2010, XIII GC 183/10 (not published).
264 (Dziurda & Zielińska, 2015) p.328.
265 Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp. v. Shanghai Zhonglu Indus. Co., Ltd. & Another [2009] HKCFI 94 at
[51], available at http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/cases/hkcfi/2009/94.html [last accessed 27 April 2018].
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one of the matters submitted to the Tribunal for determination. The Tribunal is not bound
by the positions taken by the parties if it can, on the basis of the evidence canvassed, come
to a different conclusion. The Tribunal did not act in excess of its jurisdiction when it made
a determination based on loss of revenue and setoff. There is no ground for complaint under
Article 34(2)(a)(iii).”266 All in all, whenever the tribunal recharacterizes the legal basis for
the claim for damages, it might be necessary to consult grounds for challenge other than
the “excess of mandate” type.
In the third hypothetical, it might be necessary to reflect whether the remedial powers
of the tribunal are limited in the agreement to arbitrate itself or elsewhere in the contract.
Arguably, if it is included in the agreement to arbitrate, it would be controlling for the
tribunal.267 Conversely, if a similar limitation is included in themain contract (for example
by prohibiting the parties to request damages or certain types of damages), it would be
within the tribunal’s powers to interpret the contract. As such, it should escape the courts
scrutiny (no review on the merits).268
The last reflections concern granting damages unknown at the seat of arbitration. This
would be the case when punitive damages are requested, and the tribunal needs to decide
whether theymay be granted. As long as an arbitral award granting punitive damagesmay
very well fit within the scope of the parties’ submission to arbitration (i.e. first two parts
of the three keyholes test), the likelihood that the unknown type of damages may violate
public policy is rather high. This risk may emerge at both stages of the post-award review,
namely at the setting-aside stage at the country of the seat and during the enforcement of
the award.269 At this point, the analysis reflects the public policy of the seat. For example,
in Germany, the award granting punitive damages will be found to be against substantive
(international) public policy.270 Arguably, however, following the recent court decision
where punitive damages have been granted for breach of contract in Singapore law,271 it
is plausible that the tribunal’s decision to the same effect might survive at the setting-aside
stage. In any event, it has been suggested by scholars that: “[…] it is preferable for arbitral
tribunals to treat any award in respect of punitive damages or any other penalties as an
266 Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp. v. Shanghai Zhonglu Indus. Co., Ltd. & Another [2009] HKCFI 94 at
[51], available at http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/cases/hkcfi/2009/94.html [last accessed 27 April 2018].
267 If the agreement to arbitrate states (however unlikely) that the tribunalmay not grant damages, the question
still remains if it is a matter that should be tackled under Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML or rather the matter
of “agreed procedure” to be dealt with under Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) of the ML.
268 See section 2.2.
269 See also Chapter VI.
270 See (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.90.
271 Airtrust (Hong Kong) Ltd v. PH Hydraulics & Engineering Pte Ltd [2015] SGHC 307, <http://www.
singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-of-singapore/case-law/free-law/high-court-judgments/18260-airtrust-hong-kong-
ltd-v-ph-hydraulics-amp-engineering-pte-ltd> [last accessed 27 April 2018].
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entirely separate claim, in order to ensure that the punitive portion of the award is severable
in the event of a successful challenge in the courts at the place of enforcement.”272
6.3.2 Decision on specific performance
Specific performance is yet another remedy available to the parties. Similar to the analysis
on damages,273 no comprehensive answer can be provided in the context of theModel Law
as to the instances when granting such remedywill be an option. Contrary to the difficulties
that may arise with respect to certain types of damages, an arbitral tribunal’s decision on
specific performance will not, by and large, be considered outside the arbitral tribunal’s
“mandate”.274 The only exception, similar to the ones discussed above with regard to
tribunal’s decisions on damages, that one could envisage is an arbitral tribunal’s decision
truly rendered ultra petita or made against the parties’ explicit limitation regarding the
tribunal’s remedial powers. These would be, in principle, instances where the award may
be open for the Article 34(2)(a)(iii) challenge.
6.3.3 Decision on contract adaptation and filling of gaps in the contract
The power of an arbitral tribunal to revise the contract and to fill the gaps therein might
be of paramount importance, particularly in the context of complex long-term contracts.
In these cases, the parties cannot reasonably be expected to foresee all problems that may
occur along the way. Consequently, they might need a fallback mechanism allowing an
arbitral tribunal to alter the initial agreement of the parties to maintain their status quo.
The exercise of the power to adapt the contract, however, might be controversial at
times. It is undisputable that the adjudicative function of the arbitral tribunal entails that
it will interpret the underlying contract and give its provisions a meaning. Yet, the power
to adapt the contract is occasionally considered to go beyond this classical (adjudicative)
function.275 It is then argued that the contract adaptation exercise involves creative analysis
and not only interpretation of the contract. Consequently, it is often required that the
parties expressly authorize the tribunal with these powers.276 In addition, the law of the
272 (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) p.519.
273 See section 6.3.1.
274 (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) p.519 (“The question of whether an arbitral tribunal is
empowered to order specific performance is thus rarely an issue in international arbitration. However, the
question of whether it is an appropriate remedy, and whether it can be effectively granted in the circumstances
of any particular case was not definitely established at the time of writing.”).
275 (Bernardini P., Stabilization and adaptation in oil and gas investments, 2008) pp.108-109.
276 (Bernardini P., Stabilization and adaptation in oil and gas investments, 2008) p.107.
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seat277 and the law applicable to the merits of the case might also be of relevance when the
tribunal needs to determine if it can accept the power to revise the contractual provisions.278
When it comes to theModel Law, it does not contain any express provision on powers
of the arbitral tribunal to revise the contract and fill the gap in the contract.279 For this
reason, it might be prudent to consult the national legislation adopting the Model Law
and find out whether any provision on contract adaptation has been included therein.280
All in all, however, theModel Law court facedwith the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge
against an arbitral tribunal’s decision on the revision of the contract would need to follow
the three keyholes test.
On the first level, the court should determine, in absence of authorization by the law
of the seat or the law applicable to themerits, whether express consent to adapt the contract
has been provided in the parties’ agreement.281 The need for the unequivocal consent of
the parties has been suggested during the drafting of the Model Law: “[…] the decisive
factor may be the generally recognized principle that a contract is binding on a party only
if he agreed to it. By adapting or supplementing a contract the arbitral tribunal creates new
contractual obligations for the parties and, therefore, such contractual obligations can become
binding only when the parties have agreed to be bound. The parties may demonstrate their
agreement to be bound by expressly conferring such amandate to the arbitral tribunal. Thus,
277 See e.g. Art. 1020(4) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (expressly allowing the parties to delegate the
power fill the gaps or modify the legal relationship between the parties to the agreement to arbitrate).
278 For further reading on the importance of lex arbitrii and the law applicable to the merits of the case, see,
e.g., (Berger, Power ofArbitrators to Fill Gaps andReviseContracts toMake Sense, 2001) pp.5-11, (Bernardini
P., Stabilization and adaptation in oil and gas investments, 2008) pp.107-108. Parenthetically, it should be
mentioned that arbitral tribunals are rather reluctant in accepting their role to adapt or revise the contract.
See, e.g., (Hunter & Redfern, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 2004) p.539 (“[…]
arbitral tribunals have proved very reluctant to substitute their own views of a fair allocation of contractual
risk for that of the parties at the time the contract was originally concluded”); (Gaillard i Savage, Fouchard
Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 1999) p.25 (“[discussing the approach in the
absence of a hardship clause] The trend in international arbitral case law is in favor of a fairly narrow,
conservative conception of the arbitrator’s powers. Arbitrators will generally be reluctant to accept the doctrine
of change in circumstances even in long-term, non-speculative contracts. Instead, they will often consider that
parties to international contracts are, generally speaking, experienced professionals well able to protect
themselves in their agreements from changes in circumstances.”). See also Himpurna California Energy Ltd
v. PT (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara, Final Ad Hoc Award of 4 May 1999, XXV Y.B. Comm. Arb.
13 (2000).
279 Although no provision on adaptation and supplementation of contracts has been included in the text of
the Model Law, it was discussed. For an informative analysis see A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.41, paras 2-11 and
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.44, paras 1-32.
280 Or in the law applicable to the merits.
281 It can be included either directly in the arbitration clause or in a specific hardship or renegotiation clause
contained in the same contract that refers to the arbitration agreement. See (Berger, Power of Arbitrators
to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make Sense, 2001) p.8.
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the usual arbitration clausesmay be interpreted as being limited to themandate to adjudicate
legal disputes arising from breach of non-performance of contracts.”282
On the second level (of the three keyholes test), arguably, the reviewing court needs to
be satisfiedwith the evidence showing that the parties requested the tribunal to revise their
contractual provisions. Importantly, even if the arbitration agreement is broad enough to
entertain contract revision, the tribunal shall refrain from intervening with the sanctity of
the contract if not specifically requested to do so.
On the third level, it has been suggested that “[t]he contract terms established by a
decision on adaptation or supplementation, like any other contract, should not be contrary
to mandatory rules of the applicable law.”283 It means that the contractual provisions
redrafted by the tribunal should comply with the mandatory rules of the applicable law.
In addition, it needs to be emphasized that the mere notion of the tribunal intervening
with the contract (thus, going outside its adjudicative function) may be set aside based on
violation of public policy.
In addition to a traditional, three-step analysis, the final question that needs to be
addressed separately is whether an arbitral tribunal vested with power to decide ex aequo
et bono or act as amiable compositeur can modify the contract terms. According to Jarvin
“the terms of the contract may not be modified by the arbitrator acting as amiable
compositeur.”284 Conversely, Berger argues that: “[…] this procedural notion of arbitration
is incompatible with the creative character of decisions required in cases of adaptation and
gap-filling which involve the evaluation of economic issues and the rewriting of the parties’
contract. From this perspective, gap-filling and contract adaptation are not arbitrable, unless
the arbitrator is freed from the constraints of substantive law and is authorized by the parties
to act as ‘amiable compositeur’.”285 Taking into account the application of Article 28(4) of
the Model Law, it is more sensible for the tribunal to refrain frommodifying the contract
terms under its ex aequo et bonomandate.286
6.4 Decisions accessory to the parties’ main submissions and the merits of
the case
Three types of tribunal’s decisions need to be discussed under this section. At first, the
analysis will focus on the tribunal’s decision on interest (section 6.4.1). It will then be
followed by reflections on costs (section 6.4.2) and on procedure (section 6.4.3).
282 A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.41 para 8.
283 A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.44 para 32.
284 (Jarvin, The sources and limits of the arbitrator’s powers, 1996) p.71.
285 (Berger, Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make Sense, 2001) p.2.
286 See section 6.2.5.
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6.4.1 Decision on interest
Due to the fact that an arbitral tribunal’s decision on interest may be as important as a
decision on an underlying claim in terms of a monetary value, the way how it is tackled
by the arbitrators may be of substantial relevance. The court testing the arbitral award of
interest against allegations arising out of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of theModel Lawwould need
to approach it cautiously.
At the outset, one should conclude that no conclusive answer can be given as to the
character of the power to award interest (procedural or substantive) in the Model Law
jurisdictions. It has been reported that “[t]he laws that govern the power of a tribunal to
award interest also vary. In some jurisdictions, for example Bermuda, Hong Kong, England,
and Scotland, the power to award interest is governed by the law of the place of arbitration.
In others, for example under German conflict-of-laws rules, the liability to pay interest is a
question of substantive law and this is governed by the law of the contract.”287
Additionally, it is necessary to point out that the Model Law in itself does not include
any provision on interest.288 Yet, “[a] number of states that have adopted the Model Law
have modified the statute, to include an express authorization for the arbitrators to award
interest, but typically without specifying any standards governing such awards. The typical
formulation in such legislation is ‘[u]nless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal
may award interest’.”289 For example, in Singapore, the power of the tribunal to award
interest is prescribed by Sections 12(5)(b) and 20 of the SIAA. “Even in the absence of
express statutory authority, there should be no doubt concerning the authority of an arbitral
tribunal to award interest.”290
By and large, the broad arbitration clause should (impliedly)291 encompass interest
claims.292 It stems from the fact that interest claims would be accessory to the underlying
claims and as such interest claimswill follow the fate of the underlying contractual claims.293
287 (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) p.528. In Singapore, the power to award interest would be
a matter of procedure as well. See (Merkin & Hjalmarsson, Singapore Arbitration Legislation Annotated,
2009) p.44.
288 It has been discussed by the UNCITRAL, however. See A/CN.9/460 paras 101-106, A/54/17 paras 367-369.
289 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3103.
290 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3103.
291 Notably, the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, the 2017 ICC Rules, the 2012 ICC Rules
and the 1998 DIS Rules are silent on the power of the tribunal to award interest. Rule 32.9 of the 2016 SIAC
Rules is, therefore, an exception.
292 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3104 (“The parties’ arbitration agreement must, of
course, encompass interest claims in order for the arbitrators to be able to make a valid award of interest. In
virtually all cases, an arbitration agreement applicable to an underlying claimwill be interpreted to encompass
claims for interest in connection with that claim. The conclusion is almost always (correctly) assumedwithout
discussion.”).
293 If the main claim will be found inadmissible or will fall outside the scope of the arbitration agreement, it
will have the same effect as to the accessory interest claims. If the main claim fits within the ambit of the
agreement to arbitrate (in the absence of the contrary stipulation), it will also include claims for interest in
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For this reason, if the reviewing court will not find any qualification within the agreement
to arbitrate prohibiting the tribunal to award interest, the challenge on the first level of
the three keyholes test will likely fail.
The general considerations of the second step of the three keyholes test will apply in
the context of awarding interest. It means that the starting but also the end point of the
relief granted is the parties’ request. The UNCITRAL Digest reported that “[a]n award
was partially set aside in a case where the arbitral tribunal awarded interests on the sums
in arrears without being asked to do so. Thus, only the part of the award relating to the
interests claimed was set aside.”294 Another award was also set aside in New Zealand when
it departed from the parties’ submissions on interests and costs.295 Consequently, interest
being awarded by the tribunal on its own initiative might satisfy the reviewing court that
the tribunal acted beyond the parties’ submissions and to (partially) set aside the award.296
It has been observed, however, that “[i]n exercising this discretion [to award interest],
the tribunal will typically invite submissions and evidence from the parties on these issues
in the same way as it would in respect of any other request for relief. Thus, parties will usually
have an opportunity to set out their respective positions on the rate of interest to be applied,
the period for which it should be applied, andwhether a different rate (for example a statutory
legal interest rate) should be applied for the period following the rendering of an award up
until payment. In making such submissions, parties would do well to make an award of
interest as easy for a tribunal as possible by providing the calculations upon which such an
award would be based.”297 Consequently, the tribunal might be granted a certain degree
of discretion regarding the decision on interest. Therefore, arguably, if the decision on
interest (i) is consultedwith the parties and (ii) does not violate public policy (of the country
of the seat), it might survive the challenge even if the issue of interest has been raised by
the tribunal on its own initiative.
Finally, it should be expected that the reviewing court will also test an arbitral award
regarding interest against its compliance with the legal rules of public policy of that
connection with the main claim. See also (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) p.528 (“Most
institutional rules of arbitration do not contain express provisions for the payment of interest, largely because
their draftsmen assumed that an arbitral tribunal has the power to make an award in respect of interest in
just the same way as it has the power to make an award in respect of any other claims submitted to it.”).
294 (UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 2012)
p.154, with a reference to Jaral Decoración, S.L v. Peñasco Rodilla, SL, Madrid Court of Appeal, Spain,
2 February 2007, case No. 94/2007—7/2005.
295 See Parts & Services Limited v. Brooks [2005] NZHC 293.
296 (Pulkowski, 2010) p.121. One should note that the judgment mentioned therein is not from a Model Law
jurisdiction. It is expected, however, that such a challenge would succeed also before the court in a Model
Law country.
297 (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) pp.529.
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country.298 Notably, in some jurisdictions (e.g. Muslim countries) the general notion of
awarding interest might be against public policy.299
6.4.2 Decision on costs
The costs incurred in arbitration may represent substantial amounts. Additionally, the
method for costs allocation differ greatly between jurisdictions. For these reasons, parties
may be tempted to challenge the tribunal’s (costs) findings at the post-award stage. At the
same time, one should not disregard, however, the value of the decision on costs as an
important managerial tool given to the tribunal.
As in the case of power of the tribunal over interest,300 theModel Law does not provide
any express provision on awarding costs.301 “Nonetheless, there is no question but that the
Model Law permits arbitrators to make awards of the costs of the arbitration and legal costs
(absent to the contrary agreement).”302 The lack of aModel Law provisionmight, however,
be remedied by states adopting the Model Law. By doing so states may design a useful
fallback mechanism for the tribunals. This is the case, for example, with Germany that
included an express provision that authorizes the tribunal to decide on costs.303 Additionally,
often and even in the absence of a statutory provision, the tribunals will be able to rely on
costs provisions in the applicable institutional rules.304
“A claim in respect of the costs incurred by a party in connection with an international
arbitration is, in principle, no different from any other claim, except that it usually cannot
be quantified until the end of the arbitral proceedings.”305 In essence, therefore, the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge will become operational in the context of the decision on
costs in the traditional three hypotheticals, namely, (i) the agreement of the parties limits
298 Which would be in turn either the law of the seat or the law where the possible enforcement will take place.
Other legal regimes might be also at stake, for example (i) law governing the arbitration agreement or (ii)
the law governing the contract. The focus of the analysis at hand should be narrowed to the question, on
how the national courts approach “the excess of mandate” type of challenge. Consequently, the courts
during the setting-aside and enforcement proceedings are not competent to review themerits of the award,
therefore they will not test the arbitral award against compliance with the public policy of every possible
legal system involved (thus for example the law applicable to the arbitration agreement or the law applicable
to the contract, unless of course it is their own law).
299 (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) pp.527-528.
300 See section 6.4.1.
301 This possibility of including an express provision on the power of the arbitral tribunal to award costs has
been considered by theUNCITRAL as potential futurework, before the text of theModel Lawwas amended
in 2006; see A/CN.9/460 paras 107-114.
302 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2009) p.2490.
303 See Art. 1057 of the GCCP.
304 See, e.g., Arts. 40-43 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 38 of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art. 37 of the 2012 ICC
Rules, Section 35 of the 1998 DIS Rules, Rule 35-37 of the 2016 SIAC Rules.
305 (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) p.532.
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the tribunal’s authority over costs (or expressly directs how the costs should be allocated),306
(ii) the costs granted are higher or granted although not requested, and (iii) the costs
granted violate the public policy rules. Put differently, the general considerations of the
three keyholes test will be correspondingly applicable in the case of costs. Thus, a tribunal’s
decision on costs must, in principle, respect the parties’ agreement to arbitrate,307 costs
must have been sought by a party and a decision on costs may be reviewable on the public
policy ground.
This paradigm may change, however, depending on the governing law of the seat and
applicable arbitration rules. For example, in theGerman context,Wolff observes that “[t]o
the extent that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to rule on costs, it will decide sua sponte,
ie even if the parties have not requested a cost decision.”308 Additionally, tribunals, while
deciding on costs, should be able to take into account the parties’ conduct in the
proceedings, which means that it should have a power to sanction the parties’ delaying
tactics and failure to proceed in a cost effective manner.309 As a consequence, arguably,
the tribunal’s decision on costsmight still survive the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge
even not aligned with parties’ underlying agreement and requests.
6.4.3 The procedural decisions of the arbitral tribunal
The procedural decisions of an arbitral tribunal should not be susceptible to the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge. Instead, one should consider invoking Article 34(2)(a)(iv)
of the Model Law which in relevant part reads that the award may be set aside if “the
arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such
agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Law fromwhich the parties cannot derogate,
or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Law […].”
306 Telestat Canada and Juch-Tech, Inc., 2012 ONSC 2785 (CanLII), par. 64, <http://canlii.ca/t/fr848#par64>,
[last accessed 27 April 2018] (“The arbitrators cannot give what the arbitration clause does not permit or
provides for otherwise.”). See (Kreindler,Wolff, &Rieder, Commercial Arbitration inGermany, 2016) p.297
(“The arbitral tribunal’s discretion is limited by party agreements on a cost allocation standard. […]However,
the price for such foreseeability is the lack of flexibility when it comes to finding a suitable cost allocation for
a specific case.”).
307 See fn.306.
308 See (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.295.
309 See, e.g., Art. 38(5) of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art. 37(5) of the 2012 ICC Rules. (Schütze, 2013) p.178 (“[…]
[the] arbitral tribunal will take account of the parties’ conduct throughout the proceedings, considering in
particular whether the party has conducted the arbitration in an expeditious and cost effective manner or
whether it has applied delaying tactics […].”).
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7 Concluding remarks
TheModel Law is a remarkable instrument thatmakes it possible to harmonize the general
perception of international arbitration and to improve its efficiency as a dispute resolution
system. Together with the New York Convention, it can be perceived as one of the
milestones of themodern architecture of arbitration. In order to provide essential coherence
with the enforcement regime prescribed by the New York Convention, the Model Law
mirrors legal norms envisaged in the New York Convention. This statement holds true
also in the case of the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge. On the one hand, this solution
(i.e. the similarity of provisions in these texts) can be praised for its harmonizing effect;
on the other hand, however, the wording of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law can
easily be criticized for its unclear wording.
By and large, the Model Law design serves its purpose: it favors arbitration, grounds
for refusal are limited, national courts generally refrain from reviewing the merits of the
arbitral decisions. Notwithstanding the above, the “excess of mandate” type of challenge
calls for an improvement. Such a development has already been proposed by van den Berg
in his “MiamiDraft” andwill be discussed further in theNewYork Convention chapter.310
It is argued that a simple change in the language of Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law
would enhance a clearer and, thus, more uniform application of the recourse mechanism.
Generally, it has been concluded that “the submission to arbitration” should be
interpreted broadly in a way that includes not only the arbitration agreement but also the
parties’ subsequent submissions. Furthermore, in determining the scope of the submission
to arbitration, the reviewing court should accept the notion that the parties may have
requested the tribunal to decide on the issues that are disputed (i.e. disputes) but also on
the other questions that are not necessarily disputed by the parties (i.e.matters).
A national court in a Model Law jurisdiction, when faced with the challenge on the
basis of the “excess of mandate” should only test whether (i) an arbitral tribunal’s decision
grants either party something more or something different than the parties consented to
arbitrate in their submissions to arbitration or whether (ii) an arbitral award goes beyond
the parties’ request stated in their submissions. These considerationsmay be supplemented
by the courts’ reflections on the question whether (iii) the arbitral award violates rules of
public policy character. The court’s review on these three levels would constitute the
proposed three keyholes test.
310 Pursuant to proviso 5(3)(c) of the Miami Draft: “Enforcement of an arbitral award shall be refused if, at the
request of the party against whom the award is invoked, that party asserts and proves that […] the relief
granted in the award is more than or different from, the relief sought in the arbitration and such relief cannot
be severed from the relief sought and granted.”.
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Accordingly, one should consider that the challenge pursuant to Article 34(2)(a)(iii)
of the Model Law is limited to a comparison of the relief sought by the parties and the
relief granted by the arbitral tribunal. Therefore, it is argued that in the Model Law the
“excess ofmandate” type of challenge is exceptionally narrow and can be used only against
an award ultra petita. Consequently, a challenging party might need to invoke different
grounds of Article 34(2)(a) of the Model Law in order to challenge the arbitral award that
they perceive to be granted in “excess” of “the tribunal’s mandate”.311
In conclusion, it should be reasonably expected that most arbitral tribunals will not
dare to render a decision beyond the parties’ request and thus the challenge on the basis
ofArticle 34(2)(a)(iii) of theModel Lawwill be successful only in exceptional circumstances.
311 For example, the inability to present its case (Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) of the ML) or failure to follow the agreed
procedure (Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) of the ML).
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III France and Book IV of the Code of Civil
Procedure
1 Introduction
“Paris, the Home of International Arbitration” is the praise found on one of the websites1
which aims at attracting users of arbitration to choose Paris as the seat of arbitration and
it is just one of many examples that evidences that the French are active (and successful)
in promoting the French legal system and Paris as a preferred place for commencing
arbitral proceedings.2 Indeed, France maintains it is the venue that is regularly selected by
parties because of the expertise of the French courts in arbitral matters and modern
legislation that is supportive of arbitration.
France adopted the new arbitration law with the Decree No. 2011-48 of 13 January
2011 which went into force on 1 May 2011 and was included in Book IV of the Code of
Civil Procedure (hereafter “the CCP”). The new arbitration law replaced the previous
regime that had been introduced at the beginning of the 1980s. It is said to “update” the
previous law by “incorporating rules developed by case law” and by “adopting new
provisions”.3 The French arbitration law is divided into two parts: the first (Title I) is
applicable to domestic arbitration and the second (Title II) provides rules for the
international arbitration proceedings. What is relevant for the research at hand is what
type of recourse against the mandate of the arbitral tribunal is recognized under French
law for international arbitration.
According to Article 1520(3) of the CCP “An award may only be set aside where […]
the arbitral tribunal ruled without complying with the mandate conferred upon it […].”4
This provision precisely corresponds to the research question and for this reason it will
be a key target for the analysis below.
1 See http://www.parisarbitration.com/home/ [last accessed on 28 April 2018].
2 See, e.g., (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.142 (“France is one of the leading centers
for international commercial arbitration in Europe and, indeed, the world.”).
3 (Derains & Kiffer, National Report for France, 2013) Chapter I(1). Notwithstanding these developments,
some academic writings and case law pre-dating the enactment of the new law remain relevant and will be
taken into account. Referencesmade to the preceding act (i.e. the 1981Act) will be qualified as the references
to “the Old CCP”.
4 (“Le recours en annulation n’est ouvert que si […] [l]e tribunal arbitral a statué sans se conformer à lamission
qui lui avait été confiée […].”). In this chapter, the translations of the French Arbitration Law as provided
by Gaillard, Leleu-Knobil and Pellarini will be used. For their translation see
http://www.parisarbitration.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/French-Law-on-Arbitration.pdf [last accessed
on 28 April 2018].
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By and large, as long as the concept of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate relates mainly to
the tribunal’s adjudicative role, other types of “non-compliance” (other than the adjudicative
one)5 may very well be successfully invoked when challenging the award. The reason for
this may be traced back to the dualistic nature of the tribunal’s mandate. On the one hand,
as pointed out above, the mandate relates to adjudicating the disputes between parties. At
the same time, however, it relies on the parties’ consent and is constrained by their contract.
This in turn creates two sets of obligations that the tribunal needs to observe.6 Before
elaborating further on this topic, a few brief comments (of more general nature) shall be
made.
Firstly, it is necessary to recognize the dualistic nature of the French arbitration regime.
In brief, it means that different legal rules applies to domestic arbitrations and different
ones to international cases. It is necessary to assess what the impact of this distinction on
a challenge procedure is.
Secondly, one should elaborate on the main characteristics of the court’s standards of
review. It means that one should determine what the grounds are for a recourse to the
court and to what extent a court is able to scrutinize an arbitral tribunal’s decision, and
what types of remedies are at the court’s disposal.
Thirdly, after explaining the basic concepts governing the setting-aside procedure, it
is necessary to focus in detail on the French approach to the mandate and the possibility
to challenge its excess. Additionally, the analysis should include reflections on the limitations
that structure the scope of the arbitral tribunal’smandate, namely the agreement to arbitrate,
the parties’ submissions and underlying principles of international public policy as seen
by the French courts.
Finally, different categories of tribunal’s decisions will be tested in order to determine
if (and if so when) they can be successfully challenged under the French concept of the
excess of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate. These decisions have been grouped thematically:
the first group focuses on the basis of the claim (for example whether the claim or the
counterclaim is based on contract or not), the second one deals with the particularities of
the process of the tribunal’s application of law, the third addresses the tribunal’s ability to
grant remedies and in the fourth and final part decisions accessory to the parties’ main
submissions are grouped (e.g. decision on costs or interest). The underlying goal is to
comprehensively catalogue (most of) the tribunal’s decisions that are crucial in fulfilling
the tribunal’s adjudicative mission. It is envisaged that such a model will make it possible
to pinpoint what the crucial factors are that allow the successful application of the excess
of mandate ground.
5 For example, decisions in violation of the parties’ procedural agreement.
6 See also (Giraud, 2017) p.94.
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The concluding sectionwill aim at summarizing the reflections presented in this chapter.
Generally, it should clarify how to apply excess of mandate challenges regarding specific
issues that arise in the arbitral process.
2 Dualism of the French arbitration regime: different statutory
architecture for domestic and international arbitration
As mentioned above, the French arbitration law accommodates the concept of an
autonomous international arbitration regime, which is, to a certain extent, more liberal
than the French statutory rules applicable in the domestic setting (section 2.1). Importantly,
however, domestic rules are still relevant in the international context (section 2.2).
2.1 Legal framework for international arbitration
The unique status of international arbitration was embedded in the French arbitration
system, even before the introduction of the Decree of 1981.7 The reform of the early 1980s
constituted an “[…] affirmation of the specific nature of international arbitration [which]
is one of the most significant features of French law. Following these statutory reforms, the
more liberal regime applicable to international arbitration was maintained and reinforced
by the French courts.”8 This characteristic of the French arbitration law was reconfirmed
by the most recent reform of 2011.
An independent statutory framework for international arbitration is, by and large,
tailored to offer amaximumamount of flexibility for the users of international arbitration.
At this point, however, reflections should be limited only to the details of the international
arbitration law relevant for the research at hand. Therefore, it is necessary (i) to determine
when arbitration can be qualified as international, (ii) to list the basic features of the
international arbitration regime, and (iii) to highlight those that may be relevant with
regard to the challenges against the tribunal’s mandate at the post-award stage.
As to the first point, the French international arbitration law gives a short and broad
definition of international arbitration. Pursuant toArticle 1504 of theCCP, “[a]n arbitration
is international when international trade interests are at stake”.9 From the perspective of
7 (Poudret & Besson, 2007) p.26.
8 (Gaillard & Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 1999) p.64.
Although this reference was made to the Old CCP, it holds true for the new CCP as well.
9 (“Est international l’arbitrage quimet en cause des intérêts du commerce international”). The same definition
was available before the 2011 reform. See Art. 1492 of the Old CCP. No changes had been proposed by the
Comité Français de l’Arbitrage; see Art. 1490 of the Proposal (Proposed Law: Texte proposé par le Comité
Français de l’Arbitrage pour une réform du livre IV NCPC, 2006).
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this definition it is, therefore, the character of the transaction that is relevant in order to
determine whether it is appropriate to apply the French international arbitration law.10
“The criterion is purely objective, focusing essentially on the object of the contract which
gives rise to the arbitration and not the nationality, domicile or seat of the parties.”11
Consequently, one should note that other connecting factors would be irrelevant per se:
“[t]he international character of an arbitration must be determined on the basis of the
economic reality of the transaction out of which it arises; in this connection, it suffices that
the economic transaction in question gives rise to the transfer of goods, services or funds
across borders, irrespective of the nationality of the parties, the law applicable to the contract
or to the arbitration, and also of the place of arbitration.”12 In other words, the nationality
of the respective parties,13 the law applicable to the merits14 or to the procedure,15 or even
the parties’ will to define an arbitration as international16 might not be important at all
andwould not automatically trigger the application of the French international arbitration
regime.17 “The essential criterion lies therefore in a material or immaterial crossborder
transfer.”18
The second point aimes at listing the features of the French law on international
arbitration which make it an attractive choice for the parties. Arguably, the outstanding
elements of the French arbitration regime that deserve to be mentioned are the following:
the centralized jurisdiction of the President of the Tribunal de grande instance of Paris
10 See also (Carducci, The Arbitration Reform in France: Domestic and International Arbitration Law, 2012)
p.149 (“Consequently, the French law regime for international arbitration applies as to a dispute submitted
to arbitration concerning a transaction which is not economically limited within the boundaries of a
country”) with a reference to Cour de Cassation Civ 1re, 26 January 2011, INSERM v. Fondation Letten F.
Saugstad, No. 09-10198 (“L’internationalité de l’arbitrage fait appel à une définition économique selon laquelle
il suffit que le litige soumis à l’arbitre porte sur une opération qui ne se dénoue pas économiquement dans un
seul Etat.”).
11 (Poudret & Besson, 2007) p.31. For further reading on the economic criterion, see also i.a. (de Boisséson,
1990) pp.424-427, (Robert, 1993) pp.226-229, (Rouche, Pointon, & Delvolvé, 2009) pp.29-31.
12 CA Paris, 14 March 1989, Murgue Seigle v. Coflexip, Rev. Arb. 1991, p.355. Translation after (Rouche,
Pointon, &Delvolvé, 2009) pp.30-31. See also CAParis, 29March 2001,Carthago Films v. Babel Productions,
Rev. Arb. 2001, p.543, and (Clay, Code de l’arbitrage commenté, 2015) pp.169-174.
13 CA Paris, 29 March 2001, Carthago Films v. Babel Productions, Rev. Arb. 2001, p.543.
14 CA Paris, 29 March 2001, Carthago Films v. Babel Productions, Rev. Arb. 2001, p.543; see also CA Paris,
Sporprom Service B.V. v. Polyfrance Immo, Rev. Arb. 1984, p.87.
15 CA Paris, 29 March 2001, Carthago Films v. Babel Productions, Rev. Arb. 2001, p.543.
16 Cour de Cassation Civ 1re, 20 November 2013, Giepac Bourgogne/Saica Pack v. Automation Group, No.
12-25266.
17 One should also note, however, the argument by the authors in (Derains & Kiffer, National Report for
France, 2013) Chapter I(1): “Although the transaction is decisive and not the parties’ nationality or will, Art.
1504 looks at the dispute that is the subject of the arbitration, as this may be determined by other facts and
circumstances than the transaction. Thus, a domestic contract may lead to an international arbitration if the
dispute implicates international commercial interests. The reverse situation is also possible.”
18 (Poudret & Besson, 2007) p.32.
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who has the role of a judge acting in support of the arbitration (“juge d’appui”)19 and,
importantly, who can act (i.a.) “when one of the parties is exposed to a risk of a denial of
justice”,20 the freedom to opt out from the rules introduced by the French arbitration law
(both domestic and international),21 and the relaxed standards as to the form of the
arbitration agreement.22
The third and final point deals with the two characteristics of French international law
that directly influence the scope of the tribunal’s mandate and the challenge against its
mandate. The first relates to the tribunal’s freedom to select rules applicable to the merits
of the dispute (in the absence of the parties’ choice). The second concerns the possibility
to waive the right to set the award aside in France.23
Pursuant toArticle 1511 of theCCP, “[t]he tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance
with the rules of law chosen by the parties or, where no such choice has been made, in
accordance with the rules of law it considers appropriate. In either case, the tribunal shall
take trade usages into account.”24 This provision offers the tribunal an extensive power to
directly determine the applicable rules of law. The consequences are two-fold: the first is
that the tribunal is not obliged to conduct any conflict of laws analysis in order to decide
what law applies to the dispute. The second is that the tribunal, in the absence of the parties’
express or implied choice, may opt for non-national rules of law (such as the UNIDROIT
Principles) as applicable to the merits of the case.25 In any event, the tribunal should also
take into consideration trade usages. Since the process of application of law by the arbitral
tribunal will be discussed in further detail at a later stage, for now, it suffices to say that
France promotes a liberal approach with regard to the process of the application of law.26
Pursuant to Article 1522 of the CCP: “by way of a specific agreement the parties may,
at any time, expressly waive their right to bring an action to set aside. Where such right has
19 See Art. 1505 of the CCP. A judge acting in support of arbitration will exercise his/her competence only
when parties did not designate any other body or institution to enforce the arbitral bargain. Therefore, if
parties had agreed that the arbitral institution will act as an appointing authority, their choice will prevail
over the defaultmechanism including juge d’appui involvement. See further (Bensaude, 2015) pp.1144-1145.
20 See Art. 1505(4) of the CCP. Notably, in cases of a risk of denial of justice (by and large with regard to the
constitution of the arbitral panel), the juge d’appui may be competent even if there is no connection with
France at all. See, e.g., (Gaillard, France Adopts New Law onArbitration, 2011), (Carducci, The Arbitration
Reform in France: Domestic and International Arbitration Law, 2012) p.149, (Bensaude, 2015) p.1145.
21 See in particular Art. 1506 of the CCP. Also, section 2.2 below and i.a. (Carducci, The Arbitration Reform
in France: Domestic and International Arbitration Law, 2012) pp.149-150.
22 Art. 1507 of the CCP.
23 See further section 5.5.
24 (“Le tribunal arbitral tranche le litige conformément aux règles de droit que les parties ont choisies ou, à
défaut, conformément à celles qu’il estime appropriées. Il tient compte, dans tous les cas, des usages du
commerce.”).
25 See also (Carducci, The Arbitration Reform in France: Domestic and International Arbitration Law, 2012)
pp.152-153, and (Bensaude, 2015) pp.1156-1157.
26 For further reading, see section 6.2.
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been waived, the parties nonetheless retain their right to appeal an enforcement order on
one of the grounds set forth in Article 1520. Such appeal shall be brought within one month
following notification of the award bearing the enforcement order. The award bearing the
enforcement order shall be notified by service (signification), unless otherwise agreed by the
parties.”27 This provisionwas introduced by the 2011 reform.What is essential is that when
a party decides to waive its right to set aside, it is still able to resist enforcement (if sought
in France) by appealing against the enforcement order28 on the same grounds used for the
setting-aside proceedings. As a result of such a successful appeal against the enforcement
order, the arbitral awardwill not be annulled. It will “only” be denied recognition in France,
whichmeans that a party successful in arbitrationwill still be able to enforce it elsewhere.29
2.2 The importance of domestic arbitration law
Although the initial idea of the Comité Français de l’Arbitrage was to introduce two fully
independent sets of rules, one for domestic arbitration and the other one for international
arbitration,30 this concept was eventually replaced by the system whereby some of the
domestic arbitration provisions apply to international arbitration unless parties have agreed
otherwise. “Thanks to this extension [of the domestic arbitration regime], fewer provisions
are listed in the shorter ‘International Arbitration’ Title II of the Decree, whose objective is
to set out exclusively those provisions truly specific to international arbitration.”31 Therefore,
although international arbitration is meticulously distinguished from the domestic
arbitration system, it does refer to the relevant principles that are set out in the domestic
regime.
Pursuant to Article 1506 of the CCP: “Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, and
subject to the provisions of the present Title, the following Articles shall apply to international
arbitration: (1) 1446, 1447, 1448 (paragraphs 1 and 2) and 1449, regarding the arbitration
27 (“Par convention spéciale, les parties peuvent à toutmoment renoncer expressément au recours en annulation.
Dans ce cas, elles peuvent toujours faire appel de l’ordonnance d’exequatur pour l’un des motifs prévus à
l’article 1520. L’appel est formé dans le délai d’un mois à compter de la notification de la sentence revêtue de
l’exequatur. La notification est faite par voie de signification à moins que les parties en conviennent
autrement.”).
28 This is the only instance where the challenge against an enforcement order can be filed. See Art. 1524 of
the CCP.
29 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1175: “[…] in the case of such a waiver, there will be no possibility for either party to
obtain the setting aside (or annulment) of the award at the place where the award was rendered.”
30 (Carducci, The Arbitration Reform in France: Domestic and International Arbitration Law, 2012) p.129.
For the proposal see (Proposed Law: Texte proposé par le Comité Français de l’Arbitrage pour une réform
du livre IV NCPC, 2006). For the explanatory note to the proposal see (Devolvé, 2006). Still, even the
proposal made a minor cross reference to the (proposed) Arts. 1483 and 1484 that constitute a part of the
domestic arbitration law.
31 (Carducci, TheArbitrationReform inFrance:Domestic and InternationalArbitrationLaw, 2012) pp.149-150.
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agreement; (2) 1452 through 1458 and 1460 regarding the constitution of the arbitral tribunal
and the procedure governing application to the judge acting in support of the arbitration;
(3) 1462, 1463 (paragraph 2), 1464 (paragraph 3), 1465 through 1470 and 1472 regarding
arbitral proceedings; (4) 1479, 1481, 1482, 1484 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 1485 (paragraphs 1
and 2) and 1486 regarding arbitral awards; (5) 1502 (paragraphs 1 and 2) and 1503 regarding
means of recourse other than appeals or actions to set aside.”32
For the purpose of the research at hand, the application of the last two provisions may
be relevant. Article 1502 of the CCP in the first two paragraphs contemplates recours en
révision which is an exceptional recourse against the arbitral award and “[i]t is the only
possible basis on which to challenge an award on the grounds of fraud.”33 Importantly,
application should bemade to the arbitral tribunal.34 Additionally, Article 1503 of theCCP
further clarifies that “no opposition may be filed against an arbitral award, nor may the
Cour de Cassation be petitioned to quash the award.”35
Overall, as long as the international arbitration regime is shaped upon its independent
structure, it relies on certain fallbackmechanisms introduced already in domestic arbitration
law. That being said, following the language of Article 1506 of the CCP, partiesmay always
contract out of these rules.
3 Court standard of review during the setting aside
At the post-award stage, the French courts are prone to take a pro-arbitration stand on
arbitration awards (section 3.1) as is demonstrated by the scope of the review undertaken
(section 3.2), as well as the remedies exercised as to the arbitral award (section 3.3).
32 (“A moins que les parties en soient convenues autrement et sous réserve des dispositions du présent titre,
s’appliquent à l’arbitrage international les articles: «1° 1446, 1447, 1448 (alinéas 1 et 2) et 1449, relatifs à la
convention d’arbitrage; «2° 1452 à 1458 et 1460, relatifs à la constitution du tribunal arbitral et à la procédure
applicable devant le juge d’appui; «3° 1462, 1463 (alinéa 2), 1464 (alinéa 3), 1465 à 1470 et 1472 relatifs à
l’instance arbitrale; «4° 1479, 1481, 1482, 1484 (alinéas 1 et 2), 1485 (alinéas 1 et 2) et 1486 relatifs à la
sentence arbitrale; «5° 1502 (alinéas 1 et 2) et 1503 relatifs aux voies de recours autres que l’appel et le recours
en annulation”).
33 (Derains & Kiffer, National Report for France, 2013) Chapter VII(4)b).
34 Art. 1502 (paragraph 2) of the CCP states that “Application shall be made to the arbitral tribunal.”
35 (“La sentence arbitrale n’est pas susceptible d’opposition et de pourvoi en cassation.”). As explained by the
authors of the translation: “Opposition is a form of a recourse under French law, available when a judgment
is rendered by default because a defendant was not properly notified of a hearing. The defendant can then
“oppose” the judgement.” See http://www.parisarbitration.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/French-
Law-on-Arbitration.pdf [last accessed on 28 April 2018].
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3.1 Pro-arbitration approach towards the arbitration award
The French arbitration regime constitutes amodel designwhen it comes to pro-arbitration
fashion; the “pro-arbitration approach” entails that the legal framework does not allow
for much interference in the arbitral process.36 Most importantly, however, the French
courts are willing to enforce the parties’ bargain to arbitrate their disputes without getting
involved, unless the most basic principles are at stake.
When it comes to testing the arbitral award after it is rendered, the French system of
international arbitration prescribes only a short list of themost grievous irregularities that
can be invoked by a challenging party.37 This list is exhaustive38 and cannot be altered.39
In other words, parties may not agree to add other grounds to the list or to expand the
court’s control over the award to the merits of the case.40 It goes without saying that at the
same time parties cannot remove any of the grounds for challenge. The only alternative
is to opt out of the setting-aside procedure at large.41
The pro-arbitration approach is also manifested by the fact that the arbitral award (at
the post-award stage) is reviewed at the level of the Court of Appeal42 and that challenges
are only rarely accepted. It is important to note that the same factual underpinning may
trigger different challenges.43 Notably, however, “if a party fails to specify the grounds for
36 It is also expressed i.a. by the so called negative competence-competence. According to this principle, the
courts will only test prima facie if the parties concluded an agreement to arbitrate, thus they will not interfere
and let the tribunal address the question of its own competence in the first place. Importantly, however,
this mechanism favoring arbitration is relevant at the outset of the arbitration and during the proceedings
instead of at the post-award stage.
37 Pursuant to Art. 1520 of the CCP, the award may be set aside when (i) the tribunal wrongly upheld or
declined its jurisdiction, (ii) the tribunal was not properly constituted, (iii) the tribunal ruled without
complying with the mandate conferred upon it, (iv) due process was violated, or (v) recognition or
enforcement of the award is contrary to international public policy. For the research at hand primarily the
third ground is important.
38 See, e.g., (Seraglini & Ortscheidt, 2013) pp.853-854, (Loquin É., 2015) p.420. See also CA Paris, 10 January
2012, Société Sharikat al Ikarat Wal Abnieh (SIWA) S.A.L. v. Société Butec S.A.L., Rev. Arb. 2012, p.203
which reads that “the action to set aside in international matters is available only under grounds exhaustively
listed in Article 1502 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (“Le recours en annulation d’une sentence arbitrale
rendue en matière internationale n’est ouvert que dans les cas limitativement énumérés par l’article 1502 du
Code de procédure civile.”).
39 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1176.
40 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1176, (Seraglini & Ortscheidt, 2013) p.854 (“L’appel, voie de recours ouverte dans
l’arbitrage interne […] est exclu à l’encontre d’une sentence rendue en France en matière internationale.”).
41 See section 5.5. For further reading, see also (Scherer, The fate of parties’ agreements on judicial review of
awards: a comparative and normative analysis of party-autonomy at the post-award stage, 2016) pp.437-457.
42 Pursuant to Art.1519(1) of the CCP: “[a]n action to set aside shall be brought before the Court of Appeal of
the place where the award was made.” (“Le recours en annulation est porté devant la cour d’appel dans le
ressort de laquelle la sentence a été rendue.”).
43 The usual difficulty and the risk of confusion exist between the challenge against the excess of mandate and
(i) the excess of jurisdiction (Art. 1520(1) of the CCP) and (ii) the violation of due process (Art. 1520(4) of
the CCP).
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the action or chooses the wrong grounds, the courts may be inclined to re-characterize the
basis of the action rather than declaring it inadmissible.”44
3.2 The scope of the court’s review
As highlighted above, the scope of the court’s review during the setting aside is of a limited
nature. It means that this type of recourse will by no means allow the court to review the
merits of the case.45 This principle has been defined by Chantebout in the following way:
“the principle prohibits the judge to consider the merits of arbitral awards referred to him
and to refuse exequatur or to set aside the arbitral awards on the grounds that he finds a
disagreement [with the tribunal’s findings] or that they [themerits] seem incorrect to him.”46
At the same time, (i) the French courts have the right to review the arbitral award based
on the statutory grounds for setting aside and (ii) this notwithstanding they often give a
deference to the arbitral tribunal.
The level of scrutiny allowed to the courts is rather high. For example, already in 1987,
theCour de Cassation in one of its decisions stated that, although the role of the setting-aside
court is limited to the examination of the setting-aside grounds enumerated therein, “there
is no restriction upon the power of the court to examine, as a matter of law and in
consideration of the circumstances of the case, elements pertinent to the grounds in question
[…] in particular, it is for the court to construe the contract in order to determine itself
whether the arbitrator ruled in the absence of an arbitration clause.”47 It therefore means
44 (Derains&Kiffer, National Report for France, 2013) Chapter VII(2)(B)(a). See also (Seraglini &Ortscheidt,
2013) p.881, (Loquin É., 2015) pp.420-421. (Clay, Code de l’arbitrage commenté, 2015) p.208.
45 For example Loquin reflects that “[t]he principle of no review on the merits of the award has been gradually
developed by the courts which deduced that any criticism of the motivation of the award is inadmissible.” See
(Loquin É., 2015) p.413 (“Le principe de non-révision au fond de la sentence a été progressivement dégagé
par la jurisprudence qui en déduit que toute critique de la motivation de la sentence est irrecevable.”). See
also (Gaillard& Savage, FouchardGaillardGoldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 1999) p.923,
(Seraglini & Ortscheidt, 2013) pp.880-881, (Racine, 2016) p.588.
46 (Loquin É., 2015) p.413 with the reference to (Chantebout, 2007): “[u]n auteur [Chantebout] a défini ce
principe pas son objet: il interdit au juge de tenir compte du bien-fondé des sentences arbitrales qui lui sont
déférées et de leur refuser l’exequatur ou de les annuler au motif qu’il éprouve un désaccord ou qu’elles lui
paraissent erronées.”.
47 (“Mais attendu que, si la mission de la Cour d’appel, saisie en vertu des articles 1502 et 1504 du nouveau
Code de procédure civile, est limitée à l’examen des vices énumérés par ces textes, aucune limitation n’est
apportée au pouvoir de cette juridiction de rechercher en droit et en fait tous les éléments concernant les vices
en question; qu’en particulier, il lui appartient d’interpréter le contrat pour apprécier elle-même si l’arbitre a
statué sans convention d’arbitrage”); translation after 26 International LegalMaterials (1987) pp.1004-1007
slightly different translation offered in Southern Pacific Properties Ltd. v. Southern Pacific Properties (Middle
East) Ltd., The Arab Republic of Egypt, Cour de Cassation [Supreme Court], Not Indicated, 6 January 1987,
Y.B. Comm. Arb. 152, 154 (1988).
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that the setting-aside court will enjoy the power to review all the issues of the case48 to the
extent that it is necessary to assess the challenge of the award itself.
Similarly, in another, more recent case theCour de Cassation held that the “annulment
judge reviews the arbitral tribunal’s award on jurisdiction, regardless of whether it is positive
or negative, by enquiring into all the legal and factual elements [of the dispute] enabling him
to determine the scope of the arbitration agreement and to determine the consequences for
the compliance with themission entrusted to the arbitrators.”49 The same has been observed
by Bensaude: “[i]n deciding upon the setting aside of an award, or upon the appeal of an
enforcement order under art. 1520, the Court of Appeal has the power to examine any
evidence and factual or legal submissions that it considers relevant to determine whether the
action should succeed on any of the grounds specified in art. 1520. Moreover, the Court of
Appeal has the power to review de novo any issue that may provide a basis for action under
art. 1520 regarding jurisdiction […], the regular constitution of the tribunal, as well as alleged
violations of [procedural and substantial public policy].”50
One can thus conclude that the Court of Appeal in its capacity of setting-aside court
is not restricted by the tribunal’s conclusions, but rather is able to exercise an independent
analysis. “Having said this, the Court of Appeal tends to give deference to findings of arbitral
tribunals, particularly with respect to questions of fact.”51
Respecting the tribunals’ findings, however, is a sensible solution, especially when the
existence or validity of the arbitration agreement is not questioned. In the end, one should
always conclude that the parties accepted that it would be the arbitral tribunal and not the
court that decides the dispute. It might be particularly important with regard to the review
of (i) the scope of the jurisdiction and (ii) the excess of mandate.
In the former instance (which would generally be challenged under Article 1520(1) of
the CCP), as pointed out above, there is no objection as to the existence or validity of the
agreement to arbitrate and the only concern relates to the scope of the jurisdiction. In turn,
if the setting-aside court is willing to examine the scope of the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal anew (without any consideration to the tribunal’s findings on the issue) it may
48 (Poudret & Besson, 2007) p.724.
49 Cour deCassationCiv 1re, 6October 2010, FondationAlbert Abela Family v. Fondation JosephAbela Family,
Rev. Arb. 2010, p.969 (“Le juge de l’annulation contrôle la décision du tribunal arbitral sur sa compétence,
qu’il se soit déclaré compétent ou incompétent, en recherchant tous les éléments de droit ou de fait permettant
d’apprécier la portée de la convention d’arbitrage et d’en déduire les conséquences sur le respect de la mission
confiée aux arbitres.”). Translation after G. Born in (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014)
p.3209 with themodification to the last part of it (“et d’en déduire les conséquences sur le respect de lamission
confiée aux arbitres.”), which was omitted in the original translation.
50 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1178.
51 (Bensaude, 2015) pp.1178-1179. Cour de Cassation Civ 1re, 10 October 2012, Neoelectra Group v. Tecso,
No. 11-20299.
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lead to the situation where the same (scope) question is disputed at length before two
different fora. Such a scenario is undesirable to say the least.
In the latter instance, the reviewing court, in principle, should focus on whether the
prayers for relief sought by the parties have been answered in the award. If the reviewing
court is vested with the power of independent determination of all circumstances of the
case, only a fine line separates it from reevaluating the merits of the case and thus acting
as an appellate body. For example, if the challenge is based on the allegation that the tribunal
exceeded its mission by requalifying the claim defined in the Terms of Reference,52 a
reviewing court that does not give any deference to the tribunal’s analysis may come to
different conclusions as to what constitutes a claim. Consequently, and arguably, it may
be eager to accept the challenge only because its findings differ from those of the tribunal.
For the above reasons, the power of de novo review is well balanced in France by the
great deference given to the arbitral awards by setting-aside courts. At all times one should
remember that the analysis of the setting-aside courts is strictly limited to the grounds
listed and the review of the merits is strictly prohibited.53
3.3 Remedial powers of the courts
Taking into account the pro-arbitration stand of the French international arbitration
regime, one can expect that only themost flagrant wrongdoing of the arbitral tribunal will
justify the annulment of the award. For this reason, setting-aside courts have been equipped
with tools that can be used to limit the consequences of the award being set aside. Therefore,
it is necessary to briefly reflect on the availability of measures of (i) partial setting aside,
(ii) remission and (iii) sanction for the abuse of the right to challenge the award.
Arguably, one of the most pro-arbitration mechanisms at the courts’ disposal is the
partial setting aside of the award. It means that the court carefully examines an arbitral
award and annuls only the part of the award that meets the requirements of Article 1520
of the CCP. Consequently, the setting-aside court can use this tool when faced with
challenges as to the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction or as to the ambit of the tribunal’s
mandate. The basis for the partial setting aside of the award can be, albeit implicitly,54
found in Article 1527(2) of the CCP, which reads that: “[a] decision denying an appeal or
application to set aside an award shall be deemed an enforcement order of the arbitral award
or of the parts of the award that were not overturned by the court.”55 As aptly explained by
52 For example, on the basis of the subsequent submissions.
53 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3183-3184, (Loquin É., 2015) p.420.
54 See (Seraglini & Ortscheidt, 2013) p.872.
55 (“Le rejet de l’appel ou du recours en annulation confère l’exequatur à la sentence arbitrale ou à celles de ses
dispositions qui ne sont pas atteintes par la censure de la cour.”).
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Bensaude, “with respect to international awards rendered in France, art. 1527 provides that
if the Court of Appeal rejects an action for setting aside an award in whole or in part, the
rejection of the setting aside action constitutes an enforcement order for the corresponding
part of the award in France.”56
The power to remit, however used infrequently, might serve as a useful tool to rectify
a flawed award. In essence, remission “permits a court, presented with an annulment
application, to allow the arbitrators an opportunity to take further steps or decisions, which
might render the annulment application unnecessary or inappropriate.”57 Alas, the remission
is generally not available as a remedy at the post-award stage of international arbitration
proceedings in France.58Without going into further details, one should note that, as argued
by Derains, “the only exception is fraud.”59 Additionally, it is necessary to stress that
application for revision (“recours en révision”) should be done directly to the tribunal that
rendered the award60 or to the newly constituted one, if the former cannot reconvene.61
Finally, French courts take a strong position against the abusive use of the right to set
aside.62 As reported by Bensaude: “[i]n recent years, the Paris Court of Appeal increasingly
sanctions parties who frivolously seek to block enforcement or recognition of international
awards under art. 1520 […], or file claims under this provision that are found to be clearly
inadmissible and filed for the sake of generating adverse publicity […]”.”63 All things
considered, both the partial setting aside and sanctions for the abuse of right seem to be
sufficient and work effectively for achieving the pro-arbitration philosophy of arbitration
regime in France.
56 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1186. See also CA Paris, 18 September 2012, S.A. Buildinvest et autres v. M. Guy Roy,
Rev. Arb. 2012, p.867 where the court concluded that nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure prevents an
action for a partial annulment (“Aucune disposition du Code de procédure civile ne fait obstacle à l’exercice
d’une action en annulation partielle d’une sentence arbitrale.”).
57 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3152.
58 (Seraglini & Ortscheidt, 2013) pp.872-873.
59 (Derains & Kiffer, National Report for France, 2013) Chapter VII(2)(B)(b) with the reference to Cour de
Cassation Civ 1ere, 25 May 1992, Société Fougerolle v. Société Procorance, Rev. Arb. 1993, p.91.
60 See Art. 1502(2) of the CCP.
61 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1187.
62 For further reading, see (Lécuyer, 2006).
63 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1179. The author made references to three cases, namely CA Paris, 21 January 1997,
Société Nu Swift PLC v. SociétéWhite Knight et autres,Rev. Arb. 1997, p.429, CAParis, 6May 2004,Carthago
Films v. Babel Productions, Rev. Arb. 2006, p.661, and CA Paris, 18 February 1986,G. Aïta v. A. Ojjeh, Rev.
Arb. 1986, p.583. In all three cases the court awarded the aggrieved parties damages (“les dommages-intérêts”).
See also (Seraglini & Ortscheidt, 2013) p.867. Additionally, Lécuyer in (Lécuyer, 2006) pp.585-589 further
explains what types of sanctions are available (analyzing damages (“les dommages-intérêts”), fines (“l’amende
civile”), irrecoverable costs (“les frais irrépétibles”) and costs (“les dépens”)).
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4 Delineation of the mandate: the importance of the consent, the
request and the law: the three keyholes test
Having established that the arbitral tribunal’s mandate for the purpose of Article 1520(3)
of the CCP is the function of resolving the dispute within the limits imposed by the parties,64
one should conclude that the mandate of the arbitral tribunal is unequivocally set by the
parties’ consent. Therefore, it is necessary to identify sources evidencing that consent,
namely an agreement to arbitrate (section 4.1) and the parties’ submissions (section 4.2).
In addition, the possible implications of legal rules should also be analyzed (section 4.3).
4.1 Agreement to arbitrate
An agreement to arbitrate is the ultimate source of the parties’ consent and inevitably the
starting point for any arbitral process. It also constitutes one of the cornerstones of the
tribunal’s mandate.65 Therefore, when deciding the case, the tribunal should closely follow
the scope of the parties’ initial agreement to arbitrate. French international arbitration law
proves to be a very progressive regime when it comes to requirements regarding an
agreement to arbitrate, both when it comes to the requirements (i) as to the form of an
agreement to arbitrate and (ii) as to the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.
Pursuant to Article 1507 of the CCP: “an arbitration agreement shall not be subject to
any requirements as to its form.”66 According to Bensaude, “an agreement to arbitrate may
exist whenever evidence is provided that there is a ‘common intent of the parties’ to arbitrate
their disputes.”67 It means that virtually all agreements to arbitrate will bind the parties, no
matter inwhat form theywere drafted, as long as some evidence exists showing the parties’
intent to arbitrate.68 It goes without saying that an agreement to arbitrate can take the form
64 See section 5.4.
65 Although an agreement to arbitrate is essential in the consensual paradigmof the arbitral tribunal’smandate,
whenever the challenge is directed at the scope of the agreement to arbitrate it fits better under the category
of the excess of jurisdiction rather than under the mandate issue. Consequently, it would trigger the
application of Art. 1520(1) of the CCP instead of Art. 1520(3) of the CCP. See further, e.g., section 6.1.1
(and the second main question therein). See also (Giraud, 2017) pp.68-72.
66 (“La convention d’arbitrage n’est soumise à aucune condition de forme.”).
67 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1136 with a reference to Cour de Cassation Civ 1re, 20 December 2000, Prodexport v.
FMT Productions, Rev. Arb. 2003, p.1342.
68 It holds true in cases of international agreements to arbitrate. In the domestic context, French (domestic)
arbitration law ismuch less lenient. See Art. 1443 of the CCP in particular. Some of the domestic arbitration
law provisions are applicable to international arbitration by virtue of Art. 1506 of the CCP. This way
principles of separability and competence-competence are introduced. Apart frommentioning the fact that
these domestic provisions do not have much impact on the notion of the tribunal’s mandate, as such they
will not be discussed further.
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of an arbitration clause (referring to arbitration of future disputes) or of a submission
agreement (being an agreement to arbitrate already existing disputes).69
The same liberal approach is offered to the interpretation of the scope of the arbitration
agreement and the parties’ “common intent to arbitrate”.70 For this reason, “the language
of the clause [is] critical.”71 In other words, parties should take their time in carefully drafting
their agreement to arbitrate, especially if they want to narrow the adjudicative powers of
the tribunal. For example, as aptly concluded, “[a] broadly worded clause will generally be
found to cover both contract and tort claims arising out of or in connection with the contract
at issue.”72
Additionally, one should also take into account the impact that arbitral rules73 may
have on the scope of the tribunal’s powers. Considering that “the language of the clause is
critical”,74 reference to the rules may give an indication of the intent to be bound by the
content of such rules.
At all times, a broad definition of the arbitral mandate will require the tribunal to
adjudicate the dispute.75 Therefore, an agreement to arbitrate should explicitly call for a
judicial determination of the dispute, i.e. a final and binding resolution of the dispute
between the parties by the arbitral tribunal.76 Consequently, “it may be said that where a
third party is appointed by disputants merely to express an opinion or to give
recommendations or proposals which are not binding, such third party is not an arbitrator;
thus, persons are not arbitrators unless they are appointed to adjudicate, and so resolve a
dispute.”77
Overall, an agreement to arbitrate is an essential element to conduct an arbitral process
and a primary source of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate.78 Although, in an international
context, the legal requirements are rather relaxed, the result of the agreement to arbitrate
69 (Giraud, 2017) p.74 (“Par l’emploi de la formule générique « convention d’arbitrage », la jurisprudence vise
tant le compromis que la clause compromissoire.”).
70 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1180.
71 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1181.
72 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1181 with reference to CA Paris, 19 May 2005, SA Sucres et denrées v. Société Talsy
Shipping Co Ltd., Rev. Arb. 2006, p.927.
73 That is procedural rules of arbitral institutions or the UNCITRAL Rules.
74 See fn.71.
75 For further reading, see section 5.1. See also (Giraud, 2017) pp.102-103.
76 For further reading, see (Oppetit, 1998) pp.72-81, (Rouche, Pointon, &Delvolvé, 2009) pp.21-22, (Carducci,
The Arbitration Reform in France: Domestic and International Arbitration Law, 2012) p.127, (Loquin É.,
2015) pp.5-12.
77 (Rouche, Pointon, & Delvolvé, 2009) p.22.
78 See also fn.65. Arguably, there might be a slight difference in interpreting the pre- and post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate (thus arbitration clauses and submission agreements), because after the dispute
arises, the parties are more conscious in delineating the tribunal’s adjudicative authority.
90
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
should “be an adjudication, which is binding upon the parties in the samemanner as a court
judgment.”79
4.2 Relevance of parties’ submissions: reference of a dispute and other
requests of the parties
As already highlighted above “[…] themandate of the arbitrators is defined by the arbitration
agreement and limited by the subject matter of the dispute as framed by the parties’ claims
even if the issue to be decided is not mentioned in the terms of reference.”80 It entails that (i)
the initial agreement to arbitrate serves only as a provisional determination of the arbitral
tribunal’s adjudicative mandate, because it is narrowed further down by the actual claims
submitted to the tribunal. At the same time, however, (ii) the parties’ subsequent
submissions may also play a role in a potential modification of claims introduced at the
beginning in the agreement to arbitrate.
The first point is rather clear-cut, because it merely points out that the parties’ petita
restrict the scope of the tribunal’s powers. Put differently, the tribunal will only be
competent to decide on the claims that have been brought by the parties. These should
generally be brought at the earliest stage of the proceedings.81 Importantly, however, claims
submitted should fit within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate,82 unless there is a clear
indication that parties intend to modify their earlier agreement to arbitrate.83
The second point is a bit more sensitive in nature. It reflects the instances where the
parties amend (or expand) their initial claims and inevitably influence the limits given to
the adjudicative mandate in the first place.84 Such amendments or expansions might raise
legitimate concerns, because thesemay contradict the consensual character of the tribunal’s
mandate.85 For this reason, changes should always be subjected to the acceptance of all
79 (Rouche, Pointon, & Delvolvé, 2009) p.16.
80 (Derains&Kiffer,National Report for France, 2013)ChapterVII(2)(B)(a)(3). See alsoCAParis, 27November
2008, Société GFI informatique SA v. Société Engineering Ingegneria Informatica SPA et autre, Rev. Arb.
2009, p.229, where it was concluded that “[t]he arbitrator’s mandate, is defined by the agreement to arbitrate
and limited primarily by the subject-matter of the dispute, as determined by the claims of the parties.” (“La
mission de l’arbitre, définie par la convention d’arbitrage, est délimitée principalement par l’objet du litige,
tel qu’il est déterminé par les prétentions des parties.”).
81 Other (subsequent) parties’ submissions throughout the arbitral process are also of relevance. Especially if
claims are being modified or added, which is discussed in the second part of section 4.2.
82 (Giraud, 2017) p.70.
83 The modification on the level of the agreement to arbitrate might be relevant not only to the dispute at
hand but also to any other future dispute arising under this agreement to arbitrate. It also distinguishes this
hypothetical from the modifications of the relief sought.
84 It will also be discussed further in section 6.1.
85 (Giraud, 2017) p.132 (“Il pourrait être objecté que la modification des contours du litige par la soumission
d’une demande nouvelle contredit le caractère conventionnel de la mission arbitrale.”).
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entities involved. At times, however, new submissions presented without any objection
by the opposite side might be considered as tacitly accepted by the opposite side and be
considered as permission for the tribunal to act in this modified scope.
In the proceedings under the ICC Arbitration Rules, the Terms of Reference (“l’acte
de mission”) constitute an additional element on the procedural map. The ICC Terms of
Reference stress the importance of well-defined and structured claims at the initial stage
of the proceedings. Consequently, it gives a clear framework for the tribunal’s adjudicative
mandate86 and imposes an obligation on the parties to prepare their claims carefully. After
the Terms of Reference are signed, they can be changed only with the authorization of the
arbitral tribunal.87 Occasionally, however, it may happen that the claims as introduced in
the Terms of Reference are broad or leave a backdoor open for the alteration of claims.
This scenario will be further discussed below.88 Briefly speaking, such a drafting strategy
may result in difficulties with challenging the excess of the tribunal’s mandate.
4.3 Mandatory rules of law of (French international) public policy and
their impact
Arbitration, being a creature of contractual origins, is always subject to the underlying
principles of justice that are at the core of any legal system. These principles are expressed
by the mandatory rules of law of a public policy character. Under French international
arbitration law, not all violations of public policy rulesmay constitute a ground for recourse.
Pursuant to Article 1520(5) of the CCP, an arbitral award may be set aside only if
“recognition or enforcement of the award is contrary to international public policy.”89 Further,
the concept of international public policy entails both procedural and substantive public
policy.
In principle, procedural public policy is related to the due process considerations90 and
substantive public policy will be violated in cases, for example, of bribery, corruption or
86 It is even further evidenced by the French name of the Terms of Reference: “l’acte de mission”.
87 See Art. 23(4) of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art. 23(4) of the 2012 ICC Rules. It is logical the consequence of the
consensual character of the mandate: after the Terms of Reference are signed, the parties and the tribunal
accept the shape of the mandate as certain. Therefore, if any of the parties wishes to change the scope of
the mandate, the tribunal needs to accept a modification. See also section 6.1.5.
88 See section 6.1.5.
89 (“La reconnaissance ou l’exécution de la sentence est contraire à l’ordre public international.”). It means that
the violation of policy has to be the consequence of the recognition or enforcement and not of the award
itself.
90 See Art. 1510 of the CCP.
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money laundering.91 Additionally, a public policy violation needs to cause an actual harm
to the party alleging violation92 and traditionally it was necessary that the violation was
“flagrant, effective and concrete”.93 This standard greatly limited the French courts
intervention. The more recent case law, however, departs from the requirement that the
violation needs to be flagrant.94 Consequently, although the threshold for violation of the
(French) international public policy remains high, the French courts reclaim a greater
control over the arbitral awards when scrutinizing if the award violates the international
public policy.95
The outstanding question is how public policy rules affect the concept of the mandate.
In principle, they are relevant, because they impose on the tribunal a duty to follow them.
In that sense, it is a duty autonomous from the contractual framework for the tribunal’s
mandate. Consequently, public policy rules may have an impact on several aspects of the
tribunal’s adjudicative mandate. For example, the tribunal will not be able to resolve
non-arbitrable disputes. It will also need to comply with due process rules.96 Furthermore,
French international public policy may have an impact on the process of (mis)application
of law, or even its manifest disregard. These issues will be addressed further in the part
below.97
91 See, e.g., CA Paris, 21 February 2017, République du Kirghizistan v. M. Belokon, Rev. Arb. 2017, p.336, CA
Paris, 16 January 2018, Société MKGroup v. SARLOnix et autre, Rev. Arb. 2018, p.295. For further reading,
see also (Bensaude, 2015) pp.1166-1167 (in the context of the enforcement of the awards) and pp.1183-1185.
92 CA Paris, 21 January 1997, Société Nu Swift PLC v. Société White Knight et autres, Rev. Arb. 1997, p.429.
93 CAParis, 18November 2004, SAThalès AirDéfense v. GIE Euromissile, Rev. Arb. 2005, p.752 (“Considérant
que la violation de l’ordre public international au sens de l’article 1502-5° duNCPC doit être flagrante, effective
et concrète, que le juge de l’annulation peut certes, dans le cadre de ses pouvoirs de nature disciplinaire, porter
une appréciation en droit et en fait sur les éléments qui sont dans la sentence déférée à son contrôle, mais pas
statuer au fond sur un litige complexe qui n’a jamais encore été ni plaidé, ni jugé devant un arbitre concernant
la simple éventualité de l’illicéité de certaines stipulations contractuelles”). Cour de Cassation Civ 1re, 4 June
2008, Société SNF SAS v. Société Cytec Industries BV, Rev. Arb. 2008, p.473.
94 See e.g.CA Paris, 20 January 2015, SA Telecel Faso v. SA Alcatel Lucent International, Rev. Arb. 2015, p.273
(referring to manifest and concrete violation of international public policy) or CA Paris, 14 April 2015,
République Hellénique v. Société Bombardier Inc., Rev. Arb. 2015, p.645 (referring to effective and concrete
standard), CA Paris, 21 February 2017, République du Kirghizistan v. M. Belokon, Rev. Arb. 2017, p.336
(referring to manifest, effective and concrete requirements); same CA Paris, 16 January 2018, Société MK
Group v. SARL Onix et autre, Rev. Arb. 2018, p.295. For further reading e.g. (Racine, 2016) pp.601-602.
95 CA Paris, 21 February 2017, République du Kirghizistan v. M. Belokon, Rev. Arb. 2017, p.336 (referring to
manifest, effective and concrete requirements); CA Paris, 16 January 2018, Société MK Group v. SARL Onix
et autre, Rev. Arb. 2018, p.295.
96 See Art. 1510 of the CCP.
97 See section 6 at large. Generally, public policy will not be discussed in every subsection of section 6. It will
be considered only in parts where its application is relevant.
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5 The French concept of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate and
testing its excess at the post-award stage
For as long as the general notion of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate has been present in
international arbitration, only very few jurisdictions have decided to introduce an “excess
of mandate” ground to their post-award challenge mechanism.98 It has already been
highlighted above that, under the French international arbitration law, such a recourse is
possible and can be found in Article 1520(3) of the CCP, which reads that the award may
be set aside if “the arbitral tribunal ruled without complying with the mandate conferred
upon it.”99 The problem lies, however, with defining the notion of the mandate itself and
determining when it is exceeded.
Indeed, on its face, the third prong of Article 1520 of the CCP seems to be an elusive
concept. Perhaps even more so in the present version of the provision, when one looks at
the verbs used and the use of the verb confier in particular. A thorough analysis has initially
been presented by Giraud in his thesis where he analyzed the verbs used in Article 1520(3)
of the CCP: statuer (Eng. “to rule”), se conformer (Eng. “to comply”) and confier (Eng. “to
entrust, to confide”). When comparing the 1981100 and 2011101 versions of the French
international arbitration law, the third out of these verbs has replaced the verb conférer
(Eng. “to confer”) whichwas used in the 1981 version of the French international arbitration
law. These two words are often considered as synonyms.
On top of that, Giraud highlights that neither commentators, nor courts have attributed
any meaning to this change.102 At the same time, however, he suggested that the use of
conférer focuses more on the formal aspect of the tribunal’s mandate, whereas the use of
the verb confier puts in the spotlight the relation of trust between the person who entrusts
and the person who is entrusted with. His observations are correct and, arguably, such a
change may affect the types of arguments brought against the award in the setting-aside
proceedings as well as the way the provision is being interpreted, because it gives room to
rely on the concept of trust, which is subtle.
Accordingly, the notion of breach of trust may not necessarily be limited to the
contractual framework (e.g. a written agreement103), but opens the possibility to invoke
98 France, the Netherlands and Sweden. See Art. 1065(1)(c) and Art. 1065(4) of the Dutch Code of Civil
Procedure and Section 34(3) of the Swedish Arbitration Act respectively.
99 (“Le tribunal arbitral a statué sans se conformer à la mission qui lui avait été confiée”).
100 Art. 1502(3) of the Old CCP (“L’appel de la décision qui accorde la reconnaissance ou l’exécution n’est ouvert
que dans les cas suivants […] si l’arbitre a statué sans se conformer à la mission qui lui avait été conférée”).
101 Art. 1520(3) of the CCP (“Le recours en annulation n’est ouvert que si […] [l]e tribunal arbitral a statué sans
se conformer à la mission qui lui avait été confiée”).
102 (Giraud, 2017) p.31.
103 As to the importance of the constraints in writing, see section 4; also (Giraud, 2017) p.133.
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other expectations from the tribunal.104 Consequently, it may influence how the courts
will approach the excess ofmandate challenge in the future. It is so particularly considering
that it may be (and it is) overly tempting for the award-debtor to interpret the excess of
mandate ground excessively broad and to use it as a ground that accommodates many
different procedural and substantive challenges. In turn, this may endanger the efficiency
and the finality of the arbitral process.105
The analysis below relies greatly on the recent noteworthy study of Giraud, who
undertook a similar exercise of searching for themeaning of the arbitral tribunal’smandate,
its limits and possible venues for challenge at the post-award stage.106 In his analysis, he
decided to use two terms in order to structure the analysis of the mandate, one with a
broad meaning and the second with a narrow scope. Giraud, therefore, suggests that the
mandate can be understood both in a broad sense as a responsibility (or function) (“la
mission-office”)107 and in a narrow sense as a contract (“lamission-contrat”).108 At the same
time, he argues that none of those definitions alone fits the notion of themandate envisaged
by Article 1520(3) of the CCP. Instead, he suggests that the concept of the mandate in
Article 1520(3) of the CCP envisages a correlation of the two, namely it addresses the
adjudicative responsibility (or function) (“la mission-office”) that is shaped by the parties’
agreement (“la mission-contrat”).109
Consequently, one should reflect on the concept of the mandate under French
international arbitration law in its broad (section 5.1) and narrow sense (section 5.2) and
the one which is reflected under Article 1520(3) of the CCP (section 5.4). Additionally,
104 One should also reflect that the most common English translation for the French word “mission” is an the
English “mandate”, where it could be easily possible to translate it as the English “mission”. Arguably, it
would go in line with the “trust paradigm” explained above. Notably, as such (i.e. “mission”) it was used
by Craig in his article (Craig W. L., The arbitrator’s mission and the application of law in international
commercial arbitration, 2010).
105 In similar vein, it has been argued by Poudret and Besson in (Poudret & Besson, 2007) p.741, that “the
mission of the arbitrator defines both his duties and powers so that this ground for setting aside could include
all failures regarding the first and all excesses in respect of the second. Conceived in such a wide manner, it
would not only have the same purpose as the other violations […], but it could excessively weaken the award.”
See also (Gaillard i Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 1999)
pp.937-938.
106 For further reading, see (Giraud, 2017). His reflections, however, are (mostly) limited to French domestic
and international arbitration law. The research at hand aims to scrutinize the “excess ofmandate” challenges
from a comparative law perspective. For further reading, see Chapter VII.
107 (Giraud, 2017) pp.55-58 and pp.94-103.
108 (Giraud, 2017) pp.58-72 and pp.104-114.
109 (Giraud, 2017) p.135 (“Lamission générale de l’arbitre est unemission unique, offrant deux aspects hiérarchisés:
la mission-office de l’arbitre, mission première, est modulée par la mission-contrat, subsidiaire, qui rassemble
les éléments déterminés conventionnellement par les parties. Au sein de ce cadre, la mission visée à l’indice 3
des articles 1492 et 1520 du Code de procédure civile désigne le point particulier de rencontre entre ces deux
missions. Elle correspond à la portion de mission juridictionnelle modelée par la mission conventionnelle. En
d’autres termes, c’est la coloration de la mission-office par la mission-contrat.”).
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since the adjudicative mission of the arbitral tribunal is invariably shaped by the parties’
consent, one should read the following sections together with the part above, namely the
one on the consensual framework of the arbitral tribunal’smandate (section 4).Moreover,
it is necessary to briefly discuss the time limits in exercising adjudicative duties (section
5.3) and – more loosely related to the concept of the mandate – the possibility to contract
out of the setting-aside recourse against the award (see section 5.5).
5.1 The functional aspect of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate
As highlighted above, the main issue at hand is the problem of a precise delineation of the
scope of the tribunal’s mandate (and the meaning of the mandate for the purposes of
Article 1520(3) of the CCP in particular).110 Arguably, if one takes a functional aspect of
the tribunal’s undertakings as a defining, underlying element of the mandate, one will
conclude that themandate of the arbitral tribunal is to finally resolve the dispute(s) between
the parties.111
This broad type of definition brings the adjudication of the dispute to the core of the
tribunal’s mandate. At the same time, definitions often require the tribunal to follow
applicable procedural and substantive rules. Therefore, for example, some authors suggested
that “in a broad sense, the arbitrator’s brief is to reach a fair decision in accordance with the
rules governing the procedural and substantive aspects of the case.”112 Others elaborated
that ‘la mission de l’arbitre’ refers to the tribunal’s “[…] contractual obligation towards the
parties to make a conclusive determination of the disputes submitted to it for resolution, in
an award made in proceedings in which the parties’ agreement as to the applicable rules of
procedure and substantive rules of law have been respected, and any relevant mandatory or
supple[men]tory provisions have been applied”113 or that “themission of the arbitrator defines
both his duties and powers […].”114
These broad definitions, when applied under the Article 1520(3) of the CCP challenge,
expose the tribunal’s mandate to too many ineligible attacks, when one considers, e.g., a
110 See also section 4.
111 For a discussion on tasks undertaken by the arbitral tribunal, see, i.a., (Lévy & Robert-Tissot, 2013)
pp.861-952.
112 (Gaillard i Savage, FouchardGaillardGoldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 1999) pp.937-938.
113 (Rouche, Pointon, & Delvolvé, 2009) p.247.
114 (Poudret & Besson, 2007) p.741 (“The mission of the arbitrator defines both his duties and powers so that
this ground for setting aside could include all failures regarding the first and all excesses in respect of the
second. Conceived in such a wide manner, it would not only have the same purpose as the other violations
studied until now, but it could excessively weaken the award. Even if only serious failures are taken into
account – those violating the fundamental rights of the defence or the requirements of international public
policy – such a ground for setting aside nevertheless has a wide scope and is frequently raised.”).
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tribunal’s alleged non-compliancewith procedural or substantive rules.115 Notably, however,
the definition of themandate as a responsibility or functionmay be useful (for the purpose
of the excess of mandate challenge) whenever temporal limits to the arbitral tribunal’s
mandate are at stake.116
5.2 The contractual framework of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate
The narrow interpretation of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate focuses on the contractual
framework for its powers and duties. It has been stated that: “themandate of the arbitrators
is defined by the arbitration agreement and limited by the subject matter of the dispute as
framed by the parties’ claims.”117 Similarly, other authors observe that the arbitrators exercise
the adjudicative mandate that has its origins in the parties’ contract.118 In other words, the
mandate is confined to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, the Terms of Reference (“l’acte
de mission”), as well as to the claims and defenses which the parties decide to bring before
the tribunal.119 These elements have already been explained above, thus a cross-reference
should suffice.120
The agreement to arbitrate as the contractual element shaping the scope of the submitted
dispute is not the only contractual component surrounding the execution of the tribunal’s
adjudicative mandate. Since resolving disputes is a service rendered to the parties, Giraud
reports that on top of the agreement to arbitrate, several other contractual ties bind the
parties and arbitrator and are relevant in the fulfillment of the adjudicative function of the
arbitrator. He therefore lists the contract of the arbitrator,121 the contract between the
parties and the arbitral institution and the contract between the arbitrators and the arbitral
institution.122 Each of these contractual ties are relevant for exercising the tribunal’s
(adjudicative) mandate, yet, each creates a different set of rights and obligations between
the different actors involved.123 It further implicates a duality of liability. It means that, on
the one hand, the tribunal is provided with arbitral (judicial-like) immunity. On the other
115 For further reading, see section 6.
116 (Giraud, 2017) pp.56-57. See also section 5.3.
117 (Derains i Kiffer, National Report for France, 2013) Chapter VII(2)(B)(a)(3).
118 See (Seraglini & Ortscheidt, 2013) p.22 (“[…] l’arbitre exerçant une mission juridictionelle qui a une origine
conventionelle”).
119 The contractual framework was discussed in detail in the previous sections.
120 See section 4.1 and section 4.2.
121 Occasionally itself considered to fall under the term “mandate”. Its legal character is also uncertain. For
further reading, see (Schöldstrom, 1998).
122 (Giraud, 2017) pp.88-94.
123 For further reading, see (Giraud, 2017) pp.104-115.
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hand, it might face civil liability claims in cases of failure to comply with its contractual
obligations.124
In addition, it is necessary to highlight that the arbitral tribunal’s adjudicativemandate
may be constrained in time, which has to be also analyzed in the contractual dimension
of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate. This issue will be discussed more closely in the section
that follows.125
All in all, if one considers the plethora of issues related to the contractual dimension
of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate, one will find that in fact the contractual definition of
the mandate is inadequate for the purpose of the “excess of mandate” challenge, because
the test of Article 1520(3) of the CCP does not focus on the contractual constraints alone.
Instead, by and large, it relates to the resolution of the dispute as constrained by the parties’
submissions. For this reason, both dimensions of the mandate should be considered in
correlation only.126
5.3 The time limits for the execution of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate
The temporal framework for the arbitral tribunal’s mandate is provided in the French
Code of Civil Procedure. According to French international arbitration law in Articles
1456(1) and 1457(1) of the CCP, (i) the tribunal is constituted when all arbitrators accept
theirmandate127 and (ii) themandate shall be carried out until completed.128 Consequently,
the tribunal is able to exercise its powers over parties and carry out its obligation only
during the duration of themandate. It further implies that any powersmay not be exercised
when the mandate is concluded. In fact, the initial proposal of the Comité Français de
l’Arbitrage for the reform of French arbitration law expressly provided that an award may
be set aside when “the tribunal ruled without complying with the mandate conferred upon
it or ruled after its mandate has expired.”129
124 See (Giraud, 2017) pp.115-121.
125 For further reading, see section 5.3.
126 See further section 5.4.
127 Art. 1456(1) of the CCP reads that: “[t]he constitution of an arbitral tribunal shall be complete upon the
arbitrators’ acceptance of their mandate. As of that date, the tribunal is seized of the dispute.” (“Le tribunal
arbitral est constitué lorsque le ou les arbitres ont accepté la mission qui leur est confiée. A cette date, il est
saisi du litige”).
128 Art. 1457(1) of the CCP reads that: “[a]rbitrators shall carry out their mandate until it is completed, unless
they are legally incapacitated or there is a legitimate reason for them to refuse to act or to resign.” (“Il appartient
à l’arbitre de poursuivre sa mission jusqu’au terme de celle-ci à moins qu’il justifie d’un empêchement ou
d’une cause légitime d’abstention ou de démission.”).
129 (“[L]e tribunal arbitral a statué sans se conformer à la mission qui lui avait été conférée ou après l’expiration
de cette mission”). See Art. 1518 of the Proposal in (Proposed Law: Texte proposé par le Comité Français
de l’Arbitrage pour une réform du livre IV NCPC, 2006) p.516. Cf with Section 34(2) of the old Swedish
Arbitration Act (“if the arbitrators have made the award after the expiration of the period decided on by the
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In summary, the arbitral tribunal’smandate, in its broadmeaning, entails the reference
to the adjudicative function of the arbitral panel, which in turn, is timely framed. This is
arguably one of the dimensions of the parties’ agreed limitations to the tribunal’s
adjudicative function. It is therefore observed that after the deadline passes the tribunal’s
adjudicative mandate ceases to exist. Put differently, in the words of one commentator:
“[a] tribunal that fails to render its award within the applicable deadline, if any, […] fails
to comply with its mission […].”130 Notably, Giraud reports that failure to comply with the
agreed time limit by a few days or even hours will lead to a uccessful challenge of the
award.131 Additionally, he concludes that it entails that the contractual dimension of the
mandate is protected, but, at the same time and by all means, a more flexible solution
would be desirable.132 This is indeed what should be preferred.
There are strong arguments in favour of excluding the availability of the challenge in
the context of delays, in particular minimal ones. When both dimensions of the mandate
are put on a scale, the adjudicative one should prevail. One should observe and prioritize
the essential duty of the tribunal, namely to resolve the dispute. The temporal aspect, albeit
extremely important, does not affect the tribunal’s findings themselves. Arguably, the
decision on the parties’ claims has already been undertaken during the tribunal’s
deliberations and as suchmay serve the sole purposewhy arbitrationwas ever commenced.
A delay in the tribunal communicating its (otherwise much sought) decision should not
by itself invalidate it.
Arguably, setting aside the tribunal’s decision due to a delay puts too much weight on
the contractual aspect of themandate. Nothing inArticle 1520(3) of the CCP directly refers
to the consequences of time delays. Importantly, the current shape of Article 1520(3) of
the CCP is a departure from the first draft proposed by the Comité Français de l’Arbitrage
explained at the outset,133 which could suggest a more lenient and flexible position of the
French legislator.
parties, or where the arbitrators have otherwise exceeded their mandate”). Translation as available at
http://sccinstitute.se/media/37089/the-swedish-arbitration-act.pdf [last accessed 28April 2018] and Section
32(2) of the (new) Swedish Arbitration Act (“if the arbitrators have made the award after the expiration of
the time limit set by the parties”). Translation as available at https://sccinstitute.com/media/
408924/the-swedish-arbitration-act_1march2019_eng.pdf [last accessed 28 April 2019].
130 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1182. Importantly, however, Art. 1463(2) of theCCP (which is applicable to international
arbitration) reads that: “[t]he statutory or contractual time limit may be extended by agreement between the
parties or, where there is no such agreement, by the judge acting in support of the arbitration.” (“Le délai légal
ou conventionnel peut être prorogé par accord des parties ou, à défaut, par le juge d’appui.”).
131 (Giraud, 2017) p.394. See also Cour de Cassation Civ. 1ère, 6 December 2005, L. et B. Juliet v. X. et autres,
No. 03-13.116, Rev. Arb. 2006, p.126 and CA Paris, 18 June 2013, M. Bruno Polge et autre v. M. Philippe
Chaumeau et autres, Rev. Arb. 2013, p.811.
132 (Giraud, 2017) p.394 (“Une telle sanction protège la dimension contractuelle de l’arbitrage. Toutefois, cette
radicalité de droit positif surprend dans une matière habituée à des solutions souples et pragmatiques, et une
évolution est souhaitable.”).
133 See fn.129.
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This is not to say that delays in rendering an arbitral award should be treated lightly.134
Again, arguably, the delays in producing the award are good examples where the remedies
against the arbitrators (for breach of contractual duties) and not against the award itself
should be sought.
5.4 The concept of the mandate (and of its excess) under Article 1520(3)
of the CCP
As highlighted above and underlined byGiraud, neither “the broad”135 nor “the narrow”136
definition of the mandate fits the needs of the excess of mandate challenge.137 This is why,
the abovementioned author offered two definitions of the mandate: (i) the general one
and (ii) the one tailored to the purposes of Article 1520(3) of the CCP.
The first proposes that: “the mandate of the arbitrator is a function entrusted by two or
more parties to one or more individuals to resolve a dispute, while deciding on the basis of
two conflicting legal claims presented by the parties and in accordance with the procedural
rules and rules of law chosen by them [the parties].”138
Conversely, under the second definition, it is suggested that “the mandate of the
arbitrator referred to in the third prong [of Article 1520 of the CCP] identifies the contractual
elements that are directly relevant in the exercise of the adjudicative mandate.”139 Put
differently, Giraud argues that the arbitral tribunal’smandate, understood as a responsibility
(or function), is subsequently limited by the contractual framework of themandate,140 and
should be applied as such for the purposes of Article 1520(3) of the CCP.141
The tailored definition (proposed as alignedwithArticle 1520(3) of theCCP), therefore,
stresses the importance of the contractual restraints on the adjudicative mandate given to
the tribunal by the parties. In other words, one could say that the challenge against the
tribunal’smandate can only be successful if it focuses on violations of contractual restraints
imposed by the parties that expressly relate to deciding on claims, i.e., resolving the dispute
134 Especially considering the pursuit of efficiency imposed on all actors (and arbitrators in particular) in
international arbitration.
135 See section 5.1.
136 See section 5.2.
137 (Giraud, 2017) p.135.
138 (Giraud, 2017) p.134 (“Lamission de l’arbitre est l’office confié par deux ou plusieurs parties à une ou plusieurs
personnes physiques de trancher un litige, en statuant entre deux prétentions juridiques antagonistes, dont
les contours sont déterminés par les parties, et selon les modalités procédurales et les règles de droit qu’elles
choisissent.”).
139 (Giraud, 2017) p.134 (“Lamission de l’arbitre visée à l’indice 3 désigne les éléments conventionnels participant
directement de l’exercice de la mission juridictionnelle.”).
140 See section 5.2.
141 See (Giraud, 2017) pp.134-135.
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brought before arbitrators. Therefore, in the context of the excess of mandate challenge,
the parties’ petita are inevitably in the spotlight. Usually, if the tribunal’s decision is not
aligned with the relief sought by the parties (petita), it is discussed in three variations,
namely (i) ultra, (ii) extra and (iii) infra petita. In principle, therefore, each of these might
in turn trigger the Article 1520(3) challenge. This will be reviewed further under the
following section.142
Since infra petita is covered separately below,143 it is sensible to highlight the difference
between ultra and extra petita. Giraud observes that “the arbitrator adjudicating extra
petita grants something that had not been requested. By definition, the parties have not
envisaged that. The violation of the adversarial process is then quasi systematic. This argument
must be nuanced in the case of ultra petita. The initial request has certainly been exceeded,
but the principle of the request was envisaged by the parties. In such a case, only themodalities
(the amount in case of granting damages) envisaged differ from those in the award. Then
the violation of the adversarial process seems less automatic.”144 Additionally, and
importantly, the ultra petita challenge will be considered separately in comparison to the
request of each party (for example in the case of counterclaims).145
All in all, one should always take into account both the functional and the contractual
aspect of the mandate in the context of the Article 1520(3) test.
5.5 (Contractual) waiver of the right to set an arbitral award aside
As mentioned in the previous section,146 the 2011 reform introduced a new mechanism
within the framework of French international arbitration law that allows the parties to opt
out contractually from bringing setting-aside actions.147
Pursuant to Article 1522 of the CCP: “[b]y way of a specific agreement the parties may,
at any time, expressly waive their right to bring an action to set aside.”148 This mechanism
can be used only under the international regime.149 Additionally, it needs to be sufficiently
142 See further section 6. As to the infra petita, see particularly section 6.1.6.
143 See section 6.1.6.
144 (Giraud, 2017) p.269 (“Il convient de distinguer l’extra de l’ultra petita. L’arbitre qui statue extra petita octroie
quelque chose qui n’avait pas été demandé. Par définition, les parties n’en ont pas discuté. La violation du
contradictoire est alors quasi systématique. Ce raisonnement doit être nuancé en cas d’ultra petita. La demande
initiale a certes été dépassée, mais le principe de cette demande a été discuté par les parties. Dans ce cas, seules
ses modalités – son montant, dans le cas de l’octroi de dommages intérêts – ont varié entre les débats et la
sentence. La violation du principe de la contradiction apparaît alors moins mécanique.”).
145 (Giraud, 2017) p.269, with a reference to CA Paris, 14 December 2000, SA Lapeyre et autres v. Sauvage,
Rev. Arb. 2001, pp.805-810, confirmed Cour de Cassation Com., 9 July 2002, No. 01-01750.
146 See section 2.1.
147 For further reading, see, i.a., (Seraglini & Ortscheidt, 2013) pp.856-863.
148 (“Par convention spéciale, les parties peuvent à toutmoment renoncer expressément au recours en annulation.”).
149 Namely, in domestic system, see Art. 1491 of the CCP.
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specific to be considered as the provision contracting out of the setting-aside review. It
means that, for example, Article 35(6) of the 2017 ICCRules will not satisfy the conditions
to be considered as a valid waiver.150 Notably, as pointed out by Gaillard: “[…] unlike the
law in Switzerland, Belgium or Sweden – where such waiver is available only when none of
the parties has its domicile, habitual residence or business establishment in that country –
French law does not limit the parties’ right to waive an action to set aside.”151
Importantly, contracting out of the setting-aside mechanism will not entail that the
defensive mechanism at the enforcement stage will also be foreclosed.152 Put differently,
if the (international) award that was rendered in France consequently is to be enforced in
France, the resisting party will be able to invoke the same grounds as they would have in
the setting-aside procedure when appealing the enforcement order. The time limits to
appeal are similar to the ones of the setting-aside proceedings, namely “onemonth following
notification of the award bearing the enforcement order”153 or threemonths when a foreign
party is involved.154
6 Application of the excess of mandate ground to selected decisions
of the arbitral tribunal
The previous sections aimed at introducing a (working) definition of the arbitral tribunal’s
mandate and at explaining the key elements limiting the possible scope of the mandate.
Briefly speaking, the analysis above stresses the importance of contractual limitations that
are directly relevant for the tribunal’s responsibility to resolve the dispute.155 In turn, it is
necessary to test what categories of the tribunal’s decisionsmay amount to being undertaken
in excess of the mandate. For the purpose of this exercise, different types of decisions have
been catalogued. Therefore, the excess of mandate challenge analysis will be applied to
decisions on claims (section 6.1), remedies (section 6.3) and other decisions accessory to
the parties’ main submissions (section 6.4). At the same time, reflections on the process
of application of law will be offered (section 6.2).
150 See (Scherer, The fate of parties’ agreements on judicial review of awards: a comparative and normative
analysis of party-autonomy at the post-award stage, 2016) p.441.
151 (Gaillard, France Adopts New Law on Arbitration, 2011) p.2; (Clay, Code de l’arbitrage commenté, 2015)
p.227.
152 (Carducci, The Arbitration Reform in France: Domestic and International Arbitration Law, 2012) p.155
(“[i]f the parties have expressly waived their right to file a recours en annulation against the award, they may
have instead filed an appeal against the court’s ordonnance d’exequatur of the award.”).
153 Art. 1522(3) of the CCP (“L’appel est formé dans le délai d’unmois à compter de la notification de la sentence
revêtue de l’exequatur.”).
154 See (Bensaude, 2015) p.1175. Also (Derains & Kiffer, National Report for France, 2013) VII(2)(B)(b) (“If
foreign parties are involved, the time limit is increased by two months by virtue of Art. 643(2) CCP.”).
155 See sections 4.1 and 4.2.
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6.1 Decisions on parties’ claims
Claims that are brought by the parties outline the tribunal’s mandate.156 They may have a
different source, however. Generally, one of themost obvious ones is the contract towhich
an agreement to arbitrate applies. As a result, a contract (for example its infringement)
may be a reason for bringing contractual claims (section 6.1.1) or counterclaims (section
6.1.2). The situation may get more complicated when claims are based on torts (section
6.1.4) or a set-off (based either on a contract or on tort) is sought (section 6.1.3). Some
difficulties may arise also in cases where new claims (or counterclaims) are submitted
(section 6.1.5) andwhen some claims (or counterclaims) are left unresolved (section 6.1.6).
Under this section it will be reviewed whether a tribunal exceeds its mandate while
rendering a decision on a specific claim, or more explicitly if the tribunal is allowed to
address specific categories of claims depending on their source.
6.1.1 Decision on contractual claims
A contractual claim is perhaps the most basic demand that can be sought by a claimant.157
In the simple scenario where a buyer and a seller conclude a contract of sale (including an
arbitration clause) and the buyer fails to pay, it is most likely that the seller will file a claim
based on a contractual obligation for payment. In principle, the resolution of contractual
claims is the underlying reason why an agreement to arbitrate is introduced in the first
place. As such, it is possible that the tribunal’s decision on a contractual claim is challenged
(albeit unlikely to be successful) under the excess of mandate ground for setting aside.
There are three potential ways to challenge the tribunal’s decision on contractual claims,
which arguably fit into the definition of excess of mandate. The first is a classic example
of the excess of mandate, namely the challenge of the tribunal’s decision that goes beyond
the scope of the parties’ requests.158 The second deals with the requalification of the claim
by the arbitrators. The third refers to the challenge against the fact that the tribunal has
awarded claims as requested (by the parties) which did not, however, conform to the scope
of the initial agreement to arbitrate.
The first notion, namely the ultra (or extra) petita notion requires, by and large, to
compare the request sought by a party with the decision by the tribunal on that request.
156 See sections 5.4 and 4.2.
157 The distinction is made between claims and counterclaims. On the one hand, claims are always introduced
initially by the claimant at the outset of the dispute. Counterclaims, on the other hand, are usually brought
by the respondent (it may so happen that the claimant also submits counterclaims as a response to the
respondent’s counterclaims). Since both types of claims are considered as legally independent they will be
discussed separately.Most of the analysis of this section, however, will be equally applicable to counterclaims.
For further reading, see also sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.4-6.1.6 (including infra petita considerations).
158 Either in the form of ultra or extra petita. See section 5.4. For further reading on parties’ submissions, see
section 4.2.
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If the latter is somewhat larger than or different from the former, then the tribunal exceeds
its mandate. For the purpose of this section, however, the reflections are limited to the
basis of the claim, therefore a contract (and not, for example, the amount of damages
granted).
The second hypothetical concerns the scenario where the tribunal requalifies the basis
for the claim.159 For example, if claimant requests the tribunal to declare the contract
avoided because of non-payment, but the tribunal finds that the contract is avoided because
of force majeure,160 it may be sensible to scrutinize the award for the excess of mandate
challenge.161 That being said, one should consider three scenarios: (i) the tribunal chooses
one of the legal theories presented by the parties, (ii) the tribunal requalifies the basis for
the claim on its own motion, or (iii) the tribunal aims to give sense to claimant’s claims
that are vague or ambiguous.
The tribunal, in principle, does not exceed its mandate when claimant in its request
introduces a few alternatives (or independent) grounds for its claim. In this instance, it is
reasonable to conclude that the tribunal’smandate is shaped by all bases onwhich claimant’s
case is brought and it is up to the tribunal to choose one (if any). At all times, however,
the parties’ requests are subject to restrictions prescribed in the agreement to arbitrate.
Therefore, it may so happen that some of the (alternative) claims fall outside the scope of
the initial agreement to arbitrate and the tribunal is unable to decide on the issue if its
jurisdiction in this respect is challenged by the respondent.162
Requalification of the (basis of the) claim on the tribunal’s own motion might be
considered as an excess ofmandate violation because the tribunal does not act on the basis
of the request. Rather, it exercises independent legal research that would justify granting
the relief sought.163 Consequently, the tribunal effectively advocates for the position of
claimant rather than acts as a neutral adjudicator. In practice, however, the circumstances
of the violation may not be as obvious. Instead of surprising parties with a requalification
of the claim on the face of the award,164 it is more likely that the tribunal invite the parties
159 Requalification may take place either from one contractual ground to another or from a contractual basis
to a non-contractual one (e.g. torts or unjust enrichment).
160 For example, when the debtor is excused because of economic sanctions.
161 Another example is requalifying the claim from a contractual one to a non-contractual one. One could
imagine that a Memorandum of Understanding includes a penalty clause, which is triggered when a party
fails to conclude certain contracts. When a dispute arises, the claimant brings a claim based on a penalty
clause. Despite the claim, the tribunal grants a request on the basis of the failure to negotiate in good faith.
For further reading on the tribunal’s decision based on pre-contractual liability, see also section 6.1.4.
162 It will be discussed at the later stage of this section (section 6.1.1).
163 By and large, this issue will be related to the issue of iura novit arbiter, which will be discussed elsewhere.
See section 6.2.3.
164 See, e.g., CAParis, 25March 2010, Société Commercial CaribeanNiquel v. SociétéOverseasMining Investments
Ltd, Rev. Arb. 2011, p.442, confirmed Cour de Cassation Civ 1re, 29 June 2011, Rev. Arb. 2011, p.678. In
this case the tribunal substituted the compensation for lost profit with the (not invoked) compensation for
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for an extra round of submissions with a hint of what theories the tribunal wishes to be
additionally informed on or even request the parties’ position on the theories introduced
by the tribunal.165 As a result, it may be difficult to show (therefore challenge) the excess
of mandate, because the tribunal will be able to substantiate its conclusions on
supplementary submissions. In any event, a tribunal’s attempt to “improve” the qualification
of claimant’s claimmay raise justified concerns regarding due process and equal treatment
of the parties.166
Yet another question relates to the effect that vague or ambiguous claims have on the
scope of the tribunal’s mandate.167 Although claims should accurately outline the dispute
that needs to be resolved, occasionally a claimant tries to introduce claims in an ambiguous
way in order to leave room for somemodification at a later stage in the proceedings. Such
a tactical maneuver may have consequences for the tribunal’s mandate. One may assume
that (similar to the first scenario above) the tribunal will ask the parties for guidance as to
the exact scope of the submissions. This offers a perfect occasion for the respondent to
object to any loose-end claims that it finds should not be admitted by the tribunal. It is
also an opportunity for the claimant to clarify the meaning of its claims. Notwithstanding
the parties’ efforts to help the tribunal with explaining ambiguous claim(s) (and therefore
with defining the limits to the tribunal’s mandate), the tribunal will need to interpret the
claims submitted. Arguably, its decision on the remaining ambiguities should not be
the loss of the chance. The court found that “this substitution is not ameremethod for evaluating the damage,
but modifies the basis for compensation of OMI.” (Translation after (Dimolitsa, The Raising Ex Officio of
New Issues of Law, 2014) p.26). Consequently, the tribunal violated the parties’ right to be heard. The
commentators highlighted, however, that the tribunal’s approach (i.e. requalification) was aimed at the
efficiency of the proceedings. See (Park, Arbitration in Autumn, 2011) p.293 (“Emphasizing procedural
fairness over efficiency, the Paris Cour d’appel affirmed the parties’ right to comment on new legal theories
even at the addition of cost and delay.”), (Dimolitsa, The Raising Ex Officio of New Issues of Law, 2014)
pp.26-27 (“From a pragmatic point of view, however, the attitude of the arbitrators, who apparently after
due consideration of time parameters did not wish to reopen the proceedings when evaluating the damage, is
understandable. Moreover, dealing with lost profit or loss of chance implies consideration of the same facts,
and in both cases the underlying rules on contractual liability are the same. If the lost profit were retained as
a basis of the evaluation of the damage, any compensation might be dismissed, which would be an unfair
result once CCN’s liability had already been accepted. Finally (and this is not the least of the present reflections,
having also in mind Swiss case law), the loss of chance is a percentage of the lost profit, and the amount of
compensation awarded to OMI on the basis of the loss of chance was actually lesser than the one claimed.
From another point of view, it may though be said that the lost profit and the loss of chance are two different
legal notions that bring into play different rules of evaluation of the damage and alter the subject matter of
proof (objet de la preuve).”).
165 Allowing parties to comment on the tribunal’s findings and new legal theories is of paramount importance
for the well-being of the award at the post-award stage. In all cases, the parties’ right to be heard needs to
be respected. See (Chainais, 2011) pp.449-467, (Giraud, 2017) pp.278-280, (Dimolitsa, The Raising Ex
Officio of New Issues of Law, 2014) pp.25-27.
166 These may be brought under Art. 1520(4) of the CCP. See also Art. 1510 of the CCP.
167 In this case it is in principle a claim (and not the basis for the claim) that is difficult to interpret.
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reviewed168 and should survive the excess of mandate challenge as long as it does not go
beyond the scope of the underlying agreement to arbitrate if contested by the respondent.
Additionally, arguably, many of the problems with vague claims may be avoided in ICC
arbitration once the ICC Terms of Reference are established.169
The secondmain question introduced above deals with a problem occurring when the
request of a party goes beyond the initial agreement to arbitrate and the tribunal agrees to
grant the request nonetheless. It should be pointed out that only the agreement to arbitrate
has a consensual element where the parties mutually agreed to resolve their disputes in
arbitration. A request of a party, conversely, is a unilateral declaration obligating the
tribunal to decide on it. Since the parties’ consent is essential for the tribunal to go forward,
allowing the claim that goes beyond the parties’ authorization (as introduced in the
agreement to arbitrate) should (and would) be challengeable if timely contested by the
respondent. Importantly, however, “[…] the language of the clause will be critical.”170 It
entails that broadly drafted clauses (for example institutional model clauses)171 can be
interpreted as accommodating any type of contractual claim.At the same time,meticulously
formulated (narrow) clauses should effectively prohibit the tribunal from dealing with the
claim that goes beyond the agreement to arbitrate.
That being said, one should note that this notion brings additional controversies with
the delineation between the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the mandate and,
consequently, whether an award is to be challenged on the basis of excess of jurisdiction
or of a mandate.172 Occasionally it is argued that when the tribunal grants relief sought
that allegedly goes beyond the scope of the agreement to arbitrate, it is acting in excess of
jurisdiction and not of mandate.173 For example, Bensaude argues that “a tribunal that
168 There should be no review on the merits, see section 3.2.
169 See Art. 23 of the 2017 ICCRules andArt. 23 of the 2012 ICCRules. The question is whether the ICCTerms
of Reference will be respected as a definite outline of the claims. See, for example, (Loquin É., 2015)
pp.429-430 and the case law therein, suggesting that the ICCTerms of Reference are not a definite limitation
to the tribunal’s adjudicative powers and as such parties may modify claims afterwards. See also (Giraud,
2017) pp.260-263.
170 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1181.
171 See, e.g., the ICC Model Clause (“All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present contract shall
be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more
arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said Rules.”) or the UNCITRAL Model Clause (“Any dispute,
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof,
shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules”).
172 The questionwill be whether a challenge should be brought under Art. 1520(1) or (3) of the CCP. Arguably,
this distinction may have further implications, for example, on the actions that parties should undertake
to be able to rely on the objection at the post-award stage. Generally, parties should act as soon as they learn
about a possible violation. See Art. 1466 of the CCP.
173 A tribunal may face this type of critique particularly in a multi-contract scenario, where different claims
refer to different contractual relationships between the parties. An extra layer of difficulties is added when
different contracts include different dispute resolution mechanisms. These instances will be discussed
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issues an award on matters falling outside the terms of a restrictive arbitration clause runs
the risk that the award will not be enforced in light of art. 1520(1).”174 This is possibly a
more convincing way to approach this specific violation by the arbitral tribunal.
Conceivably, however, there is room to argue that such a violation may trigger Article
1520(3) of theCCP aswell. Even though the tribunal complies with the parties’ submissions,
one should not forget that under Article 1520(3) of the CCP175 the tribunal’s mandatemay
be violated if the tribunal fails to respect the contractual constraints imposed by the parties
on the tribunal’s adjudicative function. One may thus conclude that going beyond the
agreement to arbitrate is in violation of the mandate. Although the better view is to apply
Article 1520(1) of the CCP, at the end of the day, the reviewing court may step in and
modify the legal basis for the challenge. As suggested by Derains and Kiffer: “if a party
fails to specify the grounds for the action or chooses the wrong grounds, the courts [in the
setting-aside action] may be inclined to re-characterize the basis of the action rather than
declaring it inadmissible.”176 Therefore, an award-debtor seeking a challenge may hope
that this rather academic dispute will not affect his chances of success, if a tribunal indeed
decided on a claim beyond the agreement to arbitrate.
All in all, it is rather unlikely that the tribunal’s decision on a contractual claim will go
beyond the scope of its mandate. Similarly, the enforcement of this type of decision will
rather survive a review in terms of French international public policy (unless the contractual
claims were inarbitrable from the very beginning).177
6.1.2 Decision on contractual counterclaims
As aptly suggested by Pavić, “when facing a claim before an arbitral tribunal, the defendant
has three options at his disposal. One is, naturally, to deny the claimant’s allegations. The
other, amore ‘offensive’ tactic, would be to submit a counterclaim, and the third, a ‘defensive’
option, to raise a set-off defense.”178 It entails that when the dispute arises and the respondent
is faced with a claim, on occasion, it may be eager to countersue.179 If it does so, the tribunal
further in the following sections (see section 6.1.2 and section 6.1.3 in particular) and will this applies to
contractual claims as well.
174 See (Bensaude, 2015) p.1181with the reference to CAParis, 22May 2003, SA Ess Food v. Société Caviartrade,
Rev. Arb. 2003, pp.1252-1265.
175 See the definition given by (Giraud, 2017) p.134 (“Lamission de l’arbitre visée à l’indice 3 désigne les éléments
conventionnels participant directement de l’exercice de la mission juridictionnelle.”). For further reading, see
the discussion above in section 5.4.
176 (Derains & Kiffer, National Report for France, 2013) Chapter VII(2)(B)(a) and the case law therein. See
also (Seraglini & Ortscheidt, 2013) p.881.
177 See section 4.3.
178 (Pavić, 2006) p.102.
179 Berger in (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999) p.60 notes that “[a] counterclaim
[…] is a procedural instrument to raise an independent substantive claim, i.e. a means of recourse for the
respondent to take initiative and attack the claimant in order to obtain a separate judgment.”
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would be required to determine if it is possible to entertain such a (counter)claim. Indeed,
the tribunals are often faced with counterclaims (“la demande reconventionnelle”), which
can be distinguished from claims brought by the claimant and which may influence the
scope of the tribunal’s mandate.
Essentially, a counterclaim should be recognized as an independent claim,whichmeans
that it is not affected by the withdrawal of the initial claim and should lead to a separate
tribunal’s decision.180 A counterclaim “[…] aims at [the] obtaining of its credit rather than
the extinction of the mutual claim.”181 Further, the value of a counterclaim can be higher
than the initial claim.182 That being said, it should be noted that the findings of the previous
section will be applicable to counterclaims by analogy.183 It means, in principle, that a
respondent should be able to bring contractual counterclaims in the sameway as a claimant
is able to bring its claims. The situation gets slightly more complicated, however, in a
multi-contract matrix.
When several contractual ties bind the parties, one should reflect on a number of
paradigms, namely whether a counterclaim arises out of (i) the same contract, (ii) different
contracts,184 or (iii) an extra-contractual relationship between the parties. Since the third
instance185 is discussed elsewhere, only the first two will be addressed at this point.
Generally, if one considers that parties in arbitration should have equal rights, then
contractual counterclaims arising out of the same contract as the initial contractual claim
should fit comfortablywithin the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.186 Arguably, therefore,
a contractual counterclaim (arising out of the same contract) should be considered as
nothing else than any other contractual claim (apart frombeing brought by the respondent).
Consequently, for the purpose of the research at hand, the counterclaim will share all the
characteristics of contractual claims as explained above187 and a tribunal’s decision on
contractual counterclaims arising out of the same contract should survive the excess of
mandate challenge.
The extension of the agreement to arbitrate to related contracts will also be generally
possible based on the theory of “group of contracts”.188What will be therefore tested therein
180 Conversely to set-off. See section 6.1.3.
181 (Fortún, 2010) p.454.
182 (Pryles & Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.448. For further
reading, see also, i.a., (Karrer, Jurisdiction on set-off defences and counterclaims, 2001), (Pavić, 2006).
183 See section 6.1.1.
184 This can be complicated further if each contract includes different dispute resolution mechanisms.
185 See section 6.1.4.
186 See (Pryles &Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.449 (“It is the
connection to the contract and not who makes the claim that matters […]”).
187 See section 6.1.1.
188 The “group of contracts” theory has been particularly developed in France. For further reading, see, i.a.,
(Leboulanger, 1996) pp.43-97, (Mantilla Serrano, 2010) pp.19-22. See also Cour de Cassation Civ 1re,
27March 2007,Alcatel Business Systems (ABS) v. société Amkor Technology et autres,Rev. Arb. 2007, p.785.
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is the economic link between the contracts. As reflected by Leboulanger: “[i]n many cases,
the different kinds of agreements seem to give rise to an indivisible transaction, an economical
and operational unit “hidden” behind amulti-contract façade, that actually amounts to one
fundamental single relationship.”189 Consequently, it is likely that the parties’ underlying
intentionwas to accommodate all possible claims arising out of their economic transaction,
which possibly containsmore than one contractual relation. Put differently, if the contracts
are interrelated, it may be sensible to treat them as a single legal relationship.190 It would
be especially the case if parties decided to draft their agreement to arbitrate in broad terms
(containing the wording such as “any dispute arising out of or in connection with this
contract” or the like).
French case law demonstrates, for example, that “where a chain of contracts operates
successive transfer of merchandise property, the arbitration agreement contained in one of
these contracts is transmitted together with the contractual rights at issue, unless evidence
is provided that there was reasonable ignorance of the arbitration clause on the part of the
party against whom that clause is invoked.”191 At the same time, however, it has been
observed that “[…] an award may be found unenforceable under art. 1520(1) where an
arbitral tribunal settles in a single arbitration a dispute concerning two separate contracts
that respectively contain different arbitration clauses providing for arbitration at different
seats.”192 Even in case of the different dispute resolution mechanisms, however, it might
occasionally be reasonable to accept both claims and counterclaims notwithstanding
conflicting dispute resolution regimes.193
One should conclude that the French courts will always try to give effect to the parties’
initial intent revealed in the agreement to arbitrate. It means that parties should draw up
their agreement to arbitrate with care, especially if they intend to settle only a narrow
category of disputes in arbitration. If the agreement to arbitrate is broad and contractual
counterclaims are properly submitted, the tribunal will not exceed its mandate when
deciding on respondent’s claims, even when those are based on a separate contract.
189 (Leboulanger, 1996) p.46.
190 See, i.a., (Leboulanger, 1996) pp.43-97.
191 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1180, with a reference to Cour de Cassation Civ 1re, 27 March 2007, Alcatel Business
Systems (ABS) v. Société Amkor Technology et autres,Rev. Arb. 2007, p.785. See also (Clay, Code de l’arbitrage
commenté, 2015) pp.184-185, (Carducci, The Arbitration Reform in France: Domestic and International
Arbitration Law, 2012) p.151.
192 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1181, with a reference to CA Paris, 16 November 2006, Société Empresa de
Telecomunicaciones de Cuba SA v. SA Telefonica Antillana et SNC Banco Nacional de Commercio Exterior,
Rev. Arb. 2008, p.109. Here again, the scope of the agreement to arbitrate, therefore an basis for the tribunal’s
decisional power, is addressed under Art. 1520(1) of the CCP. Taking into account the definition of the
mandate for the purposes of Art. 1520(3) of the CCP (see section 5.4), arguably, the scope may be also
addressed under Art. 1520(3) of the CCP. For the arguments, see section 6.1.1.
193 For the arguments favoring a tribunal’s jurisdiction over counterclaims even in cases of conflicting dispute
resolution mechanisms, see (Karrer, Jurisdiction on set-off defences and counterclaims, 2001) pp.177-178.
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6.1.3 Decision on set-off
Although the notion of set-off might be problematic in international commercial
arbitration,194 it seems that nowadays a broad recognition of the set-off as a defensive tool
has been established.195 The set-off as discussed under this section will, in principle, entail
the notion of “compensation légale”.196Mourre succinctly observes that “[s]et-off is a defence
to the whole or a portion of a claim based on a defendant’s claim to money which entails the
mutual extinction of both claims, in full or in part.”197 Consequently, in order to successfully
apply a set-off defense, the parties’ obligations need to be mutual, of the same kind, due
and payable and certain.198 Moreover, set-offs may not exceed the value of the original
claim (thus on which it is dependent), which means that “contrary to a counterclaim, the
respondent can recover nothing for himself.”199 It also entails that “[…] there is no need for
separate awards on claim and set-off defence. The other corollary of that is that if the claim
is not made out or is withdrawn, there is no need to adjudicate upon the set-off.”200 Finally
(and importantly), it should be noted that for the purpose of this study, set-off would be
considered as a party’s substantive right (compensation légale), thus a mechanism of a
substantive rather than of a procedural nature.201 The outstanding question herein is
whether (and if so, how) the tribunal exceeds its mandate when granting set-off. This
should be analyzed particularly (i) in the multi-contract scenario202 and (ii) in the case of
setting-off the claim without a party’s request.
194 See (Pryles &Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.448.
195 See, e.g., (Pryles & Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.453,
(Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999) p.60 (“It can be used only ‘as a shield not as
a sword’”).
196 In the French system an additionalmechanism of compensation judiciaire exists. It has been aptly described
as “a procedural mechanism, which requires a judge to declare the set-off; in other words proceedings must
be brought. Where the debts are connected (for example, arise out of the same contract) the judge is obliged
to declare the set-off. Where the debts are not connected the judge has a discretion to declare the set-off. If he
does, he will have jurisdiction to hear the set-off claim as an exception to the usual jurisdictional rules.” See
(Rogers, 2006) pp.131-132. In addition, partiesmay also agree to include contractual set-off (“compensation
conventionelle”) provisions in their contract. For further reading, see also (Pichonnaz & Gullifer, 2014)
pp.28-30.
197 (Mourre, The Set-off Paradox in International Arbitration, 2008) p.387.
198 See (Rodner, 2011) p.553 and pp.554-557. Similarly, i.a. (Mourre, The Set-off Paradox in International
Arbitration, 2008) pp.387-388, (Schöll, 2006) p.99.
199 (Berger, Set-off in International EconomicArbitration, 1999) p.60. Similarly, (Pryles &Waincymer,Multiple
Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) pp.453-454.
200 (Pryles &Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.454.
201 (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999) p.72. Rules applicable to set-off may differ
depending on the jurisdiction. Sometimes it is perceived as a procedural tool (e.g. the English concept of
statutory set-off), otherwise it constitutes the substantive right of the party (e.g. the French concept of
compensation légale). For further reading, see, e.g. (Scherer, Chapter III: TheAward and the Courts, Set-Off
in International Arbitration, 2015) pp.455-456.
202 In essence, there should be no doubt that set-off based on the same contract as the initial claim should be
granted.
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Before going further into details, in principle, the problems that an international arbitral
tribunal may encounter with regard to set-off are related mainly to its jurisdiction or
determination of applicable law (and not the excess of mandate).203 Therefore, these issues
do not immediately fit within the scope of the inquiry at hand. As pointed out above,
objections regarding the alleged excess of the scope of the agreement to arbitrate are usually
well suited to the challenge of the tribunal’s jurisdiction (thus the challenge under Article
1520(1) of the CCP). At the same time, however, they may also fit the excess of mandate
challenge. Possibly the best and most commonly used solution for the award-debtor is to
invoke the excess of jurisdiction challenge with a conditional challenge of the mandate.204
That being said, one should briefly reflect on set-offs arising out of amulti-contract situation
and on how it impacts the tribunal’s mandate.
When the set-off is based on a different contract than the initial claim, two main
hypotheticals are possible: (i) only the contract from which the initial claims stem from
has an arbitration clause or (ii) both contracts have dispute resolution clauses. This
multi-contractual puzzle has already been discussed in the context of contractual
counterclaims and those considerations generally apply here as well.205 Therefore, the idea
of single economic transaction and the theory of the “group of contracts” will be relevant.206
The notion of set-off, however, adds another twist to it. In other words, although it is true
that the expression of the common intention of the parties is essential, it is equally important
to remember that set-off constitutes a substantive defense against the initial claim brought.
Therefore, it should, in principle, be possible to include set-off claims, even if the set-off
arises out of a different contract. One should bear in mind that “[b]eing a substantive
defence which denies the existence of the claim, the set-off has the same quality as any other
substantive defence. The tribunal should therefore be authorized to decide on all defences
which are raised against the claim (‘le juge de l’action est le juge de l’exception’), and
consequently on the merits of the set-off.”207
That being said, it is necessary to be cautiouswith general conclusions. Although “[t]he
extension of jurisdiction to the defense of setoff, does not extend the jurisdiction to other
matters arising out of the related contracts”,208 allowing for set-off in cases where two
contracts include dispute resolution clauses is a delicate matter. It is so, because one may
reasonably conclude that two resolution clauses entail that parties intended to introduce
203 See, e.g. (Scherer, Chapter III: The Award and the Courts, Set-Off in International Arbitration, 2015),
(Rodner, 2011), (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999).
204 The intertwinement between both challenges has been addressed above, see section 6.1.1.
205 See section 6.1.2.
206 See section 6.1.2. See also (Pryles &Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties,
2009) p.491.
207 (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999) pp.72-73.
208 (Rodner, 2011) p.562.
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separate mechanisms for each of the contracts. Indeed, it would be particularly true when
the dispute resolution clauses are different (for example, an arbitration clause and a choice
of court clause).209 Nonetheless, Karrer suggests that “set-off should be possible pending an
arbitration even if the obligation that is used for the set-off is not subject to the arbitration
agreement under which the first obligation is sought to be enforced, and even if the party
setting off could have brought it as a claim only before a different arbitral tribunal or a state
court as provided in the agreement from which it arises.”210 He justifies his opinion arguing
that (amongst other things) “[c]ontracts are primarily designed to prevent disputes or to
resolve them amicably, and exercising a right to set-off is a perfectly acceptable way to
extinguish obligations.”211 Arguably, his argument is more convincing in the context of (or
against) the excess of mandate challenge. As explained above, a tribunal’s mandate,
primarily, gives the parties the expectation that the disputes between themwill be resolved.
In this context, it is a more than sensible solution to admit set-off as a way of speeding up
the process of resolving the conflicts between parties. Ultimately, the tribunal’s mandate
is to resolve the dispute between parties and, by acting on set-offs, the tribunal will precisely
fulfill its adjudicative function.212 That being said, it is necessary to add that the tribunal’s
decisionwill not be ironclad in the context of the potential excess of jurisdiction challenge.213
The second point concerns the eventuality of a set-off deduction from the initial claim
made by a tribunal ex officio. This is, of course, an obvious example of extra petita and
thus excess of mandate.214 Arguably, however, the situationmay change when the tribunal
is given amiable composition authority or if the tribunal finds that in specific circumstances
set-off operates ipso iure.215 In these instances it is possible to conclude that set-off is
inherently entwined with providing a just determination of a dispute. If this argument is
accepted, the tribunal’s decision would survive the challenge.
209 Even where both contracts call for the same dispute resolutionmechanism (e.g. an ICC arbitration), parties
may have intended to appoint different arbitrators for different disputes.
210 (Karrer, Jurisdiction on set-off defences and counterclaims, 2001) p.177.
211 (Karrer, Jurisdiction on set-off defences and counterclaims, 2001) p.177.
212 See also (Pichonnaz&Gullifer, 2014) p.59 (“[…] the best practice is for an arbitral tribunal also to adjudicate
the cross-claim, despite the absence of [an] original jurisdiction. One reason is linked to the efficiency of arbitral
proceedings but, moreover, it takes into account the fact that refusing to take account of a set-off of a substantive
nature, which has possibly already been triggered outside of court proceedings, places too much weight on the
right of the cross-debtor to have his arguments heard by the judge who would have had jurisdiction. By relying
on set-off, the cross-creditor has, at least de facto, renounced the original jurisdiction. Finally, an arbitral
tribunal avoids the schizophrenic situation of rendering an award which is already inadequate as a matter
of substantive law, since themain claimmay have already been reduced by the effect of (extrajudicial) set-off.”).
213 Thus under Art. 1520(1) of the CCP.
214 See also section 6.1.1.
215 In any event the tribunal should consult the parties about its findings.
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6.1.4 Decisionon claims/counterclaimsbasedon torts orpre-contractual liability
Although most of the disputed claims are contractual, it does not exclude the possibility
that also non-contractual liability may cause a party to bring a claim (or counterclaim) in
arbitration. Nowadays there is a growing acceptance that non-contractual claims would
fit comfortably within the scope of the broad agreement to arbitrate. As pointed out by
Bensaude, “[a] broadly worded clause will generally be found to cover both contract and
tort claims arising out of or in connection with the contract at issue.”216 Therefore, the
principal test therein would be that they are sufficiently connected with the contract or
transaction.217 This question, however, yet again dealsmorewith the scope of the agreement
to arbitrate. Consequently, it is an issue closer related to the tribunal’s jurisdiction than
to its mandate. As such, it has already been addressed above and will not be dealt with
again.218
Yet another way in which parties may be eager to attack the tribunal’s decision on
claims based on torts exceeding the tribunal’s mandate is when the tribunal requalifies the
basis for the claim from contractual to tortious.219 This issue, however, has been also
addressed above.220 In principle, by requalifying the claim the tribunal may be found to
assist one of the parties in its inquiry and in obtaining the request sought. It means that
the tribunal exposes itself to allegations of bias in helping to achieve one party’s goal in
arbitral proceedings against the other party’s goal. As already explained, in reality, a
requalification of a claim is much more subtle and most likely involves an invitation from
the tribunal to the parties to discuss its suggestions. On the one hand, it can be argued that
the tribunal is appointed for its expertise and its advice might be very useful (especially
for example if given to both parties). Additionally, it touches upon the notion of iura novit
arbiter221 and the tribunal’s powers to apply relevant legal mechanisms and theories to the
facts and circumstances presented by the parties. On the other hand, however, if a tribunal’s
requalification “strengthens” the arguments of one party only, itmay create an appearance
of bias (especially if parties are not given sufficient opportunity to address the tribunal’s
216 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1181.
217 See for example, (Poudret & Besson, 2007) p.267 (“[…] the jurisdiction of an arbitrator to rule on tort claims
depends on thewording of the arbitration agreement and should ordinarily be recognised, unless such agreement
is clearly confined to disputes concerning the performance of the contract. The expression “disputes resulting
from the contract” is ambiguous in this respect and should be replaced by “disputes in relation to” or “in
connectionwith the contract”,which definitely allows the arbitrator to rule on tort claims.”). Similarly, (Berger,
Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999) p.65 (“This wording [i.e. ‘dispute which has arisen out
of or in connectionwith the contract’] covers not only contractual claims. Thus from this procedural standpoint,
the cross-claim can also be of a tortious nature.”).
218 See sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.3.
219 Or any other non-contractual basis for a claim. Of course, it can also go the other way around, i.e., a change
from a non-contractual basis to a contractual one.
220 See section 6.1.1.
221 “An arbitrator knows the law”. For further reading, see section 6.2 and the literature therein.
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changes) and violation of principe de la contradiction.222 Consequently, the tribunal will
no longer (properly) exercise its mandate. Instead, it will violate it.223 Arguably, as long as
the principe de la contradiction is preserved, the tribunal’s actions will not be easily open
for challenge under Article 1520(3) of the CCP.
Other conclusions, mentioned above,224 will apply here by analogy. Therefore, (i) in
cases where parties present alternative claims, the tribunal will not exceed its mandate
when choosing a non-contractual cause of action rather than a contractual one, and (ii)
in cases of ambiguous or vague claims, a tribunal should have a final say in interpreting
them, especially if parties fail to address the ambiguity or fail to clarify their positions. It
entails that parties should not be given an opportunity to object to the tribunal’s
interpretations at the post-award stage, provided that it decides within the scope of the
agreement to arbitrate.225
6.1.5 Decisiononnewclaims/counterclaims and changeof claims/counterclaims
Since the arbitral tribunal’s mandate is shaped by the agreement to arbitrate and is further
limited by the parties’ requests, reformulation of the initial parties’ requests inevitably
affects the limits of the mandate. Consequently, there are several issues that need to be
addressed accordingly.226 First, it is possible that a new claim/counterclaim (or a changed
claim/counterclaim) goes beyond the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. This type of
contention has already been addressed above.227 Second, there is a possibility the new
claim/counterclaim does not exceed the framework of the agreement to arbitrate but goes
beyond the dispute initially submitted to the tribunal. Third, the question arises whether
the tribunal may exceed its mandate while acting on a new, changed or late
claim/counterclaim.
As pointed out by some scholars “[…] the fact that the new claims fall within the ambit
of the arbitration agreement is not necessarily sufficient. It may be contended that the new
claims go beyond the dispute or difference referred to the arbitration already commenced
and thereby require the commencement of a new arbitration.”228 The difficulties that arise
from a submission of a new claim/counterclaim are related to the consensual character of
the tribunal’s adjudicative mission.229 The moment in which the tribunal accepts its
222 SeeArt. 1510 andArt. 1520(4) of theCCP. See alsoCAParis, 25November 1997, Société VRV v. Pharmachim,
Rev. Arb. 1998, p.684.
223 Arguably, however, due process violations would be better addressed under 1520(4) of the CCP.
224 Section 6.1.1.
225 It is also very well possible that the tribunal rejects the claim if it is exceedingly vague. See also section 6.1.1.
226 See also (Giraud, 2017) pp.256-268.
227 See sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.3. Also (Giraud, 2017) pp.258-260.
228 (Pryles &Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.470.
229 (Giraud, 2017) p.132 (“Il pourrait être objecté que la modification des contours du litige par la soumission
d’une demande nouvelle contredit le caractère conventionnel de la mission arbitrale.”).
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mandate,230 a new contractual multiparty relationship is created. From this point in time
the parties and the tribunal have defined and accepted the scope of themandate. It further
entails that the introduction of the new claim/counterclaim may disturb the balance that
has been agreed upon. As it is rather undisputed that the introduction of new
claims/counterclaims may alter the scope of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal, one
should reflect whether a party has a power to unilaterally stretch the boundaries of the
mandate initially agreed upon by all involved.231
In principle, it would be possible for the party to submit a new claim/counterclaim,
provided that the tribunal agrees to accept it and therefore to accept alteration of the
mandate.232 It also entails that it would be rather difficult to argue successfully that the
tribunal exceeded itsmandate, because it went beyondwhat was initially submitted to it.233
It would be particularly true when the initial parties’ submissions or Terms of Reference
as in the ICC system are drafted in a particularly broad fashion. In this way, parties may
leave themselves room for the introduction of a new claim/counterclaimwithin themeaning
of what was already submitted and thus, within the meaning of the tribunal’s initial
mandate.
Moreover, the tribunal will not exceed itsmandate when admitting new claims. By and
large, it will be able to find a power to admit late claims in the institutional rules governing
the proceedings.234 One should note, however, that the wording of each set of rules differs,
which means that also the scope of the tribunal’s powers to accept certain category of
claims (e.g. claims/counterclaims/set-offs) may be different.235 Also in ad hoc arbitration,
the tribunal should be allowed to decide on late claims. Overall, it is most likely that the
tribunal accepts new claims/counterclaims only when it finds it relevant to reach a just
230 Art. 1456(1) of the CCP.
231 Yet another question is how far the party autonomy can go to modify the tribunal’s mandate. In other
words, how far the tribunal’s (initial) mandate may be modified by the parties’ agreement during the
proceedings.
232 Whether the tribunal has a power to accept new claims will be discussed immediately below.
233 See (Derains & Kiffer, National Report for France, 2013) Chapter VII(2)(B)(a)(3) (“the mandate of the
arbitrators is defined by the arbitration agreement and limited by the subject matter of the dispute as framed
by the parties’ claims even if the issue to be decided is not mentioned in the terms of reference. The agreement
of the parties plays a predominant role.”); also (Bensaude, 2015) p.1183 (“The arbitral tribunal’s substantive
mission is defined by the subject matter of the parties’ dispute, which is itself determined by the parties’
submissions during the course of the arbitration […]. As a consequence, claims that are not expressly set out
in [the] terms of reference do not necessarily fall outside the arbitrators’ mission […].”), with a reference to
CA Paris, 29 September 2011,M. René Scolardi et autres v. SASU Techman Head, Rev. Arb. 2011, p.1093,
Cour de cassation Civ 1re, 20 June 2012, Chaudronnerie Mécanique Algéroise v. Adlor Sofal Nemoneh, No.
10-21375, andCour deCassationCiv 1re, 6March 1996, Société Farhat Trading Company v. Société Daewoo,
Rev. Arb. 1997, p.69.
234 See, e.g., Art. 23(4) of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art. 23(4) of the 2012 ICC Rules, Art. 22 of the 2010 UNCITRAL
Rules, Art. 20 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules.
235 Cf, e.g., Art.23(4) of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art. 22 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules and the powers available
under Art. 22.1(i) of the 2014 LCIA Rules.
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result as to the dispute between the parties and having in mind all the circumstances of
the case.236 Depending on the applicable procedural rules, the issue is, thus, much more
one of due process than of mandate.
6.1.6 Decision not covering all claims/counterclaims
In general terms, a decision that does not address all parties’ claims/counterclaims (decision
infra petita) violates their expectations, which means that the arbitral panel can be
considered to fail to comply with the mission entrusted to it. Therefore, it is necessary to
reflect (i) if such a failure on the side of the tribunal meets the threshold set by Article
1520(3) of the CCP, or (ii) to the contrary, the decision is not reviewable and deserves to
be res iudicata, thus to be finally adjudged.
An infra petita awardwould not be easily susceptible to the excess ofmandate challenge
under French international arbitration law.237 As concluded by Bensaude: “[a]wards that
are infra petita do not run foul of art. 1520(3), because in such a situation, the claim may
be again submitted to the tribunal.”238 The reference therein is given to the rule provided
in Article 1485(2) of the CCP according to which: “[…] on application of a party, the
tribunalmay interpret the award, rectify clerical errors and omissions, ormake an additional
award where it failed to rule on a claim. The arbitral tribunal shall rule after having heard
the parties or having given them the opportunity to be heard.”239 Consequently, the first
236 Arguably, if the tribunal does not allow a new claim, the issue will remain outstanding between the parties,
waiting to be submitted before another tribunal.
237 Even though it can be considered as non-compliance with the mandate. See (Loquin É., 2015) p.431
(“L’omission de statuer n’est pas en revanche un moyen d’annulation de la sentence arbitrale et cela, même
s’il est vrai, qu’en ne statuant pas sur toutes les demandes des parties, le tribunal ne respecte pas la mission
qui lui a été conférée.”). See also (Giraud, 2017) pp.154-156.
238 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1182, (Racine, 2016) pp.546-547 and p.590. See also, i.a., CA Paris, 27 June 2002, SA
Compagnie commerciale Comecim v. Société TheobromaNV, Rev. Arb. 2002, p.793 (“Le recours en annulation
de l’article 1502-3° NCPC ne peut être exercé contre une sentence ayant statué infra petita, les cas d’ouverture
de ce recours devant s’interpréter restrictivement, d’autant plus que l’impossibilité de réunir à nouveau le
tribunal arbitral pour compléter éventuellement la sentence n’est pas démontrée.”), CA Paris, 12 September
2002, Société Enterprise de la Céramique Sanitaire Ouest (ECO) v. Société Eurotech SPA, Rev. Arb. 2002,
p.1044 (“L’omission de statuer sur certains chefs de demandes n’entre dans aucun des moyens d’annulation
des articles 1502 et 1504 NCPC, l’auteur du recours n’établissant pas, au demeurant, une impossibilité de
saisir à nouveau le tribunal arbitral […]”), CA Paris, 23 June 2005, Société British Motors et autre v. Société
Bentley Motors Limited, Rev. Arb. 2005, p.798 (“L’infra petita ne constitue pas une cause d’annulation de la
sentence mais une omission de statuer qui peut toujours être réparée.”).
239 (“[…] À la demande d’une partie, le tribunal arbitral peut interpreter la sentence, réparer les erreurs et
omissionsmatérielles qui l’affectent ou la completer lorqu’il a omis de statuer sur un chef de demande. Il statue
après avoir entendu les parties ou celles-ci appelées.”). The application of this rule is possible by virtue of
Art. 1506 of the CCP. Perhaps, however, it would be better if the translation exposes more that, on the
reading of the provision alone, the “error” and/or “omission” is substantial. Consequently, onemay suggest
that the provision in fact reads that: “[…] on application of a party, the tribunal may interpret the award,
rectify substantial errors and omissions which affect the award, or make an additional award where it failed
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step that an aggrieved party should undertake is to refer the point that has not been decided
back to the tribunal. Importantly, the tribunal may only then decide on infra petita and
cannot reopen the case and decide all issues anew.240
Arguably, only when the tribunal refuses to take any action to remedy the alleged infra
petita occurrence, may the party request the court to set the award aside. One should note,
however, that “[…], the tribunal’s failure to decide upon each and every legal or factual
argument raised by the parties in the course of an arbitration is not sufficient to trigger the
application of art. 1520(3).”241 Additionally, it is likely that the tribunal’s omission needs
to be so grievous as to violate (French) international public policy.242 Even if successful, it
is most likely that the challenge will affect only part of the award.243 Further, it leads to the
conclusion that arbitral awards, in principle, benefit from the presumption that the arbitral
mandate has been fulfilled in full. As noted by Born “[t]he presumption is that arbitrators
did not decide matters infra petita, but rather decided all the disputes submitted to them
(including by impliedly rejecting claims and defenses not specifically addressed)”.244
The presumption that the tribunal’s mandate has been completed entails that all the
disputes and claims of the parties have been considered and decided upon by the tribunal.
In fact, it will be even strengthened if the tribunal concludes its award with the magical
formula “rejecting any and all other claims” or the like. In this case, arguably, a party that
wishes to challenge the award on the excess of mandate ground will have a difficult task.
6.2 Process of application of law by the arbitral tribunal
The arbitral tribunal’s fulfillment of its adjudicative mandate inherently entails that it will
reach its decision in accordance with a certain set of legal rules. Consequently, the process
of application of law by the tribunal can be broken down into a series of decisions on
particular issues. First, the tribunalmay need to decidewhatmethodwould be appropriate
to determine the applicable law (section 6.2.1) and decide on the basis of the selected law
to rule on one of the heads of a claim. The arbitral tribunal shall rule after having heard the parties or having
given them the opportunity to be heard.”
240 See (Derains & Kiffer, National Report for France, 2013) Chapter V(7)(A)(a): “However, even in that case
the arbitrators do not have the power to modify their decision on the issues already decided.” The authors
argue that no modification should be allowed in the context of domestic arbitration. It is argued that the
same holds true in an international arbitration context. Consequently, if the tribunal failed to decide upon
a substantial defense submitted, it would be, arguably, impossible to bring the case back to a tribunal and
request it to adjudicate the omitted claim without revisiting its previous conclusions.
241 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1182, also (Gaillard& Savage, FouchardGaillardGoldman on International Commercial
Arbitration, 1999) p.940. See also the case law referred to in fn.238.
242 For further reading, see section 4.3.
243 See also section 3.3.
244 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3294.
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accordingly (section 6.2.2).When the applicable law is selected, the tribunal will be required
to apply the selected law to the facts of the case (section 6.2.3) and carefully approach the
question of the applicablemandatory rules of law (section 6.2.4). Occasionally, the tribunal
may be given the additional power of rendering its decision based on equity or reached ex
aequo et bono (section 6.2.5). It is therefore of essence, to explain in what instances (if any)
the tribunal will exceed its mandate by applying these standards and when its decision is
open to the Article 1520(3) challenge.
6.2.1 Decision on the method of determining applicable law
It is by far the most preferable solution for the parties to make an explicit choice of law in
their contract.245 In case of the parties’ default, however, the tribunal may be required to
search for an applicable law. In principle, two methods are available for arbitrators to
determine the applicable law: (i) a conflict of laws (private international law) analysis246
or (ii) a direct choice of law (“voie directe”). Irrespective of which method the tribunal
chooses, this step is an important one and may have a great impact on the outcome of the
case.247 At the same time, it is unlikely that its decision on the method of determining the
applicable law is open to the excess of mandate challenge.
The challengewill have little chance of success, because French international arbitration
law gives the tribunal a lot of freedom in the process of applying the law.248 In particular,
pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 1511 of the CCP, “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall
decide the dispute in accordance with the rules of law chosen by the parties or, where no such
245 There are possibly (at least) two separate choices that need to be made: (i) the choice of law applicable to
the agreement to arbitrate and (ii) the choice of law applicable to the merits of the dispute. Arguably, for
the purpose of the excess of mandate challenge, it is not necessary to distinguish them at this stage, because
they only affect the tribunal’s later decision on applicable law. The distinction may be relevant in the phase
of applying the chosen law. Consequently, the law chosen to be applicable to the merits of the case may
influence its outcome, whereas the law chosen to apply to the agreement to arbitrate may have an impact
on the tribunal’s jurisdiction (and not necessarily on the mandate).
246 When the tribunal decides to follow the conflict of laws analysis, it would be, in fact, required to explain as
well why it finds specific conflict of laws rules to be applicable (for example conflict of laws rules available
at the seat of arbitration) which adds yet another layer of complexity to the scenario. It falls outside the
scope of the research at hand, however.
247 See, e.g., (Craig W. L., The arbitrator’s mission and the application of law in international commercial
arbitration, 2010) p.260: “It is certain that the arbitrator’s discretion to choose the applicable law in the
absence of choice by the parties gives him the widest power to influence the outcome of the case on the merits
by the choice of a national law that he feels appropriate to the subject and providing a legal basis for the
outcome he sees as desirable.”
248 The question if the freedom of arbitrators using the voie directe approach is “absolute” (see (Poudret &
Besson, 2007) pp.586-588 or “complete” (see (Mayer, Reflections on the International Arbitrator’s Duty to
Apply the Law – The Freshfields Lecture 2000, 2001) p.238) falls outside of the scope of this research. For
further reading, see, i.a., the discussion in (Poudret & Besson, 2007) pp.586-588, (Gaillard & Savage,
Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 1999) pp.876-877.
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choice has been made, in accordance with the rules of law it considers appropriate.”249 This
provision allows the tribunal to select the applicable law directly without invoking a conflict
of laws analysis.250 “To satisfy in practice the requirements of art. 1511, the arbitral tribunal
needs merely to state in the award that the rules of law selected and applied by the tribunal
are ‘appropriate in the circumstances’.”251 In addition, some of the (leading) institutional
rules exempt the tribunal from undertaking a conflict of laws analysis.252 Consequently,
onemay conclude that determining appropriate applicable rules of law is inherently within
the scope of the tribunal’s adjudicative mandate.
Arguably, the only exceptionwhere the tribunal’s decision on themethodof determining
applicable law is exposed to a challenge is in the situation where the parties, instead of
including a choice of law clause, opt for selecting (only) applicable conflict of laws rules.253
Such a choice, similarly to the choice of applicable law,254 should be respected by the
tribunal. Thus, if the tribunal does not follow the parties’ choice (of applicable conflict of
laws rules), but rather applies a different set of (conflict of laws) rules,255 its decisionmight
be considered to be in the excess of mandate conferred upon it in the sameway as if it does
not follow the parties’ choice of law.256 Nonetheless, the wrong application of the chosen
a conflict of laws rules is not reviewable.257
249 (“Le tribunal arbitral tranche le litige conformément aux règles de droit que les parties ont choisies ou, à
défaut, conformément à celles qu’il estime appropriées.”).
250 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1157, (Mayer, The Laws or Rules of Law Applicable to the Merits of a Dispute and the
Freedom of the Arbitrator, 2011) pp.54-55, (Poudret & Besson, 2007) pp.586-88.
251 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1157. The tribunal, however, will be still free to undertake a conflict of laws analysis,
see, e.g., (Rouche, Pointon, &Delvolvé, 2009) pp.144-145 (“It often happens, however, that arbitrators, even
though they have very wide discretion in themanner in which they determine the substantive law, give reasons
for their decisions which reveal that they are very cautious, perhaps because they are anxious that any court
called upon to order enforcement of their award should be satisfied that serious thought and research were
devoted to the question. For this reason, it is not unusual for arbitrators sitting in France to take the French
conflict of laws route, or to make a comparative law approach to various systems of conflict of laws, in order
to ascertain common provisions; sometimes they refer, in support of their finding, to general principles of the
conflict of laws which they believe exist.”).
252 See, e.g., Art. 21(1) of the 2017 ICCRules, Art. 21(1) of the 2012 ICCRules, Art. 35(1) of the 2010UNCITRAL
Rules, Art. 17(1) of the 1998 ICC Rules. See, however, Art. 33(1) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, which
requires this additional step of conflict of laws analysis when determining the applicable law.
253 See also (Mayer, The Laws or Rules of Law Applicable to the Merits of a Dispute and the Freedom of the
Arbitrator, 2011) p.58.
254 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1157 (“Where the parties have agreed on rules of law to govern the merits of their dispute,
the arbitral tribunal must apply those rules of law in its awards”).
255 Or if it opts for the voie direct approach.
256 See also section 6.2.2.
257 See section 3.2. See also (Derains & Kiffer, National Report for France, 2013) Chapter VII(2)(B)(a)(3)
(“However, an error of law in applying the law agreed upon by the parties is not seen as a breach of the
arbitrator’s mandate.”).
119
III France and Book IV of the Code of Civil Procedure
6.2.2 Decision on applicable law
As already discussed in the previous section, it is preferred that parties designate which
law is to be applied to the merits of the dispute.258 In fact, in the context of the French
international arbitration regime, this statement needs to be qualified to the extent that the
explicit choice of the parties does not only entail the choice of law but also the choice of
rules of law. It will be discussed further in this section. But first, one should reflect on the
underlying question, i.e.when does the tribunal exceed its power (i) when a choice of law259
exists and (ii) in the absence of any choice by the parties.
The disregard of the parties’ choice of law to be applied would, in general, meet the
requirements of invoking the excess of mandate challenge, because it directly violates
contractual constraints imposed on the tribunal’s adjudicative powers.260 It is necessary to
distinguish, however, the scenariowhere parties expressly designate a specific law to govern
their contract and one where their choice is implied. The latter is more problematic, since
it is feasible that parties will submit contradicting statements, with respect to which law
they intended to be applicable.261 Consequently, it would be up to the tribunal to examine
258 See section 6.2.1. As highlighted in the previous section (see fn.245), there are two outstanding questions
with regard to the applicable law, namely (i) what law applies to the agreement to arbitrate and (ii) what
law applies to the merits of the case. The first question, however, relates more to the jurisdiction of the
tribunal and need not to be discussed further at themoment. As such it will be reviewable under Art. 1520(1)
of the CCP. Notably, Bensaude observes that “when evaluating an appeal or a request for setting aside based
on [Art.] 1520(1), the Court of Appeal will not refer to any national law other than the mandatory rules of
French law and French international public policy.” For further reading, see (Bensaude, 2015) pp.1179-1180.
Additionally, “under French international arbitration law, the law chosen by the parties to apply to themerits
of a dispute is no indication of a choice of law to govern either the arbitration agreement or procedure, unless
this has been expressly agreed upon by the parties” See (Bensaude, 2015) pp.1156-1157, with a reference to
Cour de Cassation Civ 1re, 10 May 1988,Wasteels v. Société Ampafrance, Rev. Arb. 1989, p.51. On the law
applicable to the agreement to arbitrate in general, see also (Loquin É., 2015) pp.127-147.
259 The term “choice of law” here includes both parties’ choice of law and their choice of rules of law.
260 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1157 (“Where the parties have agreed on rules of law to govern the merits of their dispute,
the arbitral tribunal must apply those rules of law in its awards.”), (Loquin É., 2015) p.437 (“Lorsque les
parties ont choisi les règles de droit applicables au litige conformément à l’article 1511 CPC, la mission du
tribunal arbitral est d’appliquer au litige ces règles. La non-application du droit choisi est considérée par la
jurisprudence comme une violation de sa mission par le tribunal arbitral.”). See also (Derains & Kiffer,
National Report for France, 2013) Chapter VII(2)(B)(a)(3) (“The same is true for the parties’ choice of the
applicable substantive law. Respect for this choice is also considered part of the arbitrator’s mandate.”). (Mayer,
The Laws or Rules of Law Applicable to the Merits of a Dispute and the Freedom of the Arbitrator, 2011)
p.48 (“Under French law, if the arbitrator […] applies a law different from that which was agreed upon in
the terms of reference, the arbitrator’s award could either be annulled or unrecognized for failure to conform
to the mission of the arbitrator […]”). See, however, CA Paris, 10 March 1988, Société Crocodile Tourist
Project Company (Egypte) v. Aubert, ès qual. et autres, Rev. Arb. 1989, p.269 and CA Paris, 29 April 2003,
SA Impregilo v. Secrétariat aux communications et transports maritimes de la Jamahiriya arabe libyenne
populaire et socialiste, Rev. Arb. 2004, p.130.
261 It would be the same case, when an express choice exists but its validity or scope is contested by one of the
parties. See (Mayer, The Laws or Rules of Law Applicable to the Merits of a Dispute and the Freedom of
the Arbitrator, 2011) pp.48-49. See also (Mayer, La liberté de l’arbitre, 2013) pp.350-351.
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all relevant circumstances and decide which law has been impliedly chosen. Since
contractual interpretation is one of the essential prerogatives of the arbitral tribunal, it will
enjoy a general protection of the “no review on themerits” principle.262 Therefore, in cases
where the choice of law is (allegedly) implied, but parties at the moment of the dispute are
not in agreement (or not anymore) of what the choice really was, the tribunal’s decision
on applicable law would be likely to survive the challenge at the post-award stage.263
The tribunal’s decision should also standwhen parties did not choose any law to govern
the contract. In this instance, it is likely (again) that they will submit opposite views as to
which law should apply and the tribunal will have to determine which law is
“appropriate”.264 More often than not, it will entail that the tribunal will follow one of the
parties’ suggestions. Occasionally, however, the tribunal may wish to apply the law265 that
has not been introduced by the parties. If that happens it is important that the tribunal
consults the parties and gives them an opportunity to address its new idea. As explained
by Bensaude: “[s]hould the arbitral tribunal consider that it may be appropriate to apply
rules of law that have not been suggested by any party, the tribunal must first request the
parties’ comments on such rules of law before taking a decision, in order to comply with the
requirements of due process […].”266 In case of such a violation, however, a party might be
better suitedwith anArticle 1520(4) challengewhich directly addresses due process issues.
“[U]ltimately, the arbitrators’ choice of law must appear neither partial nor arbitrary.”267
Finally, one should highlight that the French international arbitration regime explicitly
grants the possibility to decide the dispute in accordance with the rules of law.268 Such a
wording of a statutory fallback mechanism is truly remarkable, because it gives a great
flexibility to opt not only for national laws but also for a-national rules of law. It further
means that, for example, rules of the enigmatic lex mercatoria or of the UNIDROIT
Principles may become a perfectly valid choice.269 In addition, one cannot stress enough
that not only parties may choose a non-national set of rules, but also the tribunal is able
to select these rules if it considers them appropriate. In turn, the tribunal has a great power
in designatingwhich rules should apply and, therefore, onemay conclude that the tribunal’s
decision on applicable law will not be exposed to the Article 1520(3) challenge.
262 See section 3.2. Also e.g. (Loquin É., 2015) p.437 (“En revanche, le principe de non révision exclut le contrôle
de la bonne application des règles de droit choisies par le parties.”).
263 If, however, both parties plead their case on the basis of the same law then the tribunal should also not
deviate from it.
264 Of course, if the parties reach an agreement as to which law should apply, this choice should bind the
tribunal.
265 Or rules of law pursuant to Art. 1511(1) of the CCP. It will be discussed below under this heading.
266 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1157.
267 (Mayer, The Laws or Rules of Law Applicable to theMerits of a Dispute and the Freedom of the Arbitrator,
2011) p.57.
268 Art. 1511(1) of the CCP.
269 See, e.g., (Bensaude, 2015) p.1157, (Audit, 2014) p.10.
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6.2.3 Ascertaining the content of applicable law by the arbitral tribunal
In principle, the essential element of fulfilling the tribunal’s mandate is to interpret the
contract between the parties and the legal issues surrounding their dispute. Consequently,
the decision-making process undertaken by the tribunal, in most instances, entails the
application of law and determination of its content.270 Considering, therefore, that the
process of applying the law to the facts of the case is inherent to the exercise of the arbitral
tribunal’s mandate,271 one should reflect if it is exposed to the challenge of Article 1520(3)
of the CCP (excess of mandate), especially in cases where the tribunal is considering (i) to
rely on its own legal knowledge and research or (ii) to seek an equitable solution.
Regarding the first point, one should reflect whether the tribunal’s mandate to apply
the law272 is unfettered (e.g., by relying on the principle iura novit arbiter) or limited to
legal theories raised by the parties only.273 The tribunal should be, in principle, allowed to
bring its own legal findings to the parties. Dimolitsa is correct in saying that the discretion
to introduce new issues of law (i.e. new legal theories) “is the normal consequence of the
power to ascertain the law and falls within the legitimate freedom of the arbitrator, as a
judge, in applying law and proceeding to the fair resolution of the dispute. It can only be
excluded by an explicit agreement of the parties limiting the arbitrators’ jurisdictionalmission
to the legal arguments they will invoke.”274 At the same time, it is to be noted that new legal
270 “Law” should be, again, understood as both (applicable) national law and (applicable) rules of law. See also
section 6.2.2. In the alternative, the tribunal would have to decide on its own sense of justice and act as
amiable compositeur (see section 6.2.5, where this will be discussed furhter). Theoretically other solutions
(such as flipping the coin) are also possible, albeit unlikely.
271 See also section 4.
272 Yet another question is whether ascertaining the content of the applicable law is the tribunal’s duty. For
further reading, see CAParis, 25November 1997, Société VRV v. Pharmachim, Rev. Arb. 1998, p.684 (where
the court held that if the dispute is to be decided in accordance with French substantive law, the tribunal
is required to ascertain the content of the law). See also (Giovanni, 2010) p.500, (Dimolitsa, The equivocal
power of the arbitrators to introduce ex officio new issues of law, 2009) p.434. Arguably, it falls outside the
scope of the research at hand, however. Yet, if one considers that “the mission of the arbitrator defines both
his duties and powers” (see fn.114), there is room for the argument that failing to ascertain the content of
the applicable law amounts to a failure to comply with the tribuna’s mandate. At the same time, however,
it will entail the review of the merits of the tribunal’s decision and will effectively free the parties from
educating the tribunal as to the content of the applicable law. That being said, the tribunal should know
the applicable public policy rules that might affect the fate of the award at the post-award stage. See further
section 6.2.4.
273 In addition, one may distinguish if the tribunal adds new legal theories ex officio or requalifies already
existing ones (i.e. the ones submitted by the parties). For further reading on requalification, see, i.a., (Giraud,
2017) pp.277-282.
274 (Dimolitsa, The equivocal power of the arbitrators to introduce ex officio new issues of law, 2009) p.431.
See also (Giraud, 2017) p.282 (“Par ailleurs, l’arbitre voit sa liberté de relever d’office des moyens de droit
limitée par la volonté des parties. Ainsi, dans l’hypothèse où les parties ont prévu que l’arbitre ne puisse
appliquer d’autres règles de droit que celles qu’elles ont limitativement énumérées, l’arbitre viole sa mission
s’il applique une règle non autorisée.”).
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theories should not come as a surprise to the parties.275 “Providing an opportunity for the
litigants to comment on the law remains vital both to the arbitrator getting it right and to
the parties’ sense of being treated justly.”276Moreover, the newly introduced theories should
not lead to granting the request beyond what was sought (a classic case of ultra petita).277
Pursuant to Article 1520(3) of the CCP, as mentioned before, the award may be set
aside if “the arbitral tribunal ruled without complying with the mandate conferred upon it.”
Consequently, as to the second point, if one considers that the mandate conferred on a
tribunal requires the application of the law, it would be fair to conclude that the tribunal’s
decision not based on law should be open for a challenge.278 This would be the case when
the tribunal renders a decision based on equity without being authorized to do so and as
such it is addressed by both French international arbitration law279 and institutional rules.280
These instruments are adamant that the power of amiable compositeur has to be explicitly
given by the parties to arbitration. Nonetheless, even if not given, convincing the
setting-aside court that the tribunal usurped the power of amiable compositeurmight not
be easy whenever the tribunal’s decision has a reference to the rules of law.
Additionally, one should note that if the award has a reference to the law or rules of
law, the (courts’) analysis is restricted. Namely, as always, the starting point of the court’s
analysis is the underlying principle that the arbitral awards are not subject to a merits
review by the setting-aside court.281 It means that if the parties ask the tribunal to apply
the law in resolving the dispute, any error in interpretation of the law the tribunal may
commit will escape post-award scrutiny as long as it does not violate the French concept
of international public policy.282
275 (International Law Association, 2008) p.20. See also Cour de Cassation Civ 1re, 14 March 2006, Conselho
Nacional de Carregadores v. Charasse Société GroupeAntoine Tabet v. République duCongo, Rev. Arb. 2006,
p.653.
276 (Park, The Predictability Paradox - Arbitrators and Applicable Law, 2014) p.64, see also (Dimolitsa, The
Raising ExOfficio ofNew Issues of Law, 2014) p.25 (“[…] the FrenchCourts, they also welcome the arbitrators’
freedom to raise ex officio new issues of law or to attribute another legal qualification to the facts of the case,
without however referring to the maxim jura novit curia. They require conversely, always – irrespective of
any criterium of surprise for the parties – the rigorous respect of the principle audi alteram partem (principe
de la contradiction) ‘in such a way that nothing from what served as a ground of the tribunal’s decision has
escaped the debate of the parties’.”). See also (Giraud, 2017) pp.277-282 for a discussion on the requalification
of the legal basis for the claim.
277 (Giovanni, 2010) p.497 (“There is unanimous consent among ordinary courts that the international arbitrator
is bound by the prayers for relief set forth by the parties”). (Dimolitsa, The equivocal power of the arbitrators
to introduce ex officio new issues of law, 2009) p.438. See also section 4 and section 6.1.1 on the general
analysis as to a decision granting claim (including requalification).
278 See also section 6.2.5.
279 Art. 1512 of the CCP.
280 See, e.g., Art. 21(3) of the 2017 ICCRules, Art. 21(3) of the 2012 ICCRules, Art. 35(2) of the 2010UNCITRAL
Rules.
281 See section 3.2.
282 See section 4.3.
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Before concluding, one should note that Article 1511(2) requires that “[i]n either case,
the arbitral tribunal shall take trade usages into account.”283 Also, institutional rules use
similar non-permissive language.284 Dimolitsa even argues that “[i]ntroducing issues
emerging from the contract or from trade usages that are deemed inherent in the contractual
agreementmay be conceived as an obligation rather than a discretion of the arbitrators, and
this not only when the applicable arbitration rules provide that “in all cases” the tribunal
shall take into account the terms of the contract and relevant trade usages […].”285 At the
same time, however, Bensaude highlights that: “despite the use of the words ‘shall’ and ‘in
all cases’ in art. 1511, there is no French case law annulling an award on the basis that a
tribunal failed to take trade usages into account.”286 Irrespective of whether it is a duty or
discretion, arguably, “[b]y raising new issues from the contract that relate to their mandate,
arbitrators substantially act within their contractual mission and abide by party autonomy,
as specifically expressed therein, with regard to the legal relationship at hand.”287
In conclusion, it is essential for the tribunal not to alter the parties’ petita288 and to
ensure that parties are heard in all legal issues presented (including those introduced by
the tribunal).289 Consequently, its decision should stand.290 Furthermore, only violation of
French international public policy and non-authorized use of the power of amiable
compositeur may allow a party to annul the decision ascertaining the content of the
applicable law under Article 1520(3) of the CCP.
6.2.4 Application of mandatory rules of law by the arbitral tribunal
Much has already been said about the interface between the arbitral tribunal’s mandate
and the process of application of the law. In principle, the tribunal needs to follow the
parties’ submissions, but in the absence of any parties’ guidance it will have ample freedom
283 (“Il tient compte, dans tous les cas, des usages du commerce.”).
284 See Art. 21(2) of the 2012 ICC Rules, Art. 35(3) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 17(2) of the 1998 ICC
Rules, Art. 33(3) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules.
285 (Dimolitsa, The equivocal power of the arbitrators to introduce ex officio new issues of law, 2009) p.430.
286 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1157.
287 (Dimolitsa, The equivocal power of the arbitrators to introduce ex officio new issues of law, 2009) p.430.
The author qualifies that although the tribunal always knows the contract it may not (always) be familiar
with trade usages. In that case it should invite the parties to “submit evidence”. (Dimolitsa, The equivocal
power of the arbitrators to introduce ex officio new issues of law, 2009) pp.430-431.
288 Ultra or extra petita. See section 5.4 and section 6.1.1.
289 See, e.g., (Dimolitsa, The Raising Ex Officio of New Issues of Law, 2014) p.23 (“There is a great discussion
about the risk for the arbitrators to give thus the impression that they favour one party. We think that such
a risk is debatable. It seems quite improbable that an arbitrator may be considered as partial by inviting all
parties to discuss a legal issue the arbitrator raised ex officio – an act that does not prejudge the final solution
of the dispute – if such invitation is specific and punctual, while the arbitrator’s overall behaviour during the
entire procedure does not give rise to any blame. To the extent known, there is no example in case law of
refusing enforcement or setting aside an award for impartiality of an arbitrator based on such a reason.”).
290 (Dimolitsa, The Raising Ex Officio of New Issues of Law, 2014) p.28.
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in applying the law.Mandatory rules of law, however, have a unique status which, arguably,
shifts the balance in what the tribunal is expected to do. Consequently, it is necessary to
reflect whether (i) the tribunal can disregard the parties’ choice of law (where, for example,
the sole purpose was to oust it from applying certain mandatory rules of law), (ii) the
tribunal can invoke mandatory rules of law ex officio, and (iii) recourse is available when
the tribunal misapplies mandatory rules of law.
Before going further, it is necessary to highlight that mandatory rules of law are
embedded in any national legal order. As aptly explained by Waincymer “[a] mandatory
rule is one that purports to apply irrespective of the wishes of the parties.”291 They are designed
to protect the essential elements of legal system(s).292 Importantly, in international
arbitration “[t]here may bemandatory rules in a number of jurisdictions that must be taken
into account […].”293 For this reason, one should recognize a dichotomous divide of
mandatory rules. Put differently, it is necessary to distinguish the rules that are “mandatory”
only when a certain law (of which they are part of) applies (“simple” mandatory rules294
or rules of ordre public interne295) from the “overriding” mandatory rules that safeguard
public interest296 and “that parties cannot contract away (lois d’application immediate)
[…].”297 This distinction may play a considerable role in the tribunal’s exercise of
ascertaining the (mandatory rules of) law. Therefore, one should bear it in mind while
testing the hypotheses below.
The first two questions have some commondenominator in the tribunal’s due diligence.
In the first two hypotheses, therefore, the tribunal undertakes its own legal research if any
mandatory rules come into play andmay affect the award. In the first out of two, however,
the tribunal focuses more on mandatory rules that might possibly be relevant but do not
form part of the legal rules chosen by the parties to apply. In the second scenario, one
would observe if the tribunal is able to invoke mandatory rules of law that form a part of
the law chosen by the parties.
In the first scenario, it is sensible to make use of the distinction between the “simple”
and the “overriding” mandatory rules. One can easily imagine that parties from countries
A and B designate the law from country C to govern their contractual relations. Perhaps
the choice ismade in order to avoid any “home field” advantage only. It is possible, however,
291 (Weincymer, 2009) p.1.
292 (Siwy, 2012) p.166 (“The distinguishing feature of mandatory rules, which separates them from rules aimed
at balancing the interests of the parties, is the interest served by such mandatory rules: Mandatory rules serve
over-individual public purposes or national or economic policies.”). Although the author does not discuss
the French legal system, the argument would be equally valid in the French context.
293 (Capper, Ljungström i Dépinay, 2014) p.35.
294 (Radicati di Brozolo L., 2012) p.50.
295 (International Law Association, 2008) p.21.
296 (Radicati di Brozolo L., 2012) p.50.
297 (International Law Association, 2008) p.21.
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that occasionally parties deliberately use their choice of law solely to avoid the application
of mandatory rules.
As briefly mentioned above, the parties’ freedom of choosing the governing law finds
its limits when facedwith “overriding”mandatory rules. As some authors concluded, “[…],
arbitration cannot be used as an instrument to evademandatory rules that would have been
applicable to a business transaction in the absence of the parties’ choice of law and that are
considered as public policy rules in the other jurisdiction. Mandatory public policy rules are
thus a limit to the parties’ freedomof choice.”298 In similar vein, the ILACommittee explained
that “[a]lthough commercial arbitration is ameans of privately resolving disputes, it operates
within a public legal system defined by international conventions and national laws. These
conventions and laws acknowledge that public policy constrains contractual and arbitral
freedom, and may impose limitations or restrictions that the parties cannot agree to
disregard.”299 Similarly, Mayer reflected that “a mandatory rule (loi de police in French) is
an imperative provision of law which must be applied to an international relationship
irrespective of the law that governs that relationship.”300 In other words, it means that “[…]
fraudulent evasion of the law, together with the non application of foreign mandatory rules
(lois de police) and the violation of international public policy, [are] among the grounds
allowing the arbitrators to disregard the parties’ choice of law.”301
Having saidwhat the effect of the “overriding”mandatory rules is, one should consider
what happens when the tribunal disregards the parties’ choice of law in order to apply the
“simple”mandatory rules. In this instance, due process is of utmost importance. Therefore,
arguably, if the tribunal invites the parties to comment on the application of “simple”
mandatory rules of law,302 its decision should survive at the post-award stage unless it
violates French international public policy.
The second scenario envisages the situation where the tribunal on its own initiative
introduces mandatory rules of law it considers applicable. At the same time, it will be
presumed that parties did not discuss thesemandatory rules in their submissions.303 Finally,
it goes without saying that the tribunal should give the parties an opportunity to express
their views on its legal findings. In principle, the tribunal will be well within the limits of
298 (Capper, Ljungström i Dépinay, 2014) p.35.
299 (International Law Association, 2008) p.21.
300 (Mayer, Mandatory rules of law in international arbitration, 1986) p.275.
301 (Poudret & Besson, 2007) p.607.
302 Even if they do not form part of the law chosen by the party, but are somewhat related to the contract and
may influence its fate (and the fate of a prospective award).
303 The mandatory rules of the law applicable to the merits will need to be taken into account always. On top
of that, one might need to investigate other mandatory rules of law which are of “overriding” nature. For
this reason, one might need to consult the law of the seat, the law of the country of (potential) enforcement
or otherwise.
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its mission when addressing public policy rules of the applicable law and other potentially
applicable “overriding” mandatory rules.
In fact, it is rather uncontroversial nowadays to accept the tribunal’s power to investigate
the applicability of “overriding” mandatory rules of law even when parties fail to submit
any arguments on the topic.304 Put differently, “[i]n order to fulfil their duty to render a
final and enforceable award, the arbitrators may have to consider such mandatory [public
policy] rules even in the event that none of the parties refer to them.”305 Therefore it is often
stated that “[…] it is clear that the public policy nature of a provision implies that it must
be applied ex officio.”306
In addition, if one accepts that the tribunal has an obligation or a responsibility to
render an enforceable award, it is only reasonable to conclude that the application of
mandatory rules of a public policy character is not only its power but also that it constitutes
a core part of fulfilling the mission to finally resolve the disputes between parties.307 In
other words, the tribunal’s ignorance of public policy rules (rather than its voluntary
compliance with them) ismore likely to violate the adjudicativemission of the arbitrator.308
304 It is important for these rules to be of public policy nature, in order for the tribunal to enjoy inherent and
unrestricted freedom to apply them. As explained earlier in this section, the mandatory rules of public
policy character without any reservation restrain the parties’ autonomy. As explained in (Poudret & Besson,
2007) p.607: “[i]t is […] evident that all mandatory laws or rules of internal public policy cannot prevail over
the freedom of choice accorded to the parties by the lex arbitrii. Only international public policy can have the
effect of restricting such freedom because only a violation thereof can lead, under most laws, to a setting aside
of the award or a refusal of recognition.”
305 (Capper, Ljungström i Dépinay, 2014) p.35.
306 (Poudret &Besson, 2007) p.613. See also (Derains &Kiffer, National Report for France, 2013) Chapter V(4)
(“[…] however, if the jurisdictional issue turns on the question of subject-matter arbitrability, which is outside
the parties’ autonomy, the arbitrators must examine it ex officio. […]”), (Dimolitsa, The equivocal power of
the arbitrators to introduce ex officio new issues of law, 2009) p.426 (“The power of arbitrators to introduce
ex officio new issues of law refers to legal issues and arguments on the merits not invoked by the parties. As
to the term ‘power’ it is used in contract to the obligation that arbitrators do have to raise issues of transnational
public policy ormay consider that they have before a dispute implicating ‘public policy rules’ (‘lois de police’).”).
307 The argument would be even stronger in the case where the tribunal is required by the institutional rules
to “make every effort to make sure that the award is enforceable at law.” See, e.g., Art. 41 of the 2012 ICC
Rules.
308 See, however, the “minimalist” approach developed in CA Paris, 18 November 2004, SA Thalès Air Défense
v. GIE Euromissile, Rev. Arb. 2005, p.752, where the court held that there is no reason to allow the
award-debtor to raise a defense based onmandatory competition law rules in order to challenge the award,
when it failed to bring such a defense before the arbitrators. Considering the finality of the award and a
principle of no review on themerits, the court concluded that when there is no fraud normanifest violation
of mandatory rules the award cannot be set aside. Similarly, Cour de Cassation Civ 1re, 4 June 2008, Société
SNF SAS v. Société Cytec Industries BV, Rev. Arb. 2008, p.473. See also (Radicati di Brozolo L., 2005)
pp.529-560. It does not change the fact, however, that “[t]o the extent that the mandatory rules of the seat
are considered to be part of ordre public of that state, arbitrators should – solely for practical reasons and
without any dogmatic justification – examine whether the disregard of such rules could lead to the setting
aside of the award. In practice, this will mostly be the case if mandatory rules of procedure are violated […].”).
See (Siwy, 2012) p.182.
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In these instances, however, the tribunal’s violation will be tested against French
international public policy instead of Article 1520(3) of the CCP.309 Consequently, the
standard of review is heightened (standard ofmanifest, effective and concrete violation)310
and disregard of mandatory rules (French or foreign) that do not amount to international
public policy might not suffice to annul the award.311
A final reflection has to be given on the tribunal’s wrongful application of public policy
rules. As previously explained, the setting-aside court should not get involved in the review
of the merits of the case.312 Therefore, one should have in mind that “[…], an error of law
in applying the law agreed upon by the parties is not seen as a breach of the arbitrator’s
mandate.”313 The ultimate test, however, is whether the tribunal violated French
international public policy whilemisapplyingmandatory rules of law. As suggested above,
it is more likely that abstaining from applying overriding public policy rules rather than
their erroneous interpretation may infringe the French concept of international public
policy.314 Therefore, the tribunal’s decision on the application ofmandatory rules has high
chances in surviving the Article 1520(3) of the CCP challenge.
6.2.5 Decision reached as amiable compositeur or on equity
The instances where the tribunal is allowed not to apply the legal rules, but rather to follow
its own (and more elusive) concepts of justice and equity, are rather exceptional. There
are a number of notions that refer to this general power of the tribunal, with amiable
compositeur and ex aequo et bono being the most popular ones. For the purpose of the
research at hand, however, the distinction is not as relevant.315 Therefore, under this section
309 See also section 4.3.
310 See e.g. CA Paris, 21 February 2017, République du Kirghizistan v. M. Belokon, Rev. Arb. 2017, p.336, CA
Paris, 16 January 2018, Société MK Group v. SARL Onix et autre, Rev. Arb. 2018, p.295. See also fn.94.
311 Especially considering the principle of no review on the merits (see section 3.2). Generally, however, the
tribunal should make sure that the applicable (foreign) public policy rules are respected considering that
it might affect the likelihood of enforceability of the award (and the tribunal should make sure that the
award is enforceable).
312 Section 3.2.
313 (Derains & Kiffer, National Report for France, 2013) Chapter VII(2)(B)(a)(3).
314 The violation of French international public policy needs to be flagrant, effective and concrete (CA Paris,
18 November 2004, SA Thalès Air Défense v. GIE Euromissile, Rev. Arb. 2005, p.752) in order to effect in
the annulment of the arbitral award. See also section 4.3. This is not to say that the wrongful application of
mandatory rules will never be susceptible to setting aside. Arguably, however, this will seldomoccur, because
the violation of the legal rule would have to be manifest. See fn.308.
315 For further reading on decisions not based on law, see, e.g., (Rubino-Sammartano, Amiable Compositeur
(JointMandate to Settle) and Ex Bono et Aecquo (Discretional Authority toMitigate Strict Law): Apparent
Synonyms Revisited, 1992) pp.5-16, (Yu, 2000) pp.79-98, (Maniruzzaman, The Arbitrator’s Prudence in
Lex Mercatoria: Ambiable Composition and Ex Aecquo Et Bono in Decision Making, 2003) pp.1-8. In the
context of the French system, see in particular (Loquin E., 1980) pp.1-385. See also (Giraud, 2017) pp.292-303.
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what happens to the decisions not based on legal rules will be considered.316 In the context
of this chapter, these decisions will be considered under the general notion of amiable
compositeur.317
Pursuant to Articlec 1512 of the CCP, “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall rule as amiable
compositeur if the parties have empowered it to do so.”318 It means that “[i]n order to decide
a dispute as amiable compositeur, an arbitral tribunal must ensure, at the outset, that the
parties have empowered it to do so. The expression of the parties’ intentions must be clear
and unambiguous, even though it may be implied; no special form is required.”319 The same
clear authorization from the parties for the tribunal to act as amiable compositeur is also
required by the leading institutional rules.320
In consequence, the basic answer to the question when the tribunal’s decision can be
challenged for failure to comply with the mandate is rather simple: it may happen when
the tribunal acts as amiable compositeurwithout the parties’ authorization321 or the tribunal
does not adhere to its power of amiable compositeur.322 Such an answer, however, requires
a few additional reflections. Accordingly, one should further discuss (i) the impact of the
‘no review on themerits’ principle on the challenge of the decision as amiable compositeur,
(ii) the use of equity in cases where the tribunal is required to apply the law, and likewise
(iii) the possibility to apply the law while acting as amiable compositeur.
316 See fn.315. Also, CA Paris, 28 November 1996, Société CN France v. Société Minhal France, Rev. Arb. 1997,
p.380 (“[…] la clause d’amiable composition est une renonciation conventionnelle aux effets et au bénéfice
de la règle de droit, les parties perdant la prérogative d’en exiger la stricte application et les arbitres recevant
corrélativement le pouvoir de modifier ou de modérer les conséquences des stipulations contractuelles dès lors
que l’équité ou l’intérêt commun bien compris des parties l’exige”).
317 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1158 (“An arbitrator is empowered to rule as amiable compositeur when vested with the
powers to decide the parties’ dispute either in amiable composition, ex aequo et bono or in an equitablemanner
(équité). French courts generally understand these concepts to have similar meanings in the context of
international arbitration.”).
318 (“Le tribunal arbitral statue en amiable composition si les parties lui ont confié cette mission”). It would be
perhaps better to include the reference to the mandate in the English translation as well. See for example
the one offered by Bensaude in (Bensaude, 2015) p.1157, who suggested that “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall
decide as amiable compositeur if the parties have entrusted the tribunal with such mission.”. It is so, because,
arguably, the French text gives an indication that the mandate to decide as amiable compositeur should be
considered as a distinctive type of the tribunal’s mandate.
319 (Rouche, Pointon, & Delvolvé, 2009) p.150.
320 See, e.g., Art. 21(3) of the 2017 ICC Rules, (“The arbitral tribunal shall assume the powers of an amiable
compositeur or decide ex aequo et bono only if the parties have agreed to give it such powers”), the same in
Art. 21(3) of the 2012 ICC Rules, Art. 17(3) of the 1998 ICC Rules, Art. 35(2) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules
(“The arbitral tribunal shall decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono only if the parties have
expressly authorized the arbitral tribunal to do so.”), Art. 33(2) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules (“The arbitral
tribunal shall decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono only if the parties have expressly authorized
the arbitral tribunal to do so and if the law applicable to the arbitral procedure permits such arbitration.”).
321 (Lévy & Robert-Tissot, 2013) pp.900-901.
322 In essence, however, it is a tribunal’s power and not an obligation to not apply the law. See (Loquin É., 2015)
p.434 (“Il est bien établi en jurisprudence que l’amiable compositeur a la faculté, et non l’obligation, de juger
en équité”).
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The first point, albeit important, need not to be discussed at length.323 Setting-aside
procedures are not designed to challenge the merits of the award and it holds true also in
the context of the Article 1520(3) challenge. It means that invoking this ground might be
particularly difficult against decisions as amiable compositeur. In essence, if the tribunal
is allowed to act as amiable compositeur, its decision escapes any scrutiny, because there
is no benchmark, apart fromFrench international public policy, onwhich the setting-aside
judge can relywhile reviewing a tribunal’s equitable solution.324 As pointed out by Bensaude,
“[i]n all cases, an arbitral tribunal vested with powers of amiable compositeur must abide
by due process and other fundamental rules of procedural international public policy”.325
Therefore, unless the tribunal’s decision violates the French concept of international public
policy, its decision would likely survive.
The second point that needs to be discussed is the arbitral tribunal’s ability to reach
an available equitable solution while applying the rules of law. Mayer suggests that, at
times, implementation of legal rules and reaching an equitable decisionmight be conflicting
notions.326 In these instances where the tribunal prefers an equitable decision, the tribunal’s
award will be exposed to the challenge that the tribunal usurped a power to decide as
amiable compositeur. However, it would only be successful when the tribunal admits that
it considered a legal (i.e. based on the rules of law) solution, disregarded it and opted for
an equitable one. As explained by Loquin “[t]his is not an error of law in itself, nor the use
of equity infra legem that are sanctioned [thus available for challenge under Article 1520(3)
of the CCP], but the deliberate abandonment of law.”327
Indeed, because of the flexibility of the French systemof international arbitration, even
when applying the rules of law, the tribunal has ample freedom to render equitable
323 For further reading, see section 3.2.
324 Arguably, although errors in application of law are not the basis for setting aside as well, the court has an
“easier” task in assessing the tribunal’s decision-making process when it is able to analyze the legal basis of
the tribunal’s decision and how the tribunal applied it. If, however, it assesses the tribunal’s decision on
equity it will be unable do the same exercise.
325 See (Bensaude, 2015) p.1158. See also (Dimolitsa, The Raising Ex Officio of New Issues of Law, 2014) p.26
(“It is confirmed in Buildinvest vs. Guy Roy that the powers of amiable compositeur do not dispense the
arbitrators from their obligation to give parties the opportunity to be heard on the new issues of law that they
have raised ex officio.”). See CA Paris, 18 September 2012, S.A. Buildinvest et autres v. M. Guy Roy, Rev.
Arb. 2012, p.867, (Poudret & Besson, 2007) p.477.
326 (Mayer, Reflections on the International Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the Law –The Freshfields Lecture 2000,
2001) p.241 (“[t]he mission of an arbitrator is […] much more ambiguous than that of a judge. Conflicting
considerations may play a role. More specifically, there may be a conflict between on the one hand the method
consisting in implementing the legal syllogism on the basis of the applicable rule of law, and on the other hand
two different concerns: the search for the most equitable solution, and the endeavour to favour the solution
that conforms most closely with the true will of the parties.”).
327 (Loquin É., 2015) p.433 (“Ce n’est donc pas l’erreur de droit en soi, ni le recours à l’équité infra legem qui
sont sanctionnés, mais l’abandon délibéré du droit.”).
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decisions. It entails that there is room for “the use of equity infra legem”.328 It is particularly
true when parties did not select any applicable rules of law. Consequently, “[…] an arbitral
tribunal already enjoys a large measure of freedom as a result both of its status and power
to determine the appropriate ‘rules of law’ as the substantive law. […] [A]n arbitral tribunal,
or at least an international one, may decide disputes on the basis of rules of law which are
not strictly defined and which include flexible andmalleable princip[l]es derived frommany
sources. In such circumstances, itmight seemunnecessary to provide for ‘amiable composition’,
when it is possible to find a just and fair solution with an intelligent and sensitive use of the
above general principles and usages.”329 Therefore, even when equipped with the default
tools of Article 1511 of the CCP only, the tribunal should be able to reach a just result
which would be, in principle, non-reviewable under Article 1520(3) of the CCP.
Finally, as to the third point, the mere reference to the law in the tribunal’s decision
does not amount to a failure to comply with a mission of amiable compositeur.330 It has
already been suggested that acting as amiable compositeur is a power and not the tribunal’s
duty.331 Bensaude explains that: “[a] tribunal vested with such powers [of amiable
compositeur] may refer to rules of law and adopt such rules if the tribunal considers these
rules to provide a fair solution. The tribunal’s reasoning should not be limited only to the
strict application of rules of law, but should also indicate or at least implicitly suggest that
the decision reached by the tribunal complies with that tribunal’s own sense of fairness.”332
Therefore, as long as the tribunal is in search for an equitable solution, there is no reason
to prohibit it to seek inspirations in (or refer to) rules of law.333
Conversely, “the strict application of the parties’ contractual terms or legal provisions,
with no reference to the powers of amiable compositeur and no consideration of fairness,
could jeopardise the enforcement or the validity in France of an award rendered by an
328 (Loquin É., 2015) p.433.
329 (Rouche, Pointon, & Delvolvé, 2009) p.149.
330 CA Paris, 6 May 1988, Société Unijet S.A. v. S.A.R.L. International Business Relations Ltd (I.B.R.), Rev. Arb.
1989, p.83.
331 See (Loquin É., 2015) p.434 (“Il est bien établi en jurisprudence que l’amiable compositeur a la faculté, et
non l’obligation, de juger en équité”). Also referred to in fn.322. It should be considered, however, a power
but also a mission. See (Loquin É., 2015) p.326 (“L’amiable composition est en effet une mission en no pas
seulement un pouvoir.”).
332 (Bensaude, 2015) pp.1158-1159, with a reference to CA Paris, 15 March 1984, Soubaigne v. Limmareds
Skogar, Rev. Arb. 1985, p.285. Also, e.g., (Craig W. L., The arbitrator’s mission and the application of law
in international commercial arbitration, 2010) p.268 (“[t]he mission of the amiable compositeur does not
exclude application of rules of law.”). (Poudret & Besson, 2007) p.743 (“[The tribunal does not exceed its
mission] when the amiables compositeurs apply rules of law since the role of moderator which is given to them
by the parties does not prohibit them from applying the law if it can lead to a solution which seems fair.”).
333 Cour de Cassation Civ 2ème, 15 February 2001, Halbout et société Matenec HG v. Epoux Hanin, Rev. Arb.
2001, p.135 (the arbitral tribunal acting as amiable compositeur cannot justify its decision only with the
strict reference to the rules of law and with no refernce to notion of equity).
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amiable compositeur.”334 Therefore, “if a tribunal merely applied the law, without taking
into account “equitable” considerations, then they would violate their mandate.”335
It is also possible that parties designate the law (or rules of law) applicable to the dispute
and, at the same time, give the tribunal power to act as amiable compositeur. “In that case,
the arbitral tribunal will first seek a solution to the dispute by interpreting and applying the
contract terms according to the applicable law and then would depart from this application,
by exercise of its powers as amiable compositeur only if it would find that strict application
of the law would lead to an inequitable result.”336
All in all, there is nothing else but to conclude, after Loquin, that “[t]he setting-aside
judge must simply check that the arbitrator has respected the mission that the parties had
conferred. This control does not imply control of the correctness of the grounds, but only a
check for the existence of grounds in equity.”337
6.3 Decisions on remedies
The analysis undertaken would be incomplete if it does not include the discussion on the
most common remedies available to the parties in international commercial arbitration.
This is so because granting (or rejecting) the relief sought is an ultimate goal of the tribunal’s
mandate. What follows is that any decision by the arbitral tribunal on remedies is an
unequivocal result of exercising its adjudicative mandate. Therefore, it is necessary to
reflect whether decisions on damages (section 6.3.1), specific performance (section 6.3.2)
334 (Bensaude, 2015) pp.1158, (CraigW. L., The arbitrator’smission and the application of law in international
commercial arbitration, 2010) p.269. See CA Paris, 3 July 2007, Leizer v. Bachelier, n°RG 2006/00011, Rev.
Arb. 2007, p.827 (“L’arbitre n’a pas statué en amiable compositeur dès lors qu’il a fait application des clauses
contractuelles sans jamais confronter à l’équité les résultats obtenus alors pourtant qu’une partie l’y invitait
implicitement, ce dont il n’a pas tenu compte la mission de juger en amiable compositeur n’étant jamais
évoquée dans la sentence”).
335 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.2775. See also CA Paris, 15 January 2004, Société
Centrale Fotovista v. Vanoverbeke et autres, Rev. Arb. 2004, p.907 (“Considérant que le tribunal arbitral
avait ainsi pourmission de trancher en amiable composition le litige concernant l’absence d’accord des parties
sur la cession du capital de la société Edelcolor, que l’arbitre ayant statué en appliquant la règle de droit
français sans s’expliquer à aucun moment au cours des quatorze pages de sa sentence sur la conformité à
l’équité de la décision ainsi motivée, la sentence est annulée sans qu’il soit besoin d’examiner les autres
arguments à l’appui du moyen”).
336 (Craig W. L., The arbitrator’s mission and the application of law in international commercial arbitration,
2010) p.269. Also, (Bensaude, 2015) p.1159 (“In rare cases, parties agree that certain rules of law shall apply
to the merits of their dispute, and vest the tribunal with the powers of amiable compositeur. In such cases, the
tribunal should first apply the rules of law chosen by the parties to the dispute and thereafter compare the
solution reached at lawwith fairness, and decide in accordance with its own sense of fairness. This comparison
may be implied from the content of the award.”).
337 (Loquin É., 2015) p.435 (“Le juge de l’annulation doit simplement vérifier que l’arbitre a respecté la mission
que les parties lui avaient conférée. Ce contrôle n’implique en rien un contrôle du bien-fondé des motifs, mais
seulement un contrôle de l’existence de motifs d’équité.”).
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and modifications of the contract (section 6.3.3) can be challenged under Article 1520(3)
of the CCP.
6.3.1 Decision on damages
Adecision on damages would be often one of the last steps of the decision-making process
undertaken by the tribunal and, arguably, one of the most anticipated by the parties. In
principle, it would be one of the basic powers of the tribunal, whose mission would be to
remedy loss incurred. Put differently, granting damages will be, more often than not,
inherently embedded in the tribunal’s mandate. At the same time, however, one should
contemplate whether the tribunal fails to comply with its mission when it grants (i) an
amount higher (or lower) than requested, (ii) a remedy different than that sought (i.e.
damages instead of specific performance), (iii) damages notwithstanding the parties’ explicit
limitation in the agreement to arbitrate, or (iv) damages unknown to French law (e.g.
punitive damages).
The first hypothesis is rather straightforward. If the value of the damages granted by
the tribunal exceeds the value of the damages sought, the tribunal will not comply with
the constraints of its mandate. In turn, such a decision will be susceptible to the Article
1520(3) challenge. One should add, however, that it is likely that the court will set aside
the part of the award which goes beyond the parties’ petita.338
That being said, one should reflect what happens if a party in its request for relief uses
a formula rather than an exact amount to explain its request. This may give room for
ambiguity butmay occasionally not be avoided.339 For example, in a simplified hypothesis,
a party asks the tribunal to award the amount resulting from the equation 2+2=5 in
damages. In most instances, considering that arbitration is an adversarial process, such a
mistake should be detected by the counterparty. The problem arises if it is not.
In this instance, the tribunal, which is already at the deliberation stage of the
proceedings, will have to decide what to do. One reasonable solution for the tribunal would
be to reopen the case on the issue. At the same time, however, it might not be procedurally
efficient (and cost effective). Another option is to determine independently which side of
the equation is the correct party’s petita.340 As long as in example, the answer is rather
obvious, and correction of the calculationmistake should not cause any difficulties, it may
so happen that the formulas are much more elaborate and even the analysis of other
materials submitted does not help resolve the dilemma. Arguably, however, if the tribunal
338 (Bensaude, 2015) pp.1182-1183 (“Awards that are ultra petita do provide a basis under art. 1520(3) for
appeal of an order of enforcement of a foreign award or the setting aside of an international award rendered
in France, but only with respect to that part of the award that is ultra petita […].”).
339 See also section 6.1.1.
340 Considering that nobody challenges that the formula is incorrect, the tribunal will not know which side of
it is the correct one (intended one).
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awards a higher amount from the example (i.e. “5”) its award should survive the challenge.
The same is most likely to happen if it corrects the value and awards the lower amount
(i.e. “4” in the example). In any event, the more sensible solution would be, for example,
to render a partial final award on all claims but for the ambiguous one.
The second scenario envisages a situation where a party asks for damages, but the
tribunal decides to grant specific performance instead (or the other way around). In
principle, this should amount to a failure of compliance with the tribunal’s mandate
(especially when the tribunal “surprises” parties), unless the tribunal possesses a carte
blanche to grant any remedy it considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case.341
Additionally, it is the parties who are responsible for the shape of the submissions, however
good, bad or ugly. Consequently, it is not the tribunal’s task to restructure the parties’
petita, because a change in the remedy sought would inevitably lead to favoring one party
(the one who benefits from the change). This analysis shares characteristics with the
reflections on the requalification of the legal basis for the claim that has been discussed
above.342 The former differs from the latter, because it truly touches the parties’ petita, and
as such the tribunal’s mandate, which it then unilaterally rewrites. Such a behavior of the
arbitral tribunal should be sanctioned by Article 1520(3) of the CCP.
The next, the third hypothesis is quite similar to the second one. If, however unlikely,
the parties limit the remedial powers of the arbitral tribunal in their agreement to arbitrate
by eliminating the power to grant damages, the tribunal should comply with those
constrains.343 It furthermeans that the tribunal’s decision to grant damages in this instance
might be challenged at the post-award stage. At the same time, however, such a clause
might be considered as inoperative and effectively frustrate the arbitral process.
The fourth and last point that needs to be briefly addressed refers to the recognition
of the award granting punitive damages.344 The starting presumption is that the parties
expressly allowed the tribunal to grant punitive damages or have chosen the law that
permits such a remedy and that punitive damages were requested by the parties. Still, the
tribunal, as a part of its mission, should be interested in the well-being of the arbitral award
and reflect if its award survives the prospective challenges at the post-award stage. For this
reason, the recurring concern is whether punitive damages violate French international
public policy. This issue has been addressed by the Cour de Cassation in the Fountaine
341 Of course when a party submits alternative claims, the tribunal would be able to select fromdifferent options.
342 See section 6.1.1.
343 Arguably, in cases of limitation of damages clauses the situationwould be different (included in the contract,
but outside the agreement to arbitrate), because the addressee would be different (parties and not the arbitral
tribunal). Consequently, these clauses do not directly refer to the tribunal’s powers. Instead they are directed
towards parties and define the shape of their rights. As such it is the exclusive competence of the tribunal
to interpret the contract.
344 For further reading, see, i.a., (Parker, 2013) pp.389-432, (Wester-Ouisse &Thiede, 2012) pp.115-122, (West
Janke & Licari, 2012) pp.775-804, (Rowan, 2010) pp.513-516, (Borghetti, 2009) pp.55-73.
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Pajot case, where the court found that “a foreign judgment ordering a party to pay punitive
damages is not in principle contrary to international public policy.”345 The court also held,
however, that international public policy may be violated if the punitive damages are
disproportionate.346 Therefore, notably, depending on the circumstances of the case, even
the tribunal’s decision on punitive damages may survive the challenge at the post-award
stage if Fountain Pajot decision is to be applied to arbtiration.347
Overall, the tribunal’s remedial powers are rather broad and usually it should be
anticipated that they are within the limits of its mandate.
6.3.2 Decision on specific performance
If damages for breach of contract are insufficient, specific performance might serve well
as a useful remedy for the parties to seek in arbitration. Some scholars point out that
“specific performance is a widely accepted remedy in civil law countries.”348 Of course, its
availability will depend on the applicable law or the parties’ authorization.349 In principle,
however, it does not raise additional questions in the context of the research at hand. For
this reason, reflections put forward in the context of the discussion on damages would
apply by analogy.350 Therefore, as long as the tribunal’s decision fits in the framework
delineating its mandate,351 its decision will survive a challenge.
In otherwords, onemay conclude that the tribunal’s decisions on specific performance
will be set aside only when they have not been requested or the tribunal’s remedial powers
have been limited by the parties’ agreement or the overriding rules of public policy of the
applicable law.
6.3.3 Decision on contract adaptation and filling of gaps in the contract
The idea that the arbitrators have a power to adapt a contract, or to fill in the contractual
gaps has not always beenwelcomed in France. In principle, the difficulty had arisen because
345 Cour de CassationCiv 1re, 1December 2010, Les époux X v. Société Fountaine Pajot, No. 09-13303, Bull.civ.
I, No 248 (“qu’une décision étrangère condamnant une partie à paiement de dommages-intérêts punitifs n’est
pas, par principe, contraire à l’ordre public international de fond”).
346 Cour de CassationCiv 1re, 1December 2010, Les époux X v. Société Fountaine Pajot, No. 09-13303, Bull.civ.
I, No 248 (“Mais attendu que si le principe d’une condamnation à des dommages-intérêts punitifs, n’est pas,
en soi, contraire à l’ordre public, il en est autrement lorsque le montant alloué est disproportionné au regard
du préjudice subi et des manquements aux obligations contractuelles du débiteur”). One should note that in
the Fountaine Pajot case the court found the 1:1 ratio between compensatory and punitive damages
disproportionate.
347 It is still yet to be seen how the case law develops in this regard.
348 (Lew,Mistelis, &Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, 2003) p.650. See also (Blackaby,
Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) p.519.
349 (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) p.519.
350 See section 6.3.1.
351 See section 4.
135
III France and Book IV of the Code of Civil Procedure
a contract adaptation and gap filling exercise has been considered a creative mechanism
as opposed to the adjudicative function of the tribunal. Nowadays, however, the discussion
seems to be rather obsolete because the prevailing opinion amongst the authorities is that
the tribunal should be equipped with contract adaptation tools.352 In any event, being
mindful that Article 1520(3) of the CCP makes, arguably, a reference to the adjudicative
mandate of the arbitral tribunal,353 one may wonder if contract adaptation fits within the
scope of a tribunal’s mandate and consequently whether it can be reviewed under the
abovementioned provision.
Some explanations on contract adaptation should be added, nonetheless. Therefore,
one should briefly address (i) the distinction between the arbitrage jurisdictionnel and
arbitrage contractuel as developed in France together with (ii) a rationale for such a
distinction (creative v. jurisdictional powers of the tribunal). Moreover, it is necessary to
highlight (iii) the importance of the applicable law and contractual provisions; the last
point (iv) deals with a tribunal’s power to adapt the contract under themandate of amiable
compositeur.
As to the first and second points, the distinction between arbitrage jurisdictionnel and
contractuel attracted a fair amount of attention some years ago. The arguments have been
brought forward explaining that the task of an arbitrator (in arbitrage jurisdictionnel) is
the same as the one of a judge, consequently entailing that “arbitration is generally seen as
a judicial dispute settlement mechanism which replaces state courts.”354 Conversely, in case
of arbitrage contractuel, “the arbitrator is requested not to settle a dispute, but rather to add
or integrate an element into the contract that the parties were not willing or were not in the
position to include directly at the time they entered into the agreement. The legal basis of
such determination is a mandate to the third party by both parties.”355 In the opinion of
some, therefore, it was irreconcilable for the tribunal, whose mandate was to resolve the
dispute, to get involved in an “exclusively creative act.”356
352 (Gaillard & Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 1999) p.29.
(“Nowadays, commentators are largely in favor of arbitrators being empowered, in French law, to adapt a
contract.”).
353 See section 4.
354 (Kröll, Contractual gap-filling by arbitration tribunals, 1999) p.12. (“To put it in the words of Kassis, ‘L’arbitre
tranche un différend, et sa mission est exactement la même que celle d’un juge.’ This means that arbitration
is generally seen as a judicial dispute settlement mechanism which replaces state courts.”).
355 (Carducci, The Arbitration Reform in France: Domestic and International Arbitration Law, 2012) p.127.
See also, (Gaillard & Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 1999)
p.25 (“Strictly speaking, “the fixing of a price by third parties does not, in principle, constitute a judicial act:”
there is no “dispute” or, more precisely, there is neither a prior “claim” by one party, nor an assessment of that
claim by a third party. Such factors would be characteristic of a judicial act and therefore also of the role of
an arbitrator. The latter could not, in that capacity, be required to extend or modify a contract.”), and
(Motulsky, 2010) p.47.
356 (Motulsky, 2010) p.47. See also (Gaillard&Savage, FouchardGaillardGoldmanon International Commercial
Arbitration, 1999) p.27. Notably the authors of (Gaillard & Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on
136
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
In principle, there is some merit in the argument recognizing the different set of
responsibilities imposed on arbitrators when asked to fill the contractual gaps. It is
emphasized that the adjudicative function of the tribunal “is […] normally restricted to the
determination of pre-existing rights”,357 whereas a gap-filling exercise “in its proper sense
is characterised by arbitrators adding provisions to the contract at their discretion. They
take up the creative task of rule-making and of regulating the parties’ relationship.”358 In
any event, as observed by David: “[t]he arbitrator may be given by the parties the task of
settling a legal dispute or intervening in the regulation of a contractual relationship. In both
cases the situation is, in essence, the same.”359 It is argued therefore, that if parties are willing
to extend the traditionally understood adjudicative function of the arbitral tribunal they
should be free to do so.360 Such an extension should not be considered to be against the
French concept of international public policy.
Importantly, as to the third point, the power to fill the gap does depend on a number
of factors, the first one being the distinction between “initial” and “supervening” gaps.361
International Commercial Arbitration, 1999) add on p.27 that: “These reservations […] generally related to
the initial determination by a third party of the price of goods, which Article 1592 of the French Civil Code
inaccurately describes as an “arbitration.”
357 (Kröll, Contractual gap-filling by arbitration tribunals, 1999) p.12. See also (Loquin É., 2015) p.436 (“L’acte
jurisdictionnel implique au contraire la sanction de droit déjà né, après verification de son existence.”).
358 (Kröll, Contractual gap-filling by arbitration tribunals, 1999) p.12. See also (Loquin É., 2015) p.436 (“La
creation d’une obligation nouvelle par un tiers appartient normalement au seul domaine dumandate commun,
et suppose non pas l’existence d’un désaccord, mais bien contraire l’accord des parties sur cette creation.”).
359 (David, 1985) p.410.
360 Parenthetically, one should note the tribunals’ reluctance to accept the power to adapt the contract. See
(Gaillard & Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 1999) pp.25-26
(“[a]rbitrators will generally be reluctant to accept the doctrine of change in circumstances even in long-term,
non-speculative contracts. Instead, they will often consider that parties to international contracts are, generally
speaking, experienced professionals well able to protect themselves in their agreements from changes in
circumstances. [next para] Even when acting as amiables compositeurs, arbitrators are generally reluctant to
interpret clauses giving them powers to rule in equity as enabling them to fill gaps left in the contract or to
adapt the contract to future circumstances. Some arbitrators do, however, consider that their amiable
compositeur status allows them to attenuate the overly harsh consequences of a strict application of the contract,
and recent French case law has accepted this practice.”).
361 See (Berger, Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make Sense, 2001) p.3 (“Initial gaps
are those deliberately left open by the parties during of the drafting the contract. In this case, the arbitrator is
not regarded as competent to fill the gap. Supervening gaps occur after the conclusion of the contract and are
unforeseen at the moment. Here, the arbitrator may be authorized to fill the gap if the conditions of the
applicable procedural and substantive law are met.”). A similar distinction has been explained by (Poudret
& Besson, 2007) p.20: (“As has been noted, namely by Jarrosson, it is important to distinguish whether the
third party is requested to fill a true gap in an incomplete contract – in which case we have seen that his
decision will have a constitutive effect – or whether he only has to fill gaps concerning secondary points. In
the latter situation the third party does not complete the contract instead of the parties, but resolves a dispute
by way of interpretation, thereby exercising a jurisdictional task as an arbitrator. The same can be the case
when a contract is adapted in order to take a change of circumstances into account. Contrary to Fouchard,
Gaillard and Goldman, we do not think that the arbitrator’s jurisdiction depends on whether the contract
contains an adaptation clause”).
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The second one is whether hardship clauses or other clauses allowing the tribunal to address
the issue of changed circumstances exist, or, in the alternative, the tribunal undertakes
contract adaptation based on its understanding of the agreement to arbitrate.362 The third
one is whether the tribunal can find a source of such a power in lex arbitri or the law
applicable to themerits of the case.363 In any event, it all leads to the question of the parties’
common intention, and as such is rather more a jurisdictional than a mandate question.
For this reason, it may be occasionally difficult to choose the appropriate ground for
challenge.364
Finally, the fourth point of inquiry to be discussed is, namely the tribunal’s power of
gap-filling in case of a mandate as amiable compositeur. As explained above, the power of
amiable compositeur gives muchmore leeway for the tribunal to decide the case.365 It does
not give the power to create new contractual ties between parties per se. It is, therefore,
again a question of the parties’ common intention. As explained by Bensaude, “[a]lthough
the tribunal may moderate the effects of the parties’ contractual agreement, such power is
not without limit. The arbitral tribunal cannot go so far as to create a new contract that was
not envisaged by the parties.”366
Overall, however, it is argued that since arbitration is an adversarial process, it is likely
that parties submit concurring views on how the contract should be adapted and, in turn,
the “creative” powers given to the tribunal by the parties will be an “extension” or a gloss
of the tribunal’s adjudicative and interpretative powers.367 Therefore, in principle, a decision
362 (Gaillard & Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 1999) p.25
(“Most of the controversy surrounding this issue centers on arbitrators’ powers to add to a contract, or to
adapt it to a change in circumstances, in the absence of a clause expressly allowing them to do so. The position
varies according to the attachment of the applicable law to the pacta sunt servanda principle, and to whether
or not that law grants the courts the power to substitute themselves for the agreement between the parties.”).
363 See fn.362. For further reading, see also (Berger, Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to
Make Sense, 2001) pp.10-12.
364 (Gaillard & Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 1999) p.28.
(“The only question which may arise is whether the parties did actually confer a power of adaptation on the
arbitrators. This is a matter of interpretation of the parties’ common intention. If such an intention does exist,
one has to accept both that it is legitimate, and that there is nothing improper about calling the intended
procedure arbitration. After all, in such cases the arbitrators will be required to determine which of the
conflicting positions is well-founded, and therefore to resolve a dispute.”).
365 See section 6.2.5.
366 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1158, (Robert, 1993) pp.160-161. See also CA Paris, 4 November 1997, Société Taurus
Films v. SARL Les Films du jeudi, Rev. Arb. 1998, p.699 (“La mission d’amiable compositeur, qui a pour
fondement la renonciation des parties à se prévaloir d’une exécution stricte des droits qu’elles tiennent du
contrat, donne à l’arbitre le pouvoir notamment de modérer les effets du contrat dans la recherche d’une
solution juste et conforme à l’équité en écartant au besoin l’application de certains droits nés de la convention,
sous réserve de ne pas en modifier l’économie en substituant aux obligations contractuelles des obligations
nouvelles ne répondant pas à l’intention commune des parties.”).
367 In the alternative, one should argue either (i) that the mission for the purpose of Art. 1520(3) of the CCP
has to be broader than only an adjudicative one (in order to entertain the tribunal’s “creative” mission) or
(ii) that the tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction (thus Art. 1520(1) of the CCP should apply) when it undertakes
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on contract adaptationwill be susceptible to theArticle 1520(3) challenge and, consequently,
failure to comply with the mission will take place in the similar instances as already
mentioned in the section on damages.368
6.4 Decisions accessory to the parties’ main submissions and the merits of
the case
Under this section, a few additional comments will be made on decisions that are more of
procedural nature, which are added to the parties’ main submissions. What follows,
therefore, is a discussion on the availability of the challenge against the tribunal’s decision
on interest (section 6.4.1), costs (section 6.4.2) and procedural issues (section 6.4.3). These
issues are characterized by the fact that the tribunal may find the source of said powers in
law and as such may be occasionally more inclined to step in and modify the parties’
request.
6.4.1 Decision on interest
Decisions on interest in international arbitration can be financially significant. At the same
time, French international arbitration law is silent on the question whether the tribunal
has the power to award interest. It also holds true for the leading institutional arbitration
rules.369 In general, it is also not mentioned in the agreements to arbitrate concluded
between parties in international arbitration. Sometimes it is suggested that the power to
award interest is inherent to the arbitral process unless prohibited.370
There are a number of outstanding issues with regard to the process of deciding on
interest. For example, the tribunal has to establish which law applies,371 what the starting
date for accruing interest is, the relevant rate and type of interest (simple or compound).
Its conclusions, therefore, in many places can go wrong.372 It is argued, however, that the
challenge against the decision on interest will be available in the same instances as already
“creative” tasks. As explained in this section, it is generally acceptable for the tribunal to take up contract
adaptation requests.
368 See section 6.3.1 (by and large, where the relief granted is different or higher than that requested or is against
the explicit limitation to the tribunal’s powers).
369 No rule in the 2017 ICC Rules and the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules is dedicated to the issue of interest. Cf with
Art.26.4 of the 2014 LCIA Rules.
370 (International Law Association, 2014) p.10.
371 In principle, there are different theories regardingwhether the interest issue has a substantive or procedural
character whichmay affect what lawwill be chosen by the arbitrator. This line of argumentation has already
been discussed above in section 6.2.1 and section 6.2.2. See also (Born, International Commercial Arbitration,
2014) pp.3102-3112.
372 See also (Giraud, 2017) pp.268-275.
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discussed in other sections, i.a. under the section on damages.373 Itmeans that the tribunal’s
decision may be subject to challenge in cases where (i) an interest rate is different (usually
higher) than sought, (ii) an interest type is different than sought, (iii) granting interest is
prohibited by the agreement to arbitrate, (iv) interest on the claim has not been requested
at all, or (v) the interest granted is considered usury under French law. These instances
will be explained briefly below.
As to the first point, when the interest rate is different than sought,374 there should be
no doubt that the tribunal decidedultra petita and as such failed to complywith itsmandate.
The same should be the case if, for example, the tribunal decides to fix the starting date
for the accrual of interest earlier than it was requested.375
Similarly, as mentioned in the second hypothesis, if the tribunal decides to award
interests of a different type than sought (for example a compound interest instead of a
simple one) it may face a challenge under Article 1520(3) of the CCP. It will generally only
happen when the rate was not discussed during the proceedings and cannot be based on
the parties’ submissions.376
As to the third point, if, however unlikely, parties prohibit the tribunal to award interest,
the tribunal should respect these limits to its powers. It goes in line with the conclusions
of the ILA Report mentioned above.377 Arguably, these restrictions would also apply even
in cases where statutory provisions enable the tribunal to grant damages.
Fourthly, when parties do not express limitations to the tribunal’s powers to grant
interest, the tribunal’s decision on granting interest may survive even when a party did
not request them. It will depend on the applicable law.Without going further into details,
it is sufficient to highlight that if French law is applicable to the issue of interest, the tribunal
would be able to grant it (at the statutory rate), even in the absence of the parties’ request.
It is argued that the tribunal may exercise the power to award statutory interest by relying
373 See section 6.3.1. See also fn.371.
374 See (Giraud, 2017) p.269 (“Par ailleurs, constitue une situation d’ultra petita le fait pour l’arbitre d’appliquer
un taux d’intérêt différent de celui plaidé.”).
375 CA Paris, 28 June 1988, Total Chine v. E.M.H., Rev. Arb. 1989, p.328.
376 (Giraud, 2017) pp.274-275 (“Il en va autrement en matière d’anatocisme. En effet, l’article 1154 du Code
civil ne prévoit pas que le juge puisse accorder d’office la capitalisation des intérêts. Statuera ultra petita
l’arbitre qui prononce l’anatocisme des intérêts alors que le contrat ne le prévoit pas et qu’aucune partie n’en
a fait la demande. Toutefois, la discussion, par les parties, au cours de la procédure arbitrale, du taux d’intérêt
applicable fera obstacle au recours reprochant à l’arbitre d’avoir statué ultra petita en ordonnant
l’anatocisme.”). The author refers as well to CA Paris, 16 January 2003, Thales Electronics v. Ingénierie des
technologies nouvelles, 2001/11782, Rev. Arb. 2003, p.249. See also Cour de Cassation Civ 1re, 12 October
2011, Société Groupe Antoine Tabet v. République du Congo, Rev. Arb. 2012, p.91.
377 See fn.370.
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on Article 1153(1) of the Civil Code378 and that interest is accessory to the main claim.379
Therefore, when there is no doubt that the tribunal may decide on the main claim, it will
be also able to determine the applicable interest.380 Again, it is necessary to stress that such
a position may change if a different law is applicable. Arguably, however, the tribunal’s
decision granting statutory interest not requested, which is based on a statutory provision
of foreign law will stand at the post-award stage in France and would not violate French
international public policy.
The fifth point, and “[o]f note, [award] ordering payment of an interest rate that is
considered usury under French law, does not violate French international public policy”.381
It all leads to the conclusion that the tribunal’s decision on interest fits well in the tribunal’s
mandate.
6.4.2 Decision on costs
Yet another issue that is accessory to the main claims brought by the parties is the costs
of the proceedings. The outstanding question is therefore, whether the tribunal’s decision
on costs may fail to comply with the tribunal’s mandate. The traditional analysis should
apply with a review of the law, the arbitration agreement and the parties’ request. In
principle, one should note that French international arbitration law does not include any
provision as to the tribunal’s authority to decide on costs. Consequently, the power would
be dependent on the agreement to arbitrate and the parties’ request.
Although parties may not expressly address the issue in their agreements to arbitrate,
whenever they do refer to the institutional rules such a tribunal’s power will be likely
discussed therein.382 Notably, the complexity of said provisions in institutional rules may
differ, which further entails the different scope of the tribunal’s powers. Occasionally it is
378 (“En toute matière, la condamnation à une indemnité emporte intérêts au taux légal même en l’absence de
demande ou de disposition spéciale du jugement. Sauf disposition contraire de la loi, ces intérêts courent à
compter du prononcé du jugement à moins que le juge n’en décide autrement.”).
379 See fn.380. See also (International LawAssociation, 2014) p.10 (“[T]he Iran-US Claims Tribunal […] found
the power to award interest ‘inherent in the Tribunal’s authority to decide claims’ […].”).
380 For further reading, see (Giraud, 2017) pp.272-275.
381 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1185.
382 See, e.g., Art. 38 of the 2017 ICC Rules, in particular Art. 38(4) which gives the tribunal prerogative to
allocate the costs (“The final award shall fix the costs of the arbitration and decide which of the parties shall
bear them or in what proportion they shall be borne by the parties.”). The same rules were included in the
2012 ICC Rules (See Art. 37 of the 2012 ICC Rules, in particular Art. 37(4)) See also Arts. 40-42 of the 2010
UNCITRAL Rules, in particular Art. 42 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules (“1. The costs of the arbitration shall
in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party or parties. However, the arbitral tribunal may apportion each
of such costs between the parties if it determines that apportionment is reasonable, taking into account the
circumstances of the case. 2. The arbitral tribunal shall in the final award or, if it deems appropriate, in any
other award, determine any amount that a party may have to pay to another party as a result of the decision
on allocation of costs.”).
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also suggested that the tribunal has an inherent power to award costs.383 Finally, the
discussion should be based on the parties’ submissions. Under certain circumstances,
however, the tribunal’s decision on costs even in the absence of the parties’ request may
survive the challenge. It will be briefly highlighted below.
In principle, a decision on costs shares features of the decision on interest discussed
above and the conclusions considered above (on decisions ultra or extra petita) may be
applicable by analogy.384 It further means that challenges against the mandate can be
categorized as follows: (i) the tribunal divided the costs between the parties differently
than has been expressly agreed between the parties, and (ii) the tribunal granted costs not
requested.
Importantly, however, one should observe that a broad discretion in awarding costs is
one of most important procedural (managerial) powers of the tribunal, because it is one
of the fewmechanisms that allows the tribunal to discipline (and eventually punish) parties
for their behavior throughout the proceedings. Such a power to discipline parties is also
expressly provided in some institutional rules.385 Similarly, the ICC Task Force “has
highlighted the relevance of cost decision-making to case management, and particularly the
use of cost allocation as a means of incentivizing efficient and cost-effective procedural
conduct and sanctioning inefficient and improper conduct.”386 Therefore, arguably, although
the parties’ agreement should be a starting point for the tribunal to decide on costs, its
decision on costs also needs to take into account other circumstances of the case. It entails
that costs allocations that are different than the one agreed by the parties may still survive
the challenge providing that, for example, the tribunal wishes to discipline a party for a
bad faith conduct. It is also possible that a similar rationale may be the basis for the
tribunal’s decision granting costs not requested. It all leads to conclusion that the
setting-aside court would likely respect the tribunal’s findings on costs and leave the
decision on costs intact.
6.4.3 Decision on procedure
Under the French international arbitration regime, the tribunal’s procedural decisions
(that do not follow parties’ choice) may be challenged on the basis of the tribunal’s failure
383 Indeed, if one thinks of ad hoc proceedings, where no fallback mechanism is given (which is opposite to
institutional arbitration), one would observe that, arguably, the tribunal will be an ultimate decisionmaker
with regard to the costs. Otherwise, the process regarding costs will be easily frustrated, with difficulties in
collecting arbitration costs.
384 See section 6.4.1. It also mirrors the reflections on the decision on damages (section 6.3.1).
385 See, e.g., Art. 38(5) of the 2017 ICCRules and Art. 37(5) of the 2012 ICC Rules, which state that: “In making
decisions as to costs, the arbitral tribunal may take into account such circumstances as it considers relevant,
including the extent to which each party has conducted the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective
manner.”
386 (ICC Commision Report, 2015) p.18.
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to comply with its mandate.387 Again, the starting point is (i) a traditional analysis of the
law, the agreement to arbitrate and the parties’ submissions, which will be discussed at
first together with (ii) the prospective clash between party autonomy to shape the
proceedings and the tribunal’s managerial powers to conduct proceedings efficiently.
Furthermore, a few reflections need to be added regarding (iii) the requirement of
establishing that harmhas been caused to the parties by the tribunal’s decision on procedure
and (iv) the impact of the challenge against violation of due process and the violation of
French international public policy. Finally, what follows is (v) a short analysis of the
tribunal’s powers to grant a judicial penalty (“astreinte”).
The initial analysis should start with French international arbitration law. Pursuant to
Article 1509(1) of theCCP “an arbitration agreementmay define the procedure to be followed
in the arbitral proceedings, directly or by reference to arbitration rules or to procedural
rules.”388 Only if the agreement to arbitrate does not provide otherwise, “the arbitral tribunal
shall define the procedure as required, either directly or by reference to arbitration rules or
to procedural rules.”389 It therefore entails that the tribunal will be obliged to rely on the
content of the agreement to arbitrate as to the scope of its procedural powers, be it as it
may, based on institutional rules, national (even foreign) laws390 or the parties’ imagination.
Only if the parties have not reached any agreement on the issue, the tribunal may step
in.391 Similarly, Bensaude explained it as follows “[w]here the parties agree upon rules to
govern the arbitral proceedings, the arbitral tribunal must conduct the proceedings in
accordance with those rules. In all cases, the parties’ agreement will bind the tribunal, so
long as that agreement is express and sufficiently specific. […] If the arbitrators breach the
parties’ procedural agreement, the award may be denied enforcement or set aside in France
for failure of the tribunal to comply with its mission (see art. 1520(3)). Failing an express
and specific agreement of the parties on any part of the procedure, the tribunal may freely
establish procedural rules without reference to any national procedural law or preexisting
387 (Racine, 2016) p.591.
388 (“La convention d’arbitrage peut, directement ou par référence à un règlement d’arbitrage ou à des règles de
procédure, régler la procédure à suivre dans l’instance arbitrale.”).
389 Art. 1509(2) of the CCP (“Dans le silence de la convention d’arbitrage, le tribunal arbitral règle la procédure
autant qu’il est besoin, soit directement, soit par référence à un règlement d’arbitrage ou à des règles de
procédure.”).
390 French law accepts the concept of delocalized arbitration, which entails that the award rendered by the
tribunal seated in France that is governed by a different procedural lawwill not be considered against French
international public policy.
391 (Clay, Code de l’arbitrage commenté, 2015) p.189. (“Premièrement, il existe une hiérarchie dans le choix des
règles de procédure applicables à l’arbitrage: c’est d’abord aux parties qu’il revient de faire ce choix, et ensuite,
à défaut, aux arbitres. Deuxièmement, ce choix, libre, peut être opéré soit de manière directe, soit de manière
indirecte, et il s’impose aux parties. Troisièmement, ce choix peut porter sur un règlement d’arbitrage ou sur
des règles de procédure à la normativité incertaine à une véritable lex arbitrii.”).
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set of arbitration rules.”392 Likewise, Loquin observes that “[t]he [French] Supreme Court
held that ‘in the presence of specific procedural rules fixed in the arbitration clause, arbitrators
could not depart from those rules without disregarding the law that the parties were given
and which was binding on them’.”393
As to the second point, indeed, it is reasonable to expect that the tribunal follows the
parties’ wishes that are introduced in the agreement to arbitrate or the initial submissions
(up to themoment of drafting the Terms of Reference, if applicable). It is so, because these
guidelines made by the parties are made before the tribunal accepts its mandate and, as
such, it knows what “rules of the game” it is expected to follow.394 The situation becomes
complicated, however, when a party (or parties) decides tomodify the agreement as to the
procedure during the arbitral process that is after the tribunal had already accepted its
mandate. There, the legitimate concerns arise. In similar vein, Giraud observes that “[w]hen
the disagreement relates to rules for which nothing had been defined at the time of acceptance
by the arbitrators of their mission, the tension between the will of the parties and the
jurisdictional aspect of arbitration is the biggest.”395 The author distinguishes three
hypotheses: (i) one party wishes to modify the procedural rule, (ii) both parties agree to
alter the rules of the procedure, and finally (iii) it is the tribunal that imposes change in
the proceedings against the will of both parties’.
The first situation is rather simple, because the tribunal is not bound at all to follow
one party’s wish. In other words, disregarding (in the sense of deciding not to follow) the
unilateral party’s request should not be perceived as a failure to comply with the mandate.
The second scenario is the most difficult one. In this case, the tension between party
autonomy and the jurisdictional mandate of the arbitral tribunal is at its peak. Giraud
observes that: “[t]he second case is more complex, where the parties, by mutual agreement,
intend to impose on the arbitrator’s compliance with new procedural rules. The arbitrator
then already accepted his mission without these new procedural provisions; he is not, at first
sight, contractually bound [to follow modifications]. But is he then authorized to refuse?
Does the mission of the arbitrator imply acceptance of any procedural modification by the
parties during the proceedings?Mr. Jarrosson expressed “caution” about automatic welcoming
of any voluntary agreement of the arbitrating parties. The arbitrator must indeed have
leeway to carry out his adjudicative mission. Hemust therefore be able, in this case, to refuse
392 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1151.
393 (Loquin É., 2015) p.437 (“La Cour de cassation a jugé « qu’en présence de règles de procédure précises fixées
par la clause compromissoire, les arbitres ne pouvaient s’écarter de ces règles sans méconnaître la loi que les
parties s’étaient donnée et qui s’imposait à eux ».”).
394 See also (Giraud, 2017) pp.196-197.
395 (Giraud, 2017) p.197 (“Lorsque le désaccord porte sur des règles pour lesquelles rien n’avait été défini au
moment de l’acceptation par les arbitres de leur mission, la tension entre la volonté des parties et l’aspect
juridictionnel de l’arbitrage est maximale.”).
144
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
to comply with this change without this constituting a violation of his mission.”396 This is a
reasonable position. One should bear in mind that the legal tie of the tribunal’s mandate
is no longer between the parties, but it is between three equal entities, the arbitral tribunal
included. For this reason, the principle of party autonomy should ultimately find its limit
in not allowing the parties to frustrate the arbitral process, if the tribunal refuses to follow
procedural modifications of the parties after it accepts its mandate.397 It is particularly so,
because the only (legal) mechanism it has to resist the parties’ usurpation would be to
resign its mandate,398 which most likely would frustrate the proceedings even more. Of
course, at the same time, the tribunal’s persuasive skills (rather than legal tools) will be
essential: “[d]ialogue and awareness of its adjudicative function are two useful tools for the
arbitrator to maintain flexibility in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings.”399
The third scenario envisages a situationwhere the tribunal imposes a certain procedural
rule which neither of the parties wishes to follow.400 Arguably, however, it is correct to
allow the tribunal to lead and manage the proceedings as it finds appropriate to reach its
underlying goal of resolving the parties’ dispute. It should again be able to follow its
understanding of the adjudicative mandate as well as to engage in a dialogue with parties
as mentioned above. At the same time, it is necessary to add that in any case, the tribunal,
while imposing its will, cannot afford to violate the principle of due process and the
fundamental rules of French international public policy.
Additionally, one should observe the adequate argument brought by scholars: “[t]he
majority opinion submits that the arbitrator or arbitrators may not veto a procedural
396 (Giraud, 2017) p.197 (“La seconde hypothèse est plus complexe, lorsque les parties, d’un commun accord,
entendent imposer à l’arbitre le respect de nouvelles règles de procédure. L’arbitre a alors déjà accepté sa
mission, sans ces nouvelles dispositions procédurales; il n’est à première vue pas tenu contractuellement. Mais
cela l’autorise-t-il pour autant à refuser? La mission de l’arbitre implique-t-elle son acceptation de toute
modification procédurale par les parties au cours de l’instance? M. Jarrosson exprime sa « circonspection »
quant à un accueil automatique de tout accord de volonté des parties au litige. L’arbitre doit en effet disposer
d’une marge de manœuvre pour mener à bien sa mission juridictionnelle. Il doit donc pouvoir, dans cette
hypothèse, refuser de se conformer à ce changement sans que cela constitue une violation de sa mission.”). See
also (Schütze, 2013) p.106, discussing the application of Art. 19 of the 2012 ICC Rules and limits to party
autonomy and references to Art. 22(1) of the 2012 ICCRules (conducting the proceedings in a cost-effective
manner) and Art. 25(1) of the 2012 ICC Rules (requirement to establish facts of the case in as short a time
as possible). In the 2017 version of the ICC Rules the same articles apply.
397 Importantly, see Art. 1464 of the CCP, which reads: “Both parties and arbitrators shall act diligently and in
good faith in the conduct of the proceedings.” (“Les parties et les arbitres agissent avec célérité et loyauté dans
la conduite de la procedure.”). The translation offered in (Bensaude, 2015) p.1152 better exposes the
requirement to act expeditiously (“The parties and the arbitrators shall act with celerity and loyalty in the
conduct of the proceedings.”). As explained by Bensaude, “[t]his provision imposes on the parties and the
arbitrators to act ‘loyally’ and ‘swiftly’ in the arbitration proceedings.” See also (Clay, Code de l’arbitrage
commenté, 2015) p.92.
398 See Art. 1457 of the CCP.
399 (Giraud, 2017) pp.197-200. See also (International Law Association, 2014) p.19.
400 The rule, however, is not in opposition to the rules of the proceedings introduced before acceptance of the
mandate. See also fn.397.
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agreement which has been properly concluded by the parties but may only resign if they feel
unable to accomplish their task. De lege lata, we feel that this majority opinion is correct in
view of the principle of party autonomy. De lege ferenda, we are of the opinion that the
Swedish solution is preferable and that the arbitrators should by law have the power to set
aside agreements which are an obstacle to the smooth conduct of the proceedings, without
having to threaten to resign in order to make their point.”401
Leaving aside the clash between party autonomy and the adjudicative function of the
arbitral tribunal, it is also necessary to highlight that a party that wishes to invoke the
ground of failure of the tribunal to comply with its mission on the procedural grounds
needs to establish that the procedural decision caused harm to that party. As explained by
Loquin, “[a]n action for annulment of the awardmay be received in respect of this complaint
[i.e. not following parties’ procedural agreement], but only as long as the violation of the will
of the parties caused a harm [to] any of them.”402 Importantly, Loquin also adds that “[t]he
harm referred [to] should not be confused with violation of due process defence which falls
under Article 1492-4°of the Civil Procedure Code. It is other than that resulting from the
infringement of the right to defend, which explains its rarity. This can be for example failure
to respect [the] time limit for presenting parties’ submissions or filing written statements,
contractually fixed by the parties to arbitration.”403 It consequently leads to the fourth point
of inquiry, thus the interface between different prongs of the setting-aside procedure.
Violating French international public policy and the violation of due process, thus
grounds separate from failure to comply with the tribunal’s mission, will be particularly
relevant in the context of the tribunal’s decision on procedure. As already pointed out
earlier,404 the annulment court may decide to requalify the challenge and assign it with a
different setting-aside ground. It means that even if a challenging party invokes Article
1520(3) of the CCP as the ground for annulment, the court may very well consider that
the challenge is valid, albeit under a different ground. Therefore, for example, one should
highlight that “misinterpretation of documentary evidence must not be confused with the
violation of the mission of the arbitrators since the latter only concerns the jurisdictional
powers and not the decision on themerits.”405 At the same time, even if the challenge against
the procedural decision is not requalified, the tribunal should be always cautious to decide
in accordancewith French international public policy. As has been argued, “[i]n any event,
401 (Poudret & Besson, 2007) pp.462-463.
402 (Loquin É., 2015) p.437 (“Un recours en annulation de la sentence pourra être reçu au titre de ce grief, mais
seulement à la condition que la violation de la volonté des parties cause à l’une d’entre elles un préjudice.”).
403 (Loquin É., 2015) p.437 (“[…] Le prejudice visé ne doit pas être confondu avec violation des droits de la
défence qui relève de l’article 1492-4° du Code de procédure civile. Il est autre que celui résultant de l’atteinte
aux droits de la défense, ce qui explique sa rareté. Il peut s’agir par exemple du non-respect d’un délai de remis
des conclusions ou d’une pièce du dossier, fixé contractuelement par les parties à l’arbitrage.”).
404 See section 3.1.
405 (Poudret & Besson, 2007) p.742.
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all procedural decisions made by the tribunal must be made in conformity with French
procedural international public policy, such as the principles of due process and equality
among the parties.”406
Finally, it is necessary to point out that whenever the tribunal is seated in France, it
will have a rather unique procedural power, namely astreinte.407 “Astreinte is a periodic
penalty payment which can be imposed by a court on a debtor who has not executed his
duty.”408 It has been observed that “[t]here is controversy as to whether arbitrators can attach
penalties to their procedural orders. It has been argued that their lack of imperium and the
absence of statutory basis prevents them from doing so. However, we consider that where
the arbitration agreement is drafted in terms sufficiently broad so as not to exclude that
option (such as “all disputes arising out of the present contract”), there is no reason why
international commercial arbitrators should not attach penalties to their injunctions, provided
that the measures are incorporated, in the interests of enforcement, in an interim award.
The French courts have held this approach to be valid.”409 Other scholarly writing considered
that “[the] power [to grant astreinte] results from the jurisdiction and not from the
imperium”410 and that, more importantly, “[t]he arbitrator, similarly to the state judge, may
order astreinte ex officio without acting ultra petita. The new Article 1468 [of the CCP]
[which is applicable in international arbitration] does not envisage any restrictions to the
arbitral tribunal’s power to impose astreinte. It is for the arbitral tribunal to determine ‘if
there is need’ to impose astreinte.”411 In the end, it means that the tribunal’s decision
disciplining the party will fit within the tribunal’s procedural powers.412
All in all, as long as Article 1520(3) of the CCP may be invoked to challenge the
procedural decision of the arbitral tribunal, one should note that it will not be easily
accepted by the setting-aside court.
406 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1151.
407 See Art. 1468 of the CCP.
408 (Borghetti, 2009) p.57. The author also adds that “[t]he latter has to pay, in addition to his initial debt and
possible damages set by the court, a certain sum (usually calculated on a daily basis) until he fulfils his duty.”
409 (Gaillard i Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, 1999) p.697.
410 (Loquin É., 2015) p.282 (“Ce pouvoir relève de la juridiction et non de l’imperium.”).
411 (Loquin É., 2015) p.283 (“L’arbitre, comme le juge étatique, peut d’office ordonner une astreinte sans juger
ultra petita. Le nouvel article 1468 CPC ne prévoit aucune restriction au pouvoir du tribunal arbitral de
prononcer une astreinte. Il appartient au tribunal arbitral d’apprécier « s’il est besoin » de prononcer une
astreinte.”).
412 For further reading, see, e.g., (Mourre, Judicial Penalties and Specific Performance in International
Arbitration, 2011) pp.355-378, (Racine, 2016) pp.448-449. See also CA Paris, 7 October 2004, Société Otor
Participations et autres v. Carlyle Holdings 1 et autre, Rev. Arb. 2005, p.737 (“Le prononcé d’astreintes ou
d’injonctions constitue un prolongement inhérent et nécessaire à la fonction de juger pour assurer unemeilleure
efficacité au pouvoir juridictionnel et ne caractérise ainsi aucun dépassement de la mission de l’arbitre.”).
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7 Concluding remarks
The position of France as leading forum for international arbitration remains impregnable.
The new statutory framework for international arbitration refreshed and modernized the
model introduced at the beginning of the 1980s without disturbing the core principle of
the system, namely its pro-arbitration stand. In addition, judges continue to respect the
parties’ choice to outsource the resolution of their disputes to arbitration and to defer to
the tribunal’s decisions at the post-award stage. Therefore, the courts will adhere to the
no review on the merits principle, will remedy (if possible) the tribunal’s wrongdoings by
annulling the award only the part of the award that is flawed and by sanctioning abusive
use of the setting-aside proceedings.
The provision that is invoked for the excess of mandate challenge reads that the award
can be set aside when “the tribunal ruled without complying with the mandate conferred
upon it.” Essentially it means that the setting-aside court needs to test what the mandate
given to the tribunal was and check if the tribunal respected its constraints. The outstanding
question is who conferred the mandate upon the tribunal: the parties or the State. In fact,
both the parties and the State shape the mandate. The parties have a much closer impact
on the shape of the arbitral tribunal’smandate, because they designate the tribunal’s powers
and responsibilities in the agreement to arbitrate and (individually) in their respective
prayers for relief. The State, however, influences the mandate as well, because it allows the
parties to delegate the dispute resolution and rendering of justice to the independent,
non-state service provider with the commandment not to violate international public
policy. Consequently, it entails that themandate is delineated by the agreement to arbitrate,
the parties’ requests and the French concept of international public policy.
Because both the parties and the State are relevant in shaping the mandate, different
definitions explaining the meaning of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate can be introduced.
In this chapter it has been argued that the mandate in its broader sense explains the
functional aspect of the tribunal’s responsibility. In other words, the broad definition of
the tribunal’smandate focuses on the adjudicative role of the tribunal, therefore, the power
that is delegated to the tribunal (indirectly) by the State. Conversely, the narrow definition
of themandate stresses the importance of the parties’ constraints imposed on the tribunal’s
powers. None of these two definitions alone serves well for the purpose of Article 1520(3)
of the CCP. For this reason, both of them need to be taken into account. Effectively, the
mandate under Article 1520(3) of the CCP should be understood as to refer to the limits
dictated by the parties but only on the adjudicative powers of the arbitral tribunal.
Notably, the excess ofmandate provision has been slightly redrafted during the reform
of French arbitration law. In the French text of the new provision the verb confier (Eng.
to entrust, to confide) has been used and replaced the verb conférer (Eng. to confer) that
had been used previously. Both of themhave been usually translated in English as to confer
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and have been used accordingly.413 Neither scholars nor judges had found this change
relevant (yet).414 One should reflect nonetheless if the change does not shift the balance of
the teleological meaning of the provision by accentuating morethe trust that is given to
the tribunal by the parties (and the State) rather than the formal (contractual) framework
on which the tribunal’s mandate has been established.415 Additionally, one should note
that in the original French text the term “mission” rather than “mandate” has been used.
Arguably, “mission that is entrusted” stresses more the adjudicative function than the
phrasing “themandate that is conferred upon”. Accordingly, if such an argument survives,
it is the adjudicative function of the tribunal that is of key importance rather than the
(contractual) limitations envisaged by the parties themselves. It would be particularly
relevant in the case of the procedural decisions of the tribunal, where the goal of resolving
disputes between the parties would eventually trump the parties’ will to shape the
proceedings freely and, on occasion, carelessly.
The application of the excess of mandate ground to the selected tribunal’s decisions
resulted in several observations. In general, decisions on claimswill fit under this challenge
whenever the tribunal’s decision is rendered ultra petita or extra petita. In other words,
the decision that grants something more (ultra petita) or something different from what
was claimed (extra petita) should be successfully annulled at the post-award stage. Notably,
however, only the part of the award that goes beyond the request is most likely to be set
aside by the court. One should add that the infra petita award (therefore the award where
not all claims have been decided upon) are not susceptible to the excess ofmandate ground
because of the remedial power given by Article 1485(2) of the CCP.
The multi-contract universe (or instances where tort claims are brought) gives rise to
another issue.When the claims presented before the tribunal arise from a different contract,
the problem of delineating the mandate is closely intertwined with the notion of the scope
of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Sometimes, based on facts, it is difficult to distinguishwhether
it is themandate of the jurisdiction that is exceeded and consequently, whether the challenge
should be based on Article 1520(1) or Article 1520(3) of the CCP. More often than not,
however, these scope questions fit better under the excess of jurisdiction ground (i.e.Article
1520(1) of the CCP).
Similarly, issues relating to set-offs give rise to jurisdictional questions (and not to
those on mandate). On occasion, however, they may be qualified as a mandate question.
Again, in the multi-contract scenario, where the set-off claimed is based on a different
contract than the initial claim, the tribunal will be faced with a difficult balancing exercise.
On the one hand, it has to recognize that its mandate is primarily shaped by the parties’
413 See Annex 1.
414 (Giraud, 2017) p.31.
415 See further section 5.
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common intention, whichmeans that theymay have wished to resolve disputes arising out
of different contracts separately (by including different dispute resolution clauses for
example). On the other hand, set-off is considered a material defense and if it is brought
to the tribunal, it means that a party makes use of its prerogative to apply all available
defenses. Depending on the circumstances of the case it is argued that at least in some
instances (for examplewhere claims are sufficiently related) the tribunal’s decision granting
set-off should survive the challenge. It is likely, however, that such a decisionwill risk being
set aside.
Another problem appears when the tribunal decides to requalify the parties’ claim.
Since the parties’ claims shape the limits to its function, by requalifying it the tribunal will
alter its mandate. If it does so, however, without asking the parties to comment on the
suggested requalification, it may violate due process and, consequently, trigger the
application of Article 1520(4) of the CCP even though it can be argued that by requalifying
the claim it fails to comply with its original task. In any event, it has been explained that
the French courts will subsume the challenge to the appropriate legal ground if they find
another ground to be better suited than the excess of mandate.
The process of the application of law, arguably, does not give rise to many excess of
mandate issues. It is so, because of the great default power given to the tribunal under
Article 1511 of the CCP. Pursuant to this Article, “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide the
dispute in accordance with the rules of law chosen by the parties or, where no such choice
has been made, in accordance with the rules of law it considers appropriate.” It essentially
means that the application of law is inherent to the tribunal’s adjudicative function.
Remarkably, the tribunal is even allowed to apply not only the law, but also the rules of
law on its ownmotion. Consequently, only decisions that acknowledge the parties’ choice
of applicable law and nevertheless disregard itmight be successfully challenged or decisions
that violate the French concept of international public policy. At this point it should be
added therefore that the tribunal’s compliance with the overriding rules of public policy
constitutes a core part of its mandate. Therefore, in case of a clash between overriding
rules of public policy and parties’ arrangements (that are contrary to these overriding rules
of public policy), a tribunal’s decision that defers to the public policy rules would have
more chances to survive.
The tribunal will have a unique set of powers when it is given the mandate of amiable
compositeur. According to Article 1512 of the CCP, the tribunal may rule as amiable
compositeur only when expressly empowered by the parties. It means that the
non-authorized use of such powers or violation of the French concept of international
public policy will be the only arguments that would explain the successful application of
Article 1520(3) of the CCP.
Overall, the tribunal’s remedial powers are broad and, in principle, it should be
anticipated that they would fit within the limits of the tribunal’s mandate. Essentially, the
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tribunal will have the power to grant damages, to grant specific performance or to adapt
the contract. Consequently, it entails that a decision on remedies may be only set aside if
not requested (or is different from that requested) or falling outside the scope of a tailored
(narrow) agreement to arbitrate or the applicable law (which limits the tribunal’s power
to grant specific performance for example). In other words, the tribunal’s decisions on
remedies may be challenged under similar circumstances as decisions on claims (usually
it will be the same decision). Therefore, in principle, only decisions ultra and extra petita
will be challengeable.
The decisions accessory to main claims such as a decision on interest or costs should
also survive the excess ofmandate challenge.Notably, a decision on interestmay be enforced
even if not requested, considering that the applicable law allows for the addition of interest
in statutory rate ipso iure. A decision on costs shows similarities with a decision on interest.
Importantly, however, they are one of a few disciplinary mechanisms against the parties
available to the tribunal. For this reason, these decisions should be approached by the
setting-aside court with leniency. In other words, if the tribunal’s decision on costs is not
aligned with the parties’ requests, because of a bad faith conduct it should not be set aside
at a post-award stage even if it does not comply with the prayers for relief. Often, such a
power to discipline is given by the institutional rules.
Finally, decisions on the procedure are sometimes brought under the excess ofmandate
challenge. As highlighted above these objections are better suited under Article 1520(4)
or 1520(5) of the CCP, namely the challenge of due process or violation of French
international public policy. As noted, invoking the excess of mandate ground is rarely
successful because the party needs to show that the (procedural) decision caused harm to
that party.
In any event, if the parties frame their agreement as to the proceedings, the tribunal
will be generally obliged to follow it. It becomes more complicated, however, when the
procedural rules are being remodeled after the tribunal had accepted its mandate. Put
differently, if the parties decide to change “the rules of the game” while playing it, tension
is brought between party autonomy and the tribunal’s legitimate expectations as to how
it can exercise its adjudicative function. For this reason, the better view is to allow the
arbitrators the freedom to disregard the parties’ (procedural) agreements that are made
after the establishment of the mandate. It also means that failure to comply with the
amendments of the procedural aspect of themandate that have beenmade after the tribunal
accepted the mandate, should not succeed at the post-award stage. Of course, such a
far-reaching freedom should only be used when dialogue with parties fails and when the
proposed procedural agreement seriously hampers the efficiency of the proceedings and
the successful completion of the underlying aim of dispute resolution.
All in all, it seems that the French courts to date do their best to ensure that only
grievous examples of non-compliance with the mandate are set aside at the post-award
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stage. One should be aware, however, that the ground remains open for (broadening)
interpretation that potentially might interfere with the autonomy of international
arbitration.
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IV EnglandandtheArbitrationActof 1996
1 Introduction
English arbitration law is currently structured upon the Arbitration Act of 1996 (hereafter
also referred to as the “Act” or the “Arbitration Act”),1 which has been drafted by the
Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law (also referred to as the “DAC”).2
TheDAC introduced in the 1996 English arbitration regime rather an elaboratemechanism
for challenging an arbitral award, which will be explained in detail below. At the outset it
should be noted, however, that the “excess of mandate” is not one of the grounds listed in
this challenge procedure. Nonetheless, it does not mean that the tribunal’s transgressions
will escape the courts’ scrutiny. In fact, it only shows that the concept of “excess ofmandate”
is scattered and, consequently, itmight be necessary to invoke all three challenge provisions
to determinewhether the tribunal has exceeded its “mandate”. The three relevant challenge
provisions are provided below.
Section 67 of the Act provides that:
“(1) A party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and
to the tribunal) apply to the court—
a. challenging any award of the arbitral tribunal as to its substantive jurisdiction;
or
b. for an order declaring an award made by the tribunal on the merits to be of
no effect, in whole or in part, because the tribunal did not have substantive
jurisdiction.
A party may lose the right to object (see section 73) and the right to apply is
subject to the restrictions in section 70(2) and (3).
(2) The arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitral proceedings and make a
further award while an application to the court under this section is pending in
relation to an award as to jurisdiction.
(3) On an application under this section challenging an award of the arbitral
tribunal as to its substantive jurisdiction, the court may by order—
a. confirm the award,
1 Whenever reference is made to the older Acts, the term will be preceded by the date of enactment of the
Act, for example, the Arbitration Act of 1950 will be mentioned as the 1950 Act. In the historical part, in
order to avoid confusion, the Act will be sometimes referred to as the 1996 Act.
2 For further reading on the historical overview, see section 2.
153
b. vary the award, or
c. set aside the award in whole or in part.
(4) The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court
under this section.”
Pursuant to Section 68 of the Act:
“(1) A party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and
to the tribunal) apply to the court challenging an award in the proceedings on
the ground of serious irregularity affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the
award.
A party may lose the right to object (see section 73) and the right to apply is
subject to the restrictions in section 70(2) and (3).
Serious irregularity means an irregularity of one or more of the following kinds
which the court considers has caused or will cause substantial injustice to the
applicant—
a. failure by the tribunal to comply with section 33 (general duty of tribunal);
b. the tribunal exceeding its powers (otherwise than by exceeding its substantive
jurisdiction: see section 67);
c. failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the
procedure agreed by the parties;
d. failure by the tribunal to deal with all the issues that were put to it;
e. any arbitral or other institution or person vested by the parties with powers
in relation to the proceedings or the award exceeding its powers;
f. uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award;
g. the award being obtained by fraud or the award or the way in which it was
procured being contrary to public policy;
h. failure to comply with the requirements as to the form of the award; or
i. any irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings or in the award which is
admitted by the tribunal or by any arbitral or other institution or person
vested by the parties with powers in relation to the proceedings or the award.
(3) If there is shown to be serious irregularity affecting the tribunal, the
proceedings or the award, the court may—
a. remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or in part, for reconsideration,
b. set the award aside in whole or in part, or
c. declare the award to be of no effect, in whole or in part.
The court shall not exercise its power to set aside or to declare an award to
be of no effect, in whole or in part, unless it is satisfied that it would be
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inappropriate to remit the matters in question to the tribunal for
reconsideration.
(4) The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court
under this section.”
Finally, Section 69 of the Act reads:
“(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may
(upon notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a
question of law arising out of an award made in the proceedings.
An agreement to dispense with reasons for the tribunal’s award shall be considered
an agreement to exclude the court’s jurisdiction under this section.
An appeal shall not be brought under this section except—
a. with the agreement of all the other parties to the proceedings, or
b. with the leave of the court.
The right to appeal is also subject to the restrictions in section 70(2) and (3).
Leave to appeal shall be given only if the court is satisfied—
a. that the determination of the question will substantially affect the rights of
one or more of the parties,
b. that the question is one which the tribunal was asked to determine,
c. that, on the basis of the findings of fact in the award—
the decision of the tribunal on the question is obviously wrong, ori.
ii. the question is one of general public importance and the decision of the
tribunal is at least open to serious doubt, and
d. that, despite the agreement of the parties to resolve thematter by arbitration,
it is just and proper in all the circumstances for the court to determine the
question.
(4) An application for leave to appeal under this section shall identify the question
of law to be determined and state the grounds on which it is alleged that leave
to appeal should be granted.
(5) The court shall determine an application for leave to appeal under this section
without a hearing unless it appears to the court that a hearing is required.
(6) The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court
under this section to grant or refuse leave to appeal.
(7) On an appeal under this section the court may by order—
a. confirm the award,
b. vary the award,
c. remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or in part, for reconsideration in
the light of the court’s determination, or
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d. set aside the award in whole or in part.
The court shall not exercise its power to set aside an award, in whole or in
part, unless it is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the matters
in question to the tribunal for reconsideration.
(8) The decision of the court on an appeal under this section shall be treated as
a judgment of the court for the purposes of a further appeal.
But no such appeal lies without the leave of the court which shall not be given
unless the court considers that the question is one of general importance or is one
which for some other special reason should be considered by the Court of Appeal.”
At the outset, it seems that the concept of “excess of powers” of Section 68(2)(b) of the Act
(as one of the serious irregularities) is the closest to the “excess of mandate” challenge.
Consequently, an analysis of the “excess of powers” ground will be a primary objective of
this chapter. Focusing, however, only on this notion would lead to incomplete results,
because some of the tribunal’s actions in relation to the exercise of the tribunal’s powers
might escape the excess of powers challenge while they can trigger other grounds available
under the English Arbitration Act (for example arbitral awards infra petitamay trigger a
different heading of “serious irregularities”; a challenge of substantive jurisdiction or an
appeal on point of law can also be relevant to determine how the tribunal exercised its
powers). For this reason, and as explained above, it is better to have a closer look at all
three avenues of the English challenge procedure (i.e. substantive jurisdiction (Section 67
of the Act), (selected) serious irregularities (Section 68 of the Act) and appeal on point of
law (Section 69 of the Act) to determine which proviso(s) can be used (and in what
circumstances) to test the tribunal’s exercise of its adjudicative mission.
At first, it is necessary to sketch a brief overview of how the setting-aside system of the
English arbitration regime evolved. Since the earliest legislation on arbitration has already
been introduced in the seventeenth century,3 it is important to show the development (and
provide an understanding) of the concept of judicial control over the arbitral award with
special focus on the actions against the tribunal’s breach of mandate.
Secondly, following the historical summary, general information on the currently
available recourse methods in the English system will be provided. Three sections will
follow, each explaining one of the three types of challenges that will be studied (namely
violation of substantive jurisdiction, serious irregularity and appeal on point of law). The
outline of these sectionswill be similar thus they are discussed here jointly. At the beginning
3 See (Lew & Holm, Chapter 1: Development of the Arbitral System in England, 2013) p.2 (“Statute 9 & 10
Will. 3, c.15 which has sometimes been referred to as the first arbitration act or the Arbitration Act of 1698”).
For the ease of reference, the term “1698 Arbitration Act” will be used. See also (Mustill & Boyd, 1989)
pp.436-440.
156
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
of each of these sections the standard of the court’s review will be discussed. Having
established how the court may approach the challenge, due regard needs to be given to
the meaning and the application of each offensive ground prescribed by Sections 67 to 69
of the Arbitration Act.
The focus will particularly remain, however, on the concept of serious irregularity,
because grounds such as excess of powers and failure to deal with all the issues that were
brought before the tribunal are listed as a serious irregularity. Pursuant to Section 68(2)
of the Arbitration Act “serious irregularity means an irregularity […] which the court
considers has caused or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant.” In addition, it needs
to be pointed out that Section 68 of theAct (alongwith Section 67) is amandatory provision
from which parties cannot contractually deviate.
The sections explaining the grounds available to challenge the award will lead further
to the introduction of a three-headed concept for a challenge. Some reflections as to the
relevance of a three-headed concept for the review of the tribunal’s adjudicative powers
under the English arbitration regime will be presented. Arguably, each of the provisions
on the challenge might be relevant while reviewing the arbitral tribunal’s undertakings.
Thirdly, different tribunal’s actions will be tested against the challenge. Ultimately (and
similarly to other chapters), the analysis of hypothetical scenarios seeks to clarify when it
is appropriate to apply the challenge procedure to the tribunal’s actions that are beyond
its authority. The tribunal’s actions have been selected to comprehensively illustrate what
the tribunal must do in order to effectively fulfill its adjudicatory function. Therefore, the
list includes the tribunal’s decisions on different types of claims, different types of remedies
and on the process of application of law. Moreover, the list entails the tribunal’s decisions
that are supplementary to its decisions on the main claims such as, for example, decisions
on interest and costs.
The conclusions offered should clarify how the tribunal’s mandate can be tested when
the international commercial arbitration is seated in England and governed by the English
Arbitration Act.
2 Historical overview of the development of judicial scrutiny over
arbitral awards under English arbitration law
Before giving a more elaborate analysis of the 1996 Act and the three-headed concept
created therein (see section 3), a few historical highlights regarding the judicial control of
arbitral awards will be addressed.4 Therefore, the overview below will be divided into the
4 The analysis aims to give only a brief overview, thus, on occasion it may come across as oversimplified.
Additionally, it will not deal with, albeit important, recourse against the tribunal’s “mistake of law”. For
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period before the 1889 Act (section 2.1), that before the 1996 Act (section 2.2) and it will
be concluded with a brief comment on the preparations of the 1996 Act (section 2.3).
2.1 Judicial control of arbitral awards before the 1889 Act
In order to understand the peculiarities of English arbitration it is necessary to briefly
examine the English arbitration regime predating the 1889 Act where in fact three
autonomous arbitration systems existed, each of them having a different scope of judicial
control. Therefore one should look at the scrutiny over (i) voluntary arbitration,5 (ii) a
reference to arbitration ordered by a court6 and (iii) a reference to arbitration in accordance
with the 1698 Act.7
In principle, voluntary arbitration largely escaped the court’s scrutiny, because “[…]
the arbitration proceeded independently of the courts, and the powers of judicial intervention
were more narrow than in the case where the submission was a rule of court [thus, reference
to arbitration ordered by a court], although not wholly non-existent.”8 In the context of
voluntary arbitration it has been also argued that “[j]udicial control over a voluntary
reference out of Court was clumsy and unsystematic.Misconduct by the arbitrator was never
recognised as a defence to an action on the award or on the penal bond. Nor was there ever
a jurisdiction in a court of common law to set aside an award for misconduct. The only
further reading on history of arbitration in England and judicial supervision of the English courts, see, i.a.,
(Mustill & Boyd, 1989) pp.431-458, (Tweeddale & Tweeddale, 2007) pp.477-492, (Lew & Holm, Chapter
1: Development of the Arbitral System in England, 2013) pp.1-18. For the historical perspective, see also
(Russell, 1849), (Cave & Wetton, 1935), (Ellenbogen, 1952), (Blanco White & Walton, 1957), (Walton &
Vitoria, 1982).
5 Voluntary arbitration has been aptly summarized in (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.434: “Wehave already referred
to the fact that the form of arbitration in use at the beginning of the seventeenth century was a voluntary
submission out of the court, secured by a penal bond. This procedure was, subject to a potentially fatal weakness,
namely that the arbitrator’s authority was conceived to be a mandate revocable at the will of either party, at
any time before award. This meant that a party could frustrate the reference simply by withdrawing the
authority of the arbitrator. The revocation was treated as a breach of contract, for which damages would lie,
and an action could also be brought on the bond. But these did not always permit a complete remedy. A
revocation did not attract the penalties appropriate to a contempt of court, since the submission was a private
contract; and the position was not improved by an insertion in the submission of an agreement not to revoke
it, since the mandate was regarded as being intrinsically revocable.” See also (Lew & Holm, Chapter 1:
Development of the Arbitral System in England, 2013) p.2 (“[…] the voluntary process relied heavily on the
good faith of parties. An arbitral award was not equated to a judgment: a party wishing to enforce an arbitral
award had to bring new proceedings at court for breach of contract.”
6 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.433 (“A reference in a pending cause. The submission to arbitration came after, not
before, the involvement of the Court in the dispute.”).
7 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.433 (“Here the submission was consensual, and preceded the involvement of the
Court. The effect of an order making the submission a rule of court was not to turn the arbitration into action,
but to attach to the submission certain characteristics which were similar to those possessed by a reference in
a pending cause.”), see also i.a. (Tweeddale & Tweeddale, 2007) p.482.
8 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.434.
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available remedy was a bill in equity.”9 For the purpose of the research at hand, however,
all the more interesting is the review mechanism with the other two types of arbitration.
This (second) method of arbitration was called “a reference in a pending cause”.10 In a
nutshell, “[i]n the absence of an arbitration agreement, high court judges had an inherent
jurisdiction to refer the matter to arbitration with the consent of the parties. Arbitration
pursuant to an order of the court remained under close supervision and control of the court.”11
It was available to the parties even before the 1698Act and is important because the arbitral
tribunal’s powers relied on the powers of the court.12 In turn, the court could rely on its
inherent jurisdiction to supervise arbitration,13 thus also to set the arbitral award aside.14
Russell in the first edition of his treatise collected and categorized when the award can
be set aside. He explained that the award may be challenged (i) “where the conduct of the
arbitrator [is] corrupt or irregular” (ii) “when the award [is] a mistaken decision in law or
fact”, (iii) “when the award is a nullity”, (iv) “when the award is not final”, (v) “when the
award is uncertain”, (vi) “when the arbitrator has exceeded his authority”, (vii) “where [the]
party or witness [is] in fault, or [a] new matter [is] discovered”.15
The enactment of the 1698 Act “allowed for enforcement of a written submission to
arbitration that was expressly made a rule of court, thus affording voluntary arbitration
some of the procedural advantages enjoyed by court-based arbitrations.”16More importantly,
9 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.435; see also (Russell, 1849) p.434 (“When the submission was by agreement out
of court, the courts of common law had no authority to set aside an award until the statute 9 & 10 Will. III
c. 15.”).
10 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.433.
11 (Lew & Holm, Chapter 1: Development of the Arbitral System in England, 2013) p.2.
12 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) pp.432-433 (“[a]lthough the Court delegated part of its functions to the arbitrator,
it retained the remainder. No statutory powers were needed to enable the Court to intervene in case of error
or misconduct; it possessed these powers inherently, because the arbitrator’s mandate from the court was
limited to the conduct of the reference in a proper manner.”).
13 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.433. Notably, however, some authors suggest that “prior to 1698 there were almost
no grounds on which a court could review an arbitrator’s award. On questions of law and fact the decision
of the arbitral tribunal was final. The court would not even review the merits of the award where questions
of natural justice were raised.” For further reading, see (Tweeddale & Tweeddale, 2007) pp.482-483; the
authors made reference i.a. toMatthew v. Ollerton (1693) 4 Mod 226, where “the courts refused to overturn
an award made by the arbitrator who was in fact one of the parties in dispute.”
14 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.437.
15 For further reading, see (Russell, 1849) pp.442-449.
16 (Lew & Holm, Chapter 1: Development of the Arbitral System in England, 2013) p.3. As pointed out by a
number of scholars, the advantage being that qualifying non-compliance with a submission agreement
expressly made a rule of court a contempt of court. See (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.433 (“The Statute went on
to provide that parties who wished to submit a dispute to arbitration could agree that their submission to
arbitration should bemade a rule of any court of record of their choice. Upon production of such an agreement,
the Court would by summary process make the submission a rule. Failure to comply with the submission
would render the offender liable to process for contempt of court.”), (Tweeddale & Tweeddale, 2007) p.482
(“[…] where the arbitration submission was made a rule of court then a breach of the submission agreement
would amount to a contempt of court.”), (Lew & Holm, Chapter 1: Development of the Arbitral System in
England, 2013) pp.2-3 (“The 1698 Act provided that where an arbitration was conducted under the inherent
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however, it also included the statutory provision on the setting-aside procedure, where,
in the relevant part, it has been stated that the award could be set aside if “procured by
corruption or undue means”.17 As long as challenge on the ground of corruption is rather
clear for the contemporary reader, the setting aside of the award “procured by undue
means” requires perhaps few words of explanation.
Russell explains that: “[i]t is evident that the term ‘undue means’ signifies something
different from corruption, for although there be no ground for imputing improper motives
to the arbitrator, the court will set aside the award as procured by ‘undue means,’ if the
course pursued on [ ] the reference ha[s] been inconsistent with natural justice; as for instance,
if the witnesses have been examined in the absence of the parties, or the plaintiff [is] not
allowed a proper opportunity of discussing his case.”18
In similar vein, the authors of the thirteenth edition ofRussell on Arbitration concluded
that: “[t]he latter phrase was interpreted to mean some act contrary to natural justice, and
included misconduct when such misconduct was contrary to natural justice.”19 Therefore,
one can conclude that two types of judicial supervision over the arbitral awards developed
simultaneously and this development had its consequences on the period that followed.20
2.2 Judicial review of arbitral awards before the 1996 Act
There is a huge gap in time between the 1889 Act and the 1996 Act. During these years a
number of changes to the English arbitration regime had taken place, starting with the
1889 Act through the 1934 Act and the 1950 Act. The last one was also amended by the
jurisdiction or by consent of the court, a failure by a party to perform the award amounted to contempt of
court.”).
17 Pursuant to 9& 10W. III. c. 15, s.2 “And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that any arbitration
or umpirage procured by corruption or under means, shall be judged and esteemed void and of none effect,
and accordingly be set aside by any Court of law or equity […].” Referencemade after (Cave&Wetton, 1935)
p.172.
18 (Russell, 1849) p.449. Yet, the same author also acknowledged that “The restriction, however, imposed by
the language of the Act has subsequently been much disregarded, for the courts will listen to application to
set aside awards under the statute on other grounds than the two enumerated in the section; […] And Lord
Eldon, C., observing on the Act in one instance, remarked, ‘There is one case in which the courts have not
considered themselves strictly bound by the words of the statute. The Act is silent as to mistake or error of the
arbitrators, yet it is now settled that an award may be set aside for mistake or error, if admitted by the
arbitrators.’”
19 (Cave &Wetton, 1935) p.173.
20 It is necessary to note the importance of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854. Since this statute, the
courts were empowered not only to set the award aside but also to remit the case back to the tribunal. See
(Lew & Holm, Chapter 1: Development of the Arbitral System in England, 2013) p.3. As argued by Mustill
and Boyd, this statutory competence to remit was available for the courts both in cases of (i) submissions
by rule of court in a pending action and (ii) submissions in accordance with the 1698 Act. For further
reading, see (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.443.
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1979 Act.21 For the purpose of the research at hand, however, it is only relevant for how
the grounds to set the award aside developed throughout the years.22 Yet, a division has
to be made for awards being set aside (i) according to the statutory provision and (ii)
pursuant to the court’s inherent jurisdiction.
With regard to the statutory grounds for setting aside, the 1889 Act replaced two
grounds available under the 1698 Act.23 The newmodel was proposed with the 1889 Act.24
Pursuant to Section 11(2) of the 1889Act, “[w]here an arbitrator or umpire hasmisconducted
himself, or an arbitration has been improperly procured, the Courtmay set the award aside.”25
It has been further amended by the 1934 Act, which supplemented the wording with the
expression “or the proceedings”26 and later became Section 23(2) of the 1950 Act, which
reads: “[w]here an arbitrator or umpire has misconducted himself or the proceedings, or an
arbitration award has been improperly procured, the High Court may set the award aside.”27
The distinction (between the misconduct of the arbitrator and misconduct of the
proceedings) was said to have no practical significance though it attracted “speculation as
to the difference between the two forms of words.”28
Essentially, it has been argued that “little would be gained by attempting a complete
definition of the behavior which constitutes ‘misconduct’”.29 In any event, of particular allure
toMustill andBoydwas the formulation introduced byAtkin J, namely “such amishandling
of the arbitration as is likely to amount to some substantialmiscarriage of justice.”30Obviously
the understanding of the term “misconduct” changed over the years.31 In a nutshell,
21 Few other Acts relating to arbitrationwere enacted during this period. They are not, however, of immediate
relevance for this research and will not be discussed. For further reading, see, e.g., (Mustill & Boyd, 1989)
pp.436-458, (Tweeddale & Tweeddale, 2007) pp.485-489, (Lew & Holm, Chapter 1: Development of the
Arbitral System in England, 2013) pp.3-8.
22 In general, the grounds for setting aside are the same grounds that can be invoked to remit the award to
the tribunal. (Walton & Vitoria, 1982) p.396.
23 Thus “an award procured by corruption” and “an award procured by undue means”. See section 2.1 above.
24 (Blanco White & Walton, 1957) p.289 (“The power to set aside for ‘misconduct’ generally was new with the
1889 Act: the previous Act, referred only to ‘arbitration or umpirage procured by corruption or unduemeans’.
Misconduct inconsistent with ‘natural justice’ was regarded as coming within these words, but cases decided
before 1889must nevertheless be regarded as unreliable upon this point. At common law, there was an inherent
jurisdiction to set aside already referred to. [The reference in section 23 (2) to misconduct of the proceedings
was new in 1934: it appears to have been, in substance, declaratory].”).
25 As referred to by (Cave &Wetton, 1935) p.172.
26 According to (Cave &Wetton, 1935) p.172, “the word in italics [‘or the proceedings’] were added by s.15 of
the Arbitration Act, 1934.” The reading of (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.447 seems to suggest that the 1934 Act
supplemented the meaning of this section with the words “or the reference” which were in turn substituted
by the 1950 Act with the words “or the proceedings”.
27 Section 23(2) of the 1950 Act.
28 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.552.
29 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.550.
30 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.550, with a reference toWilliams v. Wallis and Cox [1914] 2 KB 478 at [485].
31 Compare for example (Cave & Wetton, 1935) pp.177-187 and (Walton & Vitoria, 1982) pp.406-425 or
(Mustill & Boyd, 1989) pp.550-553.
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however: “[t]he term ‘misconduct’ here would appear to be used in its widest sense, perhaps
even including amistake (in law or fact) admitted by the arbitrator.”32 It makes the concept
elusive and as argued by Mustill and Boyd: “[t]he task of formulating a general definition
is made the more difficult by the fact that various types of conduct which have prompted the
Court to remit or set aside an award can equally be categorized as misconduct or as separate
ground giving the Court jurisdiction to intervene. For example, excess of jurisdiction and
defects in the form of the award are probably best regarded as separate grounds for invoking
the jurisdiction of the Court, but there is substantial authority for the view that they also
amount to misconduct.”33
Although there are arguments favoring inclusion of “excess of jurisdiction” within the
scope of the statutory concept ofmisconduct, traditionally, this ground had an independent
standing among other grounds based on the court’s inherent jurisdiction.34 These grounds
naturally evolved as to their scope, which becamemore andmore limited.35 On top of that
the 1979 Act “[…] limited the much criticized and outdated case stated procedure and the
setting aside of awards for errors of fact or law on the face of the award. These antiquated
procedures were replaced by a limited appeal procedure ‘on any question of law arising out
of an award on an arbitration agreement’ provided that all the parties consented to this or
leave of court was obtained.”36 Notably, therefore, the excess of jurisdiction ground
remained, arguably, the most relevant independent ground based on the court’s inherent
jurisdiction.37 An award in excess of jurisdiction was summarized in the following words:
“[a]n award will be entirely void if the parties never made a binding arbitration agreement;
if the matters in dispute fell outside the scope of the agreement; if the arbitrator was not
validly appointed, or lacked the necessary qualifications; or if the whole of the relief granted
lay outside the powers of the arbitrator.”38
In any event, an important, and arguably still valid question, has been posed byMustill
and Boyd: “[a] particular difficulty arises where the contract prescribes the remedy which
must be granted in the event of a breach. In such a case if the arbitrator, having found a
32 (Walton & Vitoria, 1982) p.395.
33 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.551.
34 (Walton & Vitoria, 1982) p.395 (“the court has further an inherent power to set aside an award which is bad
on its face as not complying with the requirements of finality and certainty. The inherent power to set aside
also extends to an award which exceeds the arbitrator’s jurisdiction […].”). Importantly, one of the examples
of the award having “patent defects” (being bad on its face) that was suggested in (Mustill & Boyd, 1989)
p.557 (with a reference to the relevant case law), was when “the award fails to deal with all the issues, the
matter will be remitted so that the arbitrator can fill the gaps.”
35 Compare for example (Cave & Wetton, 1935) pp.187-216 and (Walton & Vitoria, 1982) pp.426-430 or
(Mustill & Boyd, 1989) pp.553-562.
36 (Lew & Holm, Chapter 1: Development of the Arbitral System in England, 2013) p.7. For the procedure of
appeal on point of law under the 1996 Act, see section 6 below.
37 See also (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) pp.554-555 and pp.558-561. Also (Walton & Vitoria, 1982) pp.427-428.
38 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.554.
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breach, mistakenly proceeds to award a remedy other than the one prescribed by the contract,
is this outside his jurisdiction, so as to render the award void, or is it simply a mistake of
law, which like a mistake as to the primary rights and obligations under the contract, does
not amount to an excess of jurisdiction?”39 The authors are of the opinion that “[i]t seems
that the latter is the correct view, and that there is no distinction to be drawn in this
connection between a mistake as to primary rights and obligations and a mistake as to the
remedies prescribed by the contract. If, however, he applies the correct remedy, but does so
in an incorrect way – for example by miscalculating the damages which the submission
empowers him to award – then there is no excess of jurisdiction. An error, however gross, in
the exercise of his powers does not take an arbitrator outside his jurisdiction and this is so
whether his decision is on a matter of substance or procedure.”40 These conclusions should
be applauded and would be equally applicable to the 1996 Act regime.
All in all, since the court was able to rely on both broad statutory grounds as well as
on its inherent jurisdiction while setting the award aside, it is understandable why the
users of arbitration were critical towards the system.41
2.3 The 1996 Act: work in progress
One of the reasons why the most recent reform of the English arbitration law has been
introduced was “the wide discontent over the extent to which the judiciary could interfere
in arbitrations […]”.42 Additionally, it has been recognized that English arbitration law
was not readily comprehensible for the users of arbitration in England.43 Consequently,
39 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) p.554.
40 (Mustill & Boyd, 1989) pp.554-555.
41 The criticism was perhaps directed more to the intrinsic involvement of the courts throughout the whole
arbitral process and not only its post-award stage. See, e.g., (Lew & Holm, Chapter 1: Development of the
Arbitral System in England, 2013) p.7 (“The criticisms were directed especially at the case stated procedure
set out in section 21 of the 1950 Act. Incessant referrals to the courts on points of law led to delays in arbitration
proceedings”). In any event, arguably, the setting-aside procedure was in itself less accessible to foreign
parties or non-English lawyers considering the complexity of the system.
42 (Karali & Ballantyne, 2009) p.352. The authors use these words in relation to the 1979 Arbitration Act, it
holds true for the situation before the 1996Act nonetheless. See also (Lew&Holm, Chapter 1: Development
of the Arbitral System in England, 2013) p.8 (“[d]espite the progressive changes to English arbitration law,
there remained significant views in England and abroad that there was excessive judicial scrutiny of and
interference in arbitral proceedings. This was considered to have had an adverse effect on London as a centre
for international arbitration.”).
43 See sections 2.1 and 2.2 above. Also (Tweeddale & Tweeddale, 2007) p.480 (in particular) with a reference
to the Saville LJ speech on the 1996 Act: “Our law has built up over a very long time indeed. In the main the
developments have come from cases, but in addition, from as early as 1698, Parliament has passed legislation
dealing with the law of arbitration. To a large degree this legislation has been reactive in nature, putting right
perceived defects and deficiencies in the case law. Thus it is not easy for someone new to English arbitration
to discover the law, which is spread around a hotchpotch of statutes and countless cases.”
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the DAC took up the challenge, which is expressed in the very first words of the 1996 Act,
namely “to restate and improve the law relating to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
agreement”44. Additionally, the DAC in its report observed that: “[n]owadays the Courts
are much less inclined to intervene in the arbitral process than used to be the case. The
limitation on the right of appeal to the Courts from awards brought into effect by the
ArbitrationAct 1979, and changing attitudes generally, havemeant that the Courts nowadays
generally only intervene in order to support rather than displace the arbitral process.We are
very much in favour of this modern approach and it seems to us that it should be enshrined
as a principle in the Bill.”45 With these words the DAC confirmed that the supportive
approach of the courts towards arbitration should be transformed into the leading principle
of the new arbitration statute.46
In order, however, to achieve this goal, the DAC did not want to implement theModel
Law in verbatim.47 Instead, the DAC decided to use the Model Law as a reference point,
while constructing an autonomous draft Bill, which later became a legal act (now) known
as the English Arbitration Act 1996.
In the context of the setting-asidemechanism, differences between theModel Law and
the Arbitration Act are visible. The DAC, instead of following the text of the Model Law
(and the New York Convention) created a unique system of review that took into account
the previous development of English law and tailored the entrenched principles of the
court’s supervision to the new pro-arbitration reality. In turn, pursuant to the 1996 Act,
recourse against an arbitral award can be made in cases where the tribunal did not have
substantive jurisdiction, serious irregularity occurred or, under limited circumstances, a
party to the arbitral proceedings brings an appeal on point of law. These challenges will
be analyzed in detail below.
3 The three-headed concept for the challenge procedure
As indicated in the introduction, a party that wishes to attack an arbitral award before
English courts has, generally, three options: it can either (i) submit a challenge on the basis
of lack of substantive jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, (ii) submit a challenge on the
basis that serious irregularities occurred, or (iii) appeal on point of (English) law. Based
44 See Preamble of the 1996 Arbitration Act.
45 (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 22. Similarly, (Mustill & Boyd, 1989)
pp.569-570.
46 See, however, the Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd lecture of 2016 criticizing the deference of the courts towards
arbitral awards because of its effect on the non-development of common law. For further reading, see
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/lcj-speech-bailli-lecture-20160309.pdf [last
accessed 30 April 2018].
47 (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 4.
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on the brief overview that follows, it is concluded that all three concepts are relevant to
test if the tribunal acted within the framework of its adjudicative powers.
The first ground for challenge introduced in the ArbitrationAct is a lack of substantive
jurisdiction. Pursuant to Section 67(1) of the Act a party to arbitral proceedingsmay apply
to the court either (under (a)) for setting aside any award of the arbitral tribunal as to its
substantive jurisdiction or (under Section (b)) for an order declaring an award made by
the tribunal on the merits to be of no effect, because the tribunal did not have substantive
jurisdiction. It is necessary to add that Section 67 of the Act is a mandatory provision of
the Act and parties may not contractually deviate from its content.48
The notion of substantive jurisdiction is strongly intertwined with Section 30 of the
Act, which sets out when the tribunal is competent to rule on its own jurisdiction.49 For
the research at hand Section 30(1)(c) of theAct is of relevance, which reads that the tribunal
may rule on its own substantive jurisdiction, that is, as to “whether matters have been
submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement.” In fact,Merkin and
Flannery made a comparison between the Act and the Model Law and suggested that
Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law falls within the scope of the understanding of
substantive jurisdiction explained in Section 30(1)(c) of the Act.50 It further entails that
when challenging the arbitrators’ powers one should take a look not only at Section 68 of
the Act, but also consult Section 67 of the Act. This is particularly important because these
sections provide the court not onlywith different standards of review but alsowith different
remedies when faced with a challenge.51 Importantly, Section 30 of the Act, however, is
not listed in Schedule 1 of the Act. Therefore, it is not a mandatory provision and can be
shaped differently by the will of the parties.52
48 See Section 4(1) of the Act: “The mandatory provisions of this Part are listed in Schedule 1 and have effect
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.”
49 Section 30 of theAct recognizes positive competence-competencewithin the English systemof international
arbitration. The relevance of the definition of substantive jurisdiction for the purpose of Section 67 of the
Act (as introduced in Section 30 of the Act) has been explained under Section 82(1) of the Act which reads
that: “‘substantive jurisdiction’, in relation to an arbitral tribunal, refers to the matters specified in section
30(1)(a) to (c), and references to the tribunal exceeding its substantive jurisdiction shall be construed
accordingly.”
50 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.294 (“There are two sources of jurisdictional challenges
within the Model Law […]. The second is Art. 34(2), which provides that the courts of the seat may set aside
an award if the applicant proves that: […] (3) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by, or not
falling within, the terms of the submission to arbitration […]. It can be seen that (3) […] fall[s] within section
30(1)(c) […].”). For further reading onArt. 34(2)(a)(iii) of theModel Law, seeChapter II. Similar observations
have been made in the context of Section 103(d) of the Act, which implements the New York Convention
grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. See (Merkin&Flannery, Arbitration
Act 1996, 2014) pp.399-400.
51 See Annex 2.
52 See (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 139.
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The second challenge prescribed in Section 68(1) of theArbitrationAct refers to serious
irregularity and reads that a party to arbitral proceedings may apply to the court on the
ground of serious irregularity affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the award. It further
explains the meaning of serious irregularity in Section 68(2) of the Act and provides an
exhaustive list of what constitutes serious irregularities.53 Amongst others, the tribunal
exceeding its powers in a different way than by exceeding its substantive jurisdiction54 and
the tribunal’s failure to deal with all the issues that were brought before it,55 amounts to
serious irregularity.56 Each of these concepts will be explained further in the sections that
follow.57 Section 68 of the Act, similarly to Section 67 of the Act, constitutes a mandatory
part of the Act.58
Finally, and under very limited circumstances, a party seeking recourse against an
arbitral awardmay file an appeal on a point of law (Section 69 of the Act). It can be brought
only with the agreement of all the parties to the proceedings or with the leave of the court.59
In a nutshell, the leave can be granted only in exceptional circumstances,60 and only
regarding questions of English law.61 The appeal on point of law is a non-mandatory
provision and as such can be derogated by the parties’ agreement. An opt-outmechanism
has been implemented for the purpose of the Section 69 appeal. It means that the parties
may agree to exclude this recourse, but if they did not agree otherwise, it is at the parties’
disposal at the post-award stage.62
Prima facie it seems that both the mandatory challenge procedure as well as the appeal
on point of law may be relevant to test the tribunal’s violations as to the way it exercised
its functions. It remains yet to be seen, however, what the importance of each of the
challenges is in general and as applied to individual cases.63
53 See section 5.1.
54 Section 68(2)(b) of the Act. See also section 5.2.2.
55 Section 68(2)(d) of the Act. See also section 5.2.3.
56 Two additional concepts will be introduced, i.e. breach of general duties of the tribunal (Section 68(2)(a)
of the Act) and uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award. See section 5.2.1 and section 5.2.4.
57 See section 5.
58 See fn.48.
59 Section 69(2) of the Act.
60 Section 69(3) of the Act.
61 Section 82(1) of the Act.
62 Section 69(1) of the Act. See also section 6.
63 See section 6.
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4 Testing the scope of the substantive jurisdiction: the importance
of the contractual framework for the arbitral tribunal’s powers
The substantive jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal relates to the concept of
competence-competence. In other words, it refers to the tribunal’s authority to decide on
its own jurisdiction and how it exercised this authority. Section 30(1) of the Act, however,
has a broader scope which allows one to conclude that the concept of substantive
jurisdiction (and in consequence a challenge against substantive jurisdiction) is also relevant
to the issue at hand.64 At the outset, the approach that the courts take when faced with the
challenge of substantive jurisdictionwill be explained (section 4.1). Subsequently, the limits
to the substantive jurisdiction will be analyzed as long as they are relevant in the context
of the tribunal’s adjudicative competence (section 4.2).
4.1 The court standard of review when faced with the challenge
When a challenging party satisfies all the formal requirements imposed, the court will have
to reflect on how to approach the parties’ objections based on Section 67 of the Act. It
should first consider if it is allowed to be involved in any reassessment of the facts already
established by the arbitral tribunal or whether it should only apply a deferential test to
review the arbitral award (section 4.1.1). Additionally, when faced with a challenge the
court will have to determine how to remedy the allegedwrongdoings of the tribunal (section
4.1.2).
4.1.1 The scope of the court’s review
By and large, in jurisdictions with a modern arbitration structure, courts are asked to act
in a pro-arbitration fashion. This entails inter alia that national courts will support an
arbitral tribunal throughout the process. It also means that courts (usually) should treat
the tribunal’s findings with a considerable degree of deference. If, however, objections
raised by a party refer to the very existence of the substantive jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal, the court may have to reflect twice if deference to the analysis conducted by the
tribunal itself is the best option as to how to proceed. Instead of limiting itself to the
examination of the arbitral award and the findings therein, national courts may consider
reevaluating evidences (that underlie the challenge) presented already to the tribunal.
64 Thus to the overarching research question: when does the tribunal exceed its mandate?
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Notably therefore, English courts when faced with the Section 67 objections opt for
reopening the case and rehearing it.65
Rehearing the case from scratch before the English court entails that all the factual
evidences and legal pleadings that have been initially brought to the attention of the arbitral
tribunal would be assessed yet again by the court.66 In principle, even new evidences or
argumentsmight be admissible, if they fit within the scope of the same ground of objection
raised already before arbitrators.67 New grounds of objection will, however, be barred by
virtue of Section 73(1) of the Act.68
As highlighted by some authorities, apart from trying the case anew, regrettably “[…]
judges are only paying lip service to the idea that the award ought to have any persuasive
value; inmany cases (and unlikemany other countries, where the award is givenmuchmore
respect), the award appears to be largely ignored (or at least hardly referred to at all in some
of the judgments).”69
There is no easy answer on how the court should approach the challenge of an arbitral
tribunal’s jurisdiction andwhether full retrial as exercised by English courts is appropriate.
On the one hand, as aptly pointed out “[i]t does no favours for the reputation of arbitration
65 See (Merkin& Flannery, ArbitrationAct 1996, 2014) pp.296-298, (Sutton, Gill, &Gearing, 2007) para 8-060,
(Joseph, 2010) p.481. See also, e.g., Gulf Azov v. Baltic Shipping [1998] C.L.C. 1240, where the court held
that: “[a]lthough there might be some prejudice to the expeditious and economical disposal of the application
by permitting oral evidence, the justice of the matter required the court to accede to Azov’s application that
oral evidence should be permitted on the s. 67 application. The parties might have come to court by agreement
under s. 32 of the 1996 Act, or if the arbitral tribunal had given its permission, because the issue was not
simply the width of the arbitration clause (on which the arbitrator’s decision might have been accepted) but
whether Azov was party to the agreement. However the court, on a challenge under s. 67, should not be placed
in a worse position than the arbitrator for the purpose of determining that challenge even if there had already
been a full hearing before arbitrators since there were substantial issues of fact as to whether Azov was party
to the agreement. The court was not required to review the challenge to the arbitrator’s award through the
eyes of the arbitrator or on his findings of fact.” As one may observe, however, the issue at hand was the very
existence of the agreement to arbitrate between the parties.
66 See, e.g., (DepartamentalAdvisoryCommittee onArbitration Law, 1996) para 143 (“Achallenge to jurisdiction
may well involve questions of fact as well as questions of law. Since the arbitral tribunal cannot rule finally
on its own jurisdiction, it follows that both its findings of fact and its holding of law may be challenged.”) See
also fn.72.
67 Primetrade AG v. Ythan Ltd. [2005] 2 C.L.C 911 at [62]. If, however, they cannot be entertained by the
objections raised already before arbitrators being entirely new objections they will not be admitted by the
court: seeAthletic Union of Constantinople v. National Basketball Association andOrs [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.
305, 2001WL 825340 and JSC Zestafoni G Nikoladze Ferroalloy Plant v. Ronly Holdings Ltd [2004] 1 C.L.C.
1146.
68 Therefore non-admissible unless a party proves that it did not know or could not have reasonably known
about this (new) ground for challenge. For further reading, see, i.a., Athletic Union of Constantinople v.
National Basketball Association and Ors [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 305, 2001 WL 825340.
69 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.298. See e.g. Gulf Azov v. Baltic Shipping [1998] C.L.C.
1240, Peterson Farms Inc v. C&M Farming Ltd [2004] EWHC 121 (Comm), [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 603.
Similarly (at the enforcement stage) Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v. The Ministry of
Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46.
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if awards are made (and subsequently enforced) against parties that had never agreed to
arbitrate in the first place”70 and that is why, “[t]he process is not, therefore, a mere judicial
review but a complete retrial.”71 On the other hand, retrial raises a number of concerns
regarding efficiency72 and costs.73 Since the arguments are strong on both ends, arguably,
the standard of full review should be carried out by the courts sensibly and with (at least
some) degree of flexibility when faced with the Section 67 challenge.74
One should imagine the case where a party had an undisrupted and complete
opportunity to introduce all its evidences and arguments against the tribunal’s jurisdiction
before the tribunal (which it fully presented under protest) and such a party,
notwithstanding the arbitral process, subsequently presents a Section 67 challenge before
the court seeking a full rehearing with a possibility to present new arguments or evidences
(evenwithin the scope of the same ground of objection as previously raised in arbitration).75
Merkin and Flannery are right in saying that in these circumstances, and if the full rehearing
standard remains inflexible, giving a challenging party an opportunity to fight two equally
complex legal battles does not represent the most just result.76 In other words, if the
challenging party has had ample opportunity to present its case before the arbitral panel,
there is no reasonwhy the court should not defer to the arbitral tribunal’s findings (instead
of relying on the parties’ pleadings anew) and benefit from an arbitral award on jurisdiction
as a starting point for its own (i.e. court’s) analysis.
The hypothetical sketched above ismost likely to occurwhen the scope of the agreement
to arbitrate (rather than its existence or validity) is being challenged. It is so, because the
70 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.296. See also (Grierson & Taok, 2011) p.416.
71 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.296.
72 See, e.g., (Paulsson J., Arbitration-Friendliness: Promises of Principle and Realities of Practice, 2007)
pp.489-490 (“The major, and well-documented, difficulty with the section 67 process is that it is a rehearing
rather than a review of the tribunal’s conclusion. This is obviously inefficient. It also creates pressure for the
courts (as is now increasingly wont) to override the competence-competence principle by determining
jurisdictional issues first, without referring the case to arbitration. According to this logic, requiring a court
hearing before an arbitration can commence helps avoid one after it has finished.”). See also (Harris, Planterose,
& Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.329 (“On the other hand, in Ranko Group v. Antarctic Maritime
SA (1998) LMLN 492 the court said it would be most unfortunate if parties could contest jurisdiction before
an arbitrator and then, on a later application under this section, seek to introduce a raft of new evidence
which could and should have been put before the arbitrator in the first instance.”).
73 One of the consequences of the full review is that considerable costs might be involved in hearing the case
on jurisdiction before two different fora. See (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.296-297.
74 It is sometimes argued that because English courts retry the case with regard to substantive jurisdiction, it
is prudent for the parties to challenge the substantive jurisdiction before the court (sometimes already) at
the outset of the case (even before the constitution of the tribunal) to save unnecessary time and expenses
whichmay occur if the jurisdictional issues are being tried twice. It interferes with the underlying principle
of (positive) competence-competence, however. In any event, if one wishes to invite the court to determine
a tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction early in the proceedings, adequate mechanisms are available in the Act.
See Section 31 and Section 32 of the Act.
75 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.297.
76 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.297.
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question regarding what matters has been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the
arbitration agreement is likely to be intertwined with the merits of the case and as such
decided upon as late as in the final award. Therefore, the better view is that deference
should be given to the tribunal’s analysis regarding the scope of the arbitration agreement.
Ultimately one should observe that disregarding a tribunal’s analysis will also conflict with
the underlying principle pursuant to Section 1(a) of the Act, which reads that “the object
of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without
unnecessary delay or expense”.77
4.1.2 Remedies at the court’s disposal
TheArbitrationAct spells out a number of tools that are imminently at the court’s disposal
when faced with a challenge of the arbitral tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction. In a nutshell,
the court will be able to (i) confirm the jurisdictional award,78 (ii) vary it,79 (iii) set it aside
in whole or in part.80 In the alternative the court will be able to (iv) declare an awardmade
by the tribunal on the merits to be of no effect, in whole or in part, because the tribunal
did not have substantive jurisdiction.81 There is a palpable distinctionmade by the drafters
of the Act between options open to the court depending on whether a party challenges a
jurisdictional award or an award on themerits. As long as the first threemeasuresmentioned
above can be used by the court against a jurisdictional award,82 only the fourth, at least
theoretically, remains available for the award on themerits.83 Each of themechanisms will
be briefly analyzed below.
The two first remedies, namely confirmation and variation of the award are fairly
self-explanatory. The first allows the court to accept and confirm the jurisdictional findings
of the arbitral tribunal, whereas the second permits the court to change the content of the
(jurisdictional) award.84 Additionally, pursuant to Section 71(2) of the Act, “[w]here the
award is varied, the variation has effect as part of the tribunal’s award.” Some authorities
discourage the courts fromusing their power to vary the award in the international context,
because “this may appear to be an unwarranted intrusion on the tribunal’s function. In all
77 See Section 1(a) of the Act.
78 Section 67(3)(a) of the Act.
79 Section 67(3)(b) of the Act.
80 Section 67(3)(c) of the Act.
81 Section 67(1)(b) of the Act.
82 Namely, options pursuant to Section 67(3)(a)-(c) of the Act.
83 See Section 67(1)(b) of the Act.
84 Any part of the arbitral award may be varied. In other words, variation can easily entail variation of the
award on costs or change of the scope of the accepted/declined jurisdiction. It should be also noted that
the court does not have power to remit the case to arbitrators. If, however, an arbitral award declining
jurisdiction is being set aside by the court (thus the jurisdiction is being reinstated), it is likely that the
tribunals will respect the court’s analysis and follow the court’s guidance. Arguably, this could be considered
as a de facto remission.
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cases where the court is considering varying an award, we would suggest that it be remitted
to the tribunal for reconsideration, perhaps with a direction that the tribunal make the
necessary changes.”85 In the context of Section 67 challenges, however sound their argument
is in other respects, remissionmight not be applicable, because courts deciding jurisdictional
objections (pursuant to Section 67 of the Act) are not vested with the power to remit the
award back to the tribunal.86
The last two remedies available for courts, namely an order to set the jurisdictional
award aside and an order to declare an award made by the tribunal on the merits to be of
no effect, deserve separate attention.While reading Section 67 of the Act onemay wonder
why two distinct powers have been introduced by the drafters of the Act. Since the DAC
Report does not offer any guidance in this respect,87 ultimately, it is necessary to determine
whether the difference between these two orders in any way affects the fate of the arbitral
award (irrespective of whether it is a jurisdictional or final decision on the merits). In the
words of one authority: “[i]t did not seem that there was any difference of principle in those
remedies. Section 67(3)(c) of the 1996 Act contemplated that setting aside, in whole or in
part, was a possible remedy for a successful challenge to the tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction.
It might be that where the whole of an award had been declared to be ‘of no effect’ (s.67(1)(b)),
there was no need for any setting aside, but the one was not inconsistent with the other. It
was an award ‘on the merits’ which might be ordered to be of no effect, which suggested that
an award which went only to jurisdiction was simply to be set aside. While the declaration
‘of no effect’ might usefully emphasise the retrospective aspect of such an order, there was no
difference in principle in either order so far as concerned its effect on the continuing status
of an arbitration where there had been a final award on the merits which had lacked
substantive jurisdiction.”88 In any event, even if the outcome of these remedies remains the
85 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.350.
86 In (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.328 (followingHussmann (Europe) Ltd
v. Pharaon (formerly trading as Al Ameen Development and Trade Establishment) [2003] 1 C.L.C. 1066) it
has been argued that there is no need for a power to remit under Section 67 of the Act, because “[…] the
arbitration simply carries on or revives as necessary. Although a valid final award on the merits will exhaust
arbitrators’ jurisdiction, there is no reason in principle why an invalid final award, in excess of jurisdiction,
should lead to the same result when once it has been declared to be of no effect by the courts. It follows that
after an award has been set aside or declared to be of no effect the arbitral tribunal remains seized of the
matter.” See alsoHussmann (Europe) Ltd v. Pharaon (formerly trading as Al AmeenDevelopment and Trade
Establishment) [2003] 1 C.L.C. 1066 at [82-84]. Notably, (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014)
p.301 seem to observe to the contrary by stating that “it is also unclear why the drafters of the section did
not include the power for the court to remit the award to the arbitrators. Such a power would seem sensible
in cases where, for example, the effect of the court’s ruling on jurisdiction is such as to result in a different
costs order.”
87 For theDAC commentary on Section 67 of theAct, see (Departamental Advisory Committee onArbitration
Law, 1996) paras 275-277.
88 Hussmann (Europe) Ltd v. Pharaon (formerly trading as Al Ameen Development and Trade Establishment)
[2003] 1 C.L.C. 1066 at [2]; see also (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 8-068 and para 8-165; (Merkin &
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same, the better view is for the parties wishing to challenge the award to follow the
instructions prescribed by Section 67 of the Act. It means that when they apply against a
jurisdictional award or an award on the merits, they should bring their application for a
correct order, namely (respectively) for an order to set aside or an order to declare the
award on the merits to be of no effect.
Yet another issue that needs to be briefly addressed is the role of the tribunal in the
case when the award (even final) has been set aside or declared to be of no effect. It has
been pointed out that: “[w]hilst the effect of an order to set aside an award clearly deprives
that award of all legal effect, such an order does not mean that the entire arbitral process is
thereby frustrated. No distinction is drawn between an order setting aside an award as to
jurisdiction and an order setting aside a final award on the merits. In both cases, the
arbitration may be able to carry on or revive as necessary unless of course the sustained
jurisdictional objection relates to the identity or manner of appointment of the tribunal or
validity of the agreement to arbitrate.”89 Additionally, Wolfson and Charlwood observe
that “[t]he setting aside of an award on jurisdiction does not render the tribunal functus
officio if they are in a position to continue and make a final award on the merits. Similarly,
a tribunal may continue to make a further award following a declaration of no effect in
relation to an award on the merits, made in excess of jurisdiction”.90
All in all, it should be noted that English courts have a number of remedies when faced
with the Section 67 challenge. Distinctively, however, they (formally) lack power to remit
the award back to the tribunal. In any event, courts should use the tools available to tailor
the remedy in a pro-arbitration fashion. They can do so by setting aside (declare to be of
no effect) only the narrow parts of the award and use their power to confirm or (at most)
vary healthy portions of the award.91
4.2 Limits to the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction
According to the definition of substantive jurisdiction as provided in Section 30(1)(c) of
the Act, the tribunal may rule on its own substantive jurisdiction as to what matters have
been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement. In other words,
the question of the scope of the parties’ submissions, which is of relevance for the research
Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) on p.320 briefly summarize that a theoretical difference between the
setting-aside order and the order declaring the award to be of no effect may exist, “based on the fact that
an award made without jurisdiction may be regarded as a nullity, and it may be more appropriate to declare
it to be of no effect.”
89 (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 8-068.
90 See also (Wolfson & Charlwood, 2013) p.557.
91 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.301 (“There is also no reason why a judgment may not
combine some or even all of those results, if the part of the award is set aside, part varied and part confirmed.”).
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at hand, fits comfortably within the Section 67 scrutiny. Therefore, an analysis of the scope
of an agreement to arbitrate (section 4.2.1) and the parties’ submissions (section 4.2.2)
needs to be offered. Finally, the highlights with respect to the public policy rules need to
be briefly discussed (section 4.2.3).
4.2.1 The agreement to arbitrate and its scope
Indisputably, the first and the main source of any tribunal’s powers is the parties’ consent
expressed through their agreement to arbitrate. Consequently, if an arbitral tribunal exceeds
restrictions imposed by the parties, they may have a legitimate reason to seek recourse
against the arbitral tribunal’s undertakings. For this reason, a few basic notions regarding
an agreement to arbitrate and its scope will be concisely addressed below.
The starting point for the analysis of what constitutes an agreement to arbitrate is the
definition that is expressly provided in Section 6(1) of the Act which reads that “[i]n this
Part an “arbitration agreement” means an agreement to submit to arbitration present or
future disputes (whether they are contractual or not).”92 It is shaped in terms similar to
Article 7(1) of theModel Law93 and following theDAC suggestions it is “amore informative
definition than that in Section 32 of the 1950 Act”.94
In a nutshell, theArbitrationAct allows the parties to conclude an agreement to arbitrate
both in the form of an arbitration agreement concluded before any dispute arises (usually
in the form of an arbitration clause included in the contract)95 and in the form of an
agreement submitting already existing disputes to a tribunal’s determination (often called
submission agreements).96 Additionally, it should be noted that partiesmay decide to alter
their initial scope of the arbitration clause by concluding a submission agreement.97
Another point that explicitly stands out on the face of Section 6(1) of the Act is that
not only contractual, but also non-contractual disputes can be referred to arbitration. The
92 Section 6(1) of the Act. Pursuant to Section 6(2) of the Act, “[t]he reference in an agreement to a written
form of arbitration clause or to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration
agreement if the reference is such as to make that clause part of the agreement.” Subsection (2) therefore
deals with the incorporation of the arbitration agreement by reference. It will not be, however, subject to
any further analysis here. For further reading, see, i.a., (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014)
pp.31-34, (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 42.
93 (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 41, (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The
Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.50, (Veeder V.) Ch.II.1.a.
94 (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 41. Section 32 of the (English)
ArbitrationAct 1950 reads that: “[i]n this Part of this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the expression
“arbitration agreement” means a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration,
whether an arbitrator is named therein or not.”
95 Veeder suggests that these agreements to submit future disputes to arbitration are sometimes called
“agreements to refer”, see (Veeder V.) Ch.II.1.a.
96 Also referred to as “ad hoc agreements”, see (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 2-003 and para 2-006.
97 See, e.g., discussion on the issue in LG Caltex Gas Co Ltd & Anr v. China National Petroleum Corp & Anr
[2001] 1 WLR 1892 at [44-68].
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term “dispute” has been further explained in Section 82(1) of the Act as including “any
difference.”98 It has been consequently suggested that because of the reference to “any
difference”, the meaning of “dispute” is broader.99
Additionally, following the concept of the “one-stopmethod of adjudication”,100 parties
are in fact presumed to submit all disputes between them to be decided by arbitrators. In
similar vein, as pointed out by one authority “[f]ollowing the decision in Premium Nafta
Products Ltd v. Fili Shipping Ltd, the parties will be presumed (unless there is a clear
indication otherwise) to have intended that all and any disputes arising out of their
commercial relationship will be covered by the arbitration agreement, whether contractual
or not.”101 This issue will be further discussed below.102
Finally, it should be highlighted that reference to the institutional rules in the agreement
to arbitrate plays an important role and should be consulted while determining the scope
of the arbitrators’ powers.103 In addition, it has been argued that “[w]here there is a reference
to arbitration rules, the general principle is that (unless the contract specifies otherwise) the
version of the rules current when the arbitration is commenced is the applicable version,
even though there have been changes since the arbitration agreement was made.”104 The
above leads to the conclusion that nowadays courts would employ a rather liberal
interpretation of an agreement to arbitrate, initiating their analysis from the point that
parties wish to have all their disputes resolved before one forum and accepting that the
tribunal’s powers may be included also within institutional rules.105
4.2.2 Relevance of parties’ submissions
When discussing the limits to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, one should always reflect not
only on the importance of the agreement to arbitrate but also on the importance of the
98 Section 82(1) of theAct reads that: “[i]n this Part […] “dispute” includes any difference”. The term “difference”
instead of “dispute” has been used in the definition of the arbitration agreement under Section 32 of the
Arbitration Act 1950.
99 (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.52 (“‘Dispute’ includes ‘any difference’
between the parties by virtue of the definition in s.82(1) and thus has a broader meaning than previously.”).
100 This is the term used by Lord Hope of Craighead in PremiumNafta Products Ltd v. Fili Shipping Ltd [2007]
UKHL 40 at [27] (also known as Fiona Trust v. Privalov).
101 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.26, see also section 6.1.
102 See sections 6.1.1 to 6.1.6.
103 Some model arbitration clauses are rather explicit on that point. See, e.g., the LCIA Recommended Clause
for future disputes (in its 2014 version), which reads that “[a]ny dispute […] shall be […] resolved by
arbitration under the LCIA Rules, which Rules are deemed to be incorporated by reference into this clause.”
104 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.34, with a reference to Jayaar Impex Ltd v. Toaken
Group Ltd [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 437; China Agribusiness Development Corporation v. Balli Trading [1998]
2 Lloyd’s Rep. 76; Ranko Group v. Antarctic Maritime SA, The Robin [1998] ADRLN 35. The authors
recognize, however, that it is common and prudent for the parties to agree subsequently on the most up to
date version of the rules.
105 See, e.g., Art. 22 of the 2014 LCIA Rules, Art. 22 of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art. 22 of the 2012 ICC Rules.
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parties’ subsequent submissions. In fact, pursuant to Section 30(1)(c) of the Act, it is the
matters that have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement
that matter in determining the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
In principle, parties are obliged to introduce their claims at the outset of the proceedings
in their initial statements. For this reason, one should consult the notice of arbitration and
the response to the notice of arbitration106 in order to determinewhatmatters are submitted
to arbitration. It has been noted, however, that “[t]he process of analysis of the scope of the
reference is usually confined to the document or documents described above, considered
objectively, and in their proper context, with the full background matrix in mind.”107 On
this occasion authorsmade a reference to one case where the tribunal was allowed to decide
the issues not formally submitted in the notice of arbitration, but unresolved and known,
and where the language of the notice of arbitration was open enough to accommodate
such claims.108 Therefore, as long as the scope of reference should be, in principle, set out
at the outset of the proceedings, one should be careful in considering it as a definitive one.
Under certain circumstances, however, the limits imposed might have a definitive
character. This would be the case, for example, with the ICC Terms of Reference.109 The
character of the restrictionsmight play a role in cases where new claims or the amendments
for claims are introduced which will be further analyzed below.110 In any event, it should
be concluded that all the parties’ submissions need to be thoroughly analyzedwhen assessing
the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
4.2.3 Overriding and mandatory rules of public policy
The twopreceding sections of this chapter have been dedicated to explaining the importance
of the parties’ consent in the context of the scope of the tribunal’s authority. Yet, it should
not be forgotten that the parties’ autonomy is not unlimited. Pursuant to Section 1(b) of
the Act “the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject only to
such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest.” In effect, it should not come as a
surprise that the autonomy of the parties to shape the tribunal’s powers according to their
will is confined by the fundamental rules of justice. Consequently, the overriding legal
106 Under different institutional rules it may be called differently. See, e.g., ‘Request of Arbitration’ under the
2014 LCIA Rules, the 2012 ICC Rules, and the 2017 ICC Rules. ‘Notice of Arbitration’ under the 1976
UNCITRAL Rules and the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules.
107 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.109.
108 See Lesser Design & Build Ltd v. University of Surrey (1991) 56 BLR 57. The notice of arbitration referred
to “a dispute […] regarding inter alia the following” and “for the avoidance of doubt, the sums claimed […]
include all sums for which it has not yet been reimbursed”; emphasis after (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration
Act 1996, 2014) p.109.
109 Occasionally it is also argued that the ICC Terms of Reference would constitute a submission agreement.
See (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.26.
110 See section 6.1.5.
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rules of public policy may very well influence the range of the arbitral tribunal’s authority
for example with the notion of the arbitrability of the claims.111
5 Substantial injustice and the concept of “serious irregularities”
and its relevance for testing the mandate
The second, and perhaps themost relevant, tool that is available to test the arbitral tribunal’s
authority before English courts is the Section 68 challenge which allows parties to object
to an arbitral award that has been flawed with serious irregularities. The analysis below is
divided in five sections. At first it is necessary to discuss the courts’ standard of review as
conditioned upon the concept of serious irregularities (section 5.1). Finally, selected
examples of serious irregularities relevant to the “excess of mandate” review will be
explained (section 5.2). It should also be noted that Section 68 of the Act is mandatory.
5.1 The court’s standard of review as conditioned upon the seriousness of
irregularity
As explained above, pursuant to Section 68(1) of the Act a party to arbitral proceedings
may challenge an award based on the occurrence of serious irregularity affecting the
tribunal, the proceedings or the award. Additionally, the framework of Section 68(1) of
the Act is supplemented by a definition of serious irregularity and the list of serious
irregularities introduced in Section 68(2) of the Act, which reads that “serious irregularity
means an irregularity of one or more of the following kinds which the court considers has
caused or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant […].”112 The application of said
Section is mandatory and cannot be contracted out.
In a nutshell, the test of serious irregularity is a vital mechanism for objection at the
post-award stage of the proceedings. It has been developed, however, to be a means of
recourse limited to the list of irregularities provided on the face of Section 68 of the Act
(section 5.1.1). Moreover, it has been restricted by the notions (i) of seriousness of alleged
irregularity and (ii) of substantial injustice caused to the applicant (section 5.1.2). These
111 According to some authorities, Section 1(b) of the AA is not related to the concept of arbitrability. See
Fulham FC v. Richards & Anr [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 616 as reported in (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration
Act 1996, 2014) p.10. For the explanation of “limits to arbitration agreements” see, (Merkin & Flannery,
Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.110 (“Obviously, no arbitration clause can be regarded as unlimited in scope.
Even the most widely drafted clauses will not be taken to clothe the tribunal with jurisdiction to entertain
criminal complaints, or indeed contracts with a criminal objective, or contracts that are void for illegality or
otherwise contrary to public policy.”).
112 The list of serious irregularities follows the definition. The relevant irregularities are further discussed in
section 5.2.
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statutory filters frame the courts’ approach allowing them to accept challenges only against
themost grievous and unjust tribunal’s actions (section 5.1.3). Each point introduced here
will be further explained in the sections below, together with reflections on remedies
available to the courts when confronted with challenges (section 5.1.4). Notably, the
standard of the court’s review and remedies available differ when compared with the
challenge under Section 67 of the Act.113
5.1.1 The scope of the court’s review limited to the irregularities listed
The first proposition that should be advanced when discussing the standard of the court’s
review under Section 68 of the Act is that the list of serious irregularities (introduced
therein) outlines the framework within which courts may operate.114 It means that the
court would only focus on violations which have been captivatingly described by Merkin
and Flannery with the use of a car analogy: “[…] section 68 is only concerned with what we
may term serious mechanical breakdowns, as opposed to substantive legal errors (driving
on the wrong side of the road or through a red light), or jurisdictional breakdowns (arriving
at the wrong destination or carrying the wrong passenger).”115
Additionally, the list of irregularities is exhaustive and limits the scope of the court’s
inquiry. In the words of the DAC: “[t]he Clause we propose is designed not to permit such
interference, by setting out a closed list of irregularities (which it will not be open to the Court
to extend), and instead reflecting the internationally accepted view that the Court should be
able to correct serious failure to comply with the ‘due process’ of arbitral proceedings […].”116
It has been further explained that: “The list of grounds is exhaustive and deliberately so,
since the DAC thought that the courts should not be free to invent more.”117
There should be therefore no doubt that the courts have no ability to freely construe
what constitutes a serious irregularity. Instead they should seek guidance in the
predetermined list of irregularities in Section 68(2) of the Act. That is also to the detriment
of applicants should fit their objections within one of the grounds listed in the Section
113 See section 4.1 above.
114 See Section 68(2) of the Act; also, section 5.2 of this chapter. It has been also pointed out that Section 68 of
the Act did not have a precise counterpart in older legislation. For further reading, see (Merkin & Flannery,
Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.304-307.
115 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.304.
116 (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 282. The phrase “such interference”
should be understood as interference in the arbitral process agreed by the parties. For the concise comment
on Section 68 of the EAA, see Petroships Pte Ltd v. Petec Trading and Investment Corporation andOrs [2001]
2 Lloyd’s Rep. 348 at [351]. See also (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.306 explaining that
“irregularities” may relate to the arbitral procedure or award.
117 (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.335.
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discussed here.118 Therefore the applicants may not employ the Section 68 mechanism for
reviewing the tribunal’s findings of facts or law.119
5.1.2 The two-step test exercised by the courts faced with challenge
Having in mind the pro-arbitration stand of the English Arbitration Act, courts tend to
use the sifting mechanism designed and introduced in the Act and consequently deter
from intervening in the arbitral process. In fact Section 68 of the Act caters the courts with
two filters used in order tominimize their (the courts) involvement in arbitration: the first
one bars the irregularity challenge upon its seriousness and the second requires the serious
irregularity to result in substantial injustice caused to the applicant.
The two filters are intertwined since they are in fact two subsequent steps of the same
instrument used by courts to test irregularities that (allegedly) occurred during arbitration.
As aptly put: “Section 68 involves what has been described as a two-stage investigation, viz,
(1) has there been an irregularity of at least one of the nine kinds identified in the section
and (2) whether the incidence of such irregularity has caused or will cause substantial
injustice. If the court decides that there has not been an irregularity of that kind, there is no
need to investigate the issue of substantial injustice.”120 Put differently, only if the court is
satisfied that (i) an irregularity occurred and (ii) it is serious,121 will the court initiate the
second part of the test, namely an assessment whether serious irregularity led to (or will
118 One should note that “irregularities” are notmutually exclusive. Additionally, if the challenge is not brought
within the Section 68(2) framework, the objection may be found as lacking legal standing; see the example
of the challenge against the award with a blatant (yet not admitted) error that a tribunal refuses to correct
(i.e. 2+2=5). For further reading, see (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.305-306.
119 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.304
120 (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 8-072, see also (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.306.
121 See, e.g., Bromley Park Garden Estates Limited v. Gary Christopher Mallen, Bruce Maunder Taylor [2009]
EWHC 609 (Ch), 2009 WL 648823 at [15-16] (“The Court should not lightly find that there has been an
irregularity in the conduct of an arbitration: a challenge under section 68 is only available in extreme cases,
where the arbitrator has gone so wrong in his conduct of the arbitration in one of the respects listed in section
68, that justice calls for it to be corrected. However, where an irregularity has occurred, it is a ‘serious
irregularity’ for section 68 purposes if, had it not occurred, the arbitrator might realistically have reached a
conclusion significantly more favourable to the applicant.”), Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores S.A. v.
Nippon Yusen Kaisha [2009] EWHC1606 (Comm), 2009WL 2392365 at [61] (“[…] the question is whether,
but for the irregularity which caused the arbitrators to reach (by a majority) a conclusion unfavourable to
CSAV, they might not have reached that conclusion. To put it another way, might what CSAV was deprived
of have made a difference.”). Also Zermalt Holdings v. Nu-Life Upholstery Repairs [1985] 2 EGLR 14 as
referred to in ABB AG v. Hochtief Airport GMBH, Athens International Airport S.A. [2006] EWHC 388
(Comm), 2006WL 755473 at [64] (“…As amatter of general approach, the courts strive to uphold arbitration
awards. They do not approach them with a meticulous legal eye endeavouring to pick holes, inconsistencies
and faults in awards and with the objective of upsetting or frustrating the process of arbitration. Far from it.
The approach is to read an arbitration award in a reasonable and commercial way, expecting, as is usually
the case, that there will [be] no substantial fault that can be found with it.”).
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lead to) substantial injustice upon the applicant.122 It all leads to the conclusion that the
two-level test brings a very high threshold for challenge.123
Before going further into details as to the threshold of the test,124 two brief notes deserve
to be mentioned. At first, it should be pointed out that even if the court is satisfied that
substantial injustice was caused to the applicant, it does not automatically mean that the
challengewill be successful. Instead, the court, before granting a relief, will need to balance
the injustice that occurred during the arbitration against the possible injustice caused by
its own decision (thus by deciding to set aside the arbitral award).125 The second reflection
has been aptly summarized by commentators: “[i]t is also important to note that the courts
will not allow a challenge under s.68 to be a vehicle for abuse by, for instance, allowing it to
stand as a substitute for what should be an appeal on a point of law under s.69.”126
In any event, applicants wishing to challenge the award on the basis of serious
irregularity carry a heavy burden of proof in order to succeed, thus they should draft their
application carefully so that the court is satisfied that the irregularity was serious and
caused a substantial injustice.
5.1.3 The high threshold for the irregularity to amount to substantial injustice
Ashinted in the section above, the threshold for serious irregularity to amount to substantial
injustice has been put very high.127 As explained in the DAC Report, “[…] Clause 68 is
really designed as a long stop, only available in extreme cases where the tribunal has gone
so wrong in its conduct of the arbitration that justice calls out for it to be corrected.”128
Authorities seem to unanimously agree that the substantial injustice test only allows
for theminimal intervention of the courts. For example, the salient argument was brought
by the DAC in its report, where the committee concluded that “[t]he test of ‘substantial
122 See also section 5.1.3.
123 See, i.a., Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA & Ors [2005] UKHL 43 (hereafter
“Lesotho Highlands”). For further reading, see section 5.1.3.
124 See section 5.1.3.
125 SeeCNHGlobal N.V. v. PGNLogistics Limited, Graglia SRL,WincantonTrans European Ltd. [2009] EWHC
977 (Comm), 2009 WL 2848157 at [38] (“A reversal of this procedural irregularity would then cause that
substantial injustice – namely, the substantial injustice which was itself caused by the howler. Inmy judgment
it cannot be possibly arguable that it would cause substantial injustice to the Claimant if the procedural
irregularity were reversed and the correction of the howler prevented, if doing so would cause, on the one
hand, a substantial injustice to theDefendant and, on the other, awholly undeservedwindfall to the Claimant.”)
andCNHGlobal N.V. v. PGNLogistics Limited, Graglia SRL,Wincanton Trans European Ltd. [2009] EWHC
977 (Comm), 2009 WL 2848157 at [43] (“I have no doubt whatever that this case falls slap within the limit
of s.68, that limit being that the court will not intervene to set aside what would otherwise be a procedural
irregularity, where such irregularity has not caused substantial injustice to the applicant because to remove
it would cause substantial injustice to the other party.”).
126 (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.336.
127 See section 5.1.2.
128 (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 280.
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injustice’ is intended to be applied by way of support for the arbitral process, not by way of
interference with that process. Thus it is only in those cases where it can be said that what
has happened is so far removed fromwhat could reasonably be expected of the arbitral process
that we would expect the Court to take action.”129 Similarly it has been concluded that:
“[t]he preliminary requirement of substantial injustice does not entail the court having a
general supervisory role over arbitrations; it can be called upon to intervene only if there is
clear and substantial injustice.”130 On top of that, it has been argued that “[t]he court’s
power is essentially designed to be supportive of arbitration in the sense of maintaining its
good reputation by being available to rectify glaring and indefensible irregularities that
occasion injustice. The limitations on the power restrain the court from interfering with the
arbitral process on any lesser occasion.”131
This high threshold has also been recognized by the courts.132 In the seminal decision
of LesothoHighlands Development v. Impregilo SpA,133 whichwaswelcomedwith approval
by the arbitral community,134 Lord Steyn concluded that “[a] major purpose of the Act was
to reduce drastically the extent of intervention of courts in the arbitral process.”135
Additionally, his Lordship adequately highlighted general principles that underlie the
Section 68 challenge by noting that: “First, unlike the position under the old law, intervention
under section 68 is only permissible after an award has beenmade. Secondly, the requirement
is a serious irregularity. […] Plainly a high threshold must be satisfied. Thirdly, it must be
established that the irregularity caused or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant.
This is designed to eliminate technical and unmeritorious challenges. […]. Fourthly, the
129 (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 280.
130 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.306, see also (Departamental Advisory Committee on
Arbitration Law, 1996) para 280.
131 (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.335; additionally, authors brought up an
example of the pre-Act judgment (Indian Oil Corporation v. Coastal (Bermuda) Ltd. [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.
407), where the court remitted the award for further consideration of an argument not pursued before
arbitrators with a comment that under the 1996 Act regime such a remedy would not be possible.
132 Petroships Pte Ltd v. Petec Trading and Investment Corporation and Ors [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 348;
Warborough Investments Ltd v. S Robinson& Sons (Holding) Ltd [2003] EWCACiv 751; Bulfracht (Cyprus)
Ltd v. Boneset Shipping Co Ltd, The MV Pamphilos [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 681; Pacol Ltd. v. Joint Stock Co
Rossakhar [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 109 (see in particular [115] where Colman J concludes that setting aside
appropriate if serious irregularity so severe that would full rehearing of the case); Buyuk Camlica Shipping
Trading and Industry Co Inc v. Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd [2010] EWHC442 (Comm) at [47] see also fn.137
below.
133 Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA & Ors [2005] UKHL 43.
134 See, i.a., (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.306-307 (“The decision in that case affirmed
many previous judicial pronouncements to the effect that the section 68 threshold is a very high one, that being
consonant with the philosophy behind the Act of minimal judicial intervention.”); (Park, The Nature of
Arbitral Authority: A Comment on Lesotho Highlands, 2005) p.484 (“In rejecting arguments that an error
about the currency of an award represented an excess of jurisdiction, their Lordships confirmed a healthy
appreciation that arbitrators do not exceed their powers simply by making a mistake”).
135 Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA & Ors [2005] UKHL 43 at [26].
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irregularity must fall within the closed list of categories set out in paragraphs (a) to (i).”136
Currently, the courts continue to approach the serious irregularities challenge narrowly.137
For this reason, it seems nowwell established that the threshold for the serious irregularity
to amount to substantial injustice is indeed very high. Ultimately, it also disciplines the
parties and reminds them about their bargain to have their disputes arbitrated (with all
its consequences).
5.1.4 Remedies at the court’s disposal
The final point that requires further exploration relates to remedies that the court can use
when dealing with the Section 68 challenge. Pursuant to Section 68(3) of the Act the court
may (i) remit the award for reconsideration,138 (ii) set the award aside139 or (iii) declare the
award to be of no effect.140 Each of these remedies can be applied to an award in whole or
only to its defective part. Most importantly, however, the same Section reads that [t]he
court shall not exercise its power to set aside or to declare an award to be of no effect, in
whole or in part, unless it is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the matters in
question to the tribunal for reconsideration.” Such a design of the remedial tools fits perfectly
with the principle ofminimal court intervention in the arbitral process, because (i) it points
out the presumption of the remission of the award back to the tribunal, (ii) it allows for
preserving the healthy part of the award not affected by the alleged default. In addition, it
clarifies and structures the remedial powers of the courts.141
Arguably, since the remission for reconsideration “is the primary remedy following a
successful application under section 68 […]”,142 it leads to the conclusion that it is a remedy
that underlies the framework of the court’s remedial powers in the context of any serious
irregularity challenge.143 In addition, it has been observed that: “[t]he proviso to section
136 Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA & Ors [2005] UKHL 43 at [28].
137 Bandwidth Shipping Corp v. Intaari [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7, ABB AG v. Hochtief Airport GmbH and Ors
[2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, Terna Bahrain Holding Co WLL v. Al Shamsi [2013] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 86 at [85].
138 Section 68(3)(a) of the Act.
139 Section 68(3)(b) of the Act.
140 Section 68(3)(c) of the Act.
141 (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.335 (“By contrast with the previous position
[i.e. under the 1950 Act], where the court could remit an award for reconsideration whenever it thought fit,
and where the setting aside of the award was linked to the difficult concept of the arbitrator’s ‘misconduct’,
this section gives considerably more definition and structure to the court’s power to intervene on the basis of
irregularity.”).
142 (Wolfson & Charlwood, 2013) p.557. See also The Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Raytheon
Systems Limited [2015] EWHC 311 (TCC) at [3] (“It is clear that remission is the “default” option and the
Court cannot set aside unless it would be “inappropriate” to remit.”).
143 (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.353 suggest, however, that “remission is
likely to be the usual remedy under susbss.(2)(d) [failure to deal with all issues], (f) [uncertainty or ambiguity
as to the effect of the award], (h) [failure to comply with the requirements as to the form of the award]. Setting
aside may be appropriate under the other subsections”.
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68(3) codifies the principle developed under the 1950Act that, faced with a choice of remitting
or setting aside the award, the court is to remit whenever it can and set aside only where
remission would not be appropriate. The cases demonstrate that setting aside the award is
appropriate where irregularity is so severe that there has to be a full rehearing, or where it
is otherwise inappropriate to allow the original arbitrators to reconsider their award owing,
for example, to incompetence or bias.”144 Importantly, once the award is remitted for
reconsideration, the jurisdiction of the tribunal (that became functus officiowhen the award
was made) will be revived to the extent of the remission.145 The tribunal shall make a fresh
award within three months of the date of remission or in the time directed by the court.146
Exceptionally, if the court considers remission to the same tribunal inappropriate, it may
decide to remit the case to a newly constituted tribunal.147
The second characteristic does not require much explanation. It is sufficient to point
out that, if possible, the court will exercise its remedial powers only to the part of the award
affected by the serious irregularity. In other words, the court will not intervene in the
healthy part of the award.
If the award cannot be cured from the serious irregularity, the court will have two
additional tools at its disposal: setting aside the award or declaring it to be of no effect.
These remedies have already been discussed in the context of the challenge of the substantive
jurisdiction and will not be analyzed in detail here.148 In a nutshell, they should be used
only if the award is so faulty that other remedies will not rectify it. The DAC’s intentions
for the introduction of two separate remedies are unclear.149 In the context of serious
irregularities challenge, however, authors do not attachmuch importance to the difference
between setting aside the award and declaring it to be of no effect,150 concluding that they
practically lead to the same results.151
144 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.320. See also (Wolfson & Charlwood, 2013) p.557
(“Where remission would be inappropriate includes cases of bias or incompetence on the part of the tribunal.”).
145 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.320, with a reference to Glencore International AG v.
Beogradaska Plovidba, The Avala [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 311 (“If the award is remitted for reconsideration,
it is likely that the same arbitrators will be retained for, although a tribunal becomes functus officio once the
award is made, its jurisdiction is revived by remission, albeit to the extent of the remission, so that no new
matters can be argued.”).
146 See Section 71(3) of the Act.
147 The Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Raytheon Systems Limited [2015] EWHC 311 (TCC).
148 See section 4.1.2.
149 No explanation is given in the DAC Report.
150 See (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.320; the authors conclude that as long as in the
context of the challenge of the substantive jurisdiction, one can see at least some theoretical arguments why
two remedies should be introduced. These (theoretical) arguments do not apply to the Section 68 challenge.
See also (Wolfson & Charlwood, 2013) p.557.
151 Hussmann (Europe) Ltd v. Pharaon (formerly trading as Al Ameen Development and Trade Establishment)
[2003] 1 C.L.C. 1066 at [81] (“In the present case, there has been no order of setting aside, but instead a
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All in all, having in mind the principle of minimal court intervention with the arbitral
process, the courts should always consider remitting the award back to arbitrators as a
primary remedy and ordering the setting aside only as a last resort.152 Even then, however,
it is likely that only the part in default (rather than the whole award) will be affected by
the courts’ rectifying order.
5.2 Selected “irregularities” relevant in the context of the arbitral tribunal
going beyond the parties’ requests
The closed catalogue of Section 68 of the Act refers to nine irregularities. Not all of them,
however, are relevant to the research at hand.153 Therefore, the following subsections will
be devoted to selected irregularities that are arguably the most relevant in the context of
the tribunal going beyond the parties’ requests.154 The first sectionwill explain the tribunal’s
breach of general duties (section 5.2.1) whereas the second sectionwill deal with the excess
of the arbitral tribunal’s powers (section 5.2.2). It will be followed by sections on failure
to deal with all submitted issues (section 5.2.3) and on ambiguity as to the effect of the
award (section 5.2.4).
declaration of no effect. It does not seem to us, however, that there is any difference of principle in those
remedies.”).
152 For the list of issues taken into account in assessing the appropriate remedy, see The Secretary of State for
the HomeDepartment v. Raytheon Systems Limited [2015] EWHC 311 (TCC) at [4] (“What the Court needs
to do in deciding whether to remit or set aside is to consider all the circumstances and background facts relating
to the dispute, the award, the arbitrators and the overall desirability of remission and setting aside, as well as
the ramifications, both in terms of costs, time and justice, of doing either. A review of “appropriateness”
encompasses a pragmatic consideration of all the circumstances and relevant facts to determine what it is best
to do but it necessarily covers the interests of justice as between the parties.”).
153 Only four from the list of serious irregularities have been selected considering their relevance for the research
at hand. These are (i) breach of general duties of the tribunal, (ii) excess of powers, (iii) failure to deal with
all issues that were brought before the tribunal, and (iv) uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the
award. For the whole list of grounds see Section 68(2) of the AA. Also see section 1 of this chapter.
154 One might also consider that Section 68(2)(g) of the Act could be of relevance since it refers to the notion
of public policy. In particular, it reads that serious irregularity may occur if “the award being obtained by
fraud or theway inwhich it was procured being contrary to public policy.” The authors ofRussel onArbitration,
however, highlight that “[a]lthough the second part of the sub-section, ‘an award procured contrary to public
policy’ is wider on its face than the first part, ‘an award obtained by fraud’ the courts have in fact interpreted
the twin concepts consistently.” (for further reading, see (Sutton, Gill, &Gearing, 2007) paras 8-099 to 8-101).
Moreover, according to (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.316: “to be contrary to public
policy, the impugned conduct had to involve more than inadvertence and generally had to involve behavior
that could readily be described us unconscionable or reprehensible.” (see also, i.a., Double K Oil Products
1996 Limited v. Neste Oil OYJ [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 141; [2009] EWHC 3380 (Comm) at [33]). Although
duly noted, it has been decided to leave this irregularity among the concepts of Section 68(2) not discussed
under this heading as they are less important in the context of the research at hand.
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5.2.1 Breach of general duties of the arbitral tribunal
The first of the notions labeled as a serious irregularity according to Section 68(2)(a) of
the Act, is the tribunal’s failure to comply with Section 33 of the Act, which defines the
tribunal’s general duty.155 These duties are described in fairly general terms,156 which attracts
disappointed parties to challenge the award on that basis.157 It does not change the fact,
however, that “[…] applicants seeking to challenge awards under this provision would do
well to bear in mind that the three principles of party autonomy, judicial minimalism and
finality of award will combine to support the award, and the tribunal, in all cases except the
most egregious.”158
One of the duties imposed by Section 33 of the Act is a duty of fairness. The Section
68(2)(a) challengemight (since it is often relied upon) arguably be relevant for the research
at hand to the extent that it deals with the tribunal’s power to act judicially and to draw
its own conclusions on the facts. Parties regularly challenge the award as “unfair”, because
of the way the tribunal interpreted the facts which could not have been anticipated during
the course of the arbitration.159 At this point, however, it is sufficient to note that there is
no simple equality between the duty of fairness and the arbitral tribunal’s power to make
findings of fact,160 nor is there a breach of fairness if the tribunal provided an opportunity
to submit arguments on “all of the essential building blocks in the tribunal’s conclusion.”161
155 Section 33 of the Act provides that: “(1) The tribunal shall (a) act fairly and impartially as between the
parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent,
and (b) adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or
expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of thematters falling to be determined. (2) The tribunal
shall comply with that general duty in conducting the arbitral proceedings, in its decisions on matters of
procedure and evidence and in the exercise of all other powers conferred on it.” For further reading, see
(Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.124-133.
156 These duties have been aptly summarized in (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014)
p.340: “[t]his includes matters such as bias, procedural unfairness and breach of natural justice.”
157 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.307 (“Section 68(2)(a) is perhaps the most significant
provision in this list (and probably the most often relied upon by upset losers).”).
158 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.308 see also section 5.1.
159 See fn.160.
160 As highlighted by Colman J in Bulfracht (Cyprus) Ltd v. Boneset Shipping Co Ltd, TheMVPamphilos [2002]
2 Lloyd’s Rep. 681 at [687] (“It has to be emphasized, however, that the duty to act fairly is quite distinct from
the autonomous power of the arbitrators to make findings of fact. Thus, whereas it may normally be contrary
to the arbitrator’s duty to fail to give the parties an opportunity to address them on proposed findings of major
areas of material primary facts which have not been raised during the hearing or earlier in the arbitral
proceedings, it will not usually be necessary to refer back to the parties for further submissions every single
inference of fact from the primary facts which arbitrators intend to draw, even if such inferences may not have
been previously anticipated in the course of the arbitration.”).
161 See OAO Northern Shipping Co. v. Remol Cadores de Marin SL [2007] EWHC 1821 (Comm) at [22] (“In
such cases, whilst it is not necessary for the tribunal to refer back to the parties each and every legal inference
which it intends to draw from the primary facts on the issues placed before it, the tribunalmust give the parties
“a fair opportunity to address its arguments on all of the essential building blocks in the tribunal’s conclusion.’”).
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Nonetheless, a number of reported examples162 of the (usually futile) challenges illustrate
that the parties challenged the award when i.a. the tribunal had made secondary findings
of fact without seeking submissions163 or had cited authorities without seeking
submissions.164 Also when the tribunal took a course not put forward by any of the parties,
but which lies somewhere in between was not sufficient to challenge the award, provided
that the findings are not based on propositions which the parties have not had an
opportunity to deal with.165 The courts where not convinced that challenge should be
admitted when the tribuna had taken account of its own expertise in analyzing the
evidence.166 Naturally, these types of challenges are very fact specific and no universal
conclusion can be drawn from the examples addressed. In any event, “collectively, the cases
demonstrate that the courts will allow tribunals a significant degree of leeway in determining
what is required in order to ensure that there is no transgression of the obligation of fairness,
and that the tribunals that refuse to spare the rod to spoil the child will not be in danger of
their award being overturned, provided that they have taken into account all the
circumstances and carefully weighed all the relevant factors before taking their decision.”167
Tribunals should not surprise the parties with their conclusions and should not reach
their decision on the underlying dispute based on findings which parties could not address.
For example, in one case the award was remitted for reconsideration, since “the arbitrator
had been guilty of an irregularity in reaching a conclusion […] which was contrary to the
common position the parties had adopted in the arbitration and in failing to give the parties
notice that he was minded so to hold and an opportunity to address him on the point.”168 In
another case the court decided that the tribunal did not comply with its duty of fairness
when the tribunal awarded interest at a rate higher than claimedwithout giving the parties
an opportunity to address the appropriateness of the new rate and without indicating why
it had chosen a higher rate.169 One can thus conclude that, while tribunals deserve a high
degree of leeway for their appreciation of facts, they should be very careful in building
their decision on what parties were actually able to address during the proceedings.
162 See (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.308 and p.311; (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The
Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.342-343.
163 Bulfracht (Cyprus) Ltd v. Boneset Shipping Co Ltd, The MV Pamphilos [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 681.
164 Sanghi Polyesters Ltd v. The International Investor KCSC [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 480 at [26-28].
165 Weldon Plant Ltd v. Commission for the New Towns [2000] 2 T.C.L.R. 785 at [35]; but see Lorand Shipping
Ltd v. Davof Trading (Africa) BV MV “Ocean Glory” [2014] EWHC 3521 (Comm). See also, Ameropa SA
v. Lithuanian Shipping Co of Lithuania [2015] EWHC 3847 (Comm).
166 Checkpoint ltd v. Strathclyde Pension Fund [2003] EWCACiv 84;Warborough Investments Ltd v. S Robinson
& Sons (Holding) Ltd [2003] EWCACiv 751;Alphapoint Shipping Ltd v. RotemAmfert Negev Ltd, The Agios
Dimitrios [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 23.
167 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.310.
168 Omnibridge Consulting Ltd v. Clearsprings (Management) Ltd [2004] EWHC 2276 (Comm) at [43].
169 Van der Giessen-de-Noord Shipbuilding BV v. Imtech Marine & Offshore BV [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 273 at
[28]. See also section 6.4.1.
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All in all, arbitrators should be capable of using their own expertise and draw
independent conclusions on the facts before them. In turn, these undertakings of the
tribunal would generally not be found as unfair or excessive ones, unless they surprise
parties or leave them no opportunity to address “essential building blocks in the tribunal’s
conclusions.”170
5.2.2 Excess of powers
Pursuant to Section 68(2)(b) of the Act, serious irregularity may also occur if the tribunal
exceeds its powers in a way other than by exceeding its substantive jurisdiction.171 Such a
concept of “excess of powers” on its face value is arguably capacious, even though it is
included in the closed list of serious irregularities.172 It does not, however, change the fact
that courts approach it very cautiously and in line with the principle of minimal court
intervention. A few points deserve further attention: (i) the excess of powers challenge
should not be confused with the concept of jurisdictional challenge (the tribunal’s
substantive jurisdiction),173 (ii) the discussed challenge can be mounted only against the
powers that the tribunal never possessed, and finally (iii) the Section 68(2)(b) challenge is
not a vehicle for reviewing the merits of the case.
The first feature of the discussed challenge is rather clear from the wording of Section
68(2)(b) of the Act, which qualifies the excess of powers as an irregularity distinct from
the excess of substantive jurisdiction.174 Put differently, there is a reason why these two
different concepts have been introduced in the Act and applicants should be careful in
respecting the statutory distinction.175 As stated by scholars: “[t]he distinction between
170 See fn.161.
171 Section 68(2)(b) of the Act also includes a cross-reference to Section 67 of the Act, thus to the challenge on
substantive jurisdiction.
172 See section 5.1.1.
173 Even though the excess of powers test depends as well on the analysis of the agreement to arbitrate and
parties’ submissions. For further reading, see section 4.2. In addition, sources of the arbitral tribunal’s
powers can be found in the Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Section 48 of the AA.
174 See fn.176.
175 On the one hand, Lord Steyn in Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA & Ors [2005]
UKHL 43 at [30] suggests that the “excess of powers” ground (i.e. Section 68(2)(b) of the AA) wasmodelled
on Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC (“Specifically, it is likely that the inspiration of the words ‘the tribunal exceeding
its powers (otherwise than by exceeding its substantive jurisdiction)’ in section 68 are the terms of article
V(1)(c) of the New York Convention and the jurisprudence on it. The context is that article V(1)(a) stipulates
that the invalidity of the arbitration agreement is a ground for non-enforcement of an award: it involves the
competence of the arbitrator. Article V(1)(c) relates tomatters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.
It deals with cases of excess of power or authority of the arbitrator.”) On the other hand, if one looks at the
construction of the substantive jurisdiction provided in Section 30(1)(c) of the AA (which stipulates that
the tribunal may decide on its substantive jurisdiction including “what matters have been submitted to
arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement”), one would see closer similarities between the
language of this Section 30(1)(c) of the Act and the language of Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC, which in turn,
might suggest that theNewYorkConvention’s ground (c) is closer to the concept of substantive jurisdiction,
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jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional issues is normally clear enough. An arbitrator who
exceeds his powers in conducting an arbitration is not to be regarded as having exceeded his
jurisdiction: the former relates to procedure, and the rules on jurisdiction are inapplicable.”176
It is particularly true if the challenge of the substantive jurisdiction relates to the validity
or existence of the agreement to arbitrate.
Occasionally, however, one may find that there is a fine line between a factual
underpinning of the jurisdictional challenge regarding the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction
and the excess of powers challenge, because both will rely on an interpretation of the
agreement to arbitrate, the parties’ submissions and mandatory rules of law.177 In any
event, the Section 67 challenge can be invoked when the tribunal granted relief over a
matter which was not within its jurisdiction (e.g. narrow arbitration clause provided for
arbitrating technical disputes, but the tribunal also decided on the issue of avoidance of
contract),178 whereas the excess of powers challenge will be available only for the
irregularities that involve the exercise of a tribunal’s power which was never allowed, for
example, the use of a remedial power by the tribunal that it never had (such as the power
to grant specific performance or interests). That being said, it leads to the second point of
interest, namely to the meaning of “excess”.
By and large, the simple textual interpretation of Section 68(2)(b) of the Act should
suggest that there needs to be an excess of powers in order to successfully challenge this
type of serious irregularity. It means that the tribunal’s powers have to be truly missing in
order to invoke this ground.179 Therefore parties should first review the contents of the
agreement to arbitrate, the applicable rules and the English Arbitration Act to check if the
rather than to “serious irregularity”. Merkin and Flannery similarly suggest that Section 103(2)(d) of the
AA (which implementsArt. V(1)(c) of theNYC into English Law) “is concernedwith substantive jurisdictional
matters, not procedural matters, which fall within section 103(2)(c) or within the general public policy rules,
rather than this provision.” See (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.400, with a reference to
“the only English authority on this provision [Section 103(2)(d) of the AA]”, namelyMinmetals Germany
GmbH v. Ferco Steel Ltd [1999] C.L.C. 647, [1999] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 315. The decision of the court in and
of itself, however, is less straightforward to classify Section 103(2)(d) of the Act as “substantive jurisdictional
matters”. All in all, it is sensible to include ultra petita decisions within the scope of the “excess of powers”
challenge, considering that infra petita decisions are on the same list of irregularities that might cause
“substantial injustice”. If the ultra petita decisions are subsumed under jurisdictional challenge then there
will be dissonance in the treatment of ultra and infra petita awards. For further reading, see section 5.2.3
and section 6 in general.
176 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.112.
177 See section 4.2. Arguably, the applicable “mandatory rules of law” might be different in the context of
“jurisdiction” and “powers”.
178 For further reading on the Section 67 challenge, see section 3 of this chapter. See also (Merkin & Flannery,
Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.110.
179 SeeCNHGlobal N.V. v. PGNLogistics Limited, Graglia SRL,WincantonTrans European Ltd. [2009] EWHC
977 (Comm) 2009 WL 2848157, where the court was satisfied that the tribunal acted in the “excess of
powers”, because it had used the power it never possessed. At the same time, however, the court concluded
that the excess did not amount to a substantial injustice.
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tribunal truly does not have a specific power.180 Regularly, however, applicants attempt to
bring other objections (regarding the allegedly erroneous use of powers) under the umbrella
of the alleged excess of powers. Courts have repeatedly rejected such arguments.181
The landmark decision Lesotho Highlands offers some guidelines on the issue. Their
Lordships concluded that: “[i]n order to decide whether section 68(2)(b) is engaged it will
be necessary to focus intensely on the particular power under an arbitration agreement, the
terms of reference, or the 1996 Act which is involved, judged in all the circumstances of the
case. In making this general observation it must always be borne in mind that the erroneous
exercise of an available power cannot by itself amount to an excess of power. A mere error
of law will not amount to an excess of power under section 68(2)(b).”182 A similar view has
been expressed by scholars. Merkin and Flannery note that: “[b]efore a losing party decides
upon invoking section 68(2)(b), it should ‘focus intensely’ on the particular power involved,
whether derived from the arbitration agreement, the terms of reference or the Act, set against
the background of all the circumstances of the case. It should also bear in mind that the
erroneous exercise of an available power cannot itself amount to an excess of power.”183 Also
Harris and others underline that “[i]t is now abundantly clear that an excess of jurisdiction
will only occur where the arbitrator can be said to have exercised a power he did not have
rather than wrongly exercised a power he did have.”184
The last reflection addresses applications against an allegedly incorrect decision as to
the facts or the law. Occasionally parties do invoke that by erroneous application of law a
tribunal exceeds its powers. It is important to note, however, that courts are impervious
to arguments aiming at the review of the merits of the tribunal’s decision. Once again, the
seminal decision of Lesotho Highlands is a good reference point.
In this decision, it was emphasized that: “Section 68(2)(b) does not permit a challenge
on the ground that the tribunal arrived at a wrong conclusion as a matter of law or fact. It
is not apt to cover a mere error of law. This view is reinforced if one takes into account that
180 The Arbitration Act, on this point, is very “user friendly” by, in general, introducingmargin notes entitling
specific Sections with the word “power” in them. Arguably, it might give some indication of the powers
that are available and, in turn, may be exceeded. For party-agreed limits, see section 4.2.
181 With a more general reference to Section 68 of the Act, see, e.g., Sonatarch v. Statoil Natural Gas [2014] 2
Lloyd’s Rep. 252 at [11] (“The focus of the enquiry under Section 68 is due process and not the correctness of
the Tribunal’s decision.”).
182 Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA & Ors [2005] UKHL 43 at [32].
183 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.312.
184 (Harris, Planterose, &Tecks, TheArbitrationAct 1996, 2014) p.345. See also (Sutton, Gill, &Gearing, 2007)
para 8-074 (“Implementing this firm policy, the House of Lords drew a clear distinction between whether the
tribunal purported to exercise a power which it did not have or whether it erroneously exercised a power that
it did have. Only the former could give rise to a challenge under s.68. Provided that the tribunal is exercising
a power which it does have, as opposed to one which it does not have, it does not matter how significant the
error is: no relief will be afforded under s.68. The issue is not whether the tribunal has come to the right
conclusion; the sole issue is whether it committed a serious irregularity resulting in a substantial injustice.”).
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a mistake in interpreting the contract is the paradigm of a ‘question of law’ which may in
the circumstances specified in section 69 be appealed unless the parties have excluded that
right by agreement. In cases where the right of appeal has by agreement, sanctioned by the
Act, been excluded, it would be curious to allow a challenge under section 68(2)(b) to be
based on amistaken interpretation of the underlying contract.Moreover, it would be strange
where there is no exclusion agreement, to allow parallel challenges under section 68(2)(b)
and section 69.”185 Also in another case, it was confirmed that the principle described in
Lesotho Highlands also applies to cases when non-English law is being used by the
tribunal.186 Therefore, the error in applying English or foreign law will not amount to
excess of powers.187 Such a conclusion is also endorsed in academic writings.188
5.2.3 Failure to deal with all the issues that were brought before the arbitral
tribunal
The next point that deserves attention is the tribunal’s failure to address all issues before
it.189 According to Section 68(2)(d) of the Arbitration Act, “failure by the tribunal to deal
with all the issues that were put to it” might constitute a serious irregularity. There are a
considerable number of decisions that provide guidance as to how this provision should
be interpreted.190 The reflections presented here, however, would be restricted to presenting
the most important features of the Section 68(2)(d) review.191 Therefore the analysis will
focus on the test developed in Petrochemical Industries Co v. Dow Chemical192 which is
four-fold and enables one to approach a challenge in a systematic way. In this case, Andrew
185 Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA & Ors [2005] UKHL 43 at [31].
186 B v. A [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 681.
187 See B v. A [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 681 (regarding the arguments concerning the misapplication of foreign
law), Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA & Ors [2005] UKHL 43 (discussing
arguments on error in application of English law).
188 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.312 (“It does not permit a challenge on the ground that
the tribunal arrived at the wrong conclusion as a matter of law or fact.”); (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The
Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.345 (“This subsection cannot be used to mount a challenge on the ground that
a tribunal has arrived at a wrong conclusion as a matter of fact or law […]”). (Craig W. L., The arbitrator’s
mission and the application of law in international commercial arbitration, 2010) p.266 (“Errors in the
performance of the mission are not reviewable, but failure to respect the mission may be a cause for
annulment.”).
189 See Section 68(2)(d) of the Act.
190 They are conveniently summarized by Akenhead J. in The Secretary of State for the Home Department v.
Raytheon Systems Ltd [2014] EWHC 4375 (TCC) at [33]; see also previous summaries at i.a. Primera
Maritime (Hellas) Ltd&Ors v. Jiangsu EasternHeavy Industry Co Ltd&Anor [2013] EWHC3066 (Comm)
at [8]; Petrochemical Industries Co v. Dow Chemical [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 691 at [16].
191 For further reading, see, i.a., (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.345-347,
(Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.313-315, (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) paras 8-093
to 8-097.
192 Petrochemical Industries Co v. DowChemical [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 691 at [15] followed i.a. PrimeraMaritime
(Hellas) Ltd & Ors v. Jiangsu Eastern Heavy Industry Co Ltd & Anor [2013] EWHC 3066 (Comm) at [7].
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Smith J contemplated that “the general question whether there was a serious irregularity
within subsection 68(2)(d) in turn raises […]more specific questions.”193 He then continued
by listing four questions namely (i) whether the relevant point or argument was an “issue”
within themeaning of sub-section [68(2)(d)]; (ii) if yes, whether it was “put to” the tribunal;
(iii) whether the tribunal failed to “deal with” it; (iv) if all of the above is answered in the
affirmative, whether the failure has caused or will cause substantial injustice.194 Since the
fourth question has been dealt with already above,195 at this point it is necessary to briefly
examine the first three questions.
The first question deals with difficulties as to what constitutes an “issue” for purposes
of Section 68(2)(d) of the Act. There is neither a statutory definition of an “issue” nor is
there an easy answer to this question. Merkin and Flannery argue that “[…] ‘issue’ does
not mean each and every point in dispute; it means (one of) the very disputes the arbitration
has to resolve.”196 Similarly, it has been suggested that “the tribunal only has to decide
matters relevant to its ultimate decision. Ground (d) is therefore designed to cover those
issues the determination of which is essential to a decision on the claims or specific defences
raised.”197 In the sameway, it has been decided that “the ‘issue’ referred to in section 68(2)(d)
must be an important or fundamental issue for only a failure to deal with such could be
capable of causing substantial injustice.”198 Finally, “amatter will constitute an “issue”where
the whole of the applicant’s claim could have depended upon how it was resolved, such that
“fairness demanded” that the question be dealt with.”199
As to the second question of the Petrochemical Industries test, it seems the court will
look at all parties’ submissions to determine whether an issue has been brought before the
tribunal. In Petrochemical Industries Co v. Dow Chemical, the court was satisfied that the
issue was “put to” the tribunal when it was introduced in the exchange of pre-hearing
memorials and closing submissions, notwithstanding the fact that it was not listed on the
agreed list of issues (introduced shortly before the hearing),200 and it was addressed as an
193 Petrochemical Industries Co v. Dow Chemical [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 691 at [15].
194 Petrochemical Industries Co v. DowChemical [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 691 at [15]; followed inPrimeraMaritime
(Hellas) Ltd & Ors v. Jiangsu Eastern Heavy Industry Co Ltd & Anor [2013] EWHC 3066 (Comm) at [7].
195 See section 5.1.3.
196 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.313; see Checkpoint Ltd v. Strathclyde Pension Fund
[2003] EWCA Civ 84 at [49] (“[…] ‘issues’ certainly means the very disputes which the arbitration has to
resolve.”).
197 (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 8-094.
198 Fidelity Management SA & Ors v. Myriad International Holdings BV & OR [2005] EWHC 1193 (Comm)
at [10].
199 The Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Raytheon Systems Ltd [2014] EWHC 4375 (TCC) at
[33(g)(iii)], with a reference to Petrochemical Industries Co v. Dow Chemical [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 691 at
[21].
200 In this specific case it was not listed by either of the parties: Petrochemical Industries Co v. Dow Chemical
[2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 691 at [23].
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aspect of a different question during oral pleadings.201 Additionally, in The Secretary of
State for the Home Department v. Raytheon Systems Ltd it has been noted (with reference
to Petrochemical Industries Co v. Dow Chemical) that “the issue must have been put to the
tribunal as an issue and in the same terms as is complained about in the Section 68(2)
application.”202
The third prong of the Petrochemical Industries test addresses the question whether
the tribunal “dealt with” the issues presented.203
In a nutshell, if the tribunal does address the issues presented (in any form), it will make
Section 68(2)(d) of the Act inapplicable.204 “[O]nce it is recognised that the tribunal has
‘dealt with’ the issue, the sub-section does not involve some qualitative assessment of how
the tribunal dealt with it. Provided that the tribunal has dealt with it, it does not matter
whether it has done so well, badly or indifferently”.205 Additionally, Section 68(2)(d) of the
Act does not require “a tribunal to set out each step by which they reach their conclusion
or deal with each point made by a party in an arbitration. Any failure by the arbitrators in
that respect is not a failure to deal with an issue that was put to it”206 nor does it require to
“answer every question that qualifies as an ‘issue’. It can deal with an issue by making clear
that it does not arise in view of its decisions on the facts or their legal conclusions.”207
Importantly, “[n]either the parties nor the court should have to indulge in speculation as to
whether a tribunal might have dismissed and not dealt with a particular issue because it
was wholly devoid of merit: if the determination of an issue is crucial to the result then,
however unmeritorious the arguments in favour of that issuemight be, the tribunal is bound
to deal with it in its award in such away as tomake it evident to the parties that it has indeed
dealt with it.”208 The general point therefore is that the tribunal’s conclusions on the key
issues would make application of Section 68(2)(d) of the Act rather moot.
201 See Petrochemical Industries Co v. Dow Chemical [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 691 at [22-25].
202 The Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Raytheon Systems Ltd [2014] EWHC 4375 (TCC) at
[33(g)(v)].
203 Petrochemical Industries Co v. Dow Chemical [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 691 at [27]., See also The Secretary of
State for the Home Department v. Raytheon Systems Ltd [2014] EWHC 4375 (TCC) at [33]; Schwebel v.
Schwebel [2010] EWHC 3280 (TCC) at [23]. For further reading, see (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para
8-094, (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.313-315.
204 PrimeraMaritime (Hellas) Ltd &Ors v. Jiangsu Eastern Heavy Industry Co Ltd & Anor [2013] EWHC 3066
(Comm) at [40].
205 PrimeraMaritime (Hellas) Ltd &Ors v. Jiangsu Eastern Heavy Industry Co Ltd & Anor [2013] EWHC 3066
(Comm) at [40].
206 Hussmann (Europe) Ltd v. Al Ameen Development & Trade Co & Ors. [2000] C.L.C. 1243 at [56].
207 Petrochemical Industries Co v. Dow Chemical [2012] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 691 at [27]. See also Buyuk Camlica
Shipping Trading and Industry Co Inc v. Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd [2010] EWHC 442 (Comm) at [30].
208 As aptly summarized in (Harris, Planterose, &Tecks, TheArbitrationAct 1996, 2014) p.347. See alsoBuyuk
Camlica Shipping Trading and Industry Co Inc v. Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd [2010] EWHC 442 (Comm) at
[38].
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5.2.4 Uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award
Uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the awardmay amount to serious irregularity.209
In very limited circumstances itmay be relevant in order to determinewhether the tribunal
decided on the issues presented to it. In all cases, however, it should be considered that it
is the effect of the award that has to cause uncertainty and not the reasoning of the award.
It was explained in the DAC Supplementary Report that the intention of the drafters was
to allow recourse in cases where “the result of the award was uncertain or ambiguous.”210
As put by scholars: “[…] the Act is concerned only with the ability of the winning party to
enforce the award.What is required […] is that the obligations of the parties under the award
[…] are free from ambiguity. In other words the ambiguity must refer to the dispositive part
of the award.”211 It goes without saying that all preliminary steps, thus i.a. requesting the
tribunal to clarify its award, should be exercised before filing the Section 68(2)(f)
application.212
6 “Appeal on point of law”: a limited safeguard of the system and
the arbitral tribunal’s discretion to apply the law
After carefully weighing a number of arguments and a fair amount of criticism, the DAC
decided that appeal on point of law, under limited circumstances should remain a viable
recourse in the 1996 Arbitration Act regime. Thus, pursuant to Section 69(1) of the Act,
“[u]nless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice
to the other parties and to the tribunal) appeal to the court on a question of law arising out
of an awardmade in the proceedings.” The detailed procedure on how to appeal on a point
of law has been further explained under subsequent subsections of Section 69 of the Act.
The mechanism will be briefly summarized in this part of the chapter.213 Therefore, the
standard of the court’s review (section 6.1) and selected (essential) features of the test
(section 6.2) will be explained. It should be always borne in mind that Section 69 of the
Act is non-mandatory.214
209 Section 68(2)(f) of the Act.
210 (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 35.
211 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.315.
212 See Section 57(3)(a) of the AA. See also (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.239-241 and
p.315.
213 Since the process of application of law is the core function of the arbitral tribunal, the availability of appeal
on point of law might be potentially relevant in the context of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
This is why it needs to be briefly discussed.
214 See Schedule 1 of the Act.
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6.1 The court’s standard of review when faced with challenge
In line with the underlying principle of the Act, courts dominimize their interference with
the arbitral process. In the context of the appeal on point of law, review is based on factual
findings made in the arbitral award (section 6.1.1) and courts have a number of remedies
available in order to limit the instances when the award can be set aside (section 6.1.2).
6.1.1 Review based on factual findings made in the arbitral award
As explained above, the appeal can bemounted only upon the express (written) agreement
of all the other parties to the proceedings or with the leave of the court.215 Section 69 of
the Act gives a clear indication that the court’s review should be based on the tribunal’s
conclusions on facts.216 As further explained by the DAC in its report: “[t]here have been
attempts, both before and after enactment of the Arbitration Act 1979 to dress up questions
of fact as questions of law and by that means to seek an appeal on the tribunal’s decision on
the facts. Generally these attempts have been resisted by the Court, but to make the position
clear, we propose to state expressly that consideration by the Court of the suggested question
of law is made on the basis of the findings of fact in the award.”217 Arguably, also when the
appeal is brought with the agreement of all other parties to the proceedings,218 the courts
should defer to the factual findings of the tribunal. After all, the Section 69 mechanism is
designed to test the tribunal’s conclusions of law, not on fact.
6.1.2 Remedies at the court’s disposal
According to Section 69(7) of the Act, in an appeal under this Section the court may by
order confirm the award,219 vary the award,220 remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or
in part, for reconsideration in the light of the court’s determination,221 or set aside the
award in whole or in part.222 Additionally, following the reading of the same subsection
“[t]he court shall not exercise its power to set aside an award, in whole or in part, unless it
is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the matters in question to the tribunal
for reconsideration.” Put differently, remission should be the primary remedy used when
215 See Section 69(2) of the Act.
216 Section 69(3)(c) of the Act (“leave for appeal shall be given only if the court is satisfied […] that, on the basis
of the findings in the award […].”).
217 (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 286(iii).
218 Section 69(2)(a) of the Act.
219 Section 69(7)(a) of the Act.
220 Section 69(7)(b) of the Act.
221 Section 69(7)(c) of the Act. Notably, the wording is slightly different than a similar provision under Section
68 of the Act. Cf Section 68(3)(a) of the Act.
222 Section 69(7)(d) of the Act.
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faced with a faulty arbitral award. Since all of the tools available to the courts have been
already explained in previous parts, they will not be analyzed further at this point.223
6.2 Distinctive features of the Section 69 challenge
A few additional features of a Section 69 appeal should be mentioned. Therefore, a brief
comment on the opt-out character of the appeal (section 6.2.1) will be given among the
comment that appeal can be mounted only on a point of law (section 6.2.2) and only on
a point of English law (section 6.2.3).
6.2.1 The opt-out character of the system
One should note that Section 69(1) of the Act provides that “unless otherwise agreed by
the parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may […] appeal […] on a question of law […].”
In a nutshell, it means that parties can agree to exclude the appeal mechanism from the
matrix of their relations. Such an agreement, however, should be inwriting.224 In any event,
institutional rules that “contain exclusion provisions count as an effective waiver for this
purpose, as in, e.g. the LCIA or ICC Rules.”225 Arguably, not all of the institutional rules’
wording will be considered sufficiently strong to circumvent the application of Section 69
of the Act.226 Finally, in accordance with the final sentence of Section 69(1) of the Act,
“[a]n agreement to dispense with reasons for the tribunal’s award shall be considered an
agreement to exclude the court’s jurisdiction under this section.” All in all, if parties wish to
exclude an option to appeal, they should be careful as to the wording (or the reference)
they use.
223 For further reading, see sections 4.1.2 and 5.1.4 of this chapter.
224 See Section 5 of the Act.
225 (Merkin& Flannery, ArbitrationAct 1996, 2014) p.322. As argued by said authors on p.323, not all formulae
used in (other) international rules (e.g. the UNCITRAL Rules) will work as an effective exclusion (see the
comparison below). Cf Art. 26.8 of the 2014 LCIA Rules (“[…] the parties also waive irrevocably their right
to any form of appeal, review or recourse to any state court or other legal authority, insofar as such waiver
shall not be prohibited under any applicable law.”); also in Art. 26.9 of the 1998 LCIA Rules (“the parties
also waive irrevocably their right to any form of appeal, review or recourse to any state court or other judicial
authority, insofar such waiver may be validly made.”); Art. 34.6 of the 2012 ICC Rules (“By submitting the
dispute to arbitration under the Rules, the parties undertake to carry out any award without delay and shall
be deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can validly be made.”);
cf Art. 32.2 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules (“The award […] shall be final and binding on the parties. The
parties undertake to carry out the award without delay”); or Art.34.2 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules (“All
awards […] shall be final and binding on the parties. The parties shall carry out all awards without delay.”).
226 See fn.225; also (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 8-122 and (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996,
2014) p.323. For an argument supporting the notion that the wording of the UNCITRAL Rules should
suffice, see (Dedezade, 2006) p.60.
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6.2.2 Appeal on point of law not fact
It is self-evident that Section 69 serves only as ameans of recourse against the legal findings
of the arbitral tribunal.227 According to Section 69(4) “an application for leave to appeal
under this section shall identify the question of law to be determined and state the grounds
on which it is alleged that leave to appeal should be granted.”228 Consequently, under no
circumstances should it effectively serve against the tribunal’s factual findings. As observed
in Russel on Arbitration, “the tribunal’s findings of fact are conclusive. The appeal is only
concerned with a question of law andmust not encroach upon the facts.”229 In fact, pursuant
to Section 69(3)(c) of the Act, the leave to appeal can only be given by the court “on the
basis of the findings of fact in the award […].” As held inDemco Investments &Commercial
S.A. & Others v. Se Banken Forsakring Holding Aktiebolag, “[t]here is no room for any
appeal under section 69 against the findings of fact in the Award itself since these have to be
accepted for the purpose of any application for permission to appeal.”230
It is acknowledged that the distinction between point of facts and law can occasionally
be difficult.231 For the purposes of the research at hand, it is sufficient to conclude that the
better approach for the courts is to undertake the restrictive “view of what is a properly
reviewable finding of law”232 and that “the court’s function under section 69 is not to embark
on any investigation into the facts or the evidence, and (jurisdictional challenges apart) it
would be in an extreme case only where the court might be justified in opening any issues of
fact, and certainly not for the purposes of attempting to decide whether any particular factual
finding was without any evidential basis.”233
6.2.3 Appeal on point of English law only
As discussed in the preceding section,234 upon application for leave to appeal, an applicant
will be required to identify the question of law justifying the application.235 The reference,
however, is restricted only to a question of English law as defined in Section 82(1) of the
227 See Section 69(1) of the Act.
228 Section 69(4) of the Act.
229 (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 8-125.
230 Demco Investments&Commercial S.A.&Others v. Se Banken ForsakringHoldingAktiebolag [2005] EWHC
1398 (Comm), 2005WL1534592 at [35]. For further reading, see also the explanatory note in (Departamental
Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 286(iii).
231 For further reading, see, i.a., (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) paras 8-124-8-126, (Merkin & Flannery,
Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.324-327, (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014)
pp.362-364.
232 (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 8-126.
233 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.326.
234 Section 6.2.2.
235 Section 69(4) of the Act.
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Act.236 Therefore, English courts will not take upon them the exercise of reviewing the
tribunal’s findings on foreign law, “even if the tribunal proceeds on the basis that for all
practical purposes English law is the same as the foreign governing law.”237
7 The application of a three-headed concept to selected issues
that might fall outside the arbitral tribunal’s authority
As explained above, all three challenges available under the English arbitration regime are
at least to some degree relevant in the context of determining of the scope of the arbitral
tribunal’s authority.238 Consequently, it is necessary to take them all into account while
reviewing if the tribunal was empowered to grant decisions on the parties’ claims (section
7.1), remedies requested (section 7.3) or decisions accessory to the parties’ claims (section
7.4). Similarly, it is also relevant to assess the way in which the tribunal has applied the
law (section 7.2). Unquestionably, certain tribunal’s decisions will meet the threshold to
be included inmore than one of the above categories. Each category shares, however, some
common features according to which the analysis will be conducted.
7.1 Decisions on parties’ claims
The first category of the tribunal’s decisions deals with the origin of the parties’ claims. It
means that it is necessary to discuss in what instances the tribunal exceeds its adjudicative
authority when the claim in question has its roots in contract (section 7.1.1) or in tort
(section 7.1.4). Additionally, one should distinguish the tribunal’s decisions on
counterclaims (sections 7.1.2, 7.1.4 and 7.1.5), as well as decisions on set-off (section
7.1.27.1.3). Finally, it is important to consider what happens with decisions on new
claims/counterclaims (section 7.1.5) and decisions that do not cover all claims submitted
(section 7.1.6). Broadly speaking, most of the tribunal’s decisions being analyzed in this
section would be qualified as decisions as to the scope of the parties’ submissions and thus
suitable for a recourse under Section 67 of the Act (challenge of substantive jurisdiction).
This will be discussed in greater detail below.
236 Section 82(1) of the Act in relevant part reads that “‘question of law’ means – (a) for a court in England and
Wales, a question of the law of England andWales, and (b) for a court in Northern Ireland, a question of the
law of Northern Ireland”.
237 (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 8-124.
238 See section 3.
196
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
7.1.1 Decision on contractual claims
By and large, it is rather uncontroversial to say that if the parties contract for arbitration,
their underlying intention is to have (at least) their contractual disputes resolved by the
arbitral tribunal. For this reason, in principle, an arbitral tribunal will be themost competent
body to render a decision on contractual claims239 and consequently a challenge against
such a decision would be rather futile. This conclusion, however, is not unqualified and
deserves further analysis. It is therefore necessary to establish what prongs of the
three-headed concept can be used (and in what circumstances) to object to decisions on
contractual claims.
As pointed out in the introduction to this section, the mechanism set out in Section
67 of the Act would be, in principle, the most appropriate tool against the decision on
contractual claims. It is so, because an underlying rationale for any objection one may
have against a decision on a contractual claim is whether this claim decided upon fell
within the scope of the submission to arbitration. Under the English arbitration regime
this question is quite straightforward.
In order to determine if a decision exceeds the scope of the submission to arbitration,
it is necessary to apply by reference Section 30(1)(c) of the Act.240 Put differently, one
should test the tribunal’s decision against “the matters that have been submitted to
arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement”. Such an exercise is two-fold,
because one should establish (i) whether the matters have been submitted to the tribunal
and (ii) whether they (the matters) were in accordance with the arbitration agreement.
Consequently, the tribunal may exceed its substantive jurisdiction if it awards (i) a claim
that has not been submitted or (ii) a claim that has not been in accordance with the
arbitration agreement (even though properly submitted).
Generally, the first scenario presented above is a rather simple one: only contractual
claims submitted by the claimant can be granted by the tribunal. In other words, there is
no (and there should not be any) overarching tribunal’s power to award to the claimant
relief that it did not seek.
One should reflect further, however, what happens if claims submitted are vague or
difficult to identify.241 In these instances, the tribunal, having in mind its general duty to
act fairly and give the parties a reasonable opportunity to put their case,242 should invite
239 Being claims based on contract and brought by claimant. It distinguishes this category from decisions on
counterclaims that are (generally) submitted by the respondent. For further reading, see sections 6.1.2,
6.1.4, 6.1.5 and 6.1.6.
240 See also section 4.2.2.
241 One should observe that, for example, according to the LMAA2012 Rules (similarly the 2006 LMAARules)
in Schedule 2, submissions must “set out the position of the parties in respect of the issues that have arisen
between them as clearly, concisely and comprehensively as possible”.
242 Section 33(1)(a) of the Act; reiterated for example in Art. 14.1(i) of the 1998 LCIA Rules, Art. 14.4(i) of the
2014 LCIA Rules.
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all parties for additional submissions.243 The rationale is to assist the arbitral panel in
understanding what the definite scope of the claimant’s submission is. Respondent should
use this opportunity to protest if it considers that the claim in question (ambiguous or
difficult to identify) should not be admitted by the tribunal.244 In the end, however, it
should be the tribunal’s prerogative to interpret any remaining ambiguity as to the claims
as long as its interpretation of claimant’s submission to arbitration does not exceed the
scope of an underlying arbitration agreement.245 It seems that, at the post-award stage, the
Section 67 challenge can be triggered if respondent considers that the tribunal’s conclusions
on ambiguous claims lead to an award that goes, in respondent’s opinion, beyond the
scope of the claimant’s submissions.246 Importantly, English courts faced with a challenge
of the interpretation of the ambiguous claim will be able to decide the scope question
(pursuant to Section 67 of the Act) anew.247 Notwithstanding, the better approach would
be to give (at least some) deference to the tribunal’s interpretation.248
The second scenario introduced above deals with the situation where the claimant’s
submissions go beyond the agreement to arbitrate and are nonetheless granted by the
arbitral panel. Considering that the modern (model) arbitration clauses are to the effect
to entertain many possible disputes,249 arguably, any claimant’s submission should fit the
scope of the underlying arbitration agreement. Additionally, taking into account the effect
of the seminal decision of Premium Nafta Products Ltd v. Fili Shipping Ltd,250 parties are
presumed to opt to have all their disputes resolved by a single adjudicative body. Such a
“one-stop method of adjudication” would further entail that any contractual claim
243 The tribunal should proceed similarly when it considers requalification of the basis for the claim. For further
reading, see section 6.1.4.
244 In principle, objections should be raised as soon as possible after the matter alleged to be beyond its
jurisdiction is raised. See Section 31(2) of the Act. Additionally, one should observe that, for example,
pursuant to Art. 23.3 of the 2014 LCIA Rules: “An objection that the Arbitral Tribunal is exceeding the scope
of its authority shall be raised promptly after the Arbitral Tribunal has indicated its intention to act upon the
matter alleged to lie beyond its authority.” For the consequences of the untimely protest, see Section 73(1)
of the Act.
245 On a similar note, it might also be difficult to conclusively asses the scope of the submission if claimant
decides to modify, amend or add new claims in the course of the proceedings. For further reading on
new/changed claims, see section 6.1.5.
246 For example, respondent alleges that the tribunal wrongly interpreted the (ambiguous) relief sought. By
doing so the tribunal admitted claims that were never brought. Arguably, such an objectionmight be raised
even if the relief granted fits within the framework of the underlying agreement to arbitrate.
247 See section 4.1.1. Also i.a. (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.296-300.
248 See also section 4.1.1.
249 See, e.g., the 2014 LCIA Model Clause (“Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract,
including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and finally resolved
by arbitration under the LCIARules, which Rules are deemed to be incorporated by reference into this clause.”);
the Standard 2017 ICC Arbitration Clause (“All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present
contract shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by
one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said Rules.”).
250 Premium Nafta Products Ltd v. Fili Shipping Ltd [2007] UKHL 40.
198
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
submitted by claimant will be in conformity with the underlying arbitration clause.
Obviously, parties are free to draft a narrow arbitration clause, where only limited
contractual claims can be brought to the tribunal’s attention. These restraints should be,
however, explicit and clear. It is necessary to point out that it is of utmost importance for
respondent to timely contest submissions that are not in accordance with the arbitration
agreement. Otherwise it may lose the right to object at the post-award stage or even be
considered to have impliedly consented to the extension.
It is rather unlikely that Section 68 of the Act (a recourse against serious irregularities)
will be applied to challenge the decision on contractual claims, because it is not designed
to tackle the scope questions. That being said, if a tribunal, for example, violates its duty
of fairness251 or renders the decision (on a contractual claim) that is uncertain or ambiguous
as to its effect,252 invoking the serious irregularity challenge might indeed be possible.
To bring an appeal on point of law would be even more farfetched. Assuming that
parties did not opt out from the application of Section 69 of the Act, the decision accepting
a claim based on contract would have to be obviously wrong, raise a question of general
public importance and at least be open to serious doubts.253 It is difficult to envisage such
a hypothetical.254
All in all, parties alleging that the tribunal did not have the authority to decide the
contractual claim submitted by claimant will have the highest chances of success by using
the Section 67mechanism. However, these objections have a standingmostly (if not only)
when the underlying agreement to arbitrate is explicitly narrow (thus to exclude all or
some types of contractual claims). In cases where the tribunal granted a relief which was
not sought Section 68(2)(b) will also be relevant.255
251 For example, by not giving an opportunity to object to the scope of the ambiguous claim as illustrated in
the first scenario. See also section 5.2.1.
252 See section 5.2.4.
253 See also section 6.
254 It is necessary to highlight once again that, under section 6.1.1, the distinctive feature of the tribunal’s
decision that is being analyzed is that the tribunal grants a claim submitted by claimant that is based on
contract. Therefore, by nomeans should it be understood that any decision on a contractual claimmay not
be appealed on point of law. It is only unlikely that an appeal can be substantiated on the fact that the
tribunal wrongly applied the law because it granted a contractual claim.
255 See also section 5.2.2 and section 6.3.1.When the relief granted exceeded or was different to the one sought
(ultra or extra petita) Section 68(2)(b) of the AA is triggered. One argument for this application of the
post-award review mechanism is a systemic one. Arguably, considering that infra petita is included in the
list of serious irregularities, ultra petita awards should be a part of the same list. See also fn.175. Additionally,
it would be the case, if one follows Lord Steyn’s suggestion and align the reading of Section 68(2)(b) of the
Act with the interpretation of Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC. See Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v.
Impregilo SpA & Ors [2005] UKHL 43 at [30]. At the same time, however, one might consider that the Act
provides that the question regarding “what matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with
the arbitration agreement” is one of the issues related to the substantive jurisdiction. See Section 30(1)(c)
of the AA. Consequently, one might consider Section 67 of the Act as a better fit (unless it is obvious that
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7.1.2 Decision on contractual counterclaims
Counterclaims are claims that are submitted by a respondent in opposition to a claimant’s
initial claims. Nonetheless, at the same time, they are independent from the latter, which
entails that they usually lead to a separate tribunal’s decision,256 which may exceed the
claimant’s primary claim.257 The main element under this section is that counterclaims
are (by and large) brought by the respondent.258 One should add that, in principle,
observations made with regard to decisions on contractual claims will be applicable also
to decisions on contractual counterclaims.259 A few additional points, however, should be
added.
As pointed out, the Section 67 challenge will apply in the same manner as it applies to
decisions on contractual claims.260 Therefore, in a nutshell, as long as the tribunal decides
on submitted (counter)claims thatwerewithin the scope of the initial agreement to arbitrate,
its decision should survive the challenge.261 Additionally, however, one should reflect on
instances wheremultiple contractual relationships exist between claimant and respondent.
In these cases, it is much more likely that respondent may wish to bring its counterclaim
that is based on a different contract than the one used by claimant to commence an arbitral
process. It consequently leads to the questionwhether an underlying agreement to arbitrate
would cover (counter)claims that are rooted in a separate contract.262
The most common approaches would consider that broadly drafted agreements to
arbitrate entail claims based on different contracts if they are brought in connection with
or relating to the “main” contract. It would be, thus, respondent’s task to convince the
tribunal of the admissibility of such counterclaims. The tribunals and the courts might be,
however, reluctant to accept these arguments.263 Arguably, if the ties between two contracts
the issue at stake relates to the limitation of the remedial authority imposed in the agreement to arbitrate).
In principle, the better view is to employ Section 68(2)(b) of the Act.
256 (Fountoulakis, 2011) p.121.
257 (Pryles &Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.448.
258 Claimant, of course, may counter the counterclaims.
259 See section 6.1.1.
260 See section 6.1.1.
261 In the majority of cases broad arbitration clauses should cover any contractual counterclaims within its
scope. As observed by the authors in (Pryles & Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the
Same Parties, 2009) p.449: “A properly drawn agreement would allow for both claims and counterclaims
under the contract that contains the arbitration clause.”
262 In other words, it is a contract that is distinct from the one of which the agreement to arbitrate forms part.
263 See, for example,MetalDistributors (UK) Ltd v. ZCCMInvestmentHoldings PLC [2005] EWHC156 (Comm);
[2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 37 and Econet Satellite Services Ltd v. Vee Networks Ltd [2006] EWHC 1664 (Comm);
[2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 423. In both cases the tribunal rejected its jurisdiction over counterclaims and/or
set-offs. It is important to observe, however, that in the first case ([2005] EWHC156 (Comm)) the arbitration
clause was rather narrow and in the second case the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules were applicable (including
Art. 19(3) which allows for counterclaims and set-offs only when they arise out of the same contract).
Additionally, these cases predated the Fiona Trust case which formulated a strong presumption favoring a
broad interpretation of the agreement to arbitrate. See also section 4.2.1.
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are strong, the counterclaim (arising out of a different contract) that is made in connection
with or relating to the “main” contract should be accepted.264
Arguably, testing a decision on counterclaims against the background of Section 68 of
theActwill slightly differ (from the review of a decision on the parties’ claims). The question
that stands out relates to the parties’ opportunity to present their case. If the tribunal in
its conclusions does not take account of the claims brought by respondent or even does
not allow respondent to submit its claims in the first place, it may raise doubts as to equality
of arms. Consequently, respondent may consider invoking Section 68(2)(a) of the Act.265
In any event, however, it all comes down to the scope of the agreement to arbitrate: if the
parties’ initial consent is limited, disallowing filing of any cross-actions, there should be
no question regarding the tribunal’s fairness.
Similar to a decision on contractual claims, it would be difficult to appeal on point of
law against contractual counterclaims if the nature of the objection focuses on the
contractual character of the counterclaim.266
7.1.3 Decision on set-off
Deciding on set-off claims might be a particularly complex topic in international
commercial arbitration. On the one hand, the general presumption in most legal regimes
is that set-off is a form of defense against the initial claim. On the other hand, the concept
of set-off as developed in other jurisdictions considerably differs.267 The differences are
particularly noticeable in England, where the notion of set-off evolved independently from
264 See, e.g., Norscot RigManagement PVT Ltd v. Essar Oilfields Services Ltd [2010] EWHC195, [2010] 2 Lloyd’s
Rep. 209 (the case (post-Fiona Trust) where the tribunal’s decision to accept jurisdiction over set-offs and
counterclaims arising out of the related contract was subsequently upheld (and the Section 67 challenge
dismissed)). At the same time, however, there should be no competing fora for the resolution of a dispute,
i.e. two contracts should not include competing arbitration or dispute resolution clauses.
265 See section 5.2.1.
266 See also section 6.1.1.
267 An important note has been put forward by Pryles and Weincymer in (Pryles & Waincymer, Multiple
Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.461 (“[…] we merely wish to reiterate that there is
no simple solution to the question of admissibility of set-off claims. It should not automatically be allowed
simply because all legal families entitle them as “defences”.).
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its continental counterparts.268 In international commercial arbitration, however, the first
step of inquiry is to determine what law applies to set-off related issues.269
In cases where the seat of arbitration is in England, the possible challenge against the
decision on set-off is likely to be based either on Section 67(1), Section 68(2)(a) or 68(2)(d)
of the Act. It is simply because the underlying concern may focus either on the scope of
the agreement to arbitrate or the overarching notion of procedural fairness and a party’s
right to present its case.
The objection available under Section 67 of the Act questions whether the tribunal’s
decision on set-off fits within the scope of an agreement to arbitrate.270 This might depend
on the legal nature of the set-off applied by the party, especially in the context of an
independent set-off and an equitable set-off.271
268 A detailed analysis of the legal character of set-off claims falls outside the scope of this research. By and
large, under English law onemay recognize that the term “set-off” refers to (i) statutory set-off, (ii) abatement,
and (iii) equitable set-off, and (iv) contractual set-off. For further reading, see, i.a., (Wood, 1989), (Aeberli,
1992), (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999), (Rogers, 2006) pp.129-133
(Fountoulakis, 2011) pp.100-123. The distinction between different types of set-off may be relevant in the
context of admitting set-off as a defense. The main (noticeable) difference is between “statutory set-off”
and “equitable set-off”. The former operates as a judicial remedy and does not require connectivity between
the primary claim and the set-off claim (therefore sometimes it is labeled as an “independent set-off”). See,
e.g., Aectra Refining &Manufacturing Inc. v. Exmar NV [1994] 1WLR 1634 at [1650] (“Independent set-off
[…] is not a substantive defence to the claim, but a procedure for taking and account of the balance between
the parties.”). The latter (i.e. equitable set-off) has characteristics of a substantive defense. See, e.g., (Berger,
Set-off in International EconomicArbitration, 1999) p.58. Notably, Berger in (Berger, Set-off in International
Economic Arbitration, 1999) p.57 highlighted that “[t]oday, the distinction between equitable set-off and
set-off at law is said to be blurred. However, like the ‘compensation légale’ and ‘compensation judiciaire’ of
French law, the two institutions have to be distinguished in terms of both prerequisites and legal nature.”
269 Considering it is a substantive defense, the issue would be determined in accordance with applicable
substantive law. Consequently, the particularities of English law might not be relevant.
270 It also operates under the general assumption that a party (usually the respondent) submitted a set-off
claim. It goes without saying that the tribunal should not be able to decide on set-off ex officio, except in
highly unusual circumstances when expressly authorized by the parties. See also reflections on the scope
question in section 6.1.1. For general comments, see also (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014)
p.111, (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.162.
271 See fn.268. Also (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999) p.57. It would seldomhappen
that the tribunal would not have jurisdiction to decide on the two other types of set-offs recognized in the
English system, i.e., abatement or contractual set-offs. Abatement serves as a narrow defense, which requires
connectivity and as such is based on the same contract. Having its basis in the same contract and being a
defense, arguably, it would rarely go outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction. It should be also noted that parties
may decide to expand or limit their entitlement to a set-off by including a specific set-off provision in the
contract. Consequently, it would be evident on the face of the contract what parties intended and thus in
what instances the tribunal may decide on set-off. See also (Pryles & Waincymer, Multiple Claims in
Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.457 (“Where debts are connected, a cross entitlement is often
a pure defence and does not even need to be treated as a set-off. Consider for example, a case of a buyer and
seller who have an ongoing two way commercial relationship with regular two way payment obligations. The
supplier sues the buyer for outstanding payment but the buyer says the claim fails to take into account agreed
allowances for faulty goods. This need not be separately pleaded as a set-off if the claimant is only entitled to
a net amount under their agreement. It is simply an allegation that the net position as claimed is wrong. This
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As mentioned above independent set-off usually arises in a multi-contract reality and
itmay concern unrelated contracts. Bearing inmind that the tribunal’s adjudicative powers
are intrinsically dependent on the scope of the agreement to arbitrate, it is often argued
that the tribunal’s jurisdiction needs to expressly encompass any prospective counterclaim
that may arise for the purpose of statutory set-off. Additionally, under the English legal
regime statutory (independent) set-off is not considered as a substantive defense, but rather
as procedural in nature.272 Consequently, arbitral tribunals are not readily eager to accept
jurisdiction in the case of independent set-off.273 Even if arbitral jurisdiction over the
counterclaims for the purpose of a statutory set-off (thus brought under a different factual
basis than the main claim) is accepted by the arbitral panel, it is likely to be subsequently
overturned by the English courts.274
Contrary to statutory set-offs, it is often accepted for the international arbitral tribunal
to entertain its jurisdiction over the counterclaims submitted for the purpose of an equitable
set-off.275 Of course, it does, yet again, depend on the content of the agreement to arbitrate.
For this reason, if the agreement to arbitrate is a narrow one, a court will likely accept an
argument that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction over a set-off arising out of a different
contract.276 At the same time, however, equitable set-off works as a (substantive) defense,
hence rejecting it or disallowing a set-off to be submitted may affect a party’s right to
present its case. On this point it has been concluded in dictum that: “[p]rovisionally, I
would be minded to think that an arbitrator does or should have jurisdiction to allow a
‘transaction’ set-off, even though that set-off arises under another contract […] As it seems
to me, the investigation and determination of the availability and amount of such a set-off
do not involve the arbitrator arrogating to himself a jurisdiction over separate contracts
is at times described as contractual set-off. If it is expressly or impliedly agreed to in this way it would easily
fall within any arbitration agreement covering the primary claim.”).
272 See above. also (Pryles &Waincymer,Multiple Claims inArbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.459
(“An independent set-off at common law is allowed for where it is capable of being ascertained with suitable
precision, described as liquidated. This would also include some damages claims, for example, where they
arise out of an express contractual provision setting up a damages formula, such as in the case of late
performance in construction contracts. Such an independent set-off need not arise out of related transactions
and is seen as purely procedural, requiring the imprimatur of legal proceedings. As such it cannot be invoked
unilaterally. It is sometimes described as statutory set-off.”).
273 (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 6-016. (Scherer, Chapter III: The Award and the Courts, Set-Off in
International Arbitration, 2015) p.464 (“[English common law] favors arbitral jurisdiction over set-offs that
arise from the same or related facts as themain claim (‘transaction set-off’) while disfavoring such jurisdiction
over set-offs that are factually unrelated to the main claim (‘independent set-off’). Arbitral tribunals applying
English law as the lex arbitri have followed the courts in acceding to this dichotomy”).
274 (Scherer, Chapter III: The Award and the Courts, Set-Off in International Arbitration, 2015) pp.464-465.
275 See, e.g., (Scherer, Chapter III: The Award and the Courts, Set-Off in International Arbitration, 2015) p.464.
276 See for example Econet Satelite Services Ltd. v. Vee Networks Ltd [2006] EWHC 1664 (Comm); [2006] 2
Lloyd’s Rep. 423, where the court upheld the tribunal’s decision declining jurisdiction over a set-off because
of the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.
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which he does not have (albeit that considerations of issue estoppel may well arise); instead
these steps form part of the process of arriving at a conclusion of whether a defence is properly
available in respect of the contract to which the arbitrator alone has jurisdiction.”277 Put
differently, “as a matter of principle, an arbitrator should have jurisdiction to deal with an
equitable set-off because such a set-off is a defence.”278
As highlighted above, when attempting to challenge the tribunal’s decision on set-off,
not only the Section 67 mechanism is of value. Therefore, it is necessary to reflect on the
Section 68 objection. In principle, Section 67 of the Act will be (more often) applied by a
party that seeks to annul the award accepting jurisdiction over the set-off defense,279 whereas
Section 68 of the Act would be commonly invoked when a party remains unsatisfied with
a decline of the set-off, thus rejecting its defense.
As explained elsewhere,280 Section 68 of the Act could be used as a filter to sift serious
irregularities that cause substantial injustice. Therefore, arguably, the possibility to bring
a set-off defense might be an essential feature of the concept of fair trial. Consequently,
“[…] if a tribunal makes an award for a sum to be immediately payable without properly
considering a claimed right of set-off, the award may be subject to challenge.”281 In this
instance a tribunal’s decision on set-off might thus be susceptible to arguments that the
tribunal violated its general duty of fairness282 or failed to deal with all the issues brought
before it.283 In principle, a tribunal will have to weigh all the arguments submitted and
carefully explain why the solution that it chose (i.e. accepting or rejecting a set-off defense)
better serves an efficient dispute resolution and the finality of the award.284
Similar to decisions analyzed previously,285 a decision on set-off is a decision on specific
parties’ submissions. In turn, parties are better off challenging substantive jurisdiction of
arbitral tribunals or serious irregularity rather than appealing on point of law. Nonetheless,
277 Ronly Holdings Ltd v. JSC Zestafoni G Nikoladze Ferroalloy Plant [2004] EWHC 1354 (Comm) at [33].
278 (Friedman, 2011) p.501 and also p.500.
279 Bringing an action regarding the tribunal’s negative ruling (thus one rejecting jurisdiction over set-off) is
of course possible. See, e.g., Econet Satelite Services Ltd. v. Vee Networks Ltd [2006] EWHC 1664 (Comm);
[2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 423.
280 See section 5.
281 (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 6-017. An argument has been advanced in the context of contractual
set-offs; it will hold true also for other types of (substantive) set-off.
282 Section 68(2)(a) of the Act.
283 Section 68(2)(d) of the Act.
284 See, e.g., (Pryles &Waincymer,Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.488 (“We
believe that in addition to considering whether all claims should be allowed, tribunals must also consider how
to conduct proceedings even if some claims are rejected. They must still consider the appropriate elements of
due process within each arbitral process, at least with an eye to what is happening with the other. In either
circumstance tribunals also have to consider the potential impact on enforceability of their decisions as to
admissibility.”).
285 See section 6.1.1 and section 6.1.2.
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in cases where an appeal is available, one may wonder if, in some instances, awarding
independent set-off will not trigger the possibility of a legal appeal.286
All in all, a tribunal required to decide on set-off will find itself between Scylla and
Charybdis, because however it decides, its conclusions might be the target of a potential
challenge at the post-award stage. On the one hand, being on the safe side, it is likely that
tribunals will restrain themselves to decisions fitting within the scope of the agreements
to arbitrate. On the other hand, however, there are strong arguments favoring the tribunal’s
efforts to resolve any and all disputes between parties by way of accepting set-off defenses
even if it is not per se in accordance with an agreement to arbitrate. Therefore, the tribunal
should look favorably on set-off submissions, but accept them only after full analysis of
their factual underpinning.
7.1.4 Decision on claims/counterclaims based on torts and pre-contractual
liability
A closer look at the statutory definition of an arbitration agreement introduced in the
English ArbitrationAct “[…]makes [it] clear that a non-contractual dispute can be referred
to arbitration.”287 Pursuant to Section 6(1) of theAct “[…] ‘an arbitration agreement’ means
an agreement to submit to arbitration present or future disputes (whether they are contractual
or not).” Yet, (at least) two questions remain unanswered: (i) does the scope of every single
agreement to arbitrate envisage claims regarding the extra-contractual liability of the
parties288 and (ii) is it possible to challenge the tribunal’s decision that requalifies contractual
claims as tortious? In a nutshell, similarly to the other scope questions, Section 67 of the
Act would be themost useful provision for parties seeking to challenge the scope, whereas
arguably Section 68(2)(b) of the Act will serve its purpose under the second hypothetical.
As to the first question, for a long time the question whether an agreement to arbitrate
covered claims having their basis outside the contract was highly dependent on the exact
wording of the agreement to arbitrate. Even broadly drafted clauses were no guarantee
that the tribunal would enjoy jurisdiction over all of the claims submitted. This situation
changed with the seminal decision of House of Lords in Premium Nafta Products Ltd v.
Fili Shipping Ltd.289
286 Still, however, it would be probably easier to apply Section 67 of the Act instead.
287 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.26.
288 For the purpose of this section, claims and counterclaims will be discussed together. Here, the analysis is
not focused on the questionwho brings the claim, but rather on what is the basis for the argument (namely
torts).
289 Premium Nafta Products Ltd v. Fili Shipping Ltd [2007] UKHL 40.
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Premium Nafta’s contribution was to applaud the notion of “one-stop arbitration”,
where all disputes between the parties are resolved before the same arbitral panel.290 In the
opinion of LordHoffmann: “[…] the construction of an arbitration clause should start from
the assumption that the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to have intended any
dispute arising out of the relationship into which they have entered or purported to enter to
be decided by the same tribunal. The clause should be construed in accordance with this
presumption unless the language makes it clear that certain questions were intended to be
excluded from the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. As Longmore LJ remarked, […]: ‘if any
businessman did want to exclude disputes about the validity of a contract, it would be
comparatively easy to say so.’”291 In other words, if parties decide to include an agreement
to arbitrate in their contract, their presumed intention (unless clearly indicated otherwise)
is to cover any and all their disputes (irrespective of whether they are contractual or not)
before the arbitral tribunal.292
Occasionally a generous interpretation of the narrow agreement to arbitrate could also
lead to a conclusion that the non-contractual claims are so closely related to the contract
that the initial agreement to arbitrate may extend to connected non-contractual claims.293
On a similar note, it has been argued that “[w]hatever the wording of the arbitration
agreement, noncontractual claims may of course become part of the reference if they are
included in a pleading and no point is taken by the other party, even if there had originally
been no contractual relationship between the parties.”294
In sum, on the one hand, following a broad, arbitration-friendly interpretation of an
underlying agreement to arbitrate, the English courts will hold the parties to their
contractual arbitration bargain. On the other hand, however, excessive expansion of the
290 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.110 (“Much work, and no doubt many potential billable
hours, were finally swept away and replaced by the sense and sensibility of the Court of Appeal in Fiona Trust,
led by Longmore LJ, in a pragmatic and praiseworthy attempt (largely successful) to ensure that parties
(particularly international commercial parties) are almost always to be treated as having bargained to bring
all their disputes under the one roof, namely that provided by the arbitration agreement and the arbitral
tribunal”).
291 Premium Nafta Products Ltd v. Fili Shipping Ltd [2007] UKHL 40 at [13].
292 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.26.
293 (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 2-004 (“Provided the terms of the arbitration agreement are broad
enough to encompass such claims they can in principle be the subject of an arbitration. Whether they do so
in any particular case requires an examination of the arbitration agreement but the courts have generally
given a broad interpretation to the scope of arbitration agreements in this regard. In this context it may be
possible to conclude that the non-contractual claims are so intimately connected with a contract that even an
arbitration clause designed primarily for contractual claims will extend to connected non-contractual claims.
In Asghar v. Legal Services Commission claims for conspiracy, misfeasance in public office and inducement
to commit breach of conduct were all found to be within the arbitration agreement because ‘the resolution of
the contractual claims cannot sensibly or practically be divorced from the resolution of the non-contractual
claims.’”) The reference is made to Asghar v. Legal Services Commission [2004] EWHC 1803 at [18].
294 (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 2-004.
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meaning of the agreement to arbitrate might impede what parties have actually agreed
upon. That being said, the better view is for the tribunal to always consult the initial
agreement to arbitrate and not to be overly eager to rely only on the presumption of a “one
stop arbitration” even if in most instances courts will likely accept arbitral jurisdiction
over tort claims if it is not evident at face value that there is an agreement to arbitrate.
The second instance that requires analysis concerns the tribunal’s requalification of
the claims submitted. One should reflect if a tribunal acts within its powers when, after
reviewing the parties’ submissions, it decides to grant the relief sought, but on a
non-contractual basis instead of a contractual one. Such a scenario may occur if (i) a party
submits two alternative bases for its claim, or (ii) a tribunal introduces a new basis for the
party’s claim on its own motion.295
If a party seeks a specific relief and argues that it should be granted because there is a
contractual basis as well as one of a tortious nature, the tribunal should be free to choose
which path to follow.296 In this case it will simply explainwhich theory submitted convinces
it most and will decide accordingly. The tribunal’s decision should survive the challenge.
If, however, the tribunal requalifies a claim on its ownmotion, it risks that the challenge
against its award may be successful. Changing the basis for the claim from contractual to
tortious should not be treated lightly, because, it will effectively mean that the tribunal
substitutes the parties’ pleadings with its own and, in turn, will step into the shoes of one
party’s counsel rather than remain an impartial adjudicative body. Therefore, if the tribunal
decides to change a justification for the remedy granted fromcontractual to non-contractual,
it may find itself in breach of the duty of fairness297 or in excess of its powers298. That being
said, arguably, the tribunal may try to minimize the chances for a prospective challenge
by inviting parties to address its recommendation for changing the basis for the claim.
This way it will make sure that parties had a full opportunity to present their case. Under
no circumstances should it “surprise” the parties with its legal conclusions.299
Parties seeking to challenge a tribunal’s decision because the relief sought is not based
on contract would have a difficult task trying to convince the court that appeal on a point
of law is justified.
295 The tribunal bases this on its own legal expertise. For further reading on the tribunal’s process of application
of the law, see section 6.2. See also section 5.2.1.
296 Occasionally its decisionmight be burdenedwith its own consequences e.g.when the tribunal opts to follow
a tort theory, but the scope of the agreement to arbitrate is not broad enough for the panel to enjoy
jurisdiction over such a claim.
297 Section 68(2)(a) of the Act.
298 Section 68(2)(b) of the Act.
299 For a discussion on the arbitral tribunal “surprising” the parties with new legal theories, see section 5.2.1
and section 6.2. “Surprise” decisions will be susceptible to challenge under Section 68(2)(a) of the Act
(breach of general duties of the tribunal).
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The reflections above lead to the conclusion that Section 67 of the Act is best suited to
be used against the tribunal’s decision based on torts claims. Occasionally, however, since
serious irregularities may occur also when the tribunal is exercising its power over tort
claims, Section 68may be also relevant. In any event, the threshold for a successful challenge
remains high.
7.1.5 Decisiononnewclaims/counterclaims and changeof claims/counterclaims
As explained earlier, the parties’ submissions shape the tribunal’s jurisdiction and its
powers.300 In principle, parties are obliged to introduce their claims at the outset of the
proceedings in their initial statements.301 It may happen, however, that during the
proceedings parties wish to amend their original submissions.302 Theymay do so by limiting
the scope of the relief previously sought. They may also decide to the contrary, namely to
change or to expand the content of their underlying request. The question that follows is
whether the arbitral panel can enjoy jurisdiction and powers over the changed or late
claims and accept them as such. Allowing for a change of claims or admitting new claims
may in turn trigger a challenge based on Section 67303 or 68(2)(a),304 68(2)(b),305 or 68(2)(c)306
of the Act at the post-award stage. Appeal on a point of law is unlikely to be applicable.
The brief analysis below would thus focus on the issues of (i) jurisdiction and (ii) the
tribunal’s powers.
The Act does not offer a special rule as to how to proceed with new or amended claims.
Therefore, a traditional scope analysis (pursuant to Section 30(1)(c) of the Act) should be
employed in order to determine whether the tribunal can accept jurisdiction and allow
new claims or the change of claims.307 Consequently, the new claims should be tested
against the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. Broadly drafted arbitration clauses, however,
will be of little assistance on how to deal with late submissions, whichmeans that they will
also not provide any specific guidelines for the amendment of claims. The issue is often
addressed by the institutional rules, if applicable.308 The institutional rules give the arbitral
300 See section 4.2.2.
301 See section 4.2.2.
302 The terms “new claims”, “changed claims” and “late claims” will be used interchangeably for the purpose
of this study.
303 (Challenge of substantive jurisdiction).
304 (Breach of general duties of the arbitral tribunal).
305 (Excess of powers of the arbitral tribunal).
306 (Failure to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed by the parties).
307 See, i.a., section 6.1.1 of this chapter.
308 See, e.g., Art. 22.1(a) of the 1998 LCIA Rules, Art. 22.1(i) of the 2014 LCIA Rules, Art. 23.4 of the 2012 ICC
Rules, Art. 23.4 of the 2017 ICCRules, Art. 20 of the 1976UNCITRALRules, Art. 22 of the 2010UNCITRAL
Rules.
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tribunal discretion to decide whether new claims will be admitted or not.309 That being
said, the rules vary as to how far the tribunal’s power to accept new claims goes.310 In any
event, the question rarely occurs if the tribunal (in institutional international arbitration)
has jurisdiction to allow late claims, as long as they fit within the scope of an agreement
to arbitrate.311 Arguably, where all parties agreed to allow new claims that fall outside the
initial jurisdiction of the tribunal, onemay conclude that parties consented to the extension
of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
The second issue does not relate to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, but rather to the tribunal’s
managerial powers. As such, it is necessary to reflect if admitting late claims affects the
fairness of the arbitral process. It has been accurately concluded by Derains in the context
of amendments to the claims and new claims: “[i]n reality, the two aspects must be
successively taken into consideration by the arbitrators. The effect on the conduct of the
proceedings of admitting the new claim should be the leading criterium. In case the new
claim is filed at a time, which allows the other side to respond to it without delaying the
schedule agreed or imposed by the arbitrators. There is no[] reason not to admit it, even if
such claim could have been submitted before. On the contrary, in case the admission of the
new claim has a delaying effect on the proceedings, consideration of fairness justify that the
arbitrators allow the claim if they are satisfied that the claim reasonably could not have been
submitted before.”312 All in all, challenging a decision on new or changed claims would be
possible if a party can convince the court that the tribunal did not give it a reasonable
opportunity to present its case.313
Additionally, as highlighted above in most instances where the arbitral process is
conducted under the auspices of an arbitral institution, the tribunal will have a discretionary
power to accept late claims.314 Consequently, the challenges based on alleged excess of
309 Similarly, (Derains, Amendments to the Claims andNewClaims:Where to Draw the Line?, 2004) p.71 (“as
a matter of principle, new claims filed in the course of the proceedings are admissible, under the control of the
arbitrators.”).
310 CfArt. 22.1(i) of the 2014 LCIARules andArt. 23.4 of the 2017 ICCRules. For example, Derains in (Derains,
Amendments to theClaims andNewClaims:Where toDraw the Line?, 2004) p.71 concludedwith reference
to the 1998 LCIA Rules that “[w]hat is the borderline after which a new claim or counterclaim should be
declared inadmissible, unless its admission is accepted by the other side? Under the LCIA Rules, the arbitrator’s
power is unlimited. […]”, whereas with regard to the 1998 ICC Rules he stated that “[t]he ICC Rules […]
have a more objective approach. Their emphasis is put on the possible effect of the new claim on the conduct
of the proceedings.” Although Derains discussed previous versions of the rules, his conclusions hold true to
the new ones as well.
311 In cases of ad hoc arbitration, it is better if all parties (and the tribunal) agree to an extension of claims. In
any event, even if there is no consensus, there is a strong argument favoring the tribunal’s jurisdiction over
the late claims that it is universally accepted practice to give a tribunal discretion to accept or reject the late
claim.
312 (Derains, Amendments to the Claims and New Claims: Where to Draw the Line?, 2004) p.71.
313 Section 33(1)(a) of the Act. See also section 5.2.1 of this chapter.
314 See fn.310.
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powers315 or failure to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the proceedings agreed
will likely be unsuccessful.316 The situation differs when parties explicitly excluded late
submissions or when agreed rules for the ad hoc arbitration proceedings are silent on the
matter of late claims.317
The overarching conclusion is that the Section 68 objections are most appropriate
when a successful recourse is sought against the tribunal’s decision on new or changed
claims. The threshold to be satisfied is, however, high.318
7.1.6 Decision not covering all claims/counterclaims
These days arbitration is a sophisticated process where parties are able to produce lengthy
submissions before the arbitral panel. For strategic or tactical reasons, they may also draft
the relief sought broadly so that it may be difficult to distill its true meaning. It may so
happen, that different alternative or secondary claims are introduced which makes the
relation between the different claims not so easy to grasp. Faced with these circumstances,
arbitrators might be tempted to use, consciously or not, heuristics in reaching their
conclusions.
In cases where an arbitral award does not fully reflect the relief sought by the parties,
the tribunal’s decision will be considered as infra petita. The English Arbitration regime
addresses infra petita in Section 68(2)(d) of the Act. Pursuant to said provision, the award
can be challenged when the tribunal failed “to deal with all the issues that were put to it”.
Much has already been said in section 5.2.3 of this chapter and reference therein is in
place.319
Themost relevant features of the challenge that deserve to be reiterated are the following:
(i) not all arguments put forward before the tribunal can be considered as issues for the
purposes of the Section 68(2)(d) application,320 (ii) if the tribunal in its award dealt with
the issue in any way (however good, bad, or ugly)321 it will make Section 68(2)(d) of the
315 Section 68(2)(b) of the Act.
316 Section 68(2)(c) of the Act.
317 Arguably, however, even when ad hoc proceedings are conducted and nothing has been said about late
submissions, the general notion of procedural fairness and pervasive practice of international commercial
arbitration (that in principle allows tribunals to deal with late claims) might lead to the conclusion that the
tribunal would be entitled to decide on late claims. See also fn.311.
318 See section 5.1.3.
319 See section 5.2.3.
320 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.313 (“There is a distinction between failing to deal with
major issues and failing to deal in the award with every argument in detail that was put to the arbitrators:
the latter allegation will fail unless the claimant can show that, on a fair reading of the award, key issues were
not considered at all. Furthermore, an ‘issue’ for the purpose of section 68(2)(d) is one that is of decisive effect
on the outcome, and not an incidental or peripheral matter, whose resolution is largely immaterial to the
overall result or that falls away in the light of other holdings.”).
321 The formula was used, albeit in a different context, in the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Oxford Health
Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2070-71, 186 L. Ed. 2d 113 (2013).
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Act inapplicable, and (iii) the court will seek to exercise its remedial powers only on the
part of the award which is affected by serious irregularity, usually preferring remission
back to the tribunal instead of the (partial) setting aside of the award.322 That being said,
two further reflections should follow: (i) one refers to the eventuality of the res iudicata
effect of the infra petita award and (ii) another deals with the possibility of setting aside
the infra petita award.
On the one hand, if one considers that the infra petita award does not fully address the
relief sought, it is possible to argue that the outstanding issues are still unresolved thus it
cannot be considered res iudicata. On the other hand, the contention that (even) the infra
petita award has a res iudicata effect is particularly alluring in cases where the tribunal
acknowledges a claimnot decided upon in any form in its reasoning or if it opts to conclude
its decision with formulae such as “rejects any and all other claims” or the “award is in full
and final settlement of all claims between the parties”. If the tribunal, however, does address
the claim in anyway, a challenging partymight face difficulty with substantiating its Section
68(2)(d) objection.323 In any event, if the court is satisfied with a challenge, it will use its
remedial powers to ensure that the relief sought has been addressed in full.324 Otherwise
the tribunal’s (allegedly) infra petita decisionwould, arguably, stand and have a res iudicata
effect.325
As to the second reflection, it has been suggested by some authors, with reference to
Section 68(2)(d) of the Act, that “this provision reflects the previous common law position
that an award which does not deal with all the issues may be remitted back to the arbitrators
with a direction to remedy the deficiency.”326 In most instances, remission would be the
most appropriate tool if a party is able to show that some prayer for relief has not been
dealt with. However, setting aside is also available in infra petita situations and it might
be a particularly relevant remedy in cases where the award has a res iudicata effect.
Nonetheless, the setting-aside mechanism should, in any event, be reserved for a very
limited catalogue of cases. The question (that needs to be addressed on a case-by-case
basis) regards the fate of the award after being set aside, namely is it possible that the same
tribunal is asked for reconsideration327 or should the award be set aside to be resolved by
322 For further reading, see section 5.1.4 and section 5.2.3. See also e.g. The Secretary of State for the Home
Department v. Raytheon Systems Limited [2015] EWHC 311 (TCC) at [3] (“It is clear that remission is the
“default” option and the Court cannot set aside unless it would be “inappropriate” to remit.”`).
323 If tribunal does not refer to a claim (that is of such an importance that it can be classified as an issue) at all,
it will be a clear-cut Section 68(2)(d) scenario. See section 5.2.3.
324 Again, by “relief sought being addressed in full” one should understand all major items of the relief that
can be categorized as “issues”. See also section 5.2.3.
325 Arguably, it will hold true even if the tribunal conclude its award with a closing formula (“rejects any and
all other claims”) without realizing that some issues remain unresolved.
326 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.313.
327 Ascot Commodities NV v. Olam International Ltd. [2002] C.L.C. 277. See also Brockton Capital LLP v.
Atlantic-Pacific Capital Inc [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 275 at [34].
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a different arbitral tribunal.328 It means that the reviewing court will likely undertake a
careful analysis as to what solution is better for the case before it and will assess whether
the original tribunal is able to resume and incorporate the court’s observations or whether
it is better for a new tribunal to have a fresh look at the outstanding issues.329
7.2 The process of application of law by the arbitral tribunal
The process of application of law by arbitrators is an inherent exercise on the way to grant
a relief requested. By and large, the tribunal would first need to determine what conflict
of laws rules are applicable (section 7.2.1) before deciding what law applies (section 7.2.2).
Once the tribunal identifies the governing law, it will face the task of ascertaining the
content of the applicable law (section 7.2.3) and its mandatory rules (section 7.2.4).
Occasionally, however, the arbitral panel may be entrusted with rendering a decision not
based on a national system of law (section 7.2.5). The underlying question is whether the
tribunal has the power to apply the law, and if so, how this process can be supervised by
the English courts.
An appropriate reference point to start the analysis with is Section 46 of the Act.330 The
first part of this Section reads that: “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute (a) in
accordance with the law chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute,
or (b) if the parties so agree, in accordance with such other considerations as are agreed by
them or determined by the tribunal.”331 Additionally, pursuant to the second subsection:
“[f]or this purpose the choice of the laws of a country shall be understood to refer to the
substantive laws of that country and not its conflict of laws rules.”332 Finally, according to
the last proviso: “[i]f or to the extent that there is no such choice or agreement, the tribunal
shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable.”333
In a nutshell, therefore, this provision empowers the tribunal to decide on applicable law.
It is necessary, however, to reflect further on the question when the tribunal’s conclusions
are open for recourse.
It is argued that the process of application of lawwill not, in anyway, affect the tribunal’s
substantive jurisdiction, which means that the Section 67 challenge would be inapplicable
for the purpose of this section. Therefore, only the Section 68 (challenge based on serious
328 The Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Raytheon Systems Limited [2015] EWHC 311 (TCC).
329 For a detailed analysis seeking the most appropriate remedy, see The Secretary of State for the Home
Department v. Raytheon Systems Limited [2015] EWHC 311 (TCC) at [2-12].
330 This section, albeit with some significant amendments, has beenmodeled on Art. 28 of theModel Law. For
further reading on the Model Law, see Chapter II.
331 Section 46(1) of the Act.
332 Section 46(2) of the Act.
333 Section 46(3) of the Act.
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irregularities) and the Section 69 (appeal on point of law) mechanisms will be taken into
account.
7.2.1 Determining the method of selection of applicable law
Although not always necessary, determining the applicable conflict of laws rules is the first
step of the legal analysis undertaken by the arbitral tribunal. This decision of the arbitral
tribunal will have, potentially, far-reaching consequences.334
Starting with the assumption that the parties did not include a choice of law clause in
their contract, it is considerably clear that the tribunal has a power to determine what
conflict of laws rules applies.335 Pursuant to Section 46(3) of the Act, “[i]f or to the extent
that there is no such choice or agreement [regarding the law applicable to the substance of
the dispute], the tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which
it considers applicable.” The tribunal will be able to rely on this fallback solution introduced
in the Act and, ultimately, enjoy broad discretion while assessing the appropriate conflict
of laws rules.336 Nonetheless, one should follow questions formulated by Merkin and
Flannery and reflect whether (i) a party has a remedywhen it considers that the arbitrators’
choice of the relevant conflict of laws rule is incorrect and whether (ii) any remedy is
available in cases where the tribunal’s application of a conflict of laws rule leads to the
choice of an incorrect substantive law.337
The most appropriate remedy to consider in cases of alleged incorrectness of legal
findings is the one provided in Section 69 of the Act. Having posed the two questions
mentioned above, scholars consequently argued that recourse will not be possible under
the first scenario,338 but can eventually be available only under the second hypothetical339
if the parties left open the possibility to appeal on point of law.
As to the first question, it appears that the default mechanism prescribed by Section
46(3) of theAct effectivelymakes the tribunal’s choice of conflict of laws rules unreviewable,
since “[…] it is difficult to understand how their [tribunal’s] determination of the applicable
conflict of law rules (as opposed to the determination of the applicable law) could be held to
constitute an error of English law, giving rise to a right of appeal under section 69.”340 With
334 The choice of applicable conflict of laws rule has a direct impact as to what law applies.
335 Arguably, the Act does not allow the tribunal to directly choose the applicable law. Itmeans that the tribunal
should always make a conflict of laws analysis (unless otherwise agreed by the parties). Consequently, if
the tribunal relies on the voie directe methodology, its decision might be annulled based on the tribunal’s
failure to comply with its general duties (Section 68(2)(a) of the Act) or on the excess of powers (Section
68(2)(b) of the Act).
336 See also (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 225.
337 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.207.
338 A scenario where the choice of a conflict of laws rule is incorrect.
339 A scenario where the application of a (correct) conflict of laws rule leads to the application of incorrect law.
340 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.207.
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regard to the second question, however, under a unique set of circumstances it might be
possible to attack errors in choosing the substantive law according to the conflict of laws
rules. It has been argued that such a recourse might be possible if (i) the parties have not
waived the opportunity to appeal on a point of law, (ii) arbitrators decided that the English
conflict of laws rules apply, or (iii) when applying these rules “the arbitrators choose an
applicable law that is not a reasonably probable consequence of the application of the conflict
of law rules […] [T]his is presumably an error of law only, and may be attacked […] under
the error of law provisions in Section 69.”341 Even if recourse is available, one should not
forget that the threshold imposed by the requirements of Section 69 is very high.
Arguably, Section 68(2)(b) of the Act might also be relevant when a decision on the
applicable conflict of laws rules is rendered. One has to imagine then that the underlying
contract includes a choice of law provision, but the tribunal, disregarding it, selects a
different legal regime based on its own conflict of laws analysis. Acting in this way, the
tribunal will usurp a power it never possessed.342 As such, it would likely be qualified as
serious irregularity amounting to substantial injustice. All in all, one should conclude that
the chances for a decision on applicable conflict of laws rules to be challenged are scant.
Importantly, however, arbitrators are required to substantiate their decision with a
conflict of laws analysis. Therefore, the provision, arguably, limits their power to exercise
other methods of identifying the applicable law, e.g. the direct approach.343 In turn, if the
tribunal (not authorized by the parties and using default mechanisms only) does not rely
on the conflict of laws methodology when reaching its conclusion on applicable law, this
decision may also be susceptible to attacks on the excess of powers ground. Yet another
layer is added when the tribunal considers that English conflict of laws rules apply. This
has already been discussed above.344 In a nutshell, and at least in theory, these decisions
can be exposed to the appeal on a point of law (if available). In any event themere (simple)
error in the choice of law analysis may not be sufficient ground to succeed in annulment
proceedings,345 even if appeal on a point of law is attainable.
341 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.207, with a reference to CGU International Insurance
plc v. AstraZeneca Insurance Co Ltd [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 142.
342 The power which, at the same time, does not affect the tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction. See also section
5.2.2 of this chapter.
343 Since, however, the tribunal can apply any conflict of laws rules it considers appropriate, the results of its
analysis will be effectively the same as if it chooses the direct approach method. For the discussion on a
direct approach, see also Chapter III.
344 See section 6.2.1.
345 It has been argued by Craig in (Craig W. L., The arbitrator’s mission and the application of law in
international commercial arbitration, 2010) p.261, albeit as a notion attributable to international arbitration
in general, that “[i]f the practice of international arbitration shows broad flexibility, if not laxity in the
choice-of-law process, this must be attributed in some part to the fact that a mere error by the arbitrator in
the choice of law is not subject to judicial review under most modern arbitration laws in effect at the most
frequently chosen neutral venues for international arbitration.” This conclusion would be also valid for the
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7.2.2 Decision on applicable law
At the initial stage of the proceedings, as a result of the analysis described in the previous
section or by following the parties’ choice, the tribunal will need to decide what law applies
to the merits of the case. Its conclusions on applicable law will affect the outcome of the
dispute. For this reason, the process of choosing the applicable law is the subject of ongoing
scrutiny by practitioners and academics.346 The outstanding question herein, however, is
whether the tribunal’s decision on applicable law can be made in excess of its authority
and be challenged as such.
By and large, one should reflect if the possibility for recourse exists when (i) parties
included a choice of law clause in their contract and when (ii) they did not include such
choice.347 Arguably, a challenge is only available under the first hypothesis, where the
parties incorporated a choice of law provision in their contract, but the tribunal did not
respect the parties’ clear direction and decided on its own concept of what law is applicable.
Similarly, under the second hypothesis, where no choice of law clause exists, parties may
still agree on applicable law at the outset of the proceedings. The tribunal’s decision’s
ignoring the parties’ directive in this instancemay be open to recourse. As already illustrated
above,348 in these cases the tribunal takes over a power (i.e. to determine the applicable
law) that the parties did not intend to give away. For this reason, the excess of power
challenge might be available.349
In circumstances where parties failed to address the issue of applicable law in their
contract, the arbitral panel may rely on the default mechanism of Section 46(3) of the Act.
It reads that “[i]f or to the extent that there is no such choice or agreement, the tribunal shall
apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which it considers applicable.”
Consequently, it means that arbitrators may rely on this provision when deciding what
law applies.350 This has been discussed in the preceding section.351
English arbitration regime. Even if a Section 69 appeal is available, the standards that need to be satisfied
are high.
346 For further reading, see, i.a., (International Law Association, 2008).
347 There are several variations of these main scenarios (for example, express choice of applicable conflict of
laws rules or different choice of law clauses in the main contract and the arbitration agreement, on the one
hand, or the parties’ choice of law is implied or pleaded before the tribunal, on the other hand). Effectively,
however, for the purpose of the research at hand mainly these two hypotheticals are of relevance.
348 See section 6.1.1 of this chapter.
349 Of course, if the parties do not agree as to the validity or the scope of the choice of law clause and submit
different pleadings on the issue, the tribunal would be fully vested with the power to decide on the applicable
law.
350 Still, the best approach is for the tribunal to invite the parties to submit their arguments on conflict of laws
rules or on applicable law. If the parties’ submissions point out the same law to be applied, it should be
conclusive for the tribunal. If the parties’ arguments on applicable law differ, they would still be of value
for the tribunal. It does not change the fact that the tribunal should not surprise the parties with its choice
of law analysis, without allowing them the opportunity to advance their views.
351 See section 6.2.1.
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It is necessary to add that the tribunal’s discretion under Section 46(3) of the Act is
limited to the application of law and not rules of law (e.g. lex mercatoria), which means
that the application of rules of law ex officio might also trigger the “excess of powers”
challenge.352
7.2.3 Ascertaining the content of the applicable law by the arbitral tribunal
One of the implications of the fact that arbitration is a creature of contract is that “in a
dispute that is to be decided in accordance with law, arbitrators should identify, ascertain
the contents of and apply the applicable law.”353 This statement entails that it is not always
necessary for the tribunal to ascertain the contents of the applicable law. If, however, the
dispute brought before the tribunal is of a legal nature, the tribunal should undertake the
task of determining the contents of the law.354 For the purpose of the research at hand, it
is only relevant to question if the tribunal’s exercise of applying the law can be challenged
before the English courts.355
The method selected for the analysis requires testing the tribunal’s action against the
mechanisms prescribed in Sections 67-69 of the Act. As pointed out in the introduction
to this section,356 it is unlikely that the mere process of ascertaining the content of the law
would affect the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.357 Consequently, arguably, the Sections
68 and 69 mechanisms remain viable. Naturally, the “obvious” choice to challenge the
tribunal’s legal conclusions is appeal on a point of law.358 Even so, the scope of this remedy
is very limited since it allows for recourse only on a point of English law and only when
additional requirements are fulfilled.359 Therefore a tribunal’s analysis of the content of
352 Section 68(2)(b) of the Act. See also Section 68(2)(a) of the Act (the tribunal’s failure to comply with its
general duties).
353 (International Law Association, 2008) p.19.
354 This is not to unequivocally qualify the tribunal’s task as a “duty”. See, however, in the context of international
commercial arbitration in general, (International Law Association, 2008) p.19 (“This [identifying and
ascertaining the contents of the applicable law] is one of an arbitral tribunal’s duties in fulfilling its mandate
[…].”).
355 The starting assumption here is that the applicable law is fully identified (either by the choice of law clause
or the tribunal’s determination). Therefore, what matters is the approach that the tribunal chooses when
addressing the content of the applicable law.
356 See section 6.2.
357 Onemay argue that actions resulting from ascertaining the content of the applicable law on its ownmotion
may influence the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction if the tribunal, for example, after consulting the
applicable law, finds on its own motion that a party is entitled to interest (which it did not request) and
consequently grants it. Such a relief sought, however, is a result of (at least) two decisions undertaken: (i)
determining that interests are available and (ii) granting them. The aim here is to treat these decisions
separately. For this reason, it is concluded that the mere process of establishing what the law contains, in
itself, will not affect the tribunal’s jurisdiction. See also B v. A [2010] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 681. For decisions on
interest, see section 6.4.1.
358 For further reading, see section 6.
359 See section 6.2.
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non-English law will fall beyond the scope of application of Section 69 of the Act. It leaves
the question whether ascertaining the content of law may be qualified as a serious
irregularity amounting to substantive injustice (i.e. the Section 68 challenge).
Yet, before going further, it is necessary to take a look at Section 34 of the Act which
gives to the tribunal a discretion “to decide all procedural and evidential matters, subject
to the right of the parties to agree anymatter”.360 Thesematters, among other things, include
“whether and to what extent the tribunal should itself take the initiative in ascertaining the
facts and the law”.361 “This provision enables tribunals to act in an inquisitorial manner.
Once again, it removes the possibility of debate as to whether arbitrators could so act.”362 It
consequentlymeans that, the tribunalmay actively participate in the process of identifying
the content of the applicable law.363 In turn, “the arbitrator – in conducting his/her
independent legal research – can reach – a new qualification of the facts of the case in his/her
conclusion that has not been argued by the parties.”364 At the same time, however, “a tribunal
must be mindful of its s.33 duties, particularly, for example, by giving all the parties an
opportunity of commenting on any evidence it obtains or any law it thinks applies.”365
In principle, and following the preceding paragraph, onemay conclude that the process
of ascertaining the content of the applicable law will escape the judicial scrutiny of Section
68 of the Act. There are, however, several instances (rare and largely dependent on the
factual underpinning) that might constitute an exception to the rule. The first irregularity
that needs to be acknowledged is surprising the parties with the tribunal’s legal
conclusions.366When the tribunal applies a rule or a principle which has not been invoked
by any of the parties, at the same time barring their opportunity to express their position
on the tribunal’s findings,367 the tribunal will effectively risk violating the duty of fairness
as a result of which the decision can be challenged under Section 68(2)(a) of the Act.368
Additionally, Section 34 of the Act leaves no doubt that parties may deviate from the basic
360 Section 34(1) of the Act.
361 Section 34(2)(g) of the Act.
362 (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2007) p.175. Also (Giovanni, 2010) pp.499-500.
363 Arguably, the tribunal’s interpretation of Section 34(2)(g) of the Act can be subjected to appeal on point
of law analysis (if available).
364 (Giovanni, 2010) p.502. See also section 6.1.4.
365 (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2007) p.175.
366 See also section 5.2.1 and section 6.1.4 (regarding requalification of the claim).
367 See, however, (Dimolitsa, The Raising Ex Officio of New Issues of Law, 2014) p.27 (“The English courts do
also require that the parties be provided the opportunity to address all issues that may be relevant to the
resolution of a dispute on application of the principle of fairness […]. The English courts are however less
severe in their requirement to respect the parties’ right to be heard, since they examine in addition, on
application of Section 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996, whether such ‘irregularity’ caused ‘substantial injustice’
to the applicant; this unavoidably entails though an extensive examination of the award on the merits.” See
also the reference to F Ltd v. M Ltd [2009] EWHC 275 (TCC).
368 See also fn.365.
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rule prescribed therein.369 Therefore, arguably, if they explicitly define way to establish the
content of the applicable law, the tribunal should follow parties’ guidelines.370 It holds true
also to the parties’ choice of law.371 Failing to do so, the tribunal’s decision may face the
challenge on the basis of the excess of powers372 or failure to conduct the proceedings in
accordance with the parties’ agreement.373 Finally, committing an error of law does not
qualify as excess of powers.374
To conclude, inwords of the ILACommittee on International Commercial Arbitration:
“[…] save in the exceptional cases where the parties have dealt with thematter, the arbitrators
will need to decide how to approach the contents of law question, without any general rules
to guide them. The freedom of the arbitrators in this respect will be largely unfettered. The
issue is by and large procedural and thus governed by broad discretionary powers of arbitral
tribunals. Orders and awards of tribunals will not be subject to judicial review in setting
aside and enforcement proceedings, save for violation of impartiality, due process, excess of
mandate and public policy […].”375
7.2.4 Application of mandatory rules of law by the arbitral tribunal
By and large, the compliance withmandatory rules of lawmight be crucial for the survival
of an arbitral award at the post-award stage, because these rules are designed to act as a
safety net of the legal system. Accordingly, parties may not derogate from them and may
not modify their scope. At the same time, courts will try to make sure that these rules are
recognized. Therefore, the tribunal’s willingness to abide by mandatory rules should not
be surprising.376 Nonetheless, in some instances parties may be willing to seek recourse
against the tribunal’s decision reflecting on mandatory rules.
369 Pursuant toArt. 34(1) of theAct, “[i]t shall be for the tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential matters,
subject to the right of the parties to agree any matter.” One should note that, generally, institutional rules
reinforce the tribunal’s ability to ascertain the law. See, e.g., Art. 22.1(iii) of the 2014 LCIA Rules. The 2014
LCIA Rules are also explicit (Art. 22.1 of the 2014 LCIA Rules) that the parties need to have a reasonable
opportunity to state their views for the tribunal to exercise its power of ascertaining the content of law. See
also Art. 22.3 of the 2014 LCIA Rules.
370 According to authorities, however, it rarely happens. See (International LawAssociation, 2008) p.16 (“Parties
are unlikely to include in their contract any express provision on how arbitrators are to determine the contents
of applicable law.”).
371 See section 6.2.2.
372 Section 68(2)(b) of the Act. If parties specifically introduced the framework as to how the tribunal should
address the law, going beyond it might be considered as using the power it never possessed.
373 Section 68(2)(c) of the Act. Taking into account that the underlying theme of Section 34 of the Act is a
procedure, an agreement on the tribunal’s approach to law might be also considered as an agreed conduct
of the proceedings.
374 See Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA & Ors [2005] UKHL 43 at [32].
375 (International Law Association, 2008) p.16.
376 Sometimes it is argued that the tribunal has a duty to render an enforceable award. Not all agree. Even if,
however, such a “duty” does not exist in a legal sense, it is sensible for the arbitral panels to respect the
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At the outset, however, it is necessary to highlight two nuances that accompany the
process of the application of mandatory rules of law by the tribunal. Although they fall
outside the scope of the research at hand, they should at least be identified, since they may
be relevant for the scenarios discussed. It is sometimes recognized that two types of
mandatory rules exist,377 i.e. “simple” mandatory rules378 and “overriding” mandatory
rules.379 Consequently, only the latter will have a public policy character.380 Having this in
mind, it is now time to turn to the outstanding question, namely whether the tribunal’s
decision reflecting on mandatory rules is challengeable in setting-aside proceedings.
The scenarios where parties might (be tempted to) initiate actions for annulment are
the following: (i) the parties intended (in their agreement to arbitrate or at the outset of
the proceedings) to opt out from the application of a certainmandatory law and the tribunal
ignored their choice,381 (ii) parties did not submit arguments regarding (applicable)
mandatory rules, but the tribunal reflected these (mandatory) rules in its award regardless,
and finally (iii) parties seek recourse against the allegedly “wrong” application ofmandatory
laws. Similarly to previous sections, prospective annulment actions may be based either
systemic safeguards introduced as mandatory rules. See, e.g., (Mayer, Reflections on the International
Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the Law – The Freshfields Lecture 2000, 2001) p.247.
377 A similar distinction has been recognized by (International Law Association, 2008) p.21.
378 (Radicati di Brozolo L., 2012) p.50. “Simple” mandatory rules have been characterized as “rules that in each
legal system cannot be derogated from by agreement if the relationship is governed by that law.” The author
additionally concludes that “in arbitration these rules lose their mandatory character because the parties are
permitted to contract out of them by an appropriate choice of a different state law to govern the merits of the
dispute or even by choosing non-national rules.” This argument is only partly true, because contracting out
of one set of mandatory rules would easily lead to falling within the scope of “simple” mandatory rules of
a system of law or legal rules selected by the parties. In other words, “choice of a different state law” would
effectively mean that a different set of mandatory norms would likely influence the arbitral dispute. Of
course the author qualifies that parties are able to make an “appropriate choice”, it does not change the fact
that, although it is possible to contract around specific “simple” mandatory rules assigned to the particular
national system, the parties will not be able to contract out of “simple” mandatory rules at large. Put
differently, the only thing parties are (arguably) able to do is to choose which set of “simple” mandatory
rules would apply to their contractual relationship and not rule them out completely (possibly save for
non-national legal ruleswhichmay be short inmandatory components). Therefore, even “simple”mandatory
rules may still be relevant in international arbitration.
379 (Radicati di Brozolo L., 2012) p.50. These rules are explained as safeguards to public interests. For this
reason, they will apply to the dispute, even if the law applicable to the contract is different. As such they
will have an “overriding” effect.
380 See fn.379.
381 It may take, at least theoretically, different forms: (i) parties select a specific legal regime, but exclude the
application of a certain mandatory rule, (ii) parties in order to circumvent application of mandatory rules
of system A select system B, or (iii) parties define the way the law has to be applied. Under this scenario
mostly the second form is analyzed. The first form would be ineffective, because the parties cannot
contractually opt out of the mandatory rules of applicable law and the third form touches upon ex officio
application of the mandatory rules of law, which is reflected upon under a different scenario explained
under this section.
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on Section 68 or Section 69 of the Act.382 It does not change the fact, however, that the
chances of success are rather low.
The first two scenarios mentioned above are fairly similar.383 On the one hand, the
tribunal should respect the parties’ choice of law or legal rules applicable to the dispute
and constraints of their legal pleadings, on the other hand, it is increasingly relevant for
the tribunals to render enforceable awards384 and to serve justice instead of only providing
the service of resolving problems with contractual interpretation. In other words:
“arbitrators will have to bear in mind something akin to a professional duty not to become
accomplices of a violation or circumvention of the law. While it is true that arbitrators are
primarily at the service of the parties, it is now recognized that they are not theirmere servants
and that in some way they are also under a broader duty to see that justice is done.”385
Consequently, it would be sensible for the tribunal to investigate whethermandatory rules
are of relevance for the dispute at hand.
In principle, the first two scenarios focus on the concept of the tribunal taking the
initiative to apply the mandatory rules of law rather than the process of the actual
application of legal rules.386 In turn, it is argued that the tribunal’s account of mandatory
rules will not trigger Section 69 of the Act (appeal on point of law). There is limited room,
however, to challenge the tribunal’s undertaking under Section 68 of the Act (serious
irregularity).
For example, if the parties choose to contractually opt out from a certain legal regime,
but the tribunal brings into equation the (mandatory) legal rules of this system, it might
be possible to invoke the excess of powers ground for the non-compliance with Section
46(1)(a) of the Act.387 Arguably, the challenge might have some prospects of success,
because taking the initiative of ascertaining the law is a matter of procedure388 and
ascertaining the content of the law not chosen by the parties (thus non-applicable) goes
beyond what parties contracted for. Such an argumentmight eventually survive, however,
only if the tribunal bases its decision on “simple” mandatory rules that had been ruled out
by the parties in their choice of law clause.389 The strength and appeal of the argument
decreases dramatically, in cases where the tribunal ignores the initial choice of law, because
382 Section 67 of the Act would not be relevant if the mere process of application of law is being challenged.
See above, i.a. fn.357.
383 It is so, because they are the consequence of the tribunal’s balancing exercise.
384 See, for example, Art. 41 of the 2012 ICC Rules or Art. 32.2 of the 2014 LCIA Rules.
385 (Radicati di Brozolo L., 2012) p.68, see also (Mayer, Reflections on the International Arbitrator’s Duty to
Apply the Law – The Freshfields Lecture 2000, 2001) p.247.
386 On this topic see also section 6.2.3.
387 Namely, the provision pursuant to which the tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the law
chosen by the parties.
388 Section 34(2)(g) of the Act. For further reading, see section 6.2.3.
389 See also the elaborate analysis provided in fn.378.
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it finds that mandatory rules of public policy charactermay be in play.390 It brings back the
notion of the tribunal’s determination to render an enforceable award.Other considerations
regarding the possibility to challenge the tribunal’s decision based on the breach of duty
of fairness and the like would not deviate much from what has already been established
in previous sections. Therefore, a cross-reference should suffice.391
If parties fail to address the otherwise applicable mandatory rule in their submissions,
it means that the tribunal may rely on the default mechanism of Section 34(2)(g) of the
Act.392 Consequently, the tribunal’s decision ascertaining the applicability of mandatory
rules, taken on its own initiative,may be challenged similarly to other legal rules ascertained.
It has already has been the subject of the analysis in section 6.2.3. In a nutshell, it would
be generally possible to challenge the award if the tribunal surprises parties with its
conclusions.
Finally, under the third illustration it is necessary to address to what extent allegedly
“wrong” decisions onmandatory law are reviewable. It has beenmentioned in the previous
section393 that incorrect decisions on facts or law are not reviewable under the excess of
powers challenge.394 They would be a classic examples of the Section 69 application with
arguablymoderate (thus “higher” than other instances discussed herein) chances of success,
since determining the flaw in the tribunal’s interpretation of mandatory laws might be
considered as a question of general public importance.395 Such recourse is, of course, only
available in cases where English law is applicable and all other conditions of Section 69 of
the Act are fulfilled. Therefore, errors in the application of mandatory rules that underlie
legal regimes other than English law will not suffice to use the Section 69 appeal.
In the end the tribunal is better off with applying relevant public policy rules, since it
is unlikely that its decision would annulled because of its willingness to comply with the
underlying principles of public policy status. As aptly put: “[a]rbitrators must respond not
only to the legitimate expectation of the parties, but also to that of the states which allow
them the power to decide even disputes in which the general interest is at stake.”396
390 Obviously, the award does not have to conform to all public policy rules in the world. It has already been
acknowledged, that determining with which public policy rules to comply is not an easy task. Further
analysis, however, falls outside the scope of this research.
391 For further reading, see sections 6.2.1-6.2.3.
392 Pursuant to Art. 34(2)(g) of the Act the tribunal shall decide procedural matters (unless parties agree
otherwise), including “whether and to what extent the tribunal should itself take the initiative in ascertaining
the facts and the law”.
393 See section 5.2.2.
394 See, e.g., Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA & Ors [2005] UKHL 43 at [31].
395 Section 69(3)(c)(ii) of the Act.
396 (Poudret & Besson, 2007) p.610.
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7.2.5 Decision based on equity or reached ex aequo et bono
It is remarkable when parties decide to entrust the tribunal to rule on the parties’ dispute
by applying principles of equity. Because of the far-reaching consequences of such a
power,397 the drafters of theModel Law398 as well asmany national legislators often address
it explicitly in their respective legal acts.399 It has been argued with regard to English law
that “[t]he 1996 Act brought English law into line with the approach in many other
jurisdictions by permitting the parties to choose to have their dispute resolved by
considerations other than the rules of a particular national law. It is now clear that if the
parties choose to have the tribunal decide the dispute “ex aequo et bono” or as an “amiable
compositeur” or on the basis of non-national law principles or indeed on the basis of any
other considerations, that choice will be binding so long as it is ascertainable.”400
The concept allowing the parties to opt for their disputes to be resolved based on
principles of equity has been introduced in Section 46(1)(b) of the Act which reads that
the arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute if the parties so agree, “in accordance with such
other considerations as are agreed by them or determined by the tribunal”.401 This provision,
despite being inspired by the Model Law, considerably differs from it.402 The DAC in its
report explains that: “subsection (1)(b) recognises that parties may agree that their dispute
is not to be decided in accordance with a recognised system of law but under what in this
country are often called ‘equity clauses’, or arbitration ‘ex aequo et bono’, or ‘amiable
composition’, i.e. general considerations of justice and fairness, etc. It will be noted that we
have avoided using this description in the Bill just as we have avoided using the Latin and
French expressions found in the Model Law. There appears to be no good reason to prevent
parties from agreeing to equity clauses.”403
Arguably, a challenge to the tribunal’s decision based on equity might be available if
(i) the tribunal renders an equitable decision without explicit authorization or (ii) by
usurping the role of amiable compositeur while relying on the fallback mechanism in the
397 This in fact led some scholars to conclude “a note of caution” regarding “consequences of an agreement
other than one which requires the tribunal to decide in accordance with law”. See (Harris, Planterose, &
Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.245.
398 Pursuant to Art. 28(3) of the Model Law, “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable
compositeur only if the parties have expressly authorized it to do so.” See also Chapter II.
399 Also institutional rules require express authorization. See, e.g., Art. 22.4 of the 2014 LCIA Rules (including
a written requirement for the authorization), Art. 21(3) of the 2012 ICC Rules, Art. 21(3) of the 2017 ICC
Rules.
400 (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 2-091; see also para 4-142 therein.
401 The scope of application of this provision, in principle, does not refer only to ex aequo et bono or amiable
compositeur but also entails application to lex mercatoria or religious laws. For the research at hand, mostly
decisions based on equity would be of relevance. See also (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act
1996, 2014) p.245, (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.205-207.
402 See Art. 28(3) of the ML. Also Chapter II.
403 (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 223.
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absence of an express choice of law.404 Additionally, it is argued that only Section 68 of the
Act, and the excess of powers ground in particular, would be relevant for parties seeking
recourse.405
Deciding ex aequo et bonowithout the parties’ authorization is a classic example of the
excess of powers, because it implies that the tribunal makes use of a power it was never
conferred.406 It should not require further explanation. The second example provided above
is a slight variation of the decision without the parties’ authorization. In this case, the
tribunalmay try to shield its decision on equity based on the defaultmechanism that allows
it to decide on the applicable law in the absence of the parties’ choice.407 This argument,
however, would beinsufficient because Section 46(3) of theAct indeed entitles the tribunal
to act if parties did not decide on the applicable law, but, at the same time, it limits the
tribunal’s choice to the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which [the tribunal]
considers applicable. Consequently, the tribunal cannot take the initiative and decide on
general considerations of justice and fairness. For it will again constitute an excess of
powers.
7.3 Decisions on remedies
Parties, while bringing their cases before the arbitral tribunal, will inevitably seek a relief.
Consequently, the tribunal will have to decidewhether the parties’ requests are appropriate.
In principle, the tribunal’s decision would either concern claims for damages (section
7.3.1), specific performance (section 7.3.2), contract adaptation and filling the gaps (section
7.3.3).
At the outset it is necessary to highlight that the structure of theArbitrationAct provides
many fallback mechanisms, including the tribunal’s default powers regarding remedies.
Consequently, pursuant to Section 48 of the Act, unless otherwise agreed by the parties
the tribunal may: (i) make a declaration as to any matter to be determined in the
404 For the purpose of this section, the differences between the concepts of equitable findings, deciding ex aequo
et bono or acting as amiable compositeur will be assumed to have the same meaning. For this reason the
terms will be used interchangeably.
405 Deciding on equity does not raise any doubts on jurisdiction. Accordingly, since no legal rule would be
applied by the tribunal there can be no appeal on point of law as prescribed by Section 69 of the Law. The
DAC in its report ((Departamental Advisory Committee onArbitration Law, 1996) para 223) unequivocally
concludes that “[…] it is to be noted that in agreeing that a dispute shall be resolved in this way, the parties
are in effect excluding any right to appeal to the Court (there being no “question of law” to appeal).” Similarly
(Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.245 (“Since such an approach applies no
system of law, it follows that no question of law would arise for decision, […] or appeal, (s.69).”).
406 See also section 5.2.2.
407 Assuming, at the same time, that the tribunal is not granted with the authority to decide on equity.
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proceedings,408 (ii) order the payment of a sum of money, in any currency,409 (iii) order a
party to do or refrain from doing anything,410 (iv) order specific performance of a contract
(other than a contract relating to land),411 or (v) order rectification, setting aside of
cancellation of a deed or other document.412 Although this catalogue is not exclusive,413 it
gives a clear indication of what are the basic remedial tools at the tribunal’s disposal (unless
parties agree otherwise).
7.3.1 Decision on damages
Arguably, damages are by far the most common relief sought. Therefore, one could
reasonably expect that the tribunal should be able to grant damages and its power to award
damages should not be subject to challenge as such. Instances related to damages which
require further analysis are the following: (i) parties in their agreement excluded damages
(or particular type of damages) from the list of remedial powers available to the arbitral
tribunal which, nonetheless, did not stop the tribunal from granting them upon request,
(ii) parties in their agreement allowed the tribunal to grant the type of damages that would
be otherwise unavailable under the applicable law (for example, punitive damages), (iii)
the tribunal granted damages higher than sought, or (iv) the tribunal granted a remedy
different than sought.
It is clear that if parties designed their agreement to arbitrate narrowly, the tribunal
should respect it.414 Two variations could be put forward: (i) parties submit a request for
damages, ignoring their initial agreement to arbitrate or (ii) the tribunal awards damages
without seeking the parties’ submissions. In the case of the latter situation the tribunal will
commit a flagrant violation of the parties’ trust and its conclusions would be open for
challenge of the substantive jurisdiction under Section 67 of theAct.415 The former, however,
is more fact specific.
When the parties’ submissions go beyond thematrix of the initial agreement to arbitrate
it is possible to argue, on the one hand, that the parties’ intention is to extend the scope of
the original agreement and consequently the original jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal
408 Section 48(3) of the Act.
409 Section 48(4) of the Act.
410 Section 48(5)(a) of the Act.
411 Section 48(5)(b) of the Act.
412 Section 48(5)(c) of the Act.
413 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.214.
414 If the agreement is silent on the possibility to award damages (or in the words used in Section 48(2) of the
Act “unless otherwise agreed by the parties”), the tribunal should be able to grant damages if requested. In
similar vein, Harris in (Harris, Planterose, &Tecks, TheArbitrationAct 1996, 2014) p.250 argues that: “The
Section [48 of the Act] also sets out the powers which the tribunal is to have if the parties do not agree otherwise.
They correspond to certain of the more familiar powers of the courts. An agreement ‘otherwise’ may be in
respect of some or all of the powers.”
415 For further reading, see also section 3.
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to award damages. On the other hand, one should reflect whether parties had a sufficient
(and equal) opportunity to address the claim for damages (submitted by one of them). If
they had an opportunity to rebut the claim, but failed to raise an objection, the tribunal
may assume that such a conduct led to an implied consent or waiver.416 Consequently, the
tribunal’s decision on damages that answers the relief sought (which, however, is beyond
the scope of the initial agreement to arbitrate) may be then tested against the excess of
powers ground.417 In any event, the chances for success are rather scant. Additionally, one
may imagine that the annulment ground of Section 68(2)(a) of the Act (referring to the
general duties of the tribunal)418 might be available if the tribunal does not give the parties
the opportunity to address the claim for damages. It is argued that granting damages (even
against the scope of the initial agreement to arbitrate) will be insufficient to appeal on a
point of law.419
Another issue relates to the question whether parties are able to alter the scope of the
arbitral tribunal’s powers to the extent that the tribunal can exercise them differently than
the court in court proceedings or even allow it to grant remedies known in other
jurisdictions, for example, punitive damages.420 Since the initial line of Section 48(1) of the
Act reads “the parties are free to agree on the powers exercisable by the arbitral tribunal as
regards remedies”, it is reasonable to conclude that the parties’ liberty to choose available
remedies is unconstrained.421 Consequently, it seems possible that, with the parties’ express
authorization, the tribunal’s decision on punitive damages should survive the challenge.
Similarly, it has been concluded that: “[i]n the light of s.48 of the Arbitration Act 1996 it
seems likely that [the court] would [enforce the award] if the parties had expressly agreed to
give the tribunal power to award exemplary damages or had chosen an applicable substantive
416 Or, in the alternative, it may work as a waiver. If, however, a party objected (to the tribunal’s power to grant
damages) but was unsuccessful, it will still be able to raise this objection at the post-award stage.
417 Section 68(2)(b) of the Act. For further reading, see section 5.2.2. Arguably, the power to grant damages is
included in the catalogue of remedial powers of the tribunal (which parties can freely shape, see Section
48(1) of the Act). For this reason, it will not constitute a jurisdictional issue, but it will fit the scope of the
“excess of powers” ground precisely (which is designed to deal with the tribunal’s undertakings that go
beyond the parties’ consent, but are not related to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, see Section 68(2)(b) of the
Act). If this argument is rejected, however, it may very well be that the challenge should be brought against
the tribunal’s jurisdiction (Section 67 of theAct) because it relates to the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.
418 See Section 33(1)(a) of the Act in particular.
419 It is necessary to recognize that appeal might be unavailable in cases where a party brings a challenge based
on the argument that the tribunal decided on damages. By nomeans should it be understood that the award
on damages may not be, when all conditions are met, brought under Section 69 of the Act. On a similar
note see fn.254.
420 See (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 234 (“Given that the parties are
free to agree on the remedies that a tribunal may order, there is nothing to restrict such remedies to those
available at Court.”); (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.249. See also (Rowan,
2010).
421 (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.249 (“[Section 48 of the Act] essentially
provides that the parties are at liberty to agree what powers the tribunal should exercise.”).
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law that permits the award of exemplary damages in the circumstances of the particular
case. The court would, however, look very closely at the agreement andwould seek to construe
it narrowly.”422 Conversely, the tribunal’s decisionwithout the parties’ express authorization,
will likely be subject to a (successful) recourse. “If a tribunal purported to award exemplary
damages in the absence of express agreement between the parties that it should do so, and
in circumstances where under English law there is no entitlement to them, the award would
be vulnerable to challenge for both serious irregularity under s.68 and for error of law pursuant
to s.69 of the Arbitration Act 1996.”423 The appropriate ground of Section 68 of the Act in
this instance would be excess of the tribunal’s powers.424
Finally, one should observe that recourse against an ultra or extra petita decision should
be available at all times. If the amount of damages granted is higher or a remedy different
than was actually requested by the parties, the tribunal exceeds its powers prescribed by
the agreement to arbitrate, thus the vehicle of Section 68(2)(b) would be an option.425
7.3.2 Decision on specific performance
As aptly summarized byHarris and others, “[s]pecific performance is a discretionary remedy
by which a party in breach of contract is ordered to complete its performance.”426 It serves
as particularly useful in cases where monetary compensation would not be an adequate
remedy. For the purpose of the study at hand, however, the decision on specific performance
would not differmuch from the decision on damages.427 Therefore, in principle, the decision
on specific performancewould bemainly challengeable under the excess of powers ground
if (i) it is explicitly excluded from the scope of the agreement to arbitrate or (ii) while
relying on the default mechanism of Section 48(5)(b)428 it concerned a contract relating
to land or (iii) it is rendered ultra petita. The reflections provided in the section above
would be equally applicable here (in the particular scenarios (i) and (iii)). Therefore, a few
points directed specifically to the second scenario (ii) will be raised below.
It is important to note that if parties wish to limit the tribunal’s powers to grant specific
performance, they should make their intentions clear. Otherwise Section 48(5)(b) of the
422 (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 6-106.
423 (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 6-106.
424 Section 68(2)(b) of the Act.
425 Sometimes it might also be argued that granting relief above the reference made (higher than requested) is
susceptible to challenge under Section 67 of the Act, because it goes beyond the matters that have been
submitted to arbitration. See, e.g., granting interest before the date claimed as inWestland Helicopters Ltd
v. Sheikh SalahAl-Hejailan [2004] EWHC1625 (Comm) at [56]. See, however, the comments and arguments
in section 5.2.2 and section 6.1.1.
426 (Harris, Planterose, &Tecks, TheArbitrationAct 1996, 2014) p.251. For a brief take on specific performance,
see also (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) p.519.
427 See section 6.3.1.
428 Section 48(5)(b) of the Act reads that “[t]he tribunal has the same powers as the court […] to order specific
performance of a contract (other than a contract relating to land) […]”.
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Act will apply. In turn, the tribunal will be entitled to order specific performance of a contract
(other than a contract relating to land). As explained by the DAC, “[w]e have excluded
specific performance of land contracts, so as not to change the law in this regard.”429Without
going further into details, it is sufficient to add that a contract relating to land is one which
creates or transfers an interest in land.430 “[W]hen considering whether the claim fell within
the land exclusion, the proper approach is to characterise not the whole contract, but the
obligation of which specific performance is sought.”431
Some authors, however, raise the argument that “[g]iven the availability of quick
registration and enforcement in the High Court of English arbitral awards under section 66,
we are not certain that the exclusion of contracts ‘relating to land’ has any justification any
more.”432 Additionally, the inclusion of the LCIA 2014 Rules would effectively expand the
tribunals’ powers over contracts relating to land, since according to Article 22.1(vii) of the
2014 LCIA Rules the tribunal shall have the power to order compliance with any legal
obligation, payment of compensation for breach of any legal obligation and specific
performance of any agreement (including any arbitration agreement or any contract relating
to land) […].”433
All in all, the challenge against the decision on specific performance may be available
in the three instances mentioned above. In principle, a tribunal’s decision may be tested
on the ground of excess of powers. It is difficult to imagine how it would affect the tribunal’s
substantive jurisdiction or how it would be appealable on point of law.
429 (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 234.
430 See Telia Sonera Ab v. Hilcourt (Docklands) Limited [2003] EWHC 3540 (Ch) at [29-31]; see also (Sutton,
Gill, & Gearing, 2007) para 6-108 (“Power to order specific performance. Section 48(5)(b) of the Arbitration
Act 1996 provides that the tribunal has the same power as the court to order specific performance of a contract
other than a contract relating to land. A contract relating to land is one which creates or transfers an interest
in land. In the event of a failure to comply with the tribunal’s award, the coercive powers of the court may be
available once steps have been taken to enforce the award.”), (Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration
Act 1996, 2014) pp.251-252 (“The position prior to this Act, that specific performance was not available in
respect of a contract relating to land, is preserved, (see the Arbitration Act 1950, s.15). However, it has been
held that the expression ‘contract relating to land’ in subs.48(5)(b) is confined to contracts for the creation or
transfer of an interest in land; and the proper approach is to characterize not the whole contract but the
obligation of which specific performance is sought, which effectively means reading the words ‘if and so far as
it relates to land’ in the parenthesis in the subsection […].”).
431 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.217.
432 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.217.
433 See also (Gerbay, Richman, & Scherer, 2015) pp.249 (“Article 22.1(vii) enumerates the contractual remedies
an arbitrator may order. In the 1998 version of the LCIA Rules, this subsection provided solely for the
remediation of a contract to the extent there was mutual mistake. Under the 2014 Rules, the Tribunal is
specifically empowered to order specific performance and compensation for breach.”).
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7.3.3 Decision on contract adaptation and filling of gaps in the contract
The tribunal’s power to fill the gap in the contract might not be self-evident. Essentially,
the problem arises when the gap-filling exercise is perceived as the tribunal’s “creative”
competence instead as a variation on its (contract) interpretative tool. Although the analysis
herein should be confined to testing the alleged transgression of the tribunal’s powers, a
fewpreliminary and, perhaps self-evident, remarks on the sources of the contract adaptation
powers should be introduced.
It has been concluded by Berger that “in order to determine the power of an international
arbitrator to adapt or supplement a contract in an individual case, one has to refer
simultan[e]ously to three different legal sources: the arbitration agreement, the law applicable
to the arbitration (lex arbitri) and the law applicable to the substance of the dispute (lex
causae).”434 For the purpose of the research at hand, the two first sources, albeit in reverse
order, are taken into account.435
The reversal in the analysis is caused by the fact that under the old English arbitration
regime it has long been debated whether parties could authorize the tribunal to adapt the
contract.436 Following the 1996Arbitration law reform, however, it seems less controversial
to conclude that according to the 1996 Act, although impliedly, parties would be able to
give the tribunal the power to fill in the gaps in the contract.437 For example some authors
434 (Berger, Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps andRevise Contracts toMake Sense, 2001) pp.7-8; others disagree,
suggesting that the law applicable to the substance is only relevant for the content and limits to the gap-filling
power rather than its existence, see (Frick, 2001) p.194 (“In our opinion, whether or not the conditions for
an adaptation are met depends on the applicable substantive law. Whether or not the power of the arbitrator
in this respect is curtailed, is a separate, procedural question.”). In the context of testing the tribunal’s powers
before the English courts, this distinction might be relevant, because allowing the tribunal to rely on the
(foreign) substantive law (i.e. law applicable to the merits) will effectively make its possible decision on
contract adaptation non-reviewable by English courts, even in the absence of the parties’ express consent
to adapt the contract and (only) with an implied approval of the English Arbitration act as to the gap-filling
powers of the tribunal.
435 Without a doubt, the law applicable to the substance of the dispute will have an impact on shaping the
tribunal’s powers. In any event, it is concluded that no matter how influential, it will not be open for the
review mechanisms of English courts during the setting-aside procedure. See also fn.434.
436 Since the tribunal’s powers could only mirror the ones of the court and since the gap-filling request may
take place even where there is no “dispute” between the parties. For further reading, see (Kröll, Contractual
gap-filling by arbitration tribunals, 1999).
437 In this respect, most of the authors seem to rely on (and to follow with approval) the major study of Kröll,
namely (Kröll, Ergänzung und Anpassung von Verträgen durch Schiedsgerichte, 1998). See, e.g., (Poudret
& Besson, 2007) p.21 (“[…] In all the countries considered here [thus including England], an arbitrator should
be empowered to deal with such questions in the same way as all other disputes arising from a contract, but
only within the limits of the law applicable to themerits.”); (Lew,Mistelis, &Kröll, Comparative International
Commercial Arbitration, 2003) p.652, fn.143, with a reference to (Kröll, Contractual gap-filling by arbitration
tribunals, 1999) p.305 (“see also Kröll, ibid, 305, who concludes that the English and the German arbitration
laws also provide for the power of the tribunal to fill gaps and adapt the contract.”), (Berger, Power of
Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make Sense, 2001) p.16, with a reference to (Kröll,
Contractual gap-filling by arbitration tribunals, 1999) p.305 (“As Stefan Kröll has stated in his study on
gap-filling and contract adaptation by arbitrators: ‘last doubts of a legal or procedural nature against the
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concluded that “[…] it is generally accepted in modern times that an arbitral tribunal has
implied consent to ‘fill gaps’ by making a determination as to the presumed intention of the
parties in order to make a contract operable.”438 Furthermore, as pointed out by Poudret
and Besson “[…] Kröll considers that pursuant to the Arbitration Act 1996, s.46(1)(b) the
parties can confer such power on an arbitrator by express provision even though a court
might not have such power.”439 Additionally, one should also be able to rely on Section
48(1) of the Act, which gives the parties a broad discretion to individually fashion remedies
at the tribunal’s disposal.440 Notably, however, a power to fill gaps and revise contractual
provisions has not been expressly included in the list of the default powers of Section 48
of the Act.441 It might arguably lead to the conclusion that the English Arbitration regime
tolerates contract adaptation by the tribunal if mandated by the parties, but it would be
less congenial to the tribunal’s decision made in the absence of some kind of parties’
authorization.442 Consequently, one should consider whether a tribunal’s decision can be
challenged in the case where there is (i) an express agreement allowing the tribunal to
adapt the contract, (ii) where the contract is silent on thematter, or (iii) where the tribunal
adapts the contract when such a possibility is excluded by the parties.
By and large, the tribunal’s decision adapting the contract based on the parties’ express
agreement will escape the scrutiny of the national courts.443 If, however, a contract does
not include any adaptation or hardship clause, the tribunal’s actions might be contested
on the basis of excess of the tribunal’s powers.444 Even then, starting with a presumption
that contract adaptation has been requested by one of the parties, the tribunal’s decision
might still survive the challenge if, for example, it relied on the law applicable to themerits
as the source of the power.445
Also, although highly dependent on the facts of the case, the tribunal may conceive
that a broadly drafted arbitration clause entails the power of adapting contractual relations
arbitrators’ authority [to fill gaps and adapt a contract under English law] should have been dissipated with
the new [1996] Arbitration Act’.”), (Kröll, Contractual gap-filling by arbitration tribunals, 1999). See also
(Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) pp.524-527.
438 (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, &Hunter, 2015) pp.524-525. See also the referencemade toMamidoil-Jetoil
Greek Petroleum Company SA v. Okta Crude Oil Refinery AD [2001] EWCA Civ 406, 2001 WL 272881 at
[69].
439 (Poudret&Besson, 2007) pp.20-21, with a reference to (Kröll, Contractual gap-filling by arbitration tribunals,
1999) pp.14-16.
440 A discretion going, arguably, as far as to allow the tribunal to grant remedies (even) unknown to the English
legal system. See also section 6.3.1.
441 In any event, as pointed out above this list is not exhaustive and, as such, it is not a conclusive evidence of
the unavailability of the gap-filling mechanism. See section 6.3 above.
442 Either in the form of the adaptation clause or otherwise.
443 Not reviewable with regard to the tribunal’s authority to fill the contractual gaps. Conversely, if the tribunal
fills the gaps against the parties’ express prohibition of this power, it will constitute the excess of powers.
444 Section 68(2)(b) of the Act. In turn, the Section 67 challenge will not be available.
445 See above fn.434.
229
IV England and the Arbitration Act of 1996
if, for example, it is included in a long-term contract. Accordingly, the tribunal may rely
on the implied authorization measured by “the significance and purpose of the agreement
and the large number of ‘open’ contract clauses contained therein”.446 Indeed, more often
than not, however, the absence of a clear authorization would be rather a sign that parties
did not intend to give the power to a tribunal and, subsequently, “adaptation and
supplementation may not be imposed on them by arbitrators”.447
It goeswithout saying that the tribunal shall complywith the parties’ express prohibition
to exercise certain remedial powers (such as the power to fill the gap in the contract).
All in all, it is reasonable for prudent parties to expressly vest the tribunal with gap-filling
power. However, without such an authorization a tribunal’s decisionmay not be lost when
brought before the English court. At the same time, a gap-filling exercise may very well
amount to serious irregularity (i.e. the Section 68 challenge) such as excess of powers,448
depending on the factual underpinning of the case.
7.4 Decisions accessory to the parties’ main submissions and the merits of
the case
A few remarks should be added with regard to decisions auxiliary to the parties’ main
claims. The English Arbitration Act in its architecture includes relevant tools for the
tribunal to decide on interests (section 7.4.1), on costs (section 7.4.2) as well as on different
procedural issues including provisional measures (section 7.4.3). The mechanisms
introduced, however, are rather detailed andwill not be discussed here elaborately. Instead,
the analysis will only concern the avenues available for the challenge of the tribunal’s
decision on specific issues.
446 (Berger, Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make Sense, 2001) pp.8-9. The author
immediately adds that “[a]bsent such an implied authority, international arbitral tribunals are reluctant to
accept such a far-reaching competence. This reluctance is based on a reasonable interpretation of the contract
and the increased responsibility of businessmen for their contractual relations. This responsibility is derived
from the presumption of the professional competence of the parties to international business contracts which
is generally regarded by international arbitrators as a principle of transnational commercial law. This
presumption serves an important function in this context. It is regarded by the arbitrators as a yardstick for
the distribution of risks in the contract. Based on this presumption, international arbitrators assume that it
is up to the parties to take precautions in their contract against unforeseen circumstances. If no such clauses
are inserted into the contract, arbitrators are reluctant to overrule the principle of pacta sunt servanda in
favour of contract adaptation and gap-filling.”
447 (Berger, Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make Sense, 2001) p.9.
448 Especially in cases when the parties explicitly prohibit arbitrators to fill the gaps.
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7.4.1 Decision on interest
A decision on interest in terms of its value may be substantial, which in turn encourages
the parties to challenge it at the post-award stage. A number of problems can arise from
the tribunal’s decision on interest that need to be decided on a case-by-case basis, including
questions, inter alia, on whether a decision on interest should be governed by procedural
law of the seat or whether it should be governed by the substantive law applicable to the
merits of the case or whether a claim for interestmay form an independent claim or always
share the fate of a decision on the main claim. The same goes for the tribunal’s powers to
decide on pre-award and post-award interest, the accrual of interest,449 and the tribunal’s
power to consider interest as damages.450 Before going further, it is necessary to point out
that the English default mechanism is rather detailed. Thus, if parties wish to deviate
therefore from how far the tribunal can go with awarding interest, they should do so
explicitly. Depending on the circumstances, it seems that all challenges might be available
for the tribunal’s decision on interest.
As mentioned above, the fallback mechanism, pursuant to Section 49 of the Act, reads
as follows:
1. The parties are free to agree on the powers of the tribunal as regards the
award of interest.
2. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties the following provisions apply.
3. The tribunal may award simple or compound interest from such dates, at
such rates and with such rests as it considers meets the justice of the case
a. on the whole or part of any amount awarded by the tribunal, in respect
of any period up to the date of the award;
b. on the whole or part of any amount claimed in the arbitration and
outstanding at the commencement of the arbitral proceedings but paid
before the award was made, in respect of any period up to the date of
payment.
4. The tribunal may award simple or compound interest from the date of the
award (or any later date) until payment, at such rates and with such rests as
it considers meets the justice of the case, on the outstanding amount of any
449 With regard to accrual of interest, the position has changed vide the 1950 Act. See (Harris, Planterose, &
Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.255 (“Another significant change is that interest no longer
automatically accrues on sums awarded, as it did under s.20 of the 1950 Act. So arbitrators have to remember
to consider awarding such interest: in our view they should generally do so.”). Also (Reisberg & Pauley, 2013)
p.26.
450 For further reading, see, e.g., (Merkin&Flannery, ArbitrationAct 1996, 2014) pp.218-221, (Harris, Planterose,
& Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.254-258, (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) paras 6-115 to 6-128.
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award (including any award of interest under subsection (3) and any award
as to costs).
5. References in this section to an amount awarded by the tribunal include an
amount payable in consequence of a declaratory award by the tribunal.
6. The above provisions do not affect any other power of the tribunal to award
interest.
Merkin and Flannery commented that: “[o]f course, if claimant does not make any claim
for interest, the arbitrators are not empowered to award interest, as it does not form a part
of the reference. If a claim for interest is subsequently added, and the respondent does not
object, then the tribunal’s jurisdictionmay be regarded as having been extended accordingly.
Similarly, if the tribunal’s final award does not provide for interest, but a claim for interest
was made prior to the award, the tribunal has jurisdiction to rectify that omission by a later
award, under section 57(3); if, on the other hand, the question of interest was not raised,
57(3) cannot rescue the claimant.”451 These arguments, which also rely on the cases
mentioned below, inevitably lead to the challenge under Section 67 of the Act, namely the
challenge of the substantive jurisdiction. It consequently shows that such a challenge against
the decision on interest is possible.
At the same time, one should observe, however, that the possibility of the challenge
under these factual circumstances is closely related to the question whether a claim for
interest is framed in the request for arbitration and the temporal aspect of when it is
submitted rather than whether the tribunal has the power to award interest.452 Indeed, it
seems that parties occasionally submit their claim for interest at the later stage of the
proceedings instead of doing it at the initial phase and, consequently, the jurisdiction
questions arise. In these instances, parties should be reminded that if no objection has
been advanced by them in due course (against such a late claim), they might be estopped
from bringing the challenge pursuant to Section 73(1) of the Act.
In the case of Westland Helicopters, the court concluded, for example, that since no
objection on a point of jurisdiction over the independent claim on interest was brought
before the tribunal, a party was precluded from raising this ground of objection after the
award was made.453 It was still possible, however, to object (under Section 67 of the Act)
to the award awarding interest for the period before the indicated period (thus longer) for
which interest was sought.454 Additionally, one should also take account of the functus
officio considerations. It has been held in Pirtek (UK) Ltd v. Deanswood Ltd, GordonHarris
451 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.218-219.
452 For a discussion on new claims, see section 6.1.5.
453 SeeWestland Helicopters Ltd v. Sheikh Salah Al-Hejailan [2004] EWHC 1625 (Comm) at [54-57].
454 SeeWestland Helicopters Ltd v. Sheikh Salah Al-Hejailan [2004] EWHC 1625 (Comm) at [57].
232
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction, when he awarded interest based on submissions
made after the award on the main claim was granted.455 Importantly, in this case, no claim
for interest was pursued prior to the award being rendered.456
In principle, an award on interestmay amount to serious irregularity causing substantial
injustice.457 It is thus possible to imagine that the duty of fairness has been violated (when
the tribunal does not give the parties sufficient opportunity to address the claim on
interest),458 or that the award is infra petita by not including the claim on interest,459 or
that the award on interest was somewhat ambiguous as to its effect.460
It is difficult, albeit not impossible, to envisage a case where the tribunal would exceed
its powers while awarding interest. As always, it is important to note that in order to be
the basis of a successful Section 68 challenge the alleged excess needs to cause substantial
injustice.461 An “excess of powers” that causes substantial injustice might in theory occur,
if the request for interest is sought in disregard of the explicit choice of the parties in the
original agreement to arbitrate (where they expressly agree that the tribunalmay not award
interest or a specific type of interest)462 and the tribunal, relying on its default competences
stemming from Section 49 of the Act, consequently grants the claim for interest sought.
Conversely, where the initial agreement to arbitrate is “only” silent as to the interest, Section
49 of the Act is, arguably, a very powerful device within the tribunal’s powers for making
decisions on interest, which in turn makes it (the decision) to a large extent resistant to
the excess of powers challenge.463
Finally, one can not completely exclude the possibility that the decision on interest
may be open for an appeal on point of law.464 An example of this is difficult to find
nonetheless.
On occasion it has been concluded that decision on interest is “an inherent element of
a tribunal’s adjudicatory authority and is implicitly containedwithin the terms of agreements
455 Pirtek (UK) Ltd v.Deanswood Ltd, GordonHarris [2005] EWHC2301 (Comm), [2005] EWHC2301 (Comm)
2005 WL 3278910.
456 Pirtek (UK) Ltd v.Deanswood Ltd, GordonHarris [2005] EWHC2301 (Comm), [2005] EWHC2301 (Comm)
2005 WL 3278910 at [10] and at [34-36].
457 For further reading, see section 5 above.
458 Section 68(2)(a) of the Act. See Van der Giessen-de-Noord Shipbuilding BV v. Imtech Marine & Offshore
BV [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 273 at [28-31]. Also, section 5.2.1 of this chapter.
459 Section 68(2)(d). See section 5.2.3.
460 Section 68(2)(f) of the Act. See section 5.2.4.
461 See section 5.1.3. AlsoCNHGlobal N.V. v. PGN Logistics Limited, Graglia SRL,Wincanton Trans European
Ltd. [2009] EWHC 977 (Comm) 2009 WL 2848157, where the “excess of powers” did not amount to a
substantial injustice.
462 See also Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA & Ors [2005] UKHL 43.
463 Section 68(2)(b) of the Act. For further reading, see also 5.2.2 of this chapter.
464 For further reading, see also section 6.
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to arbitrate, at least absent contrary indication by the parties.”465 Considering the powers
prescribed in Section 49 of the Act, it may not be easy to convince the court that the
tribunal’s decision on interest should be set aside.
7.4.2 Decision on costs
The English Arbitration Act offers a very detailed framework as to the costs of arbitration
proceedings. In fact, seven Sections of theAct are devoted solely to the question of assessing
the costs of arbitration.466 Since the default mechanism is extensively developed, it
diminishes the chance of a decision on costs being subject to challenge. In any event, it
seems that a decision on costs mainly triggers a challenge as to serious irregularity. Similar
to other decisions, recourse against the decision on costs depends on (i) the will of the
parties outlined in the agreement to arbitrate, and (ii) how they frame their submissions,
and (iii) how far the tribunal relies on the fallback mechanism.
If the parties frame how the tribunal should tackle the issue of costs, the tribunal should
inevitably follow their instructions. Very often, with regard to costs, institutional rules
supplement the parties’ choice expressed in the agreement to arbitrate.467 If not, the tribunal
may rely on a default rule prescribed in Section 61 of the Act: “(1) The tribunal may make
an award allocating the costs of the arbitration as between the parties, subject to any
agreement of the parties. (2) Unless the parties otherwise agree, the tribunal shall award
costs on the general principle that costs should follow the event except where it appears to
the tribunal that in the circumstances this is not appropriate in relation to the whole or part
of the costs.”
In principle, parties should claim their costs, if they wish these to be awarded to them.
If they do not do so, the tribunal is, arguably, not under any obligation to award costs. At
the same time, however, the tribunal should have the power to sanction bad faith conduct
465 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3103, also (International Law Association, 2014)
p.10.
466 See Sections 59-65 of the Act. The structure of the Act has been explained by a number of scholars and will
not be elaborated upon here. For further reading, see (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration
Law, 1996) paras 265-272, (Merkin& Flannery, ArbitrationAct 1996, 2014) pp.244-261, (Harris, Planterose,
& Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) pp.291-316, (Sutton, Gill, & Gearing, 2007) paras 6-129 to 6-161.
As highlighted by Merkin and Flannery in (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.245, the
statutory costs provisions are not mandatory (with the exception of Section 60 of the Act). See, however,
(Harris, Planterose, & Tecks, The Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.291.
467 See, e.g., Art. 28 of the 2014 LCIA Rules, Art. 38 of the 2017 ICC Rules, and Art. 37 of the 2012 ICC Rules.
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in its award on costs. In these cases, the tribunal may rely on Section 61(2) of the Act468 or
on the institutional rules, for example on Article 28.4 of the 2014 LCIA Rules.469
In any event, an apt argument has been put forward by some scholars who concluded
that: “[w]hichever way the tribunal orders costs, it must act fairly and give both sides an
opportunity to address it on matters and of quantum, and not proceed to determine costs in
amanner that come as a surprise to the loser (or even the winner) upon reading the award.”470
It means that a decision on costs may be open to the Section 68(2)(a) of the Act challenge
(failure to comply with the tribunal’s general duties). Additionally, similar to the decision
on interest the decision on costsmay be subjected, for example, to infra petita.471 As hinted
above, arguably, the excess of powers challenge might be rarely useful considering how
elaborately the Arbitration Act deals with the costs issues. Recourse against the tribunal’s
substantive jurisdiction or appeal on point of law would be also rather unsuccessful.472
7.4.3 Decision on procedure
As already explained above on a number of occasions, the Arbitration Act is very detailed
and provides the tribunal with a great deal of procedural powers.473 Since they are of
procedural character, it is unlikely that they would trigger the Section 67 challenge.474
Therefore, more often than not, they are eventually open for a challenge for serious
irregularity.475
One of the grounds listed as a serious irregularity under Section 68 is tailored precisely
to the non-compliance with the parties’ procedural requests. Pursuant to Section 68(2)(c)
of the Act the award may be successfully challenged when the court is satisfied that the
“failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed
by the parties” will amount to a serious irregularity causing substantial injustice. At the
468 “Unless the parties otherwise agree, the tribunal shall award costs on the general principle that costs should
follow the event except where it appears to the tribunal that in the circumstances this is not appropriate in
relation to the whole or part of the costs.” For further reading, see also (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act
1996, 2014) p.249.
469 Pursuant to Art. 28.4 of the 2014 LCIA Rules “[…] [t]he Arbitral Tribunal may also take into account the
parties’ conduct in the arbitration, including any co-operation in facilitating the proceedings as to time and
cost and any non-co-operation resulting in undue delay and unnecessary expense. Any decision on costs by
the Arbitral Tribunal shall be made with reasons in the award containing such decision.” See also e.g. Art.
38.5 of the 2017 ICC Rules and Art. 37.5 of the 2012 ICC Rules.
470 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.248.
471 See Section 68(2)(d) of the Act. Also, section 5.2.3 of this chapter.
472 See the reflections put forward above under section 6.4.1.
473 See, i.a., Section 37 of the Act (granting the tribunal power to appoint experts, legal advisers or assessors)
and Section 38 of the Act (referring to general powers exercisable by the tribunal, e.g., allowing the tribunal
to order security for cost).
474 The Section 67 challenge is limited to the challenge of substantive jurisdiction. It is not designed to tackle
procedural irregularities. See section 3.
475 For the requirements that need to be fulfilled, see section 5 above.
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same time, however, scholars observe that “[i]n practice, this headwill be of little significance,
as the arbitrators are free to determine the procedure in the absence of any agreement to the
contrary, and (except in relation to institutional arbitrations) there is rarely any such
agreement.”476 For this reason, other grounds listed under Section 68 will be of relevance
and the “excess of powers” ground will be at the top of the list.477
Again, considering that the tribunal hasmany procedural powers under theArbitration
Act itself and that these are further supplemented by the powers included in the applicable
institutional rules, the use of the “excess of powers” challenge is limited. The relevant
question that arises in the context of the procedural decisions is who bears the ultimate
power of managing the proceedings. Put differently, the question is whether the parties’
joint procedural request would be controlling for the tribunal or, conversely, whether the
tribunal will have a power to disregard it if it considers that it will affect its adjudicative
function.
An important shift in this regard has beenmade in the recent change to the LCIARules.
According to the 1998 version of the Rules,478 the tribunal should follow the parties’
directives and “[i]n principle [it] cannot override procedural agreements of the parties” (with
the exception of the violation of mandatory rules of law).479 The 2014 modification tips
the scales in favor of the arbitral tribunal. Pursuant to Article 14.2 of the 2014 LCIA Rules,
“[t]he parties may agree on joint proposals for the conduct of their arbitration for
consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal. They are encouraged to do so in consultation with
the Arbitral Tribunal and consistent with the Arbitral Tribunal’s general duties under the
Arbitration Agreement.” Consequently, it gives the tribunal the so much needed control
over the arbitral process, making the parties’ joint requests a suggestion or a proposal
rather than mandatory directives. “In deciding whether to accept the parties’ agreement, or
reject or modify it, the Arbitral Tribunal should evaluate the parties’ request in light of the
Arbitral Tribunal’s own obligations and duties and after considering the position of the
Arbitral Tribunal itself. In carrying out this evaluation it will be helpful if the Tribunal is
able to identify the reasons why the parties have reached their agreement, insofar as the
Tribunal is able to do so.”480
All in all, considering the broad spectrum of procedural freedom given to a tribunal
and the high threshold that needs to be met in order to successfully challenge an arbitral
award, in most instances the procedural decisions will survive.
476 (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.312.
477 Another ground that might be relevant is the one prescribed under Section 68(2)(a) of the Act (failure to
comply with the general duty of the tribunal).
478 See Art. 14 of the 1998 LCIA Rules.
479 (Konrad & Hunter, 2013) p.456.
480 (Gerbay, Richman i Scherer, 2015) p.206.
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8 Concluding remarks
In general, the 1996 Act is a true milestone for the development of English law. Among
other things, it truly brought the post-award judicial control closer to the internationally
recognized standards. The developed tradition of the supervision based on the statutory
grounds and the courts’ inherent jurisdiction could easily become a burden in structuring
the new system. Yet, the drafters were able to take into account previous achievements
and, at the same time, introduce the versatile yet comprehensible system of judicial review
in the 1996 Act.
The setting-aside system under the Act is based on three pillars, namely a challenge of
the tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction, a challenge of the serious irregularities causing
substantial injustice and, finally, an appeal on point of law. Each of these grounds for
recourse, although to a different degree, proved relevant for testing the tribunal’s use of
its adjudicative powers. Also, each of them has its autonomous features. To name a few,
on a comparative basis, only the challenge of substantive jurisdiction and the challenge of
serious irregularity are mandatory provisions thus parties are not able to freely exclude
from the post-award judicial review on these grounds. Importantly, the English system of
appeal on point of law, although non-mandatory is designed as an opt-out system, which
means that parties are well advised to be explicit if they intend to contract out from a
judicial control on point of law. Another important comparative point is the difference in
the standard of the court’s review with regard to objections regarding the tribunal’s
substantive jurisdiction and the serious irregularities. In the case of the former, it seems
that the court is able to review the case de novo including having a full hearing and (even)
admission of new evidence, whereas in the case of the serious irregularities courts apply a
much higher degree of deference towards the tribunal’s decisions. Last, but not least, the
way the courtsmay approach each of the available challenge routes differs because different
remedies will be at court’s disposal. Notably, not only traditional remission and setting
aside are possible, but also confirmation of the award, variation of the award or declaration
of the award to be of no effect. The availability of remedies depends on which head of the
challenge is being invoked. However, the court reviewing the tribunal’s substantive
jurisdiction has, at least in theory, been deprived of the power to remit it back to the
tribunal. It could, arguably, prove to be useful in cases where the court reviews the scope
of the tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction, thus in the single instance of the substantive
jurisdiction challenge that is of interest for the research at hand.
As pointed out above, the substantive jurisdiction challenge is only relevant for the
research at hand to the extent it is invoked against the scope of the substantive jurisdiction
(thus not when the validity, the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, nor the constitution
of the arbitral tribunal are at stake). By and large, the scope of the tribunal’s substantive
jurisdiction is determined by the underlying agreement to arbitrate (alongwith arbitration
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rules, if applicable), the subsequent parties’ submissions and the statutory rules that protect
the public interest at large. Importantly, pursuant to Section 30(1)(c) of the Act, the scope
of the tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction is primarily predetermined by the parties’
submissions (or put differently, by the matters that have been submitted to arbitration).
Only if a matter is truly submitted does it deserve to be checked against the matrix of the
agreement to arbitrate.
The test of serious irregularities is different. The irregularity may affect the tribunal,
the proceedings or the award. It shows that, arguably, this test can be traced back to the
(pre-1996 Act) review of whether the arbitrator misconducted himself or the proceedings.
In turn, it implies that the test of the serious irregularities is closely connected with the
service of justice, thus, by and large, with the concept of due process. Instead of the broad
definition that could have been freely shaped by the courts, the 1996 Act provides that
“only” nine notions can be effectively considered by the courts as a serious irregularity. It
means that this exhaustive list remarkably limits the scope of the court’s review.
Additionally, the successful application for the setting aside on the ground of serious
irregularity is conditioned not only upon the fact that the irregularity needs to be serious,
it also has to cause a substantial injustice to the applicant and the setting aside should not
itself cause the substantial injustice.
Out of the nine irregularities listed, arguably, three are of particular importance when
testing the tribunal’s adjudicative powers. Of course the most important is the notion of
“excess of powers” which is accompanied by the failure to comply with the duty of fairness
and failure to deal with all the issues brought before the tribunal. The Act in itself makes
a clear distinction of the difference between the excess of powers and excess of jurisdiction.
In practice, however, it is sometimes difficult to properly categorize the objection.
Acknowledging that it can be considered as an overly simplistic view, it is argued that
parties may find inspiration in the Act itself to determine which of the tribunal’s powers
do not affect the tribunal’s jurisdiction. An overlook of the content of theAct would suggest
that the tribunal has a power for example to order a specific performance, the power to
award interest and the like. In turn, if the parties decide to limit these powers and, in turn
the tribunal exceeds them, it will be appropriate to remedy these tribunal’s actions with
the excess of powers challenge. Otherwise, however, the Act proves to be a comprehensive
source of the tribunal’s powers.
Additionally, it goes without saying that the tribunal should act fairly, which means
that, amongst other things, it should not surprise partieswith its conclusions. Put differently,
it should give the parties the opportunity to address the “essential building blocks” of its
own conclusions.
Finally, the tribunal should deal with all the issues brought before it. One of the main
difficulties regarding this ground lies in the definition of the notion “issues”. As put by one
authority: “amatter will constitute an “issue”where the whole of the applicant’s claim could
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have depended upon how it was resolved, such that “fairness demanded” that the question
be dealt with”.481 Also, arguably, “the issue” should be distinguished from “thematter” that
is a relevant concept for the substantive jurisdiction challenge.
The DAC left an appeal on point of law as a statutory ground for challenge
notwithstanding criticism from the international arbitration community. As highlighted
this opt-out system is rather limited in its scope of application. Even if applicable, however,
it will be subject to a number of strict requirements. Consequently, in the case of testing
the tribunal’s adjudicative powers it will rarely be of relevance.
The application of this three-headed concept of a challenge proved that all of the three
heads (however, the mandatory ones in particular) are relevant when testing different
decisions of the arbitral tribunal.
By and large, decisions on contractual and non-contractual claims and counterclaims
will most likely trigger the challenge of substantive jurisdiction since the claims indeed
are matters brought before the tribunal and thus define the scope of the tribunal’s
substantive jurisdiction. It does not change the fact that, on occasion, the tribunal’s decision
on claims (in a broad sense) can be flawed with a serious irregularity causing substantive
injustice.
In principle, the process of determining the applicable law (including conflict of laws
rules) and ascertaining the content of the applicable law will naturally attract an appeal
on point of law. As pointed out, however, its scope of application is rather limited. Since
it is unlikely that the process of applying the law affects the tribunal’s jurisdiction, parties
will be left with the challenge of serious irregularities.
It has already been suggested that the possibility to grant a remedy should be considered
a power of the tribunal. Consequently, in cases where the tribunal granted a remedy that
was not at its disposal, such a decision should be set aside on the “excess of powers”
grounds.482 Since, however, the Act includesmany fallbackmechanisms, it arguablymeans
that parties should first expressly limit the tribunal’s powers to grant certain types of
remedies in their agreement to arbitrate in order to rely on Section 68(2)(b) of the Act. As
always, it may be relevant to test the tribunal’s decision upon the (most invoked) ground
of the breach of duty of fairness and possibly failure to deal with all essential issues.
Finally, the conclusion regarding decisions on remedies is equally applicable to decisions
accessory to the main submissions. Therefore, in short, they may be flawed with serious
irregularities and the excess of powers. However, taking into account a number of default
powers prescribed by the Act, the challenge will rarely be successful.
481 See fn.199.
482 And should not be a challenge of the substantive jurisdiction under Section 67 of the Act.
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V The United States and the Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925
1 Introduction
The U.S. arbitration law is a complex legal system that provides a perfect setting for the
study of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge – the challenge that across the ocean
would be, by and large, understood under the notion of “excess of powers” rather than the
“excess of mandate”.1 In turn, the subject of the present inquiry is the meaning of the
concept “excess of powers” by the arbitral tribunal in the U.S.2
Before addressing the underlying question (i.e. with respect to concept of the “excess
of powers”), the intricacies of the arbitration architecture in theU.S. need to be highlighted.
Therefore, at first, the legal framework of arbitration will be discussed in general terms. It
means that reference will be made to the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (hereafter the
“FAA”)3 as well as to state laws governing arbitration. In particular, it seems of relevance
to discuss the relation betweenChapter 1 of the FAA and state arbitration statutes regarding
the grounds for vacating an arbitral award.4 A brief commentwill follow on how the judicial
system in theU.S. functions and how theU.S. SupremeCourt (in this chapter also referred
to as the “SupremeCourt” or “theCourt”) (re)shapes the structure of commercial arbitration
in the U.S.
The American notion of “excess of powers” has been introduced in Section 10(a)(4)
of the FAA according to which: “the United States court in and for the district wherein the
award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party
to the arbitration […]where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
1 As explained in Chapter I, “excess of mandate” and “excess of powers” are different models of the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge. These will be the subject of a separate comparative law analysis in Chapter
VII.
2 It should be acknowledged that in theU.S. consumer arbitration, labor arbitration and securities arbitration
are areas of the arbitration system distinct from commercial arbitration. The scope of the research at hand
is limited, however, to commercial arbitration. In any event, some principles developed in other specialized
arbitration systems have been successfully transplanted into commercial arbitration. For that reason, some
reference to the “non-commercial arbitration” cases may be occasionally made.
3 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
4 When discussing the arbitration system in the U.S. one should note that the statutory language of the FAA
(and state laws) refers to vacatur of the arbitral award. For the purpose of the research at hand, it will be
considered that the vacating procedure is an extraordinary means of recourse against an arbitral award
recognized elsewhere as a setting-aside procedure or annulment procedure.
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them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.” This provision, drafted in rather broad terms, aches for further analysis.
First, the court standard of review should be briefly discussed. Other questions that
need to be answered accordingly are the following: should the court be allowed to confirm
the arbitral award in part and should the court take into account the correlation between
an arbitral award rendered and alleged “excess of powers” (and if so, to what extent)? In
other words, can the tribunal “exceed its powers” in other ways than by producing the
award?
After explaining the general features of vacating arbitral awards, the core issue (i.e. the
“excess of powers” challenge) needs to be properly addressed. The study undertaken will
be three-fold. As a starting point, the limits to the arbitral tribunal’s powers and lines for
their demarcation will be defined. Further, this research will focus on themeaning of both
the notion of “excess of powers” and the concept of “imperfect execution of powers upon
the subject matter submitted” and how the courts interpret these notions. It consequently
means that the “excess of powers” challenge in a broad sense will be considered to comprise
the notions of “excess of powers” and “imperfect execution of powers upon the subject
matter submitted”. Further, it is necessary to briefly reflect on the (alternative) argument
suggesting that the New York Convention grounds rather than the grounds prescribed in
Chapter 1 of the FAA should be applicable to international awards rendered in the U.S.5
What naturally follows from the judicial interpretation of the statutory concepts in the
common law jurisdictions is the introduction of the body of common law that expands
the understanding of the provisions of law (if needed). In the context of the “excess of
powers” challenge in the U.S., the doctrine of the “manifest disregard of the law” that has
been judicially created on the federal level should not be passed by and unnoticed. The
additional question, however, would bewhether the “manifest disregard of the law” doctrine
is independent from grounds prescribed in Section 10 of the FAA or whether it may fit
within the ambit of the “excess of powers” challenge.
The next section of this chapter will be dedicated to the application of the “excess of
powers” challenge to selected issues that arguably may fall outside the scope of the arbitral
tribunal’s powers. The section is divided thematically into four parts: the first will be
devoted to the arbitral tribunal’s decisions on parties’ claims (including, i.a., contractual
claims, set-off claims and tort claims); the second will explain the process of application
of law by the arbitral tribunal (starting from the application of relevant choice of law rules
through the decision on applicable law, and finishing with ascertaining the content of the
applicable law by the arbitral tribunal); the third part focuses on the excess of the arbitral
tribunal’s powers when awarding different types of remedies (such as damages, punitive
damages, specific performance, contract adaptation and filling the gaps); the fourth and
5 Whether this line of argumentation is accepted, see Chapter II and Chapter VI.
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final part is devoted to arbitral tribunals’ decisions on interest and costs which are decisions
accessory to the parties’ main submissions. The decision on the procedure should also be
taken into account.
The concluding remarks will give a general overview of the approach taken by the
courts when testing the award for the alleged excess of the tribunal’s powers, especially
taking into account that the “excess of powers” ground is said to be the most frequent
statutory ground for vacating arbitration awards.6
The research at hand recognizes the importance of the recently finalized Restatement
(Third) of International Commercial Arbitration (also referred to as the “Restatement on
International Arbitration” or the “Restatement”).7 It is a major project undertaken by the
American Law Institute that started in December 2007 and concluded in the mid 2019.8
The Restatement provides a profound and systematic analysis of the systemof international
commercial arbitration as it developed in the U.S. It is not, however, source of law thus it
does not bound the U.S. courts. It may only operate as a (strong) persuasive authority.9
2 The legal context of international commercial arbitration in
the United States
Before discussing in detail how the “excess of powers” of the arbitral tribunal is tested in
the U.S., a brief outline of the U.S. legal landscape has to be given. It should be noted that
the issues addressed here remain subject to the ongoing debate and as such theymay come
across as oversimplified. The aim of this section, however, is just to sketch a general picture
that would explain i.a. what the legal bases are for the architecture of (international)
arbitration in the U.S. (see section 2.1 and section 2.2), how the judicial system of the U.S.
6 136A.L.R. Fed. 183 (Originally published in 1997) (“Themost frequent ground for vacating arbitration awards
is that the arbitrators exceeded their powers permitting the vacating of the award under § 10(a)(4) and more
awards have been vacated on this ground than under all the other re[a]sons for vacating awards combined.”).
See also (Brewer & Mills, 2009) p.46, (Mills & Brewer, 2013) p.121.
7 Due notice is also made to a bill of the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2018 (hereafter the “AFA”) that has been
referred to a Senate Committee on the Judiciary on 22 March 2018 (see S.2591 - Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2018 115th Congress (2017-2018) available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/
senate-bill/2591 [last accessed 23 April 2019]. It is, however, uncertain whether the bill would be enacted
by the Congress, taking into account that it has been already introduced for a discussion at least six times
(in 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013, 2015, 2017) and it was repeatedly rejected. In any event it should be noted
that the AFA is aimed at protecting consumers and employees and invalidating predispute arbitration
agreements concluded with them. Further, the AFA does not contain any amendments to Section 10 of the
FAA (grounds for vacatur). In consequence, it has no direct influence on commercial arbitration, especially
in the context of the “excess of powers” challenge which is the subject of the research at hand.
8 See https://www.ali.org/projects/show/international-commercial-arbitration/ [last accessed 23April 2019].
9 Occasionally, the reference can be made to the earlier drafts of the Restatement.
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functions (section 2.3), and finally the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in (re)designing of
the system of arbitration (section 2.4).
2.1 The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 and its supremacy
The FAA is often reported as “a response to the judiciary’s long standing refusal to enforce
executory agreements to arbitrate.”10 Taking into account the “judicial hostility” against
arbitration that existed in theU.S. until the beginning of the twentieth century,11 enactment
of the FAA in 1925 is considered to be a breakthrough,12 because it provided amuch-needed
statutory framework for the enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.13
Additionally, it is frequently suggested that the FAA was designed by Congress as a
procedural device to enforce arbitration in federal courts,14 which was intended to apply
in an interstate context.15 Consequently, a number of authors reject the idea that the FAA
was ever considered to be a body of substantive law. As put forward by Horton, “the
legislative record repeatedly disavows the idea that the statute [the FAA] creates federal
substantive law capable of binding states.”16 Nonetheless, after a series of Supreme Court
decisions, starting withMoses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.
(hereafter “Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital”)17 and Southland Corp. v. Keating (also
referred to as “Southland”),18 the FAA was no longer a procedural vehicle enacted by the
Congress in 1925. As such “[the FAA] has now been pressed into service as a body of
10 See, i.a., (Burns, 2010) p.1817; (Horton, 2013) p.1219. See also H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924).
11 “Judicial hostility” was taken in byAmerican courts from the English jurisprudencewhich heavily influenced
the development of the U.S. legal system. As explained by Horton in (Horton, 2013) p.1225: “In
seventeenth-century England, judges invented special rules to stunt arbitration’s development. Under the
ouster doctrine, they invalidated agreements to arbitrate because mere individuals were not competent… [to]
diminish the statutory judicial power. Likewise, the revocability doctrine allowed either party to retract their
assent to arbitrate until the arbitrator ruled.” See also (Haydock & Henderson, 2002) pp.145-148. It is also
mentioned by Burns in (Burns, 2010) p.1817 that “U.S. courts criticized the common law rule, but they
refused to overturn it without legislative action”; similarly, (Horton, 2013) p.1225 (saying that American
courts were invoking these doctrines under frequent protest).
12 See, e.g., (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.877.
13 (Rutledge, Kent, &Henel, 2009) p.878 (“[…] the FAAprovided […] that arbitration agreements are enforceable
(subject only to generally applicable contract defences) and that arbitral awards are judicially enforceable
(subject to limited number of non-merits defences).”) For a summary of arguments favoring enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate presented before the Congress, see also (Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How
the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 2006) pp.101-109.
14 See, i.a., (Schwartz, 2004) p.8, also (Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 2006) pp.101-113, and (Burns, 2010) p.1818.
15 H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924), (Bermann, Coe, Drahozal, & Rogers, 2009) p.1335, also (Burns, 2010)
p.1818.
16 (Horton, 2013) p.1227.
17 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983).
18 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984).
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substantive law that binds state courts as well, requiring that arbitration agreements be
enforced on the same footing as other contracts.”19 Itmeans that, irrespective of theCongress’
intentions in 1925, nowadays the FAA applies in state courts and preempts state law that
is in conflict with the spirit of the FAA, namely with a federal policy favoring arbitration.20
For this reason, it may be, by and large, considered superior to (and overriding) state
legislation, especially in the context of international arbitration.
The FAA consists of three chapters: Chapter 1 introduces general provisions regarding
(among others) enforcement of arbitration agreements, the appointment of arbitrators,
and vacatur and the enforcement of arbitral awards,21 whereas Chapters 2 and 3 contain
implementing legislation for the New York Convention (Chapter 2)22 and the
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (hereafter the
“Panama Convention”) (Chapter 3). In this paper, however, mainly Chapter 1 of the FAA
will be discussed in detail.23
2.2 State laws and their (marginal) significance
In a nutshell, one may not disregard the importance of state law.24 Two separate legal
regimes on a state level need to be distinguished: firstly an intrastate (“domestic”) arbitration
statute thatmay be of relevance and secondly an interstate (or even international) arbitration
law (if enacted) on a state level that can also add a layer of confusion as to the question
which law applies. These two legal frameworks might be particularly important in cases
where state law has been explicitly chosen by the parties as the governing law or in cases
where an enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is not possible under the New York
19 (Park, Amending the Federal Arbitration Act, 2002) p.2.
20 For further analysis of the FAA’s preemption, see section 2.4. For further analysis of the pro-arbitration
policy, see section 3.1.
21 9 U.S.C. § § 1-16.
22 For further reading, see also [Chapter on the NYC]; the Panama Convention escapes the focus of this
research.
23 For a comprehensive analysis of the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge under theNewYorkConvention,
see Chapter VI. See, however, the Restatement’s take on the post-award relief against arbitral awards (in
principle, suggesting to follow the New York Convention grounds). For further reading, see section 5.3.
24 It is so, notwithstanding the fact that, by and large, state legislation may be preempted if it conflicts with
the FAA, it is not entirely clear, however, when this may happen. Bermann in (Bermann, ‘Domesticating’
the New York Convention: the Impact of the Federal Arbitration Act, 2011) p.330 points out that “the fact
remains thatmanyUS states have also enacted legislation governing arbitration in both interstate and foreign
commerce. Moreover, this legislation differs in many important respects both from the FAA and indeed from
state to state. While the FAA enjoys supremacy over state arbitration law in the event of conflict between
them, it does not preempt the field. Unfortunately, it remains to this day unclear when exactly state law that
is different from federal law is also in conflict with federal law.” See also sections 2.1 and 2.4 of this chapter.
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Convention nor under the Panama Convention.25 Therefore, apart from the framework
set out on the federal level by the FAA, state legislation on arbitration can also be significant
with regard to international arbitration.
It should be noted that intrastate (“domestic”) arbitration statutes are usuallymodeled
either on the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1955 (hereafter the “UAA”),26 or on the Revised
UniformArbitrationAct of 2000 (hereafter the “RUAA”)27 whereas separate international
arbitration statutes on a state level can be based for example on the Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration.28 It is argued, however, that in the context of the
analyzed ground for vacatur it is nearly impossible for the intrastate (“domestic”) statute
that is based on the UAA or the RUAA to be conflicting with (and thus preempted by) the
FAA. It is simply because the wording of the provisions is almost identical.29 The situation
may change if the state introduces an independent legal regime that governs international
arbitration in the said state. Still, however, it is highly unlikely that even the corresponding
provision of the Model Law30 that has completely different wording from the FAA, would
be inconsistent with the spirit of the FAA.31 Consequently, it is considered that state law
rarely differs and thus will rarely matter with regard to vacatur of the arbitral awards.
Nonetheless, as argued by some authors, “the practitioner should always keep this dual
25 In the case of the enforcement of arbitral awards that are subject to neither the New York nor Panama
Convention some argue that Chapter 1 of the FAA shall apply, others that state law should be the governing
law. This question, among others, has been the subject of analysis in the Restatement (Third) of International
Commercial Arbitration. For further reading, see (Bermann, Coe, Drahozal, & Rogers, 2009) pp.1338-1339
or (Bermann, Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, 2009) p.196.
26 In order to provide the users of arbitration with consistency, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws prepared the model bill that could be used by a state legislator wishing to introduce
state arbitration acts. <http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Arbitration%20
Act%20(1956) [last accessed 23 April 2018].
27 See http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20(2000) [last accessed
23 April 2018].
28 See California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon, Texas. See the list available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html [last
accessed 23 April 2018]. For further reading on the Model Law, see Chapter II.
29 See § 12(a)(3) of the UAA (“[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers) or Section 23(a)(4) of the RUAA (“an
arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s powers”) as compared to Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA (“where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made”). One may also argue that the wording of the UAA and
RUAA is evenmore narrow. In any event, and considering the emphatic, federal policy favoring arbitration
it is likely that the wording of these statutes would be interpreted in line with the FAA.
30 Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law provides with a completely different model of the “excess of mandate”
type of challenge (“the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration,
provided that, if the decisions onmatters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted,
only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set
aside”). For further reading, see Chapter II.
31 Arguably, Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML limits instances for recourse against an arbitral award more than the
FAA does. See also Chapter II and Chapter VII and also section 5.3.
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system [i.e. state and federal law] in mind, both because of the potential forum-selection
benefits and for the occasional case where state practice becomes relevant.”32 Notably it may
dramatically change if the Carbonneau draft proposal for the new federal arbitration law
was to be enacted.33 According to the Preamble of the (Carbonneau draft) FAA proposal,
“[…] the present statute is commanded by a strong national policy favoring arbitration and
the arbitrability of disputes.”34 As explained by Carbonneau: “[…] the emphatic of strong
federal policy on arbitration has been replaced by a ‘strong national policy favoring
arbitration,’ thereby underscoring that the proposed law, if enacted, will become the national
American law on arbitration. It would govern at all levels of the U.S. legal system and would
not have any state law statutory rivals.”35 Such an undertaking would effectively simplify
the U.S. law on arbitration by framing it only on one legislative (national) level.36
2.3 The role of the courts and the organization of the judicial system in
the United States
A few words of introduction addressing the organization of the U.S. judiciary need to be
added. Farnsworth aptly points out that “[t]he judicial system [in theU.S.] is the best starting
point for an inquiry into the sources of law for, though decisional law stands below legislation
in the hierarchy of authorities, and case law is subject to change by statute, the judiciary has
been the traditional fountainhead of law in America as in other common law countries.”37
In other words, it cannot be forgotten, however, that the system of arbitration in the U.S.
(i.e. a common law country) is not based only on the statutory provisions but also on
federal common law. For this reason, in the context of arbitration one should take into
account that the structure of the vacating mechanism of the FAA has been supplemented
i.a. by the judicially developed doctrine ofmanifest disregard of the law.38 The interpretation
and the impact of this doctrine will be addressed later in this chapter.39
The judicial system of the U.S. is organized nationwide into two prongs: a system of
state courts and a system of federal courts. It means that, as long as federal law may be
32 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.879.
33 One should note, however, that the Carbonneau draft is a private initiative, and - as such - not currently
considered as a basis for a legislative reform.
34 (Carbonneau, Toward a New Federal Law on Arbitration, 2014) p.101. See also pp.143-147 therein.
35 (Carbonneau, Toward a New Federal Law on Arbitration, 2014) pp.144-145.
36 Arguably, the Restatement efforts are also directed at simplifying the U.S. arbitration regime.
37 (Farnsworth, An Introduction to the Legal System of the United States, 2010) p.43.
38 The phrase first appeared in dictum of the caseWilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S. Ct. 182 (1953) (overruled
on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490U.S. 477, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989)).
Currently, the availability of the manifest disregard challenge is, however, uncertain. For further reading,
see section 6.1.1.
39 See section 6.2 of this chapter.
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considered superior and may preempt the application of state law in case of a conflict, the
state court decisions are independent and generally not subject to review by the federal
courts. Instead, the state judiciary provides for its own independent mechanism of appeal
to the highest appeal court of the said state.40 The federal court system, on the other hand
and as it is relevant for arbitration, consists of the U.S. District Courts, the U.S. Court of
Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court.
The division of competence on state and federal level in the context of international
arbitration, nonetheless, is not clear-cut.41 The argument advanced by many authors is
that “[i]ndeed, by all outward appearances, it [the FAA] was subject to an important limit:
it was a procedural rule that governed federal courts and thus neither applied in state court
nor preempted conflicting state law.”42 Surprisingly, however, the FAA does not create
subject matter jurisdiction for the federal court and, as such, parties that seek to proceed
before the federal court are required to assert a separate jurisdictional basis for the federal
court.43 Conversely, in the light of Southland and its progenies state courts can (and do)
apply the FAA notwithstanding the original intention of the Congress. It is argued that in
the context of the vacatur of the arbitral award, the FAAmay only be applied by the federal
court as Section 10 of the FAA has been considered as a procedural vehicle rather than the
substantive law provision.44 Still, even if it so happens that the state court applies the FAA,
it will do so in a fashion that accommodates federal policy favoring arbitration.45
40 (Farnsworth, An Introduction to the Legal System of the United States, 2010) pp.44-45.
41 This is especially the case after Southland. For more, see section 2.4. See also (Bermann, ‘Domesticating’
the New York Convention: the Impact of the Federal Arbitration Act, 2011) p.329.
42 (Horton, 2013) p.1226.
43 (Burns, 2010) p.1819.
44 Conversely to Section 2 of the FAA, which is said to be a substantive law provision.
45 See also section 3.1. Additionally, one should observe that the Restatement, while defining what the “court”
entails (for the purposes of the Restatement) concludes that “The vacatur, confirmation, recognition, and
enforcement of international awards are not entrusted exclusively to federal courts. FAA Chapters Two and
Three contemplate that vacatur, confirmation, and enforcement of Convention awardsmay be sought in state
or other nonfederal courts, as evident from the removal provisions found in § § 205 and 302 (incorporating
§ 205 for actions under the Panama Convention). In connection with agreements to arbitrate governed by
FAA Chapter One, the Supreme Court has stated that FAA § 2 creates ‘a substantive rule applicable in state
as well as federal courts.’ Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). Relatedly, several state courts
have regarded agreements to arbitrate that are subject to the New York Convention as requiring enforcement
as a matter of treaty obligation. See F.A. Richard & Assocs., Inc. v. Gen. Marine Catering Co., 688 So. 2d 199,
203 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (compelling London arbitration). Thus, Convention awards and non-Convention
awards are subject to confirmation, recognition, and enforcement in all courts throughout the United States
and its territories.” See the Restatement (second tentative draft) p.36.
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2.4 The role of the United States Supreme Court in (re)structuring the
system of arbitration
The important point that needs to be highlighted under this section is the process of the
“federalization” of arbitration law in the U.S. Reference should be made to the already
mentionedMoses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and Southland cases which are a part of the
so-called “second trilogy”, i.e. a part of three U.S. Supreme Court decisions that are
considered to “federalize” arbitration law, by showing domination of federal law over state
law and preempting the latter.46 To use the words of Brunet: “[…] the Supreme Court has
shaped a Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’) that routinely trumps state laws dealing with
arbitration and created a situation in which applications of state arbitration law are the
exception.”47
As explained by one scholar, “ironically, FAA preemption, though seen as illegitimate,
is now well-established.”48 Therefore, without going into the details of the ongoing debate
regarding the intentions of the Congress in 1925 and the Supreme Court interpretation
of the FAA, the superior character of the FAA should be taken as a starting point for the
analysis of the “excess of powers” challenge.49 In consequence, one may argue that, by and
large, only grounds for vacatur arising out of the FAA (and not state legislation) are of
relevance.50
3 Court standard of review of arbitral awards
The vacatur procedure is an extraordinary means of recourse against an arbitral award.
By and large, it further entails that it is governed by the rules prescribed by the FAA rather
than the general rules of American civil procedure. In this section, the court standard of
review of arbitral awards will be analyzed.
46 Authors generally refer toMoses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, Southland and Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v.
Byrd, 470U.S. 213 (1985). See, e.g., (Carbonneau, Carbonneau onArbitration: Collected Essays, 2010) p.54,
(Stipanowich, 2011) p.325, (Bermann, United States: Arbitration, 2014) p.493.
47 (Brunet, 2007) p.326.
48 (Horton, 2013) p.1228.
49 Although taking into account that the core of the preemption debate refers (mainly) to the validity of an
arbitration agreement, thus section 2 of the FAA (sometimes introduced as “front end” issues), it has been
also suggested that challenges against arbitral awards as prescribed by Section 10 of the FAA (being part of
so-called “back-end” issues) would be also (exclusively) controlled by the FAA. For illustrative purposes,
see “The Preemption Continuum” and “Preemption VennDiagram” in (Hayford, Federal Preemption and
Vacatur: The Bookend Issues under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001) p.74 and p.77.
50 It would be even more evident if one takes into account Carbonneau’s draft proposal for the new federal
arbitration law and its “national policy favoring arbitration”. For further reading, see section 2.2 of this
chapter.
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In the case where the court finds itself competent to review the arbitral award based
upon a challenge of excess of powers, it needs to follow a pro-arbitration stand that usually
entails deference to the original arbitral decision (section 3.1) and no review on themerits
(section 3.2). Even if the court is satisfied with the objections against the award, it will still
aim at (at least) the partial confirmation of the healthy part of the award (section 3.3).
3.1 Pro-arbitration stand in the context of vacatur
The pro-arbitration policy was the underlying reason why the FAA was introduced in the
first place. Having in mind the “judicial hostility towards arbitration” at the beginning of
the twentieth century,51 the FAA proved to be one of the first legal instruments worldwide
that effectively guaranteed that the arbitral award will be respected in its shape and will
be judicially enforced. Consequently, the ultimate goal of the court is to confirm the arbitral
decision unless the FAA grounds for vacatur are met; a closer look at Section 9 of the FAA
proves that the court must confirm the arbitral award unless it is (in exceptional
circumstances) vacated, modified or corrected.52
The FAA’s philosophy favors the enforcement of arbitral award. In thewords ofDomke
onCommercial Arbitration, “when arbitration awards are reviewed by courts under [Section]
10(a) [of the FAA], they are construed liberally rather than technically or exactly, and every
reasonable assumption is made in their favor.”53 Additionally, Born argues that, “U.S. courts
have consistently interpreted the provision of the FAA concerning vacatur and confirmation
of awards in a robustly pro-enforcement fashion.”54 This “robust pro-enforcement fashion”
entails that courts generally rely on the findings of the arbitral tribunal and refrain from
the review on the merits employed on ordinary appeal.55 Therefore, it has been concluded
that, “[s]ince the goal of arbitration is to provide the parties an alternative to a lengthy and
costly litigation process, a court reviewing an arbitration award is more deferential to the
arbitrator’s decision than an appellate court would be in reviewing a decision of a trial court.
Thus, a court will not overturn an arbitral award for serious factual or legal errors.”56
51 See section 2.1.
52 Section 9 of the FAA reads that “[…] any party to the arbitration may apply to the court […] for an order
confirming the award, and thereupon the courtmust grant such an order unless the award is vacated,modified,
or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.”
53 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § 39:13. See also Halliburton
Energy Servs., Inc. v. NL Indus., 553 F. Supp. 2d 733, 754 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (“In deciding whether an arbitration
panel exceeded its authority as a basis for vacatur under the FAA, the district court resolves all doubts in favor
of arbitration”).
54 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3181.
55 See section 3.2, however.
56 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § 38:1. Similarly (Holtzmann,
Donovan, Tahbaz, & Amirfar, 2013) Chapter VII(2)(a) (“In light of the strong public policy favoring
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Courts continuously support this line of argumentation. The Supreme Court held that
“[u]nder the FAA, courts may vacate an arbitrator’s decision ‘only in very unusual
circumstances.’”57 Accordingly, courts explained that, “[a] reviewing court examining
whether arbitrators exceeded their powers ‘must resolve all doubts in favor of arbitration’”58
and that “judicial review of commercial arbitration awards is narrowly limited […] [the]
federal court should defer to [the] arbitrator’s decision whenever possible.”59 Similarly, it
was also held that “[…] any judicial review of an arbitration award is ‘extremely limited,’
and is, in fact, ‘among the narrowest known to the law’”60 and that “review of the arbitration
award itself ‘is very deferential’.”61
3.2 The scope of the court’s review
As hinted to in the previous section, no review of the merits shall be at the disposal of the
parties during vacatur.62 It has been pointed out that “[t]he scope of judicial review sanctioned
by §10(a) of the FAA is extremely narrow”63 and the pro-arbitration policy limits the ambit
of review of the award.64 Further, it is argued that “[…] the grounds for vacatur of an arbitral
award under s[ection] 10 of the FAA are directed to procedural issues and do not allow a
substantive review of the arbitrator’s decision on the merits.”65 Finally, the Restatement
reads that “under no circumstance, should a court take a judicial review as an opportunity
to revisit the merits of the underlying dispute.”66 It should be mentioned, however, that if
arbitration, courts are highly deferential to arbitrators’ decisions”); 136 A.L.R. Fed. 183 (Originally published
in 1997) (“The grounds upon which a Federal District Court may vacate an arbitration award are, therefore,
much narrower than the grounds upon which an appellate court can overturn a decision of a Federal District
Court and the courts have, correspondingly, shown little inclination to vacate arbitration awards on any
ground […]”).
57 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 186 L. Ed. 2d 113 (2013) (hereafter “Oxford Health”)
(referring to First Options of Chicago).
58 Action Industries, Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337,343 (5th Cir. 2004).
59 B.L. Harbert Intern., LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 909 (11th Cir. 2006).
60 Long John Silver’s Restaurants, Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345, 349 (4th Cir. 2008).
61 PoolRe Ins. Corp. v. Organizational Strategies, Inc., 783 F.3d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 2015).
62 See, e.g., Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Investments, Inc., 614 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Court of Appeals
would not review merits of arbitrator’s conclusions since franchisees did not allege grounds enumerated in
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).”).
63 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § 39:13.
64 (Domke,Wilner, & Edmonson,Domke onCommercial Arbitration, 2013) § 39:1 (“Any discussion of judicial
review of commercial arbitration awardsmust take into account the strong federal policy favoring arbitration
reflected in the [FAA]. The key to effectuating this policy as reflected in § 10(a) of the FAA, is by limiting
judicial review of arbitration awards.”).
65 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.930.
66 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.105. See alsoMed. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Investments, Inc.,
614 F.3d 485, 488 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Courts have no authority to reconsider themerits of an arbitration award,
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a challenge is targeted at the validity or existence of an agreement to arbitrate, a court will
give no deference to an arbitral tribunal’s decision and will pursue an independent
determination on the issue.67
Although no reassessment of themerits of the arbitral award can bemade,68 one should
know that courts will still exercise a fully independent determination on whether the
grounds for vacatur exist. In other words, although the court should refrain from judging
whether the tribunal’s interpretation of facts or of law is correct, it will examine de novo
the content of the award in order to establish whether a party’s objections (e.g. that the
tribunal exceeded its powers) are valid; no other conclusions affecting the arbitral decision
can be reached by the court at that point. It is reasonable to allow the court to have a second
look at the tribunal’s findings, but with the clear goal to only check whether a party’s
challenge is valid.
Occasionally courts were tempted to examine (at least partly) the merits of the award,
while considering objections on the non-statutory grounds, i.e. on the basis of ‘violation
of public policy’, an arbitral award being ‘irrational’, in ‘manifest disregard of the law’ or
‘not drawing its essence from the agreement’.69 Even in these instances, however, it has
been reported that “US courts have consistently held that they cannot be invoked to challenge
mere errors of fact or law, but rather should be limited to extreme circumstances, such as
where the arbitrator knew of a binding rule of law but consciously chose to disregard it.”70
After the Supreme Court decision in Hall Street,71 availability of these grounds became
uncertain.72 In general, it should be concluded that under no circumstances shall the court
find itself competent to correct errors of law or factmade by arbitrators, thus it shall refrain
from reviewing and revising the merits of the case.
3.3 The remedial powers of the courts
In principle, the U.S. courts are well-equipped with remedial powers when faced with the
arbitral award at the post-award stage. These include (i) the power to correct and modify
the award73 and (ii) the power to remand the award back to the tribunal.74 What can be
even when the parties allege that the award rests on factual errors or on a misinterpretation of the underlying
contract.”).
67 For further reading, see section 7.1 of this chapter.
68 Unless parties agreed to have an appeal mechanism included in their arbitration agreement.
69 See also section 6.
70 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.930.
71 Hall Street Assocs, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008) (hereafter
“Hall Street”).
72 For further reading, see section 6.2.
73 See Section 11 of the FAA.
74 See Section 10(b) of the FAA.
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readily observed is that there is no power to rescue a healthy part of the award in cases
where it can be severed from the part affected by flaw. Nonetheless, one will find that the
remedial powers of the courts in the U.S. are to the same (if not greater) effect.
The first power of the courts that will be analyzed is prescribed under Section 11 of the
FAA, which allows the court to correct or modify75 the award “upon the application of any
party to the arbitration”.76 It can be done in three cases.77 Particularly relevant in the context
of excess of powers is, however, Section 11(b) of the FAA that reads that the modification
or correction can bemade “where the arbitrators have awarded upon amatter not submitted
to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter
submitted.”78 Notably, as explained by the Restatement, “[a]n alternative route to the same
result [as in Section 11(b)] is a partial confirmation and partial vacatur of the award.
Although the FAA does not by its terms contemplate partial confirmation or vacatur, courts
faced with awards that resolve matters not submitted to arbitration sometimes confirm in
part and vacate in part, rather than purport to correct the award as such. The Restatement
expressly acknowledges a court’s power to do so.”79 Therefore, the Restatement, while
acknowledging that the FAA does not include partial confirmation and partial vacatur as
a remedial power of the court, proposes that Section 11 of the FAA fulfills the same function
(as a partial vacatur).80 More importantly, however, the Restatement is adamant that the
vacating courtmaymake use of its Section 11 powers ex officio (or sua sponte as considered
by the Restatement).81 This is, arguably, in contrast with the wording of Section 11 itself,
75 As reported in the Restatement there is no practical distinction between “correction” and “modification”
and they are used interchangeably. See the Restatement (third tentative draft) p.74.
76 Section 11 of the FAA.
77 Apart from Section 11(b) of the FAA which is explained, other instances include “evident material
miscalculation” or “evidentmaterial mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property” in the award
(see Section 11(a) of the FAA) and imperfections “inmatter of form not affecting themerits of the controversy”
(see Section 11(c) of the FAA).
78 Section 11(b) of the FAA.
79 The Restatement (third tentative draft) p.75.
80 See the Restatement (third tentative draft) p.78 (“A court’s power to correct and modify coexists with its
power to vacate or deny confirmation under [the New York Convention grounds]. FAA § 10 (enumerated
vacatur grounds) and § 11 (grounds for correction andmodification) are part of the same post-relief architecture
and were crafted together. Although the Restatement contemplates partial vacatur […], FAA § 10 does not.
Rather, FAA § 11 seems to have been intended to perform that function.”). See also the Restatement (third
tentative draft) p.75 (“[w]hile a court may, in keeping with the FAA vocabulary, describe its narrowing of the
award’s scope as a ‘correction’ or ‘modification,’ the relief granted is in effect partial vacatur […].”).
81 See the Restatement (third tentative draft) p.77 (“In the context of a proceeding to vacate or confirm a U.S.
Convention award, a court may elect sua sponte to correct or modify an award. A court may do so whether
or not a party preserved its rights to seek such relief and whether or not such relief was first sought before the
arbitral tribunal. The parties may not by agreement preclude correction or modification by a court.”). Also
the Restatement (third tentative draft) p.79 (“Sound policy favors that courts retain considerable flexibility
in selecting the appropriate form of relief following issuance of an award, consistent with the relief actually
requested. In the context of a post-award action to vacate or confirm a U.S. Convention award, little would
be gained by precluding a court from correcting or modifying an award of its own initiative ‘so as to effect the
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where “the application of any party to the arbitration” is required.82 Considering the
deference that is given to the tribunal’s findings, however, parties are well advised to initiate
the Section 11 mechanism themselves.
The second power of the court is prescribed in Section 10(b) of the FAA. It reads that
“[i]f an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to
bemade has not expired, the courtmay, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.”
This provision allows the court to use the power to remand the award back to the tribunal.
As one may see, according to the text of Section 10(b) the remand is possible once the
award is vacated. Nonetheless, the Restatement concludes that the remand is an important
tool to salvage the award before it is vacated. As pointed out “[c]ourts in the United States
[…] have followed the practice [of remanding] as an alternative to vacatur in limited settings,
such as when the award’s language leaves the court uncertain of the award’s import.”83
Importantly, “[r]emand is usually surgically framed. Thus, one court remanded when only
a portion of the remedy given exceeded the tribunal’s mandate, but the tribunal’s help was
required to identify exactly the portion to be confirmed.”84 Finally, the Restatement reports
that similar to the case of the Section 11 mechanism, a court can remand the award on its
own motion (when faced with the award at the post-award stage).85
In the end, one should note, that the remedial powers available to the U.S. courts are
unique on their face. In any event, they allow the courts to approach the award with the
pro-enforcement fashion at the post award stage. As concluded by theRestatement: “[s]ound
policy favors that courts retain considerable flexibility in selecting the appropriate form of
relief following issuance of an award, consistent with the relief actually requested.”86
intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.’ See FAA § 11(c). For similar reasons, courts may
reform an awardwhether or not a party first sought such relief from the arbitral tribunal and notwithstanding
an agreement purporting to limit a tribunal’s options to vacatur or confirmation in the event of defects. In
practice, such agreements are not often encountered.”).
82 See Section 11 of the FAA.
83 The Restatement (third tentative draft) p.82.
84 The Restatement (third tentative draft) p.83, with a reference toClarendonNat’l Ins. Co. v. TIG Reinsurance
Co., 990 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
85 See the Restatement (third tentative draft) p.82 (“In the context of a proceeding to vacate or confirm a U.S.
Convention award, a court may elect sua sponte to remand an award to the arbitrators. To allow courts to
remand to the arbitrators adds flexibility, and often efficiency, to the administration of justice. Entrusting the
arbitrators to refine the award in appropriate instances also comports with the parties’ choice of arbitration
to resolve their dispute. It follows that the parties should not be empowered by agreement to restrict a court’s
access to the remand option. Equally, a court retains the prerogative to remand an award even if neither party
has first sought post-award relief from the arbitral tribunal or otherwise preserved its right to seek remand to
the arbitrators.”).
86 The Restatement (third tentative draft) p.79.
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4 Limits to the arbitral tribunal’s powers
To proceed with the further analysis on the “excess of powers” ground for challenge, one
should start with establishing the framework upon which the arbitral tribunal’s powers
are based. It remains undisputed that in determining the limits to the scope of the powers
of the arbitral tribunal one should identify the parties’ consent. In a nutshell, it means that
it is the agreement between the parties that shapes an arbitral tribunal’s powers (see section
4.1). Nonetheless, in establishing the limits, onemight also need to confer with the parties’
subsequent submissions (see section 4.2) and the statutory rules of a public policy character
(see section 4.3).
4.1 Agreement to arbitrate
In the commercial context, a valid agreement to arbitrate is all it takes to require the parties
to make their disputes subject to the arbitral tribunal’s (rather than a court’s) final
determination. Pursuant to Section 2 of the FAA: “[a] written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy hereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.” What is important for the study at hand is that the FAA, similar to other
modern arbitration statutes, recognizes as valid agreements both arbitration clauses (being
agreements to arbitrate before any dispute or “controversy” arises) and submission
agreements87 (i.e. the agreements to arbitrate already existing disputes).88 In consequence,
both types of agreements are able to frame what the tribunal is entitled to do and if the
tribunal trespasses these limits, it may face a successful challenge against its decision on
87 The term submission agreements is used by some authorities (see, e.g., (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009)
pp.882-890); others, however, are simply referring to them as “submissions” (see, e.g., (Domke, Wilner, &
Edmonson,Domke onCommercial Arbitration, 2013) § 8:4). In order to distinguish submission agreements
from submissions (thus parties’ motions and filings), “submission agreement” will be the term used for the
reference to the agreement to arbitrate already existing dispute(s).
88 Other issues regarding the formal and substantive validity of agreements to arbitrate fall outside the scope
of this research. For further reading, see, e.g., (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial
Arbitration, 2013) part III in general.
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the basis of the excess of powers defense;89 both scholars and judges seem to support this
conclusion.90
Since an agreement to arbitrate limits the arbitral tribunal’s powers, parties shall draft
it cautiously.91 An agreement should express the clear and unmistakable intention of the
parties in what they entrust the tribunal to do.92 Particularly in cases where the parties
wish to narrow the scope of what the tribunal can or should do, the intent should be
articulated unambiguously.93 As some authorities suggest, it is the case because the courts
may even bewilling to expand the scope of the initial intent of the parties after the decision
of the Supreme Court inMastrobuono v. Sherman Lehman Hutton Inc.94 and the general
pro-arbitration and pro-enforcement trend in case law.95 The only way to avoid the risk
of scope-broadening by courts is a precise drafting of the agreement to arbitrate.96
Precision is also required with respect to the question of the tribunal’s competence to
determine its own competence.97 It has been suggested that “parties would be well advised
89 Notably, since the FAA does not include a separate “excess of jurisdiction” recourse, the concept “excess
of powers” entails excess of jurisdictional powers as well as other powers given to the tribunal. See, i.a.,
section 7.1. See also the Restatement’s take on the “excess of powers” ground, section 5.3.
90 See, e.g., (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3287-3288, (Domke,Wilner, & Edmonson,
Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § 39:6, also Kimm v. Blisset, LLC, 388 N.J. Super. 14, 25, 905
A.2d 887, 894 (App. Div. 2006) (“[…] the arbitrator’s powers are limited by the agreement of the parties and
an arbitrator may not exceed the scope of the powers granted to him or her by the parties.”).
91 For example it is suggested in (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2015)
§ 8:4 that “a submission to arbitrate [i.e. submission agreement] must embrace everything necessary to give
the arbitrators jurisdiction over the parties and the matter in dispute although it will be presumed that the
parties intended to grant to the arbitrators such powers as are reasonably necessary to settle the dispute fully.”.
92 See, e.g., Seagate Tech., LLC v.W.Digital Corp., 854N.W.2d 750, 765 (Minn. 2014) (“In addition, we reiterate
that the scope of [the] arbitrator[’s] authority is amatter of contract […] and parties are always free to fashion
arbitration agreements in ways that limit the arbitrator’s power to award certain types of relief.”).
93 One should know that the interpretation of the clauses may differ between circuits. See (Domke, Wilner,
& Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2015) § 8:14 (“The Ninth and Second Circuits have held
that a clause that covers disputes “arising out of” or ‘arising under,’ but omits reference to claims ‘relating to’
an agreement, covers only those disputes relating to the interpretation and performance of the contract itself.
Thus, a misappropriation of trade secrets claim does not relate to the interpretation or performance of the
contract; it is an independent wrong from any breach of the licensing and nondisclosure agreements and is
therefore nonarbitrable. By contrast, the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits have rejected this approach and have
held that the terms ‘arising out of,’ ‘arising under,’ and ‘arising hereunder’ are sufficiently broad to encompass
all claims that are germane to the subject matter of the contract, and notmerely those that sound in contract.”).
94 Mastrobuono v. Sherman Lehman Hutton Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995) (also referred to as
“Mastrobuono”).
95 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.886 (“Thus, in an attempt to broaden the power of arbitrators, the
Mastrobuono court essentially revised the nature of the proceeding the parties initially agreed upon. In light
thereof, it may be that US courts are willing to prioritize the power and utility of arbitration proceeedings
over and above the nature of the agreement itself.”). See also section 3.1.
96 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.886 (“parties may hedge this risk of scope-broadening by clearly and
precisely defining the scope of their arbitration clause”).
97 Especially considering the question whether it is an exclusive competence given to the tribunal. It will be
particularly relevant in the context of the competence regarding the issues relating to the scope, the validity
and the existence of the agreement to arbitrate. For further reading, see section 7.1.1 and section 7.1.2.
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to indicate whether threshold jurisdictional questions should be referred initially to the
arbitral tribunal or United States courts.”98 After First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan99 it
would be presumed that it is a court that decides on the underlying question of whether
the parties agreed to arbitrate at all. Therefore, if the parties fail to clearly and unmistakably
designate the power to the arbitral tribunal to establish its own jurisdiction, arguably the
tribunal will not be capable (will not have power) to decide this issue.100 One should note,
however, that generally the incorporation of arbitral rules that provide for the tribunal’s
competence-competence will suffice to express the clear and unmistakable intention of
the parties to grant the tribunal the power to resolve the issue of its own competence.101
The issue, however, is a bit more complex when the validity or existence of the arbitration
agreement is at stake.102
Finally, it should also be stated that arbitral rules, as one of the components of the
agreement to arbitrate, may also (indirectly) constitute the framework for the arbitral
tribunal’s powers and obligations (other than the power to decide on its own competence).
If the parties do not include any specific deviation from the rules in their agreement to
arbitrate, then the tribunal itself will be safe to make use of any power prescribed by the
arbitral rules.103 In cases where the rules allow the tribunal to do so, it will also be
empowered to interpret the rules.104
4.2 Parties’ (subsequent) submissions
The FAA offers no guidance as to whether the parties’ submissions should be taken into
account when determining whether the tribunal exceeds its powers. Section 10(a)(4) of
the FAA is silent on the point of the excess of powers and only makes some reference to
the “subjectmatter submitted” in connectionwith the “imperfect execution of the tribunal’s
powers”.105 Nonetheless, when seeking the limits to the tribunal’s powers, one should not
disregard the parties’ subsequent submissions.
98 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.883.
99 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 131 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1995).
100 See also section 7.1.
101 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.892; for examples of the competence-competence provisions see, i.a., :
Art. 18 of the 2016 JAMS Rules, Art. 19 of the 2014 ICDR Rules, R-7 of the 2013 AAA Rules.
102 See section 7.1 and, i.a., (Bermann, The “Gateway" Problem in International Commercial Arbitration,
2012), (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.1125-1208 (discussing the division of
competence between courts and tribunals regarding jurisdictional threshold issues in the U.S.).
103 For example, to grant provisional measures, to award interest or costs. See also section 7.5.
104 SeeEcopetrol S.A. v. Offshore Exploration&Prod. LLC, 46 F. Supp. 3d 327, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Accordingly,
the arbitral panel was vested with the authority to interpret and apply the rules governing the parties’
arbitration.”).
105 The notion of the “imperfect execution of powers” will be further discussed in section 5.2.
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The importance of the parties’ submissions in determining the scope of the arbitral
tribunal’s powers entails that any party’s filing should be taken into account. It further
means that every parties’ motion, starting from the initial one (usually called “Request for
Arbitration”106, “Notice of Arbitration”107 or “Demand for Arbitration”108) to the last one
should be taken into consideration as long as it (the filing) includes any reference to claims
or demands of the parties.109 According to some scholars, “[t]he parameters of the exceeded
powers inquiry are defined by the submission of issues to the arbitrator and by the arbitrator’s
authority as set forth in the arbitration agreement.”110 Additionally, it is argued that “[a]
tribunal exceeds its authority by ruling on an issue not presented by the parties in the
arbitration even if the issue or dispute that it addresses is within the scope of the parties’
arbitration agreement.”111 It has been similarly viewed by the courts which held that the
tribunal will exceed its powers if it decides on issues not presented to it. In one case a
district court held that “[…] relief [granted by the tribunal] exceeded the arbitrators’ powers
because it was not sought by either party, and was completely irrational because it wrote
material terms of the contract out of existence.”112 In another case it has been held that
“[a]rbitrators have the authority to decide only those issues actually submitted by the
parties.”113
One may, thus, conclude that when testing the arbitral tribunal’s powers, one should
not be satisfied with only the framework of the arbitration agreement; instead, one should
seek further guidance in the parties’ submissions of claims andmandatory rules of a public
policy character.114
4.3 Mandatory rules of public policy character
As hinted in the previous section, public policymay also condition the scope of the arbitral
tribunals’ powers. Public policy is usually considered a non-statutory addition to the
106 In accordance with i.a. Art. 4 of the 2017 ICC Rules.
107 See, e.g., Art. 2 of the 2014 ICDR Rules.
108 Pursuant to i.a. R-4(a) of the AAA Rules.
109 Especially taking into account that parties may wish to modify or expand their submissions. See (Oehmke
&Brovins, 2014) § 146:3 (“Parties may expand the scope of arbitrable issues explicitly by stipulation, implicitly
if both parties present evidence on an issue and seek a ruling, or when one party submits new issues to the
arbitrator and the other party fails to object.”).
110 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2015) § 39:6.
111 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3291-3292. See also (Domke,Wilner, & Edmonson,
Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2015) § 39:6.
112 PMA Capital Ins. Co. v. Platinum Underwriters Bermuda, Ltd., 400 F. App’x 654, 656 (3d Cir. 2010).
113 AGCO Corp. v. Anglin, 216 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2000).
114 See section 4.3.
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statutory excess of powers test provided in Section 10 of the FAA.115 Since the parties’
contract does not exist in a legal void, the tribunal may be required to consider the
mandatory rules of public policy character in thematrix of its award. It further entails that
(i) on the one hand, the tribunal might have a(n) (implied) power to decide upon the
claims that escape the scope of the initial agreement to arbitrate (e.g. statutory claims)116
and (ii) on the other hand, it can be argued that the existence ofmandatory rules of a public
policy character imposes a duty on the arbitrators to apply and enforce these rules even if
they have not been raised by the parties (for example the application of patent law or
antitrust law).117
Although there is no statutory basis to annul the award on the basis of violation of
public policy,118 it is well settled that such a judicially created ground for vacatur exists.119
Therefore, the consequences of noncompliance with themandatory rules of a public policy
character is substantial, because the court may vacate the award if it is convinced that
public policy was violated.120 It should be highlighted, however, that challenge on the basis
of public policy is exceptionally narrow and needs to satisfy the following test: “(1) the
decision must violate some explicit public policy that is well-defined and dominant, and this
dominant policy is to be ascertained by reference to laws and legal precedents rather than
general considerations of supposed public interest and (2) the conflict between the public
policy and the arbitration award must be explicit and clearly shown.”121 In other words,
only the most severe violations of public policy would satisfy the vacating courts, thus:
“public policy can generally be invoked only where recognition of a decisionwould ‘undermine
the public interest, the public confidence in the administration of the law or security for
individual rights’ or be ‘repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the
State where enforcement is sought.’”122
115 See also section 6.1.2 and section 6.2. See, however, section 5.3 and the Restatement’s interpretation of the
“excess of powers” ground.
116 Either by rejecting them as nonarbitrable or accepting them even if they have been originally contracted
out or have not been expressly agreed upon by the parties. It is argued that mandatory rules of public policy
character are so basic and essential that they have to be taken into the decision-making process.
117 The application of the mandatory rules by the arbitral tribunal will be further discussed in section 6.2.4.
118 See, however, the Restatement’s interpretation of the “excess of powers” ground. See section 5.3.
119 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.932. See also section 6.1.2.
120 It can be argued that the public policy test – as a non-statutory ground for vacatur – did not survive the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Hall Street; notwithstanding it is only possible to conclude that the possibility
to invoke public policy is a fundamental component of arbitration law and works as a safety valve for the
arbitral tribunal’s grievous wrongdoings. Consequently, public policy cannot be removed from the legal
framework. See also section 6.1.2 and (Marcantel, 2009), the Restatement (second tentative draft) p.291.
121 (Domke,Wilner, & Edmonson,Domke onCommercial Arbitration, 2013) § 38:24, also (Born, International
Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3314 and the Restatement (second tentative draft) p.291.
122 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3314.
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The mandatory rules of a public policy character should be taken into account when
determining the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s powers.123 If the parties’ claims clearly and
unequivocally infringe public policy and the tribunal awards these claims (irrespectively
of whether consciously or carelessly), it will act beyond its powers prescribed by law, even
if no contractual limits have been trespassed.124
5 The United States standards for excess of arbitral tribunal’s
powers
The tribunal’s going beyond the powers that have been given it by the parties is one of the
reasonswhy the arbitral award can be challenged. The FAA envisages two separate concepts
that relate to the notion of the tribunal’s powers: the excess of powers (section 5.1) and
the imperfect execution of these powers (section 5.2). In addition, a brief reflection on the
Restatement’s views on the post-award relief needs to be given (section 5.3).
5.1 The concept of the “excess of powers”
The concept of the “excess of powers” is an important element of the structure of the FAA
since it appears, at least according to some authorities, to be the most frequently used
(statutory) ground when an award-debtor wishes to challenge an arbitral award before a
national court.125 The FAA does not, however, give any definition of what constitutes the
arbitral tribunal’s powers and “as such, the statutory phrase, ‘exceeding their powers’, is an
empty vessel into which content must be poured by judicial determinations of what are the
powers of the arbitrators.”126 When answering this inquiry, courts rely on the three pillars
mentioned in the previous sections, namely (i) the agreement to arbitrate, (ii) the parties’
submissions, and (iii) themandatory rules of a public policy character.127 Importantly, one
should also review the alternative reading of the post-award architecture128 and the “excess
of powers” provision made by the Restatement.
123 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.291.
124 If one wishes to follow the division between “substantive” and “procedural” public policy, arguably both
limit the scope of the tribunal’s powers.
125 See fn.6 above.
126 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.287.
127 See, e.g., Liebman v. Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc., No. 3:15CV1263 (JBA), 2017 WL 1088078, at *3
(D. Conn.Mar. 21, 2017) (“For the Arbitrator to have exceeded his authority hemust have either (1) considered
issues outside those submitted to him by the parties for consideration, or (2) reached issues prohibited by law
or the parties’ agreement.”) For further reading, see sections 4.1-4.3.
128 See section 5.3.
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Firstly, the starting point for the analysis of a court faced with the vacatur challenge is
rather straightforward: the underpinning of arbitration is the parties’ consent; consequently,
if any restrictions to the (usually broad) arbitral tribunal’s powers exist, they will stem
from limits expressed by the parties in their agreement.129 Therefore, it has been suggested
that “[t]hemeasure as to whether the arbitrator did or did not exceed the powers contractually
granted is to compare the arbitration agreement (and related documents) against the
award.”130 Courts seem to follow this method. It has been held for example that “[b]ecause
[the arbitrator] acted contrary to the express arbitrator- and forum-selection clauses in the
arbitration agreements to which PoolRe was a party, we affirm the district court’s holding
that [the arbitrator] exceeded his authority under [the FAA].”131 Another court explained
that “[w]here the arbitrator goes beyond that self-limiting agreement between consenting
parties, it acts inherently without power, and an award ordered under such circumstances
must be vacated.”132
Importantly, however, it should be noted that, according to some authorities, the
contractually defined powers of the arbitrators do not refer only to the adjudicatory function
of the tribunal,133 but also to the tribunal’s “managerial” role.134 The Restatement suggests
that “[i]f the parties do not agree to arbitrate a dispute or a particular claim in the dispute,
then the tribunal does not have the power to adjudicate that dispute or claim. Similarly, if
the parties agree to certain procedures and the tribunal materially deviates from those
procedures, the tribunal exceeds its powers.”135 Additionally Carbonneau observes that
“[u]nder traditional principles of law, excess of arbitral authority refers to circumstances in
which the arbitrators ruled on matters not submitted thereby exerting excessive authority.
[…] From a less traditional angle, excess of arbitral authority can – in theory – cover a
129 See also section 4.1 and also (Oehmke & Brovins, 2014) § 146:1 (“The paramount point to be remembered
is that the power and authority of an arbitrator derives totally from the parties contract; this prohibits the
arbitrator from substituting a unique brand of industrial or commercial justice for what has been contractually
agreed to by the parties.7 An arbitrator is empowered to decide all issues of fact and law that are submitted
and to fairly remedy the problem, unless contractually proscribed by the arbitration contract”).
130 See (Oehmke & Brovins, 2014) § 146:1.
131 PoolRe Ins. Corp. v. Organizational Strategies, Inc., 783 F.3d 256, 265 (5thCir. 2015). See alsoAncorHoldings,
LLC v. Peterson, Goldman & Villani, Inc., 294 S.W.3d 818, 829 (Tex. App. 2009), Morgan Stanley & Co.,
LLC v. Core Fund, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2012),Murtagh v. Emory Univ., 321 Ga. App. 411,
414, 741 S.E.2d 212, 215 (2013), reconsideration denied (Apr. 11, 2013) (“Under the FAA, an arbitrator of
a contract dispute issues an unauthorized award or exceeds his powers to resolve the dispute only when the
arbitrator’s award contradicts the express language of the parties’ agreement.”).
132 Porzig v. Dresdner, Kleinwort, Benson, N. Am. LLC, 497 F.3d 133, 140 (2dCir. 2007). See alsoRay v. Chafetz,
No. CV 16-428 (CKK), 2017 WL 663527 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2017) (“To succeed on claim that an arbitrator
exceeded his powers under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), as basis for vacatur of [the] arbitration award,
a party must demonstrate that the arbitrator strayed from interpretation and application of the agreement
and effectively dispensed his own brand of industrial justice”).
133 It refers to the power to decide upon matters submitted by the parties.
134 That is the role of conducting and managing the arbitral process.
135 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.284. See also Chapter II and Chapter VI.
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multitude of ‘sins’ – from overbearing procedural decisions and the prejudicial treatment of
a party to the exclusion of evidence and testimony to manifest disregard of the law. Possible
infractions are copious and frequently overlap.”136 The “traditional angle” better serves the
purpose of the interpretation of the “excess of powers” ground.
Arguably, Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA should be interpreted as covering only
“adjudicatory powers” (and not the “managerial” ones) of the arbitral tribunal. It is so,
because this provision refers to powers both (i) in case of the excess and (ii) imperfect
execution of powers. If one agrees that “powers” in both legs of this proviso refer to the
same concept, one needs to conclude that by “imperfect” execution of powers also has to
be meant to embody the adjudicative function of the tribunal, simply because (arguably),
no imperfect execution of the “managerial” powers of the tribunal will have a bearing on
the rendition of the “mutual, final and definite” award. Consequently, it is only reasonable
to conclude that Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA refers to the power of the tribunal to finally
resolve the dispute and bind parties by that decision.
It is acknowledged, however, that lack of appropriate recourse against the procedure
chosen by the tribunal lures parties to expand the understanding of Section 10(a)(4) of the
FAA. Also the Restatement prefers to include (material) incompliance with the agreed
procedure within the scope of Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. It would be, arguably, much
easier had this provision referred only to the “excess of powers” without a complementing
concept of imperfect execution of powers. In any event, the better viewwould be to interpret
Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA as designed to cover only (or at least mainly) the adjudicative
power of the tribunal. This is, however, not the prevailing view.137
Secondly, parties’ submissions also serve a purpose in delineating the tribunal’s
powers.138 It has been confirmed by courts on several occasions. In one case the court
concluded that “[o]ur inquiry under Section 10(a)(4) [of the FAA] is whether the arbitrator
had the authority, based on the arbitration clause and the parties’ submissions, to reach a
certain issue, not whether the arbitrator correctly decided the issue.”139 Another court stated
that “Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA empowers a court to vacate an arbitration award if the
arbitrators “exceeded their powers,” but the provision applies narrowly and only if the
arbitrators decide an issue not submitted by the parties or grant relief not authorized in the
arbitration agreement.”140
Thirdly, the importance of the public policy rules should not be passed unnoticed.141
It has been underlined by the Restatement that “[a]lthough FAA §10 does not expressly list
136 (Carducci, TheArbitrationReform inFrance:Domestic and InternationalArbitrationLaw, 2012) pp.517-518.
137 See also further under this section and section 7.5.3.
138 See also section 4.2.
139 Ancor Holdings, LLC v. Peterson, Goldman & Villani, Inc., 294 S.W.3d 818, 829 (Tex. App. 2009).
140 Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC v. Core Fund, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
141 See section 4.3 and (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § 39:6.
262
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
public policy as a ground for vacating an arbitral award, such a ground is a necessary part
of a national arbitration.”142 What is more, “an award whose recognition or enforcement
would violate public policy is by definition an award in excess of an arbitral tribunal’s
powers.”143
Fourthly, it is necessary to highlight that, under the Restatement interpretation of the
FAA, the “excess of powers” groundwould be available against “non-convention awards”.144
As such, according to the Restatement, the capacity of the “excess of powers” is large
enough to fit the whole range of concepts that are used under the New York Convention
regime.145 These include (i) the invalidity of the agreement to arbitrate,146 (ii) the “excess
ofmandate” type of challenge,147 (iii) the procedurewas not in accordancewith the parties’
agreement,148 (iv) the subject matter is not arbitrable,149 and (v) an award violates public
policy.150 Such a broad interpretation brings some difficulties, however.
For example, as mentioned above, entertaining the non-compliance with parties’
procedural agreements might not easily fit under Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, if one
acknowledges that it includes two concepts (excess of powers and imperfect execution of
powers) and not only the “excess of powers”. Similarly, including the concept of
inarbitrability and public policy within the meaning of the “excess of powers” ground
makes it sometimes available only upon the application of the party and sometimes available
for the court on an ex officio basis. It creates a potential risk of developing two standards
of application of the same provision. By filling Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA with so many
different concepts, the Restatement shows how capacious it is.
In any event, all authorities seem to agree that the underlying, pro-enforcement
philosophy behind the FAA,151 will permit the vacatur only in exceptional cases. Therefore,
it is necessary to highlight that under no circumstances should the court find itself
competent to engage in the contract interpretation when evidence (even remote) exists
that the tribunal’s findings stem from the contract and the parties’ agreement. For example,
142 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.291.
143 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.286.
144 It means that international awards that are rendered by the tribunals seated in the U.S. would be generally
subject to post-award relief based on the New York Convention (or Panama Convention) grounds unless
the award is not susceptible of being enforced under theseConventions. The reason for such an interpretation
is to align theU.S. vacatur systemwith the internationally recognized concepts of theNewYorkConvention.
See further section 5.3.
145 For further reading, see the Restatement (second tentative draft) pp.283-297.
146 See Art. V(1)(a) of the NYC.
147 See Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC.
148 See Art. V(1)(d) of the NYC. The Restatement qualifies this ground as “the arbitral procedure is contrary
in a material respect to the agreement of the parties”. See the Restatement (second tentative draft) p.283.
149 See Art. V(2)(a) of the NYC.
150 See Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC.
151 See section 3.1.
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inBGGroup v. Argentina, the SupremeCourt held that “arbitrators’ decision, in concluding
that [the] foreign investor in [an] Argentinian entity was excused from having to comply
with local court litigation requirement, did not stray from interpretation and application of
arbitration provisions in treaty, and could not be disturbed by court.”152 Similarly, inOxford
Health, the SupremeCourt concluded that “[n]othing we say in this opinion should be taken
to reflect any agreement with the arbitrator’s contract interpretation, or any quarrel with
Oxford’s contrary reading. All we say is that convincing a court of an arbitrator’s error –
even his grave error – is not enough. So long as the arbitrator was “arguably construing” the
contract – which this one was – a court may not correct his mistakes under §10(a)(4). […]
The arbitrator’s construction holds, however good, bad, or ugly.”153 Therefore, the
interpretation of the parties’ contract is the responsibility of the arbitrators and “[…] a
court may not rely on a finding that [the arbitrator] misapprehended the parties’ intent,
because § 10(a)(4) [of the FAA] bars that course, and permits courts to vacate an arbitral
decision only when the arbitrator strayed from his delegated task of interpreting a contract,
not when he performed the task poorly.”154 Consequently, deference to the arbitrators’
decision proves to be imposed on a high level.155
5.2 The notion of “imperfect execution of powers upon the subject matter
submitted”
The FAA in Section 10(a)(4) offers, as a ground complimentary to the excess of powers
challenge, the concept that an arbitral award can be vacated in case of the imperfect
execution of the arbitral tribunal’s powers.156 Pursuant to the second part of Section 10(a)(4)
of the FAA the award may be vacated if the arbitrators “so imperfectly executed them [i.e.
powers] that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.” By and large, it should be pointed out that (i) the imperfect execution of the
tribunal’s powers is impeccably linked to the formation of the arbitral award and its finality;
(ii) courts faced with the challenge discussed here would be rather likely to remand the
award back to arbitrators instead of vacating it; and finally, (iii) even if the court would be
152 BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 188 L. Ed. 2d 220 (2014).
153 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2070-71, 186 L. Ed. 2d 113 (2013); also, i.a., Johnson v.
Directory Assistants Inc., 797 F.3d 1294, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2015), BNSF R. Co. v. Alstom Transp., Inc., 777
F.3d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 2015). For further reading, see section 7.
154 Wolf v. Sprenger + Lang, PLLC, 86 A.3d 1121, 1134 (D.C. 2013), as amended (Jan. 30, 2014).
155 For further reading, see, i.a., section 3.1 and (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial
Arbitration, 2015) § 38:14.
156 As noted previously (see fn.29), it is worth mentioning that the notion of imperfect execution of powers is
not included neither in the UAA nor the RUAA. Some states, however, expanded the model solution and
brought “imperfect execution” back to the text of their state arbitration laws (see, e.g., Delaware Arbitration
Act, 10 Del. C. 1953, § 5714(a)(3)).
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satisfied that the powers were so imperfectly executed that the decision upon the subject
matter submitted has not been made, it would not hesitate to enforce the healthy part of
the award.
Pursuant to the second part of Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, the tribunal’s powers are
executed imperfectly if the dispute submitted has not been resolved by the tribunal in its
award. As highlighted above, it is necessary to establish that a certain issue in dispute has
been submitted before arbitrators and that the tribunal failed to address it. Notably,
however, it is required that the arbitral award that is being tested be mutual, final and
definite. In words of one authority, for the award to be considered as mutual and final it
“must fully resolve a single issue, or all issues as to a given party, that were submitted for
arbitration […] Arbitrators must resolve all issues submitted to arbitration, and determine
each issue fully so that no further litigation is necessary to finalize [the] obligation of parties
under the award. An award is not final if it merely ‘kicks the can’ to the court to determine
an issue that the arbitrators should have resolved.”157 The award is definite when it is
unambiguous and ready for confirmation and enforcement.158 One can add that, due to
an overriding pro-arbitration policy,159 even partial or interim arbitral awards can be
considered mutual and final if they definitely dispose of some independent claims.160 In
other words, interim orders or partial awards may also survive the challenge of the second
157 (Oehmke&Brovins, 2014) § 147:2, See (Domke,Wilner, & Edmonson,Domke onCommercial Arbitration,
2015) § 39:6. See also PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C. v. Mawing, 603 F. App’x 137, 139 (4th Cir. 2015),
where the court observed that the award that the award can only be vacated as a not final and definite award
“when the arbitrator either failed to resolve an issue presented to him or issued an award that was so unclear
and ambiguous that a reviewing court could not engage in meaningful review of the award.” For further
reading on parties’ submissions, see section 4.2 of this chapter. See also section 3.3 for the information on
the court’s broad remedial powers. In principle, in cases where the award is unclear and ambiguous it will
be remanded back to the tribunal. See, as well, the Restatement (third tentative draft) p.82.
158 See fn.157.
159 See section 3.1.
160 (Oehmke&Brovins, 2014) § 147:4, section 4.2. See also, i.a., Compania ChilenaDeNavegacion Interoceanica,
S.A. v. Norton, Lilly & Co., 652 F. Supp. 1512, 1515 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“Contrary to defendant’s argument,
“an ‘interim’ award that finally and definitively disposes of a separate, independent claim may be confirmed
notwithstanding the absence of an award that finally disposes of all the claims that were submitted to
arbitration. The $48,010 award in the instant case, based solely on defendant’s accounting, is separate from
plaintiff’s other claims, which will require the consideration of more extensive evidentiary sources. The
arbitration panel explicitly indicated the separate nature of the $48,010 award by describing it as a Partial
Final Award.”),Crawford Grp., Inc. v. Holekamp, No. 406-CV-1274 CAS, 2007WL 844819, at *5 (E.D.Mo.
Mar. 19, 2007) (“[…] in determining whether an award is final, a court must consider the language of the
award and the intention of the arbitrators. As noted above, the Court finds that the language of both the
interim award and the final award indicate that the interim award reached a final determination on the
merits with respect to themost significant issues. Thus the Court finds that the arbitrators intended the interim
award to be final as to the substantive issues in this matter.”), Ecopetrol S.A. v. Offshore Exploration & Prod.
LLC, 46 F. Supp. 3d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“an award which finally and definitely disposes of a separate
independent claim may be confirmed although it does not dispose of all claims that were submitted to
arbitration. In other words, an award is final if it resolves the rights and obligations of the parties definitively
enough to preclude the need for further adjudication with respect to the issue submitted to arbitration.”).
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part of Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA if the court becomes satisfied that the tribunal included,
in a partial award, its ultimate and final decision on certain matters submitted.
If, however, a court has difficulty with determining whether the subject matters
submitted have been finally and unambiguously decided upon, it will still use the federal
pro-arbitration policy as its signpost. Consequently, it will rather remand the award back
to the tribunal for the corrections than use its authority to vacate. According to the
Restatement, “[i]n the domestic setting, this vacatur ground overlaps to a substantial degree
with the power of a court to remand a matter to the tribunal to complete or clarify the
award.”161 As one court held: “while I have the authority to vacate the arbitrator’s award
under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), I find that remanding the matter back to the arbitrator is more
appropriate as I conclude that the arbitrator failed to make a final determination on a
material, threshold issue.”162
In the case when an arbitral award cannot be corrected by the court itself or sent back
to the tribunal for corrections, the court faced with a challenge will still be able to confirm
or enforce the healthy part of the award.163 In other words, if a claim is finally and definitely
addressed and can be separated from the claims that are being questioned it can (and will
likely) be confirmed.164
5.3 The Restatement’s take on the post-award challenge architecture
Since the Restatement’s views on the post-award architecture and the interrelation between
different Chapters of the Federal Arbitration Act might influence the applicability of
Chapter 1 of the FAA to the vacatur of international arbitration awards rendered in the
U.S., it is necessary to give a brief overview of the Restatement’s position.165
161 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.288.
162 Fisher v. Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125826, *10, 2011 WL 5240372 (D. Colo.
Oct. 31, 2011). Similarly, in Olympia & York Florida Equity Corp. v. Gould, 776 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1985)
it was also concluded that “[t]he Award was thus ambiguous and did not constitute ‘a mutual, final, and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted’ within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 10(d). While this defect
may not bring the Award within the provisions of 9 U.S.C. § 11(c) empowering the district court to make an
order modifying or correcting an award where it ‘is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy,’ there is sufficient evidence of lack of a ‘mutual, final, and definite award’ within § 10(d) to
warrant a remand to the arbitrators to enable them to state what their true intention was if Gould, having
elected to purchase, should hereafter default.”
163 See section 3.3.
164 See, e.g., Zephyros Mar. Agencies, Inc. v. Mexicana De Cobre, S.A., 662 F. Supp. 892, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(“[…] an interim award that finally and definitely disposes of a separate, independent claimmay be confirmed
notwithstanding the absence of an award that finally disposes of all claims that were submitted to arbitration.”)
See also Compania Chilena De Navegacion Interoceanica, S.A. v. Norton, Lilly & Co., 652 F. Supp. 1512
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
165 For an overview, see also (Bermann, ‘Domesticating’ the New York Convention: the Impact of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 2011) pp.317-332.
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Although initially “confirmation and vacatur” and “recognition and enforcement” of
the awards were to be discussed under two separate chapters of the Restatement, the
decision was made to consolidate both under the overarching concept of the “post-award
relief”.166 Consequently, “the draft [Restatement] adopted the position that the grounds for
vacating or denying confirmation of U.S. Convention awards are those specified in the
Conventions, not the grounds set forth in FAA Section 10.”167 If this version is accepted,
then the U.S. vacatur system for international awards would effectively mirror the Model
Law system and make the analysis of this chapter largely obsolete.168 At the same time,
however, “[t]he majority of the circuits that have addressed the issue [namely the issue
whether to apply the New York Convention grounds or Section 10 of the FAA] have used
the FAA § 10 grounds.”169
Applying Section 10 of the FAA for the purpose of vacatur is a more sensible solution.
The New York Convention has not been designed to be applicable at the challenge stage.
Additionally, there is a question on the applicability of Article V(1)(e) of the New York
Convention if the Convention grounds are used for vacatur purposes.170 Additionally, one
may wonder if the vacatur grounds as prescribed in Section 10 of the FAA might not
develop to be even narrower than the ones envisaged by the New York Convention,
especially considering the developed and strong policy favoring arbitration.171
All in all, from the general perspective of the post-award review not much will change.
Indeed “[a]n initial question is whether the choice among the two sets of grounds even
matters. Certainly the verbal formulation of the grounds for denying recognition or
enforcement under the New York and Panama Conventions differs from the verbal
formulation of the grounds for vacating awards under the FAA. But courts and commentators
have tended to construe the grounds similarly.”172 At the same time, it will matter, when
one interprets the “excess of powers” ground based on the Restatement’s conclusions.173
Should one try to invoke Chapter 1 of the FAA for the purpose of vacatur, as traditionally
envisaged, the better view therefore is to construe it in a more narrow fashion than the
Restatement.
166 For a more elaborate explanation, see the Restatement (second tentative draft) pp.xvii-xviii.
167 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.xvii.
168 For further reading on the New York Convention and the Model Law system, see Chapter II and Chapter
VI respectively.
169 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.155 and the case law therein.
170 Art. V(1)(e) of the NYC reads that the award may be refused recognition and enforcement in cases where
“[t]he award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent
authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”
171 See section 3.1.
172 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.152.
173 See section 5.1.
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6 The impact of non-statutory grounds on the Federal Arbitration
Act framework: “manifest disregard of the law” and other
concepts
By and large, the vacatur is limited to the ground listed in the FAA.Occasionally, however,
the courts have been willing to develop additional non-statutory grounds for vacatur. In
this section it is necessary to briefly explain these grounds (see section 6.1). Subsequently,
one should try to establish if they indeed fall outside the ambit of Section 10 of the FAA
or whether they can be depicted as a “judicial gloss” on the statutory grounds for vacatur
provided by Section 10 of the FAA and it should be observed if these (non-statutory)
concepts in any way influence the understanding of the “excess of powers” challenge (see
section 6.2).
6.1 Judicially created non-statutory grounds for vacatur
Without a doubt, the most (in)famous and most often discussed non-statutory ground is
the manifest disregard of the law. It is therefore important to briefly explain what the
manifest disregard of the law entails and also if the test is still available after theHall Street
decision (section 6.1.1). Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that over the years courts
also vacated the award when it was “contrary to public policy” (section 6.1.2), “arbitrary
and capricious” or “completely irrational” (section 6.1.3).
6.1.1 Decision in manifest disregard of the law
The first judicially created ground that should be scrutinized is the manifest disregard of
the law. It is usually said that the manifest disregard of the law is rooted with the Supreme
Court decision in Wilko v. Swan, where it was held in dictum that “the interpretations of
the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”174 This wording has been accepted as
allowing the review of the arbitral award on the basis ofmanifest disregard of the law. Both
federal and state courts welcomed with open arms such an opportunity to evaluate if an
arbitral award can be vacated “where the arbitrators consciously choose to disregard a clearly
174 Wilko v. Swan, 346U.S. 427, 436-437 (1953) (overruled on other grounds Rodriguez deQuijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)). The Restatement points out, however, that “[…] the authorities cited by
the Wilko Court suggest that what the Court meant by ‘manifest disregard’ may have been different from the
modern understanding of the phrase – i.e., that an arbitral tribunalmanifestly disregards the law if it knowingly
refuses to follow a controlling legal rule. See 346 U.S. at 437 n.24. Those authorities, including three Supreme
Court cases that predated enactment of the FAA, provide evidence that themodern view of manifest disregard
was not what the Court was describing inWilko.” For further reading, see the Restatement (second tentative
draft) p.295 and the literature therein (i.a. (Scodro, 2005)).
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applicable legal princip[le]”.175 It can be reasonably concluded that “[t]he principle of vacating
an arbitration award because of a manifest disregard of the law is an important safeguard
of the integrity of alternate dispute resolution mechanisms, because judicial approval of
arbitration decisions that so egregiously depart from established law that they border on the
irrational would undermine society’s confidence in the legitimacy of the arbitration process.”176
Instances, however, where the manifest disregard may apply are exceptional.177
By and large, the test for the manifest disregard of the law as applied by the federal
courts is two-fold.178 First, one should determine if the applicable legal principle is
well-defined and clearly applicable to the case at hand; secondly, it should be concluded
if the arbitrator knowingly ignored to apply such a well-defined legal principle.179 Only
when the court finds that the answer to both questions is in the affirmative may it vacate
the award on the basis of manifest disregard.180 In effect, courts construe the manifest
disregard test in an extremely narrow fashion.181 In similar vein, it has been argued that
“[…] the manifest disregard standard is akin to public policy analysis, requiring that the
tribunal have been aware of controlling legal authority and deliberately chos[e] to disregard
it – hence, the phrase ‘manifest disregard of the law’.”182 Consequently, no court will vacate
175 (Domke,Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § 38:23; also (Carbonneau, The
Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates, 2013) p.604 (“The classical
formulation is that it [manifest disregard] pertains to a situation inwhich the arbitrators describe the applicable
law cogently and knowledgeably and then deliberately ignore it in reaching their determination”).
176 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § 38:23. See also Restatement
(second tentative draft) p.297.
177 (Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates, 2013) p.604.
178 Some scholars highlighted that the wording of a manifest disregard test varies slightly among the circuits
but generally the two-prong test is applicable. See (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial
Arbitration, 2013) § 38:23.
179 (Holtzmann, Donovan, Tahbaz, & Amirfar, 2013) Chapter VII(2)(a)(8), see also (Born, International
Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3345, (Domke,Wilner, & Edmonson,Domke onCommercial Arbitration,
2013) § 38:23 and the questions therein: “courts generally apply the following two part test in determining if
the award should be vacated for manifest disregard of the law: (1) Did the arbitrator know of the governing
legal princip[le] yet refused to apply it or ignored it all together? and (2)Was the law ignored by the arbitrators
well-defined, explicit and clearly applicable to the case?” See also e.g. Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer
Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2003), Long John Silver’s Restaurants, Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345,
349-50 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[…] an arbitrator does not act in manifest disregard of the law unless: (1) the
applicable legal principle is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrator refused
to heed that legal principle.”).
180 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § 38:23, see also (Holtzmann,
Donovan, Tahbaz, & Amirfar, 2013) Chapter VII(2)(8), the Restatement (second tentative draft) p.292.
181 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3341, (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on
Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § 38:23, also i.a. Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d
391, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[…] the ‘manifest disregard’ standard is an extremely narrow, judicially-created
rule with limited applicability.”).
182 (Born, International Arbitration: Law and Practice, 2012) p.330.
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the award on the basis of a simple misapplication of law, even if the legal error committed
by the arbitrator is obvious.183
The application of the manifest disregard test became somewhat problematic after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street.184 The Supreme Court had to decide the split
between the circuits with regard to the contractual extension for the grounds for vacatur
as prescribed by the FAA.185 In its holding the Court concluded that the grounds stated in
Section 10 of the FAA are exclusive grounds to vacate an arbitral award,186 therefore they
cannot be supplemented by contract.187 It further meant, arguably, that if the statutory
grounds for vacatur enumerated in the FAA were to be exclusive, it would entail that
non-statutory grounds such as manifest disregard would cease to apply.188
Irrespective of its holding, however, the Hall Street Court, engaged in the discussion
what the manifest disregard of the law could actually mean by stating that “[m]aybe the
183 See, e.g., Huntington Hosp. v. Huntington Hosp. Nurses’ Ass’n, 302 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40-41 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(“Vacating an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law is severely limited. For an award to be
vacated on this ground there must be more than a showing that the arbitrator made an error or misstated the
applicable law. Instead, it must be shown that the error made was obvious and capable of being readily and
instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator. Additionally, it must be shown
that the arbitrator knew of the governing legal principle but chose to ignore it. The limited nature of the
manifest disregard ground has been demonstrated by the Second Circuit which has recently described this
ground as ‘a doctrine of last resort – its use limited only to those exceedingly rare instances where some egregious
impropriety on the part of the arbitrators is apparent, but where none of the provisions of the [Federal
Arbitration Act] apply.’”), Josephthal & Co. v. Cruttenden Roth Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 232, 238 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (“An award may not be vacated under this subsection on the grounds that the arbitrators’ opinion fails
to interpret correctly the law applicable to the issues in dispute in the arbitration proceeding, or misinterprets
the underlying contract, even if thatmisinterpretation is ‘clearly erroneous.’”),Gwynn v. Clubine, 302 F. Supp.
2d 151, 161 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Application of the doctrine requiresmore than ‘simple error in law or a failure
by the arbitrators to understand or apply it; and, it is more than an erroneous interpretation of the law.’ Id.
To vacate an arbitration award for manifest disregard of the law, the court must find ‘something beyond and
different from a mere error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the
law.’”).
184 Hall Street, 552 U.S. 576, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008).
185 (Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates, 2013) p.593,
see also (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § 38:23. For more
literature on opt-in agreements extending the scope of the review, see for example (Marcantel, 2009) p.600.
186 Hall Street, 552U.S. 576, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008) (“grounds stated in the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) either for vacating, or for modifying or correcting, arbitration award constitute the exclusive
grounds for expedited vacatur andmodification of arbitration award pursuant to provisions of the FAA […]”).
Acknowledged i.a. by the courts in Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir.
2009) (“The answer seems clear. Hall Street unequivocally held that the statutory grounds are the exclusive
means for vacatur under the FAA”), Cat Charter, LLC v. Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 843 (11th Cir. 2011)
(“The Supreme Court has made clear that the statutory grounds justifying vacatur found in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)
are exclusive.”).
187 (Cullemark, 2014) p.167.
188 Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009) (“In the light of the Supreme
Court’s clear language that, under the FAA, the statutory provisions are the exclusive grounds for vacatur,
manifest disregard of the law as an independent, nonstatutory ground for setting aside an award must be
abandoned and rejected.”).
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term ‘manifest disregard’ was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it merely
referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them. Or, as some courts have
thought, ‘manifest disregard’ may have been shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the
paragraphs authorizing vacatur when the arbitrators were ‘guilty of misconduct’ or ‘exceeded
their powers.’”189 In other words, the SupremeCourt indicated three ways how themanifest
disregard standard could be construed: either (i) as an independent ground for vacatur,
(ii) as a “judicial gloss” on Section 10 of the FAA collectively, or (iii) as a “shorthand” for
individual statutory grounds (arbitrator’smisconduct or excess of powers).190 Consequently,
if one reads the manifest disregard as a judicial interpretation of statutory grounds (either
of Section 10 in general or subsection (a)(3) or (a)(4) individually), it wouldmean that the
manifest disregard doctrine may survive the Hall Street holding. After the Hall Street
decision, circuits split191 and doctrinal debate192 ignited yet again on the question of the
future of themanifest disregard of the law. To date, no further guidance from the Supreme
Court has been given since it refused to clarify if themanifest disregard test is still available
in deciding Stolt-Nielsen by concluding that “[w]e do not decide whether ‘manifest disregard’
survives our decision in Hall Street […] as an independent ground for review or as a judicial
gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. §10.”193
Currently, the question whether the manifest disregard of the law doctrine together
with other non-statutory grounds for vacatur (i) can be reconciled with the exclusivity of
the FAA challenges or (ii) whether they simply cannot apply anymore, still stands and
aches to be addressed by the Supreme Court. Without going into details at this point,194 it
should be noted that the prevailing opinion is that themanifest disregard of the law doctrine
afterHall Street is not a ground for vacatur under the FAA and it usually has been argued
189 Hall Street, 552 U.S. 576, 585, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1404, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008).
190 The idea of the manifest disregard doctrine being a “shorthand” description of statutory grounds has been
criticized as having no basis in either legislative history or the statutory language. See (Carbonneau, The
Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates, 2013) p.605.
191 For example, courts of the Fifth, Eighth and EleventhCircuit concluded thatmanifest disregard is no longer
a viable ground for vacatur. The FourthCircuit accepted the application of themanifest disregard irrespective
of whether it is interpreted as an independent ground or just a judicial gloss on the FAA’s statutory grounds,
the Second and Ninth Circuits are of the opinion that the manifest disregard of the law test still exists as a
“judicial gloss on the FAA’s statutory grounds”. For further reading, see (Born, International Commercial
Arbitration, 2014) p.3343; also i.a. (Cullemark, 2014) pp.170-171 or (Marcantel, 2009) p.633.
192 See, i.a., (Smit H., Hall Street Associates v. Mattel: A Critical Comment, 2006), (Ellis, 2009), (Gross, 2009),
(Marcantel, 2009), (Burns, 2010), (Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting
Hall Street Associates, 2013), and (Cullemark, 2014).
193 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768, 176 L. Ed. 2d 605
(2010) (hereafter “Stolt-Nielsen).
194 For further reading, see section 6.2.
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that if it is available at all, it has to fit within the excess of powers challenge.195 A reasonable
alternative is to recognize the doctrine as a variation of public policy.196
In any event, it should not be forgotten that “it is clear that an award cannot be vacated
on manifest disregard grounds merely because the reviewing court is convinced that the
award is wrong, or even clearly wrong, about the law. In one lower court’s colorful
explanation: Arbitrators do not act as junior varsity trial courts where subsequent appellate
review is readily available to the losing party.”197
6.1.2 Violation of public policy
An allegation that the arbitral award is contrary to the public policy is another reason that
the parties seeking vacatur invoke. Similar to the manifest disregard, courts will be rather
resistant to accept the allegation that the award violates public policy. As explained in one
of the previous sections, the challenge on this non-statutory groundwould only be successful
if the court is satisfied that the unambiguous, well-defined and dominant public policy is
being violated.198 The existence of the public policy exception, however, became questioned
(together with other non-statutory grounds) as an aftermath of theHall Street holding.199
In any case, the public policy exception needs to survive theHall Street holding, because
it is an essential element of the arbitration system and the last resort safeguard protecting
the legitimacy of the arbitral process.200 Similarly, the Restatement acknowledges that
“[a]lthough FAA § 10 does not expressly list public policy as a ground for vacating an arbitral
award, such a ground is a necessary part of a national arbitration law.”201 Rau also recognizes
195 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.292 (“The Restatement takes the position that manifest disregard
of the law is not a ground for vacating or denying recognition or enforcement of an award under FAA § 10.
Because the FAA § 10 grounds are exclusive, manifest disregard of the law, if it is available at all, must fall
within the excess-of-powers ground stated in § 10(a)(4).”). See also (Born, International Commercial
Arbitration, 2014) p.3344 (“Even if the manifest disregard doctrine retains vitality, the doctrine provides very
little, if any, basis for annulment beyond that provided by the FAA’s “excess of authority” provision (in §
10(a)(4) of the FAA).”).
196 (Rau, Fear of Freedom, 2006) pp.500-501. See section 6.2.
197 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3344.
198 See section 4.3. See also, the Restatement (second tentative draft) p. 291 and i.a. Huntington Hosp. v.
Huntington Hosp. Nurses’ Ass’n, 302 F. Supp. 2d 34, 41 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Courts have come to recognize a
limited public policy exception to the general rule in favor of confirmation of an arbitrator’s award. The public
policy exception is narrow, and requires an award to be vacated only if the arbitrator’s interpretation of the
contract violates some explicit public policy that is well-defined and dominant.”).
199 (Marcantel, 2009). For other examples see (Rau, Fear of Freedom, 2006) and fn.103 therein.
200 Marcantel makes a strong case by arguing that the use of the public policy exception is an inherent power
of the courts derived from their social contract powers. For further reading, see (Marcantel, 2009) i.a.
pp.608-611 and pp.635-638.
201 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.291. As mentioned in the Restatement, however, one court
decided to exclude the possibility to vacate on public policy grounds, see Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604
F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010), where the court held that “[its] judicially-created bases for vacatur are no
longer valid in light of Hall Street.”
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that “[…] vacatur for violation of “public policy” is a necessary fail safe, universally understood
in every existing legal system as a ground (whether ‘statutory’ or ‘non-statutory’) for refusing
to honor an award. However rarely successful, it must somehow be made to fit within the
architecture of our law of arbitration.”202 Consequently, the better view is to allow the courts
to rely on public policy as a safety valve irrespective of whether it is a gloss on the excess
of powers or as an independent ground for recourse.
6.1.3 Arbitrary, capricious and completely irrational awards: the award that
fails to draw its essence from the underlying contract
The last non-statutory grounds that need to be briefly addressed are the vacatur in cases
where the award is “arbitrary and capricious” or “completely irrational”, or “fails to draw
its essence from the contract”. All of them originate from labor arbitration203 and all of
them are likely to share the fate of all judicially created grounds: in other words, it is highly
uncertain if these grounds for vacatur remain viable.204
Before analyzing all of the grounds, one should be reminded that a court should under
no circumstances conduct de novo review of themerits of the arbitral awards.205 It has been
held that it is possible to vacate an arbitral award under the “arbitrary and capricious”
standard only if the award exhibits a wholesale departure from the law, or is not grounded
in the contract which provides for the arbitration.206 As long as there is a proper basis for
the award, it will be confirmed.207 Some authors observed that the “complete irrationality”
test is similar in nature and a thrust to the “arbitrary and capricious test” and “[t]hus an
award could not stand if it did not meet the test of fundamental rationality.”208 Others
suggested that “complete irrationality is an extremely narrow, limited and highly-deferential
standard for vacatur not found in the FAA […]” and that “one articulation of the irrationality
test is when an award is unfounded in reason and fact.”209 Finally, the award fails to draw
its essence from the contract if “it is contrary to plain contractual language, or where the
arbitrator has construed the contract in a way that is implausible or irrational.”210
202 (Rau, Fear of Freedom, 2006) pp.501-502.
203 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § § 39:10-39:12, also (Oehmke
& Brovins, 2014) § 148:1.
204 Arguably, the public policy ground for vacatur should be the exception to the post-Hall Street regime. See
section 6.1.1 and for further reading, see also sections 6.1.1 and 6.2 and (Reuben, 2009) pp.1141-1142.
205 See section 3.1; also (Oehmke & Brovins, 2014) § 148:3, (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on
Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § 39:12.
206 Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 781 (11th Cir. 1993).
207 (Oehmke & Brovins, 2014) § 148:2, see also (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial
Arbitration, 2013) § 39:10.
208 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § 39:11.
209 (Oehmke & Brovins, 2014) § 148:2; as indicated by the authors, “mere errors of law do not make an award
irrational.” See (Oehmke & Brovins, 2014) § 148:2.
210 (Oehmke & Brovins, 2014) § 148:3.
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In summary, it is very difficult to successfully challenge the award on these non-statutory
grounds because of the deferential standard of review and federal pro-arbitration policy.211
In addition to their questionable value, it is also uncertain if these grounds can still be used
against arbitral awards at the post-award stage.
6.2 Attempts to judicially expand the “excess of powers” challenge on the
federal level
As highlighted earlier in this chapter,212 the concept of the excess of powers resembles an
“empty vessel” that has to be filled with meaning by the courts.213 Accordingly, parties
fighting awards in courts were eagerly willing to provide arguments to courts that even
common law grounds to vacate in fact fit within the scope of the FAA as an addition to
the open-ended phrasing used in Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA.214 The notion that the “vessel”
of the excess of powers can be “filled with” concepts of non-statutory grounds became
particularly accurate when the Supreme Court in its opinion in Hall Street proposed that
the manifest disregard can be perceived as judicial shorthand for statutory grounds for
vacatur.
The Hall Street Court’s suggestion regarding the inclusion of the manifest disregard
standard into the FAA’s framework was two-fold: this doctrine could be perceived either
as the characterization of the FAA’s statutory grounds collectively or as the interpretation
of Section 10(a)(3) or Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA.215 Since the first contention is rather
far-fetched,216 the second one (i.e.manifest disregard as a variation of the excess of powers
challenge) deserves more attention. The idea that the manifest disregard of the law is a leg
of the excess of powers challenge has been occasionally used before Hall Street.217 After
Hall Street, however, it became an essential argument in favor of keeping the manifest
disregard alive.218 Also the Restatement acknowledges that if (and only if) the manifest
disregard of the law is still available “at all, [it] must fall within the excess-of-powers ground
211 See section 3.1.
212 See section 5.1.
213 See also the Restatement (second tentative draft) p.287.
214 Similarly, broad discretion can be observed in the language of Section 10(a)(3) of the FAA (“where the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in
refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced […]”).
215 Hall Street, 552 U.S. 576, 585, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254, 2008, A.M.C. 1058 (2008). The court also
recognized that it may be considered as a non-statutory ground for vacatur; then, however, it does not fit
in the FAA framework.
216 Conceptually it does not fit in with any existing illustration of the manifest disregard doctrine.
217 Without success, however. See, e.g., 136 A.L.R. 183 § 24; occasionally parties had argued that other
non-statutory grounds for vacatur also constitute a judicial interpretation of the excess of powers challenge.
218 It has been accepted by some circuits. See fn.191.
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stated in § 10(a)(4).”219 In the alternative, not mentioned by the Hall Street court but
acknowledged by the Restatement, manifest disregard might be classified as a special case
of public policy.220
If one argues that the manifest disregard is still viable under Section 10(a)(4) of the
FAA, one must acknowledge this statutory ground’s limitations. Under no circumstances
should the “manifest disregard of the law” doctrine and the “excess of powers” challenge
be reconciled at the cost of expanding the understanding of the latter. It also goes without
saying that even if we conclude that themanifest disregard of the law doctrine is a “judicial
gloss” on the excess of powers, no review of the arbitral tribunal’s legal conclusions will
be available.221
An alternative, i.e. classifying manifest disregard of the law “as a special case of public
policy”, is far more appealing.222 Under such a notion, the manifest disregard of the law
doctrine only provides that “an arbitrator may not direct the parties to violate the law”.223
As observed by Rau: “[m]ost of the isolated holdings in which a finding of ‘manifest disregard’
has actually led to vacatur can be fitted within this rationale. And it is evident that this leg
of the analysis conflates ‘manifest disregard’ and the notion of vacatur on grounds of ‘public
policy’ as now understood by the Supreme Court - in the process, rendering the former
essentially irrelevant.”224
The manifest disregard of the law doctrine is better off being subsumed under the
public policy exception rather than under the excess of powers ground for vacatur. First
of all, the standard of review against public policy is more deferential than one employed
219 It should not be forgotten, however, that the primary position of the Restatement is that “manifest disregard
of the law is not a ground for vacating or denying recognition or enforcement of an award under FAA § 10.”
See the Restatement (second tentative draft) p.292. Also, i.a., (Born, International Commercial Arbitration,
2014) p.3344.
220 TheHall Street court could not classifymanifest disregard under the public policy exception, since the latter
is also a non-statutory ground for vacatur. As argued previously, it needs to survive theHall Street holding,
to ensure the legitimacy of arbitration as a system. See section 6.1.1. TheRestatement’s take on the post-award
relief would allow the inclusion of the manifest disregard under the public policy ground for recourse. It
can happen if one accepts that the New York Convention grounds apply for the purpose of vacating
international awards. See section 5.3.
221 See section 3.1.
222 According to the Restatement this is the view adopted in the Seventh Circuit. See the Restatement (second
tentative draft) p.292 (“Under the Seventh Circuit’s alternative definition, manifest disregard is a special case
of the public policy ground for vacating or denying recognition or enforcement of awards”); also (Born,
International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3344 (“[…] themanifest disregard standard is akin to a form
of public policy analysis […]”), p.3346 (“Indeed, as noted above, one post-Hall Street decision effectively
equated the doctrine with notions of public policy […]”), with a reference to the pre-Hall Street decision of
George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001).
223 George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2001).
224 (Rau, Fear of Freedom, 2006) pp.500-501. A similar conclusion can be found in the Restatement (second
tentative draft) p.292 (“As such, manifest disregard of the law has no independent substantive force as a
ground for denying recognition or enforcement of non-Convention awards.”). See also fn.220.
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in testing excess of powers challenge. Secondly, although the manifest disregard loses its
independence, it will make it possible to further shape and provide the necessary structure
for the elusive public policy ground – the only non-statutory ground that needs to survive
the Hall Street aftermath, the only one that is fitted to be used against fundamental
wrongdoings of an arbitral tribunal and the only one that in extreme rare circumstances
may limit the arbitral tribunal’s powers beyond the contractual framework set by the
parties.
7 Application of the United States standard of excess of powers
to selected issues that might fall outside the arbitral tribunal’s
authority
Decisions undertaken by the arbitral tribunal can be divided into certain categories based
on their common denominator. This division becomes helpful for the analysis of which
of the tribunals’ decisions go beyond the powers vested upon them. The sections may
intertwine (e.g. decisions on parties’ claimswould be (irreconcilably) decisions on remedies
that parties request). Nevertheless, carrying out the analysis of excess of powers from
different angles might be useful for a more profound understanding of the issue. Since the
whole arbitration process starts with the underlying question of whether the tribunal has
jurisdiction based upon a valid arbitration agreement, it would be a starting point (section
7.1). If the tribunal’s decision on its jurisdiction stands, the vacating court may still be
asked to review the arbitral tribunal’s determinations on the parties’ respective claims
(section 7.2). This section will address the issue of the availability of particular claims in
arbitration in more abstract terms, whereas sections on decisions on remedies (section
7.4) and on decisions accessory to the parties’ main submissions (section 7.5) will follow.
A tribunal’s determination of the applicable law will be discussed in detail in section 7.3.
7.1 Decisions on jurisdictional/threshold issues
By and large, according to the principle of competence-competence the tribunal is inherently
competent to decide on its own jurisdiction. Generally, this concept has been recognized
by major arbitration-friendly jurisdictions as one of the key features of arbitration.225 In
225 Depending on the jurisdiction, it takes up different forms, i.e. negative competence-competence and positive
competence-competence.
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tandem with the principle of severability226 it serves well as a safeguard of a tribunal’s
authority to have a first (and usually the final) say on issues that are detrimental to the
tribunal’s jurisdiction. In the U.S, however, the traditional paradigm of
competence-competence has been shifted by the introduction of the notion of “gateway
issues”.227 The meaning of the term “gateway issues” in this chapter would “encompass
only those threshold issues that a court, if asked to do so, will decide at the outset, but
excluding those that courts reserve for initial determination, along with the merits, to the
arbitral tribunal itself”.228 As aptly put by Bermann “[g]raphically, it is easy to picture a
“portal” through which a party seeking arbitration must pass before arbitration may
commence, in the event that its opponent raises certain objections to arbitral jurisdiction at
the outset.”229
Generally, the salient question there is who has the authority to decide these objections:
a court or an arbitral tribunal.230 For the purpose of the current study, it ismore appropriate,
however, to ask what happens if the tribunal decides on a certain threshold issue and
whether its decision can be subsequently (and successfully) challenged on the basis of
excess of powers. In turn, if vacatur is possible what is the appropriate standard of review
of the tribunal’s decision on threshold issues?231 Additionally possible threshold issues
enjoy a slightly different treatment from the court at the post-award stage, which will be
explained further below.
It should be noted that threshold issues are sometimes discussed altogether, not only
under the term “gateway issues” but also under the broad notion of “arbitrability”,
226 The principle of severability entails that the agreement to arbitrate (arbitration clause) will be treated as a
contract independent from themain contract. For further reading, see i.a., the Restatement (fourth tentative
draft) pp.46-57.
227 And no default (positive) competence-competence rule is provided in the FAA. See, e.g., (Born, International
Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.1127.
228 (Bermann,The “Gateway" Problem in InternationalCommercialArbitration, 2012) p.8; the author recognized
a narrow and broad definition of gateway issues. The concept of the gateway issues used in this chapter
represents the narrow meaning of the term; the broad definition includes “any feature of a dispute, the
parties to it, or the contract fromwhich it arises that, when raised by a party resisting arbitration, can potentially
keep an arbitration from going forward.” see (Bermann, The “Gateway" Problem in International Commercial
Arbitration, 2012) p.7.
229 (Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial Arbitration, 2012) p.8.
230 Amore detailed analysis of who defers to whom, falls outside the scope of this research. The basic question
in the competence-competence discussion in the U.S. boils down to the point who has the first and/or final
authority to decide the “gateway issues”. The question here is when does the tribunal exceed its powers if
it decides the “gateway issues”. For further reading, see, i.a., (Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction and theDimensions
of “Consent”, 2008), (Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial Arbitration, 2012),
(Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.1125-1208.
231 It should be also noted that both positive and negative jurisdictional decisions made by an arbitral tribunal
are subject to the subsequent court’s review. It means that the vacating court has competence to rule on the
tribunal’s decision rejecting its jurisdiction over the dispute. As argued by Born in (Born, International
Commercial Arbitration, 2014), p.3212: “Similarly § 10(a)(4) of the [FAA] applies equally to both positive
and negative jurisdictional awards.” For further reading, see therein pp.3211-3213.
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understood “as if to denote every condition or requirement that must be met in order for an
arbitration to go forward.”232 The term “arbitrability”, however, should be reserved to entail
only the reference to the question what disputes can be subjected to the arbitrators’
determination. Alas, the term can also appear in its broad sense in some extracts from
court decisions.
Objections that may be characterized as gateway questions, include the question of the
validity or existence of an agreement to arbitrate (section 7.1.1), the scope of the arbitration
agreement (section 7.1.2), arbitrability of claims233 (section 7.1.3), and class arbitration
(section 7.1.4). These matters are extremely delicate, since they touch upon the very
existence of the parties’ consent to arbitrate (in case of objections towards validity or
existence of the agreement to arbitrate and to some extent when the scope of the agreement
to arbitrate is in question)234 or public policy (in the case of arbitrability of claims or class
arbitration).
7.1.1 Decision on the validity and existence of an agreement to arbitrate
Decisions on the validity or existence of an agreement to arbitrate lead to the very core
question, whether the parties consented to arbitrate their disputes. Consequently, if a party
argues that no agreement to arbitrate had ever been concluded, the existence of adjudicatory
powers of the tribunals is subject (at the very least) to a legitimate concern. For this reason,
it is only logical to accept the premise that the tribunal’s decision on the validity or existence
of an agreement to arbitrate should not escape judicial scrutiny.235
232 See (Bermann, The “Gateway" Problem in International Commercial Arbitration, 2012) pp.10-13. The term
arbitrability, as developed in theU.S., is then further divided into “substantive arbitrability” and “procedural
arbitrability”. Whereas the authority to address the “substantive arbitrability” questions is initially for the
court to decide, the authority regarding the questions of “procedural arbitrability” is for the tribunal to
decide. The Restatement, for example, explains that this division corresponds to the division between
questions of “jurisdiction” and “admissibility”. See further the Restatement (fourth tentative draft) pp.63-64.
The “procedural admissibility” would entail “‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear
on its final disposition”. SeeHowsam v. DeanWitter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84, 123 S. Ct. 588, 592, 154
L. Ed. 2d 491 (2002). Importantly, the Supreme Court also found that the 18months litigation requirement
before the commencement of the arbitration was a procedural question for the tribunal to decide. See BG
Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 188 L. Ed. 2d 220 (2014).
233 This is understood as what categories of claims are capable of being arbitrated, thus can be lawfully brought
before the tribunal for its final determination. See, i.a., (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014)
pp.943-1045.
234 The consent is a cornerstone of arbitration. Consequently, if a party argues before a court that no agreement
to arbitrate had ever been concluded (therefore no consent to confer a tribunal with the adjudicatory powers
have ever been granted), a legitimate concern arises regarding why the court should give a deference to the
arbitral panel.
235 The analysis reflects what happens with the jurisdictional challenges at the post-award stage. It is noted,
however, that the court may be involved with the jurisdictional issues pending arbitration, for example,
when the dispute has been brought to the court notwithstanding the agreement to arbitrate or when a
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That being said, it should be noted that, under the U.S. statutory framework the
tribunal’s considerations on the validity or existence of an agreement to arbitrate will be
subject to judicial review pursuant to Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. Few elements of this
judicial test, however, need to be highlighted and analyzed further: (i) if the very existence
(or validity) of the arbitration agreement is at stake, the court will likely pursue an
independent and full (instead of deferential) review on the point of the parties’ underlying
consent to arbitrate; (ii) arguably, the explicit authorization to decide upon all matters
related to the arbitration agreement (including, but not limited to its existence and validity)
may alter how profound a review the court would exercise; (iii) similarly, the parties’
agreements surrendering jurisdictional issues to the arbitrators’ final determination will
further modify the degree of the court’s analysis.
The starting point for the court faced with a challenge of an arbitral tribunal’s decision
on jurisdiction, would be to review it de novo.236 In other words, no deference needs to be
given to the tribunal’s jurisdictional findings and conclusionswhen the existence or validity
of an arbitration agreement is challenged at the vacatur stage.237 The origins of the court’s
full review can be traced down to the SupremeCourt’s decision inFirst Options of Chicago.238
In its holding the SupremeCourt concluded that the “question whether arbitrators or courts
have primary power to decide if parties agreed to arbitrate merits of dispute depends on
whether parties agreed to submit question to arbitration.”239 In its opinion the Court further
explained that “[if] […] the parties did not agree to submit the arbitrability question itself
to arbitration, then the court should decide that question just as it would decide any other
question that the parties did not submit to arbitration, namely, independently.”240
Additionally, the Court concluded that “courts should not assume that the parties agreed
to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did
so.”241 In other words, a default position is that it would be the court, not the arbitral
tribunal, whowill have the power to answer the questions related to arbitrators’ jurisdiction,
in the absence of clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to vest the tribunal
with the competence to answer all questions related to the validity or existence of an
agreement to arbitrate. Consequently, the tribunal’s decision on the validity or existence
motion for an order to compel arbitration is filed. For further reading on interlocutory judicial resolution,
see i.a., (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.1148-1151 and pp.1198-1204.
236 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3208.
237 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3208. Born recognizes, however, that the vacatur
courts, while formally distancing themselves from accepting the preclusive effect of the tribunal’s conclusions
on its jurisdiction, they (i.e. the courts) tend to follow (or at least give some weight to) the tribunal’s factual
and legal findings regarding the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. See (Born, International
Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3208-3210.
238 First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. 938, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 131 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1995).
239 First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. 938, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 131 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1995).
240 First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. 938, 943, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924, 131 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1995).
241 First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1924, 131 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1995).
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of an agreement to arbitrate, granted without the parties’ express authorization, would
likely be subject to a successful vacatur on the basis of the “excess of powers” ground.242
In any event, parties may try to shield themselves from the full review of the court on
the jurisdictional/threshold issues by explicitly delegating the power to resolve these issues
to arbitrators. Parties can do so by including a clear and unambiguous delegation clause
in their agreement to arbitrate or, in the alternative, they can refer to the institutional rules
that ensure that the tribunal has the power to decide all questions related to its
jurisdiction.243 It has been noted that “because the United States has taken a unique position
regarding the extent of an arbitral tribunal’s initial competence-competence, parties would
be well advised to indicate whether threshold jurisdictional questions should be referred
initially to the arbitral tribunal or United States courts. Major arbitral institutions offer
model arbitration clauses that are ordinarily expected to withstand judicial challenge.”244
Arguably, delegation would work satisfactorily in the case of the question of the validity
of the agreement to arbitration,245 but it will not withhold the court at the post-award stage
from pursuing an independent review if the very existence of the agreement to arbitrate
is at issue.246
242 It does notmean, however, that every arbitral tribunal’s decision on the validity or existence of the agreement
to arbitrate will automatically lead to its vacatur at the post-award stage. The vacating court may very well
be convinced that this decision was inherently for the tribunal to make. See, e.g., (Born, International
Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p. 1164 (“Thus, at least in international cases, parties virtually always agree
to ‘arbitrate arbitrability’: the arbitrators’ competence-competence to consider and resolve jurisdictional
disputes is presumptively an integral and fundamental part of their adjudicatory mandate. Although it is
beyond the scope of this Treatise, the same conclusion should apply in domestic U.S. matters. The
competence-competence to consider jurisdictional challenges is an inherent aspect of any adjudicatory body,
and there is no suggestion in the FAA or in U.S. judicial authority that, absent a First Options agreement,
arbitrators in the United States lack the authority to consider jurisdictional challenges; […] it is clear that
any such suggestion would be unfounded.”).
243 See, e.g., Art. 6(3) and Art. 6(5) of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art. 21(1) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 23(1)
of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 18 of the 2016 JAMS Rules and R-7(a) of the 2013 AAA Rules (“The
arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect
to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or the arbitrability of any claim or
counterclaim.”). See, however, criticism in the Restatement (fourth tentative draft) pp.66-71.
244 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.883.
245 See the Restatement (fourth tentative draft) p.71 (“We may assume that if the unconscionability issue is
amenable to delegation, so too are other challenges to an arbitration agreement’s validity.”). The conclusion
is based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2774, 561
U.S. 63, 63 (U.S. 2010) (“Under the FAA, where an agreement to arbitrate includes an agreement that the
arbitrator will determine the enforceability of the agreement, if a party challenges specifically the enforceability
of that particular agreement, the district court considers the challenge, but if a party challenges the enforceability
of the agreement as a whole, the challenge is for the arbitrator.”).
246 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3215. Born explains that “where a party denies that
it has concluded any agreement at all, there cannot be ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence of an agreement to
arbitrate arbitrability issues; any such evidence, in the form of the putative arbitration agreement, is necessarily
disputed and cannot satisfy First Options’ requirement for ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence.”
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As highlighted, generally, courts will be satisfied to respect the arbitrators’ decision on
the validity of the agreement to arbitrate if the power over jurisdictional/threshold questions
has been given to the tribunal by the incorporation of the institutional rules.247 If the clear
and unmistakable evidence of delegation of powers exists, then the level of scrutiny of the
court’s review changes drastically. In other words, if the court is satisfied that parties agreed
to pass the competence over jurisdictional/threshold issues to the tribunal, the vacating
court will pursue only a deferential review of the arbitral tribunal’s decision as opposed to
the full test in the absence of a delegation clause.248 If the delegation provides that the
tribunal’s determination of the jurisdictional/threshold issues is to be treated as final, the
degree of the court’s deference is even higher.249
Finally, it should be pointed out that under no circumstances will the court surrender
its power to independently and fully determine if the agreement to arbitrate ever existed.
Consequently, parties cannot contractually alter the scope of the court’s review on this
issue. It is reasonable to conclude that if the initial consent to arbitrate is being questioned,
the court will undertake the full test on that point no matter how clear and unmistakable
an agreement to arbitrate is or whether the agreement leaves the tribunal with the power
of a final determination.250
7.1.2 Decision on the scope of an agreement to arbitrate
The scope of an agreement to arbitrate qualifies in the U.S. for the category of
jurisdictional/threshold issues. Under the FAAdefaultmechanism it is also, presumptively,
for the court and not for the tribunal to decide.251 At the same time, however, “it is […]
247 See, in general, (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.1167-1170. See, however, the
Restatement (fourth tentative draft) pp.67-69 (“[T]he majority of lower courts, when asked to determine the
effect of arbitral rules and more specifically whether they constitute the ‘clear and unmistakable evidence’
contemplated by First Options, have concluded that they do. […] The Restatement rejects the majority line
of cases as based on a misinterpretation of the institutional rules being applied.”). The broadly drafted
agreements to arbitrate, in principle, will not be sufficient to show “clear and unmistakable” evidence to
surrender disputes related to the validity or existence of the agreement to arbitrate. See, e.g., (Born,
International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.1170-1171.
248 See (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.1169 (“Most lower courts have held that the First
Options analysis requires evidence of an agreement to arbitrate jurisdictional issues, not a waiver of judicial
review of arbitral decisions regarding jurisdictional issues. Under these decisions, once such an agreement to
arbitrate particular jurisdictional disputes exists, then the arbitrators’ jurisdictional decisions are subject to
judicial review only under the FAA’s de minimis manifest disregard standard, in the same way as awards
resolving other arbitrable disputes.”).
249 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3214, (Bermann, The “Gateway" Problem in
International Commercial Arbitration, 2012) pp.36-40.
250 Even though the court reviews the issue of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate independently and
fully, it does not change the fact that in line with the federal pro-arbitration policy the court will likely reject
frivolous challenges against the tribunal’s decision on the issue. See section 3.1.
251 First Options of Chicago, 514 U.S. 938, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 131 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1995). (Born, International
Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.1181-1183.
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clear that the presumption that scope disputes are for judicial decision is a rebuttable one
under the First Options analysis – which leaves the parties free to agree that particular
objections will be submitted to arbitration.”252 Therefore, if parties, in their agreement, are
keen to (expressly) delegate the disputes over the scope of the agreement to arbitrate, the
courts are likely to defer to their bargain. By and large, one should also observe that the
incorporation of (most of) the institutional rules or even broadly drafted agreements to
arbitrate253 might suffice as evidence of the parties’ consent to surrender the scope issues
to the tribunal’s determination.254 Consequently, if an arbitral tribunal decides on the scope
of the agreement to arbitrate, its decision on the issue deserves a high degree of judicial
deference.255
Generally, incorporation of the institutional rules will give the tribunal competence to
decide on its own jurisdiction.256 As accurately reported by the Restatement: “there appears
to be a consensus that parties can validly delegate to an arbitral tribunal primary authority
over whether a given dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement (assuming
its existence and validity are not questioned). Courts that are prepared to treat the
incorporation by reference of a competence-competence clause as “clear and unmistakable
evidence” under First Options have little hesitation in doing so in the context of a dispute
over whether a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement. […] This result is
not particularly surprising since whether a given dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration
agreement is ultimately a question of contract interpretation […], and it is not unreasonable
to suppose that primary authority of a question of that type is delegable to the arbitrators.”257
It should be pointed out, however, that – on the one hand – globally recognized rules,
such as the ICC Rules or the UNCITRAL Rules, introduce a rather broad notion of
252 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.1183.
253 For instance with a formula such as “Any and all disputes arising out of or in connection with…”.
254 Even if no express delegation of powers to an arbitral tribunal exists in the agreement to arbitrate. In cases
of broad agreements to arbitrate the scope question might not be mentioned. Nonetheless, based on the
comprehensive wording of the agreement to arbitrate it might be implied that it is a question for the tribunal
to decide. Arguably, only when the agreement to arbitrate is narrowly drafted, may the court question the
parties’ intention to delegate the scope question to arbitrators. This would be particularly important for the
interlocutory judicial revision of the agreement to arbitrate. See fn.235. Arguably, however, it might also
affect the standard of the post-award review which is discussed at hand.
255 See (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3298 (“Where parties have concluded a valid
agreement to arbitrate, the arbitral tribunal’s decision on the scope of that agreement should be accorded
substantial deference. That is particularly true where parties have agreed to institutional arbitration rules
granting arbitrators authority to determine their own jurisdiction, but the same conclusion is also implicit in
an agreement to arbitrate.”).
256 See, e.g., Art. 19 of the 2014 ICDR Rules, Art. 18 of the 2016 JAMS Rules, Art. 6 of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art.
6 of the 2012 ICCRules, Art. 21(1) of the 1976UNCITRALRules, Art. 23(1) of the 2010UNCITRALRules.
See, however, applicable in domestic context, R-7(a) of the 2013 AAA Rules (“The arbitrator shall have the
power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or
validity of the arbitration agreement or the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.”).
257 The Restatement (fourth tentative draft) pp.69-70.
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competence-competence, without mentioning that the tribunal is competent to decide on
the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. Arguably, it shows that these rules acknowledge,
as a default tenet, that the decision on the scope of an agreement to arbitrate is inherently
for the tribunal tomake.MajorAmerican arbitral institutions – on the other hand – fathom
the structure of the arbitral system in theU.S. and prefer to leave no doubt that the decision
on the scope of an agreement to arbitrate fits comfortably within the limits of the tribunal’s
adjudicatory powers. As such these set of rules include jurisdictional delegation clauses
on the issues regarding the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.258 In any event, as argued
by Born, “[i]n the case of scope objections […] most institutional rules should be interpreted
as granting arbitrators the authority to finally resolve such disputes.”259 Consequently, if
the vacating court accepts that, by reference to the institutional rules, the power to decide
the scope of an agreement to arbitrate has been transferred to the tribunal, it will exercise
a deferential test of the arbitral tribunal’s decision. Moreover, if the court is satisfied that
the parties agreed that the tribunal will decide the scope of an agreement to arbitrate, the
excess of powers objections will likely fail.
Arguably, also broadly drafted agreements to arbitrate entail that the scope disputes
can be decided by an arbitral tribunal (as discussed, subject to the subsequent judicial
control upon vacatur).260 Therefore, only in the case of a narrowly drafted agreement to
arbitrate,261 may a vacating court become satisfied that no authorization to decide the scope
issues has ever been granted. If that happens, the vacating court will take the default position
that the scope question is presumptively for the court to decide. Consequently, if the
vacating court becomes satisfied that no authorization to decide the scope issues has ever
been granted, it will be entitled to an independent and full review of this threshold issue.
It should be noted, however, that a tribunal’s initial decision on the scope of the agreement
to arbitrate does not exist in a void. Therefore, the vacating court will vacate not on the
basis of an abstract decision on the scope of the agreement, but rather it will vacate the
258 See, e.g., Art. 19 of the 2014 ICDR Rules (“The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to rule on its own
jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the […] scope […] of the arbitration agreement(s) […]”),
R-7(a) of the 2013 AAA Rules (“The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction,
including any objections with respect to the […] scope […] of the arbitration agreement”).
259 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.1184.
260 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.1187 (“where commercial parties have admittedly
entered into a valid, broadly-drafted arbitration agreement, whose continued validity is not disputed, then it
is most consistent with their expectations, and with an efficient arbitral process, for the arbitral tribunal to
resolve disputes about the scope of its jurisdiction.”).
261 See, e.g., Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 308, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2862, 177 L. Ed. 2d
567 (2010) (“The issue is whether the formation-date defense that Local raised in response to Granite Rock’s
no-strike suit can be characterized as ‘arising under’ the CBA. It cannot for the reasons we have explained,
namely, the CBA provision requiring arbitration of disputes ‘arising under’ the CBA is not fairly read to
include a dispute about when the CBA came into existence.”). For further reading, see, e.g., the Restatement
(fourth tentative draft) p.134, (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.1185-1188.
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part of the award that addresses the issue or dispute that has not been (in the court’s
opinion) part of the initial consent to arbitrate.262
All in all, it is more than reasonable to let the tribunal decide the issues regarding the
scope of the agreement to arbitrate (with the reservation that the existence or validity of
the agreement to arbitrate is not disputed), since “these disputes are […] inescapably
intertwined with the substantive interpretation of the underlying contract and the parties’
right thereunder – matters which are plainly for the arbitral tribunal to resolve under the
parties’ arbitration agreement.”263 In other words, determining the issue of the scope of
the agreement to arbitrate might be a task too closely related to the merits of the dispute
for the court to interfere with the arbitral process. It is therefore sensible to allow the
tribunal to first determine this issue.
7.1.3 Decision on arbitrability of claims
Yet another jurisdictional/threshold decision that may be challenged during vacatur
proceedings is the decision on arbitrability of claims (or the decision on subject-matter
arbitrability), i.e. the decision determiningwhether certain categories of claims (for example,
anti-trust claims) may be disposed in arbitration at all. Generally, the analysis from the
previous two sections can be applied here in verbatim. Therefore, without the parties’
express authorization, the vacating court will give no deference to the tribunal’s decision
on arbitrability and thus proceed with an independent analysis. If, however, parties did
authorize the tribunal to decide on the issue of the arbitrability of claims,264 the vacating
court will test the award with some degree of deference.265 Since the consent of the parties
262 Taking into account the federal pro-arbitration policy, it is suggested that only part of the award would be
vacated.
263 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.1188. See also the Restatement (fourth tentative
draft) p.70 (“This result is not particularly surprising since whether a given dispute falls within the scope of
an arbitration agreement is ultimately a question of contract interpretation […], and it is not unreasonable
to suppose that primary authority of a question of that type is delegable to the arbitrators.”).
264 Either in the text of the comprehensive arbitration clause (see, e.g., the JAMS Model Arbitration Clause
(“Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, including the formation,
interpretation, breach or termination thereof, including whether the claims asserted are arbitrable […]”)), or
by reference to the rules that expressly provide for the tribunal’s competence over the arbitrability of claims
(see, e.g., R-7(a) of the 2013AAARules (“The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her jurisdiction,
including any objections with respect […] to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.”)).
265 Especially taking into account that the vastmajority of claims after the Court’s seminal decision inMitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473U.S. 614 (1985) (after: “MitsubishiMotors”) are considered
arbitrable in theU.S. For further reading, see the Restatement (second tentative draft) p.241, also e.g. (Moses,
Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by
Congress, 2006) p.144 (“After Mitsubishi, however, the Court continued to add more new rooms to its FAA
structure, holding other kinds of statutory rights to be arbitrable, including those under the Racketeer Influenced
andCorruptOrganizations Act (RICO), the AgeDiscrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). It is unlikely that many statutes remain today that the Court would not find
arbitrable.”).
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would not be an issue, the arguments thatmight be eventually raised to evidence the excess
of powers objections will be built up upon the notion that the tribunal’s decision (i) went
beyond the parties’ submissions or (ii) violated public policy.
Parenthetically, it is necessary tomention that instanceswhere decisions on arbitrability
are challenged upon vacatur rarely occur, because a decision on arbitrability per se would
be rather of declaratory character and, arguably, would not be rendered as a self-standing
award. Instead, the decision on arbitrability is a prerequisite for the tribunal to grant
particular relief to a party.266 Therefore, the challenging party will be aiming at vacating
the decision on a specific claim of which the arbitrability is questionable, rather than the
decision on arbitrability of said claim (which is accessory to the main decision).
Arguably, the only instances where a decision on arbitrability might stand as an
independent award and in turn be challenged on vacatur is the tribunal’s decision rejecting
a claim as nonarbitrable or the tribunal’s ruling rejecting jurisdiction based on the
nonarbitrability (inarbitrability) of a certain claim.
If it is argued that a decision rejecting a claim as nonarbitrable went beyond the scope
of the parties’ submissions, it means that a proper defense against a nonarbitrable claim
has not been raised and the tribunal decided to refuse to grant a nonarbitrable claim on
its own motion.267 The tribunal’s decision to this effect squarely points to the fact that the
panel had major policy concerns relating to the claim presented.268 Consequently, the
tribunal considered that the award granting (and not rejecting) the claim would put the
enforceability of the award at risk. If, however, a court decides to vacate such a tribunal’s
decision269 as going beyond the scope of the submission, it would, at the same time,
unequivocally conclude that the tribunal was wrong and thus the claim (being arbitrable)
266 For example, respondent’s anti-trust counterclaim is arbitrable and valid thus the tribunal agrees to award
damages based on that counterclaim.
267 On the tribunal’s considerations on arbitrability raised by the tribunal on its own motion, Born in (Born,
International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.1044 aptly concluded that “The arbitral tribunal’s adjudicative
mandate is to resolve the disputes that are submitted to it in accordance with applicable law – including
applicable mandatory law – and to render an award on such matters that is binding and enforceable. Where
the parties’ contract raises issues of illegality, violations of public policy or mandatory law, or performance of
administrative functions, then the tribunal’s mandate must necessarily include consideration of those issues
insofar as they would affect its decision or the enforceability of its award. For an obvious example, the parties’
request that the tribunal decide whether to grant a patent or declare a party bankrupt should not prevent the
tribunal from considering sua sponte whether or not such claims are arbitrable; equally, if granting one party’s
substantive claims (or defenses) would violate applicable mandatory criminal, competition, intellectual
property, other laws, then the tribunal both can and must consider those mandatory law issues on its own
motion. Of course, as discussed elsewhere, it is an essential element of the arbitrators’ mandate and the parties’
procedural rights that any sua sponte consideration of nonarbitrability or similar issues by a tribunal be
accompanied by notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard on the issue.”
268 Before deciding on the issue, a tribunal would likely give the parties an opportunity to address their concerns.
That makes it even more difficult to imagine that a decision would go beyond the parties’ submissions. See
also fn.267.
269 This is a tribunal’s (ex officio) decision rejecting the claim as being nonarbitrable.
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should be arbitrated. It is difficult to imagine how the tribunal’s decision rejecting a claim
as nonarbitrable would violate public policy.270
The scenario, where the tribunal decides to reject its jurisdiction because it finds the
claims inarbitrable (for example because claims are of a criminal nature) is similar to the
one explained immediately above with the only difference that it affects the tribunal’s
jurisdictional findings. The court – as is the case with any other tribunal’s jurisdictional
decision (positive or negative) – will be able to step in and vacate the award.271 It seems
unlikely, however, that the court would be convinced with arguments that the tribunal has
exceeded its powers.272
7.1.4 Decision on class arbitration
The Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen cast a shadow on the availability of class
actions in arbitration.273 At this point it suffices to say that the tribunal can accept
jurisdiction over a class action onlywhen the parties in their agreement to arbitrate expressly
consent to class arbitration. In fact, however, express waivers of class actions rather than
a willingness to give a tribunal the power to decide on class claims occur more often.
Therefore, if no agreement on class actions has been reached, a decision accepting
jurisdiction over such actions will be vacated as a decision in excess of the tribunal’s
powers.274
7.2 Decisions on parties’ claims
Decisions on parties’ claims in an abstract sense focus mostly on the basis for the claims
rather than on remedies sought by the parties.275 Not all claims, however, may fall under
the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s powers based on their underlying legal nature. Therefore,
it is necessary to establish if the tribunal exceeds its powers if it decides on contractual
claims (see section 7.2.1) and contractual counterclaims (see section 7.2.2). Additionally,
decisions on set-off defenses (section 7.2.3) have their unique features that should be
highlighted. Also, decisions on claims that are of a non-contractual basis, i.e. based on
torts (section 7.2.4), need to be subsequently analyzed. Finally, it might be necessary to
determine if it is possible to challenge a tribunal’s decisions on the introduction of new
270 This goes squarely to the application of mandatory rules ex officio. See further section 6.2.4.
271 See fn.231.
272 See fn.267.
273 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. 662, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 176 L. Ed. 2d 605 (2010).
274 For further reading, see, i.a., (Strong, 2013), (Pharaon, 2015).
275 See section 7.4.
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claims (and counterclaims) or changes to the existing ones (section 7.2.5), as well as a
tribunal’s decision that does not cover all claims (or counterclaims) (section 7.2.6).
7.2.1 Decision on contractual claims
At face value, a tribunal’s decision on contractual claims appears to be the most basic
reason why the tribunal has been requested to act in the first place. The decision on
contractual claims covers the claims that arise out of contract and that are brought by
claimant (as opposed to counterclaims that are brought by respondent in response to the
claimant’s initial claims).276 In general, it should be considered that the decision on
contractual claims would be rarely vacated by the court because (i) claims arising out of
contract would be anticipated by most of the (model) agreements to arbitrate, (ii) the
decision answers claimant’s direct request, and (iii) it is unlikely that contractual claims
will infringe public policy.
A quick look at institutional model clauses proves that the claims arising out of or in
connection to the contract are unambiguously designated to be settled in arbitration.277
This means, that the general assumption of users of arbitration is to submit all the
contractual matters before the tribunal for its final determination. Of course, parties are
free to tailor their agreement to arbitrate differently than themodel solutions and, in turn,
designate different or more limited powers towards the arbitral tribunal. Nonetheless, as
noted above, contractual claims are in the very core of the arbitral system and it is very
unlikely that the parties will limit their consent to arbitration by excluding contractual
claims.278 It is possible, however, that parties in their agreement will entrust the tribunal
only with a specific category of contractual claims (e.g. claims on damages or compensation
for breach of contract) or, in contrast, they will exclude certain contractual claims from
the tribunal’s powers (e.g. claims over the validity or existence of the main contract). In
276 For further reading, see section 7.2.2.
277 See, i.a., the ICDRModel Clause (“Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the
breach thereof”), the JAMS Model Arbitration Clause (“Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this contract, including the formation, interpretation, breach or termination thereof […]”), the
1976 UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Clause (“Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating
to this contract, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof […]”), the 2010UNCITRALModelArbitration
Clause for Contracts (“Any dispute, controversy out of or relating to this contract, or the breach, termination
or invalidity thereof […]”), the 2012 and the 2017 Standard ICC Arbitration Clause (“All disputes arising
out of or in connection with present contract […]”). See also In re Arbitration Between Gen. Sec. Nat. Ins.
Co. &AequiCap ProgramAdministrators, 785 F. Supp. 2d 411, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“As a threshold matter,
arbitration provisions that specify that ‘any disputes’ shall be determined by arbitration are typically deemed
to be ‘broad’ arbitration provisions.”).
278 Parties are more often tempted to exclude claims based e.g. on torts. For reflections on decisions based on
torts, see section 6.1.4.
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these instances, the tribunal needs to respect the limitations imposed. Otherwise, the award
might suffer in the vacatur proceedings based on the “excess of powers” ground.279
Furthermore, the parties’ submissions shape the scope of the tribunal’s powers. For
this reason, claimants’ contractual claims introduced in the documents initiating the
arbitral process280 and motions made at the early stage of the proceedings281 frame what
contractual claims should be scrutinized by the tribunal. It further means that the tribunal
is not entitled to render, on its own motion, a decision on other contractual claims that
have not been brought by claimant before the tribunal. That being said, two issues need
to be highlighted, namely, (i) what happens if the contractual claims brought are not clear
in themselves and (ii) what happens if the contractual claims go beyond the initial agreement
to arbitrate.282
If the contractual claims are not clear, claimant risks of not being awardedwhat it asked
for. If the claims are ambiguous, however, they would be an easy target for respondent to
rebut and/or for the tribunal to call for clarification during e.g. a preliminary hearing.283
If the claims are not rebutted nor the tribunal’s call for clarification answered, the tribunal
who accepted jurisdiction over these claims will have to address the claims in the way it
interprets them.284 Unusually, some authors argue that “[t]hough the amount which is being
sought as the relief by the party-claimant need not necessarily be included in the submission,
in certain instances it may be advisable to mention it, thus framing the issue as far as the
demand for a money-award is concerned.”285 By doing so, claimant will limit the discretion
of the tribunal regarding the amount awarded by the tribunal. In reviewing the decision
on contractual claims (that are alleged to be unclear), the vacating court will likely defer
to the tribunal’s interpretation.286
As a default rule, if claimant requests the tribunal to decide on the issues that go beyond
the scope of the parties’ initial agreement to arbitrate, the tribunal should reject the claim
as being placed beyond the parties’ consent. Nevertheless, in the event that the participating
respondent fails to raise that the tribunal has no power over these claims, it may very well
be found to have impliedly consented to expand the initial scope of the agreement to
279 The vacatur court, however, will exercise a deferential test over the tribunal’s decision. See sections 3.1 and
7.1.2 of this chapter.
280 For example, Notice of Arbitration under the ICDR Rules, Request for Arbitration under the JAMS Rules,
Demand for Arbitration under the AAA Rules.
281 See, e.g., Terms of Reference under the ICC Rules. For the claims submitted at the later stage of the
proceedings, see section 7.2.5.
282 As will be explained below, it would likely take the form of the “scope” question.
283 See, for example, R-21(a) of the AAA Rules.
284 It is equally possible that the tribunal will simply reject ambiguous claims.
285 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2015) § 8:4.
286 Irrespective of whether it is claimant or respondent who challenges the award. If the tribunal gave the party
a reasonable opportunity to address its concern and it failed to do so, it should not be allowed to raise its
arguments as late as at the post-award stage.
288
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
arbitrate. In turn, a tribunal’s decision might conceivably survive the challenge at the
vacatur stage. It should be noted, however, that in this instance the challenge would likely
be framed as the jurisdictional/threshold issue (namely the “scope” question) and,
consequently, be subject to a de novo review by the vacatur court.287
The public policy considerations on contractual claims come down to the question
whether the claims are arbitrable. Since the question of arbitrability has been discussed
above,288 it should be highlighted that it is unlikely that the contractual claims will infringe
public policy.
7.2.2 Decision on contractual counterclaims
The decision on counterclaims deserves separate attention, because it may not always be
allowed for the tribunal to decide on counterclaims.Generally, they need to be characterized
as a category of offensive actions brought by respondent in response to claims initiating
arbitral proceedings.289 Additionally, counterclaims are, by and large, remote from the
claimant’s claim and therefore shall lead to the arbitral tribunal’s separate and independent
determination.290 In effect, even if the initial claimant’s claims are rejected or even
withdrawn, the tribunal’s decision on counterclaims will be standing out. In this section,
only the decision on counterclaims that have their source in the contract will be discussed,
since the focus here should be directed on the most basic notion of the decision on
counterclaims that can arise out of contractual relations.291 As long as some parts of the
analysismirror the conclusions from the previous section,292 few additional reflections will
be introduced.293
287 See further section 7.1.2.
288 Section 7.1.3 of this chapter.
289 (Fortún, 2010) p.453. The theoretical possibility exists, where it is a claimant who brings a
counter-counterclaim in response to the respondent’s counterclaim. It should not, however, affect the
analysis undertaken in this section. If the tribunal accepts to hear counterclaims it is only reasonable that
it will also accept to hear the claimant’s counter-counterclaims, taking into account the principle of equal
treatment of the parties.
290 (Pryles & Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) p.448, (Fortún,
2010) p.453.
291 In the following sections the point of interest will be shifted to the non-contractual basis for the claims and
to the question if such a basis can alter the scope of the tribunal’s power to grant a specific counterclaim.
In these instances, however, claims and counterclaims will be discussed jointly since they can both be
considered, for the purpose of the analysis, as the same type of offensive claimwith the only difference lying
in who is bringing the claims. Therefore, the claims can only be brought by claimant, whereas counterclaims
are generally brought be respondent (it is still possible that claimant in its answer to counterclaims presents
additional counter-counterclaims. See fn.289). See sections 6.1.4-7.2.6 of this chapter.
292 See section 7.2.1.
293 Occasionally, a partymaywish to file a conditional counterclaim. It is argued that the analysis of this section
will also apply to them.
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Similar to the considerationsmentioned above,294 a tribunal first needs to seek a power
to award contractual counterclaims in the agreement to arbitrate.295 Typically, model
arbitration clauses should be interpreted in away that they allow contractual counterclaims
to be introduced. It is so, because they use the general notion of “controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this contract”.296
Arguably, it is the relation between the (counter)claim and the contract thatmatters.297
Consequently, if the clause is drafted broadly, it should allow both parties to bring their
claims before the tribunal. In other words, it might be considered that counterclaims are
nothing more than claims falling within the scope of the arbitration agreement.298
In a comparable fashion, when faced with the agreement to arbitrate stating that “any
controversy between us arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof or
arising out of transactions with you shall be settled by arbitration”, one court concluded
that “[i]t is not an unreasonable construction of the terms of the provision for the arbitrators
to consider the counterclaims for defamation and damage as a result of an unfounded suit
on the breach of the customer agreement. A restrictive reading of the broad language of the
arbitration clause would be contrary to the law favoring arbitrability of disputes.”299 Also
in a different case, another court found that “The arbitration was certainly broad enough
to comprehend the issues raised by [former employees]. It was [the employer] that filed the
cross-claims in the first place, and there is nothing unusual or heterodox about the
counterclaims.”300 Therefore, onemay conclude that,more often than not, the tribunal will
find adjudicative authority over contractual counterclaims in the underlying agreement
to arbitrate.
294 See section 7.2.1.
295 See, i.a., (Pavić, 2006) pp.104-106.
296 For examples of model arbitration clauses, see fn.277.
297 And not the relation between the claim and counterclaim.
298 Pryles andWaincymer in (Pryles &Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties,
2009) p.449 also suggest that “[i]t is the connection to the contract and not who makes the claim that matters
[…].” Nonetheless, they immediately raise their concerns that “[…] although there can still be consent issues
as to the constitution of the tribunal which should hear the case.” The authors further explain i.a. that there
may be some “fairness considerations” with regard to the tribunal’s composition under “some procedural
systems”, where counterclaims do not have to be notified prior to the tribunal’s composition. In that case
the claimant might not be able to select the most suitable arbitrator to hear both claims and counterclaims.
In the U.S. context, however, taking into account the rules of the major American arbitral institutions, it
should be conceivably concluded that these doubts will generally not apply. See, e.g., Art. 3.2 of the 2014
ICDR Rules and Art. 5.1(e) the 2016 JAMS Rules which allow claimant to respond to respondent’s
counterclaims.
299 Ritterman v. Amari, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13569, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1989).
300 Johnston Lemon & Co. v. Smith, 886 F. Supp. 54, 55-56 (D.D.C. 1995) aff’d, 84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
In its holding, the court argued that “(1) [the] arbitration panel did not exceed its powers or scope of arbitration
by awarding damages on various tort counterclaims asserting unfairness of [the] firm’s pursuit of [the]
indemnification claim against employees after prior arbitration had concluded with rulings in their favor on
[a] similar indemnification claim”.
290
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
Usually, even if institutional model clauses are not used, parties do refer to the
institutional rules. If they do so, these rules will complement the parties’ consent expressed
in the agreement to arbitrate. In consequence, it is likely that a respondent will have an
opportunity to bring its counterclaims and it will be, by all means, in the tribunal’s powers
to render the decision on respondent’s request.301 As it was in the context of claimant’s
contractual claims, the tribunal’s decision on counterclaims can only follow the respondent’s
request as actually submitted. Another point is that the counterclaims should be brought
only against claimant.
An additional problem arises in the multiple contract reality. There, it is possible that
counterclaims brought by respondent find their support in a different contract from the
one used by claimant to evidence the initial claims.302 In this case, it all boils down to the
question of the scope of the agreement to arbitrate, which, as discussed, is usually for the
tribunal to decide.303 When the agreement to arbitrate is drafted broadly, respondent will
have sufficient chance to prove that its counterclaim, based on a different contract arises
out of or relates to the contract on which the initial claim was brought. If the claim is
accepted, however, depends on the tribunal’s determination. By and large, if the scope
question is within the tribunal’s capacity to decide, then the vacating court will respect the
tribunal’s findings on the construction and interpretation of the (scope of the) agreement
to arbitrate.304
Finally, one should note that, like the decision on contractual claims, the decision on
contractual counterclaims may be reviewed on public policy grounds only when the
counterclaim grantedwas in fact nonarbitrable.305 It is difficult to imagine how the tribunal’s
choice to accept or reject contractual counterclaims would amount to the violation of
public policy, especially taking into account how extremely narrow the public policy test
is.306 Notably, considering the Restatement’s take on the post-award relief under the FAA,307
public policy challenges will also be considered under the “excess of powers” ground.308
301 See, e.g., Art. 5.1(b) of the 2016 JAMS Rules, Art. 3.2 of the 2014 ICDR Rules.
302 Although the contract is different, it may very well be between claimant and respondent.
303 See section 7.1.2.
304 Even if a vacating court will not be satisfied that parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to have the arbitrators
decide the scope question and, in consequence, proceed with the independent review of the agreement to
arbitrate, generally, it will reach the same conclusion as the tribunal did, since the broadly drafted clauses
are presumed to include counterclaims that especially take into account federal policy favoring arbitration.
See, e.g., fns.299 and 300.
305 See section 7.1.3.
306 See section 4.3 and section 6.1.1.
307 See section 5.3.
308 For further reading, see section 6.1.2. The Restatement’s take on the “excess of powers” ground is considered
for the purposes of the post-award relief against “non-convention awards”. See section 5.1 and section 5.3.
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7.2.3 Decision on set-off
In contrast to a traditional counterclaim that works as an attacking tool, set-off is, by and
large, considered as a respondent’s defensive mechanism.309 It cannot be stressed enough
that these two concepts cannot be mixed.310 Some of the set-off’s traits should be, thus,
briefly highlighted.311 First of all, as mentioned above, a counterclaim has a destiny
independent from the initial claimant’s claim, whereas the set-off claim shares the fate of
the primary claim.312 Therefore, if, for example, the primary claim falls outside the scope
of the agreement to arbitrate, so does the set-off claim.313 Secondly, the amount of the
set-off claim cannot exceed the amount of the primary claim.314 Thirdly and finally, the
set-off claim has to be of monetary character.
Traditionally, also in the context of set-off claims, it is necessary to reflect on the
question (i) how these claims fit into the scope of the agreement to arbitrate and (ii) what
is the relevance of the parties’ relief sought.315 An answer to these questions will help to
determine when the tribunal’s decision can be found to be in excess of powers.
In order to answer the first question, one should imagine (at least) three scenarios: in
the first, the simplest one, the tribunal decides on a set-off claim that has its standing in
the same contract as the primary claim; in the second one, the claimed set-off is based on
torts related to the same contract; in the last, and themost difficult one, the tribunal accepts
the set-off defense emerging from a different contract (different from the contract that is
the basis for the primary claim) or even torts related to a different contract.316
309 In principle, set-off will be considered as a substantive defense. Therefore, the initial question would be to
determine the law applicable to the issue of set-off. Consequently, U.S. law will not necessarily will be the
law that applies to the issue of set-off. For a brief analysis of U.S. law on set-off, see (Rodner, 2011) p.551.
310 See, i.a., (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999) pp.58-61, (Fortún, 2010) pp.453-454,
(Pryles &Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) pp.448-449.
311 For further reading on set-off in international commercial arbitration see, i.a., (Fountoulakis, 2011),
(Pichonnaz & Gullifer, 2014).
312 The primary claim being usually the claimant’s initial claim. It is possible, however, that a set-off defense
is raised by claimant in response to respondent’s counterclaim.
313 (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999) pp.60-61.
314 (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999) p.61.
315 It is difficult to imagine how the tribunal’s decision on set-off could violate federal public policy. Although
not discussed under this section, it is always necessary, on a case-by-case basis, to determine if a specific
tribunal’s decision infringes the underlying values of the American legal system. On that note, in one case
a court held that “dismissal of [a] counterclaim, even if granted as sanction for [a] company’s destruction of
evidence, did not warrant vacating [the] arbitration award.” See AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Oxford
Mgmt. Servs., 627 F. Supp. 2d 85 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
316 Arguably, not only the decision accepting the claim but also the tribunal’s negative determination on set-off
can be challenged in vacatur proceedings. If, however, the tribunal found that the specific set-off cannot
be dealt with under the underlying agreement to arbitrate, it is unlikely that the vacating court would vacate
such a decision on the basis of excess of powers. Asmentioned previously (section 7.1.2), the vacating court
will not overturn the decision on the scope per se but rather annul these elements of the decision that go
beyond the parties’ consent.
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The first two out of three scenarios are rather straightforward. In the first hypothesis,
irrespectively of how broad or narrow an agreement to arbitrate is, the tribunal should be
able to also decide on the subject of said set-off claim, especially taking into account that
both concurring claims (the primary claim and the set-off) arise out of the same contract
and that the set-off claim shares the fate of the primary claim. The second hypothesis
depends on the wording of the agreement to arbitrate. The traditional broad wording of
agreements to arbitrate (such as “controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
contract”)317 may allow for the tribunal to reach a decision on set-off also if it is based on
a tort claim. If parties drafted their agreement narrowly (limiting the tribunal panel’s
considerations to only contractual claims), the tribunal would violate the limits of its
powers if it grants set-off on the basis of a tort.318
The third scenario is more difficult. By and large, the narrowly drafted, traditional
agreement to arbitrate (e.g. “claim arising out of this contract”) would not encompass set-off
claims arising out of a different contract. Arguably, the broad wording of the agreement
to arbitrate (“controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract”) might entail
that set-off claims based on different contracts or tortious liability related to different
contracts if there is evidence that these claims are sufficiently linked (i.e. arise out of or
relate to) to the primary contract.
In case of multiple contracts, however, one twist can shatter the arbitral tribunal’s
power over set-off claims based on other contracts: when these contracts have its own
arbitration or forum selection clause, there is an obvious obstacle in the way of
determination of the parties’ intent to arbitrate.319 If the parties included different dispute
resolution mechanisms in their contracts (even related ones), the tribunal’s decision on
set-off claims that fits within the scope of a different agreement to arbitrate320 might raise
legitimate concerns regarding the arbitral panel’s powers to decide on the claims.
That being said, and coming to the second question introduced at the outset, it is also
necessary to remember the defensive character of set-off claims. It means that set-off
arguments will be submitted by the parties themselves in defense of the initial claims.
Consequently, there are strong arguments, usually advocated by Swiss scholars, to let the
tribunal decide on these types of set-offs. First of all, respondent should have a right to
317 For other examples, see fn.277.
318 One should note that it will exceed the powers because it was based on a tort claim and not because it dealt
with a set-off defense. For further reading on decisions on tort claims, see section 6.1.4.
319 See, however, (Karrer, Jurisdiction on set-off defences and counterclaims, 2001) p.177, who discusses the
issue in general (“(…) in my opinion, it would be very difficult to say that the existence of incompatible
arbitration or choice-of-forum clauses makes it impossible to set off obligations which otherwise could be set
off one against another. (…) Contracts are primarily designed to prevent disputes or to resolve them amicably,
and exercising a right to set-off is a perfectly acceptable way to extinguish obligations.”). See also (Pryles &
Waincymer, Multiple Claims in Arbitration Between the Same Parties, 2009) pp.488-492.
320 Therefore the agreement to arbitrate that is different from the one which sets up the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
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oppose and present material defense reducing its outstanding obligations. Second of all,
having in mind procedural efficiency, it might be justified to resolve all the parties’
disagreements at once rather than to tolerate the state of a permanent legal battle between
the parties.
Likewise, Karrer reflected that “[…] the parties must be presumed to prefer the dispute
about the set-off defence to be resolved by the arbitral tribunal already in place. After all,
the claimant started the arbitration before that arbitral tribunal, and the respondent who
is setting off prefers to use the second obligation the other way, as a defence in the existing
arbitration, or the respondent would not have raised it there and would have commenced
arbitration elsewhere. All this makes good sense to me, and the claimant’s insistence that
the obligation used as a set-off defence should be brought before a different arbitral tribunal
that first must be set up appears abusive of the legal process. The legal process should bring
peace quickly and efficiently and should not be an all-out battle.”321 Additionally, a very
cogent argument has been advanced by Blessing: “[t]he Tribunal could not confine itself
[to] adjudicating the claims arising under one contract only, while closing its eyes in respect
of certain justified set-off claims (although those originated from different contracts with
different arbitration clauses).”322
Being extremely cautious over each individual case’s factual underpinning, it is a sensible
solution to allow the tribunal to decide on set-off when it constitutes a truly substantive
defense to a primary claim, even if it has a different basis than the primary contract, thus,
even if, arguably, they go within the scope of the competing agreement to arbitrate.
Importantly, some of the institutional rules in the U.S. seem to accept the notion that
set-offs may not necessarily be covered by the agreement to arbitrate (as opposed to
counterclaims) for the tribunal to decide upon them. For example, the 2014 ICDR Rules
provide that “[a]t the time Respondent submits its Answer, Respondent may make any
counterclaims covered by the agreement to arbitrate or assert any setoffs […].”323 One should
note that it is a significant change in the rules, considering that in their 2010 edition they
provided that respondent “maymake counterclaims or assert setoffs as to any claim covered
by the agreement to arbitrate[…].”324
321 (Karrer, Jurisdiction on set-off defences and counterclaims, 2001) p.177.
322 Blessing did not discuss the U.S. arbitration system. The argument remains strong, nonetheless. Referred
after (Fortún, 2010) p.459.
323 Art. 3.2 of the 2014 ICDRRules. See alsoArt. 5.1(b) of the 2016 JAMSRules thatmentions that the Statement
of Defense should include a brief statement describing the nature and circumstance of any setoffs asserted
or counterclaims advanced by the respondent against the claimant. The AAA Rules do not design specific
rules to deal with set-off claims. They refer only to counterclaims (R-5 of the 2013 AAA Rules). To the
contrary, for example, Art. 19(3) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules explicitly allowed only set-off claims that
have arisen out of the same contract as primary claim.
324 See Art. 3.2 of the 2010 ICDR Rules.
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All in all, it is important for the parties to request set-offs. Under no circumstances
should the tribunal ex officio extinguish the claimant’s claim against a non-requested set-off
claim. Such a tribunal’s decision would likely be found in excess of powers and violating
the equal treatment of the parties.
7.2.4 Decision on claims/counterclaims based on torts and pre-contractual
liability
Award-debtors, although contemporarily with lesser frequency, may try to argue that a
decision based on torts exceeds the tribunal’s powers. This argument may be based either
(i) on the notion that the agreement to arbitrate did not foresee claims based on torts. In
the alternative, (ii) onemay also suggest that the excess can be illustrated by the case where
the tribunal decides to requalify the parties’ claims (by awarding the relief sought but
changing the basis for the claim from contractual to tortious).
Nowadays it is rather uncontroversial that an arbitral tribunal should enjoy the
possibility to address all the parties’ claims at once. The practical argument is the one of
the reasonable expectations of the parties to settle the whole conflict (all disputes) between
them in order to be able to move on with their business relationship.325 This means that a
broad agreement to arbitrate presumptively covers not only contractual differences but
also other disputes thatmay arise in the context of the underlying contractual relationship.
It should also be noted that such an agreement would address claims irrespective of by
whom they are introduced. It further entails that both claims and counterclaims can be of
a tortious nature.326 Courts have generally rejected challenges against the tribunal’s awards
based on torts, finding that tort claims have been covered by the agreement to arbitrate.327
Additionally, it is necessary to reflect on the issue of a tribunal’s requalification of the
basis of the party’s claim. To illustrate such an instance, one should imagine that a party
requested the tribunal to award damages supporting this claimon the underlying contract;
the tribunal awarded damages, but at the same time rejected the contractual foundations
325 The concept is sometimes called the “one-stop shop for arbitration”. For further reading on this subject,
see Chapter IV.
326 (Berger, Set-off in International Economic Arbitration, 1999) p.65. Although the arguments are not made
in the American arbitration context, they will be equally applicable.
327 See, i.a., the court in Jih v. Long & Foster Real Estate, Inc. (1992, DCMd) 800 F. Supp. 312 decided that the
“arbitration panel did not exceed [its] authority because damages awarded, though potentially based on a
tort theory of liability, were inextricably tied up with the merits of the underlying dispute” (as reported in
EST, LLC v. Smith, No. 5:08-CV-32, 2011WL 2118984, at *6 (W.D.N.C. May 24, 2011). See also Federated
Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. J.V.B. Indus., Inc., 894 F.2d 862, 869 (6th Cir. 1990) (“We hold that the arbitration clause
[…] is broad enough to encompass a tort claim originating in an alleged breach of the contracts.’”), Johnston
Lemon & Co. v. Smith, 886 F. Supp. 54 (D.D.C. 1995) aff’d, 84 F.3d 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (the “arbitration
panel did not exceed its powers or scope of arbitration by awarding damages on various tort counterclaims
asserting unfairness of [the] firm’s pursuit of [the] indemnification claim against employees after prior
arbitration had concluded with rulings in their favor on [a] similar indemnification claim”).
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of the claim. Instead, it went to find that the damages are in fact justified but on the basis
of extra-contractual rather than the contractual liability. In the case when a party submitted
two alternative bases for the claim of damages, there is no reasonwhy the tribunal’s decision
should be successfully vacated.
If, however, the tribunal rejects the basis for the claim submitted and nonetheless grants
the claim substantiating it, on its ownmotion, on torts, such an action gives rise to legitimate
concerns. As long as it is fair to say that such an award should be vacated, the question
remains if the challenge should be based on the excess of powers ground.
Arguably, not only claims in themselves limit the tribunal’s powers, but also the
remaining content of the parties’ submissions, including the parties’ legal reasoning for
the claims. In the alternative, however, the hypothetical touches upon the notion of iura
novit arbiter in international arbitration and the extent for the tribunal to introduce its
own legal theories while deciding the claims.328 In any event, even in case of rejection of
the argument that the tribunal’s decision was an act beyond its power, it is likely that it
will also amount to violation of due process if the parties are not heard about the tribunal’s
new theory, because the tribunal, while changing the basis for the claim, effectively argues
for one of the parties. Considering, how broad the concept of the “excess of powers” is
being interpreted by the Restatement, arguably, such a due process violation will also be
considered under Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA.329
7.2.5 Decisiononnewclaims/counterclaims and changeof claims/counterclaims
It goes without saying that bringing new claims330 or amending already presented claims
might reshape the arbitral tribunal’s adjudicatory powers. Nonetheless, in order to protect
the procedural integrity of an arbitration, it is not always acceptable to let the parties
proceed as they will (that is to redraft the scope of their submissions). Generally, the usual
test of the vacatur court, i.e. comparing the award with an agreement to arbitrate, parties’
submissions and public policy, equally applies to a tribunal’s decision as discussed in this
section. What needs to be determined is, however, whether the tribunal initially has a
power to decide on extended/amended claims and what happens in instances where these
claims are perceived as being (i) within and (ii) beyond the initial agreement to arbitrate.
The FAAdoes not provide any guidancewith regard to the question of the admissibility
of new claims or the amendment of existing ones. Generally speaking, the same contention
applies to broadly drafted arbitration clauses. Nonetheless, usually the issue is addressed
by the arbitration rules which provide that, after the tribunal is constituted, the tribunal
328 See also section 6.2.3.
329 See section 5.1 and section 5.3.
330 Under this section, the term “claims” should be interpreted broadly so that it entails both “offensive”
counterclaims and “defensive” counterclaims.
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has to agree on the admission of new claims.331 One could argue that the request for the
tribunal’s consent effectively denotes its power to decide on the issue.
Additionally, the institutional rules further assist in determining the second issue of
interest, namely, to what extent parties can expand their initial claims. The ICDR and the
JAMS Rules are very explicit in saying that amendment or addition to the initial claims
cannot go beyond the initial agreement to arbitrate,332 whereas the AAA Rules do not
address the relevance of the initial agreement to arbitrate in the context of the change of
claims or the introduction of new ones.333 As mentioned earlier on several occasions, the
institutional rules do influence the shape of the tribunal’s powers. Therefore, although the
tribunal will still be able to determine the scope question (i.e.whether new/changed claims
fit within the framework of the agreement to arbitrate),334 it would need to follow the
guidelines of the institutional rules that limit the scope of its powers ultimately to the ambit
of the agreement to arbitrate, prohibiting the tribunal to admit claims that go beyond the
initial consent to arbitrate. Failing to do so would expose the arbitral award to vacatur on
grounds of excess of powers.
7.2.6 Decision not covering all claims/counterclaims
In the infra petita situation, i.e.when the tribunal has not decided in its award on all claims
or issues submitted to it, there is no concern as to the scope of the agreement to arbitrate
nor is there a problemwith public policy violations. The only thing that matters is that the
tribunal failed to address all the claims/counterclaims presented before it. Since the FAA
does not provide for a separate ground for vacatur regarding infra petita decisions, the
question that follows is whether such a tribunal’s decision can be challenged on the excess
of powers ground.
331 See, e.g., Art. 9 of the 2014 ICDRRules (“Any partymay amend or supplement its claim, counterclaim, setoff,
or defense unless the arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow such amendment or supplement
[…]”), Art. 6.1 of the 2016 JAMS Rules (“Claims or counterclaims within the scope of the arbitration clause
may be added or amended prior to the establishment of the Tribunal, but hereafter only with the consent of
the Tribunal.”), Art. 6.1 of the 2016 JAMS Rules, and R-6(b) of the 2013 AAA Rules (“After the arbitrator
is appointed, however, no new or different claim may be submitted except with the arbitrator’s consent.”).
See also, Art. 20 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 22 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 23.4 of the 2017
ICC Rules, and Art. 23.4 of the 2012 ICC Rules.
332 Art. 9 of the 2014 ICDR (“A party may not amend or supplement a claim or counterclaim if the amendment
or supplement would fall outside the scope of the agreement to arbitrate”) and Art. 6.1 of the 2016 JAMS
Rules (“However, a claim or defense may not be amended in such a manner that the amended claim or the
amended defense falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause or the parties’ separate arbitration agreement”).
333 The AAA Rules do address, however, the difference between the change of the value of the claim, which
practically does not ask for the tribunal’s permission (as it does not affect its adjudicatory powers) and
change of the claims themselves or introduction of new claims that requires the tribunals’ ruling. See R-6(a)
and R-6(b) of the 2013 AAA Rules. These are, however, domestic rules.
334 Subject to its general competence of the scope question, see section 7.1.2.
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Hypothetically, one could reflect that it is justified to vacate the decision, especially
when it does not address all of the counterclaims or material defenses. If the tribunal
omitted certain parts of the parties’ submissions, it could be questioned whether (i) the
panel deliberately decided not to render a decision on a certain claim or (ii) whether it was
an accident. That could be particularly important for the fate of an infra petita award.
If the tribunal knowingly chose not to decide on a claim (or counterclaim), one may
wonder if it had a power to do so. On the one hand, parties have genuine expectations
towards the tribunal to have all of their claims answered, since it is the underlying reason
why the tribunal is specifically contracted. On the other hand, if a specific claim has been
omitted in the award, but it is clear that it has been taken into account during the
deliberations, it might be conceivable that by not including the claim the tribunal impliedly
rejected it.335 Such a conclusion would be particularly true if the tribunal firmly states that
it “rejects any and all other claims” or that “it was in full and final settlement of all claims
between the parties.”336 In this context, such an infra petita awardwould be in fact considered
complete and as such it will also entail a res iudicata effect, preventing parties’ frombringing
omitted claims before another arbitral tribunal or before the court.
Conversely, if it is clear from the award that the tribunal indeed failed to address all
the issues, namely, intended to answer all issues raised, but was not successful, the award
cannot be considered as complete. It is possible, however, that it will also be concluded
with an closing statement that it “rejects any and all other claims”, which would make it
difficult to prove that the omissions were not intended. Nonetheless, if the court finds that
a material defense of a party has not been considered, it might use its remedial powers to
save the award.337
335 Arguably, however, an implied rejection of claims is not an ideal solution, especially if it has been introduced
as a party’s material defense.
336 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 794 F. Supp. 53, 55 (D.P.R. 1992) (“[…] the record of the
proceedings reflects that the arbitrators, although silent in their award regarding the counterclaim, did consider
and render a decision on the claim. The chairman stated that the arbitrators had reviewed all the papers filed
by the parties, which presumably included respondents’ counterclaim. Respondents testified in some detail as
to their alleged damages arising out of their counterclaim. As a result, the explicit statement in the award that
it was in full and final settlement of all claims between the parties must be viewed as a statement that it
included a decision on petitioners’ counterclaim – in respondent’s favor.”).
337 See section 3.3. See, however, the Restatement (third tentative draft) pp.83-84 (“Courts occasionally remand
awards because a matter that was properly submitted to the tribunal and is essential to the completeness of
the award appears not to have been decided in the award. […] Reference in this context is usually made to
overlooked claims rather than overlooked defenses. However, a tribunal’s utter and inexplicable failure to
address a matter such as the statute of limitations, a jurisdictional argument, or even an essential substantive
defense, if properly invoked, may justify remand for supplementation of the award. […] On the other hand,
it is critical in this regard that the court remand only if there is a real and genuine omission. Before finding
a lacuna that might justify remand, a court will carefully consider whether remand for supplementation is
unnecessary, and indeed improper, because a decision on the ostensibly omitted matter is implicit in the
award’s reasoning. In cases of doubt, the court may ask a tribunal to indicate more clearly what in fact it
298
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
On the one hand, Born prefers that “awards should generally be subject to annulment
on infra petita grounds, including when […] arbitration legislation contains no express
provision to that effect. That is because an arbitral tribunal’s failure to consider issues
presented to it in fact amounts to an excess of authority, even if it appears only to be the
reverse, because it effectively rewrites the tribunal’s mandate, which is an act beyond the
arbitrators’ competence; that is particularly true when a tribunal fails to consider defenses
or counterclaims related to relief that it does grant.”338
On the other hand, the Restatement offers remedies in order to heal the infra petita
awards and make them in turn effectively confirmed. In the view of the Restatement:
“[i]ndeed, an ‘incomplete’ awardmight be characterized as a partial award – an award that
resolves some but not all issues in dispute – and be enforceable as such. A party faced with
an incomplete award may nevertheless ask a court to remand it to the arbitrators […], and,
in appropriate circumstances, a court may be entitled to provide a remedy using its powers
of correction […].”339
The better view is the one of the Restatement. Having in mind the exclusive character
of the grounds for vacatur, it is argued that infra petita is not one of them and it should
not be subsumed by the excess of powers ground. Taking into account the federal
pro-arbitration policy it is preferred to partially enforce the award or remand the award
to the tribunal rather than to vacate the award. If the tribunal intentionally omitted some
claims, it could mean that they should be considered as not admitted, if, however, the
omission happened by mistake, it is difficult to attribute the intention to “rewrite the
mandate” to the arbitral panel.
7.3 Process of application of law by the arbitral tribunal
The process of application of law by the tribunal is a complex one. Since the beginning of
an arbitration until the verymoment of the issuance of the award, the tribunal has a power
but also a duty to follow the applicable rules of law. Albeit not all of its decisions on
applicable law can be found in the award, each of these decisions undoubtedly structures
final determinations of the tribunal made in the award. The process of application of law
can be divided into steps that will be analyzed below: first, the tribunal needs to determine
the method of selecting the applicable law (section 7.3.1) and consequently choose the
decided in the award; that response will determine whether further action by the tribunal is required.”). For
further reading on remand, see the Restatement (third tentative draft) pp.80-85.
338 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3294.
339 TheRestatement (second tentative draft) p.201. See also theRestatement (third tentative draft) p.79 (“Remand
is also the appropriate mechanism by which to perfect an award that demonstrably has failed to address a
claim or defense that was properly before the tribunal. In such a case, a court lacks authority to decide the
omitted matter itself, while vacatur may also be inappropriate or unavailable.”). See also p.82 therein.
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applicable substantive law (section 7.3.2).While ascertaining the content of the applicable
law (section 7.3.3), the tribunal might face problems related to the mandatory rules of law
(section 7.3.4) and its ability to decide on principles of equity (section 7.3.5).
7.3.1 Determining the method of selection of applicable law
This section is intended to briefly reflect on two methods of selecting the applicable law,
namely (i) on the choice of the applicable conflict of laws rules and (ii) on the direct
determination of the applicable law. Generally, such a first step is only necessary when no
choice of law clause can be found in the contract. In the absence of the parties’ choice of
law, the tribunal will be, by and large, entitled to determine on its own motion what law
is the most “appropriate”. Conversely, if parties have expressly indicated the applicable
law, the tribunal should follow the parties’ choice of law.340
Assuming that the parties have not included a choice of law clause, then the tribunal
needs to initiate an inquiry in order to determine what law applies. Since the FAA does
not provide any fallback mechanism (nor limitations) for determining the applicable law,
the tribunal, arguably, will have extensive freedom in the approach it takes for the
determining the method to select the applicable law. On that note, in fact, the conflict of
laws rules analysis is not the easiest one and thus the tribunal may decide not to opt for
this path at all, especially taking into account that it has another approach at its disposal,
namely, the direct application of law without any reference to the applicable conflict of
laws rules. Conceivably, a number of institutional rules accommodate the tribunals with
such a power to decide on the applicable lawwithout the need of any recourse to the conflict
of laws rules.341 In any event, the decision on the applicable conflict of laws rules (if any)
or the direct selection of the applicable law should be, in principle, considered as embedded
in the process and, therefore, within the boundaries of the tribunal’s powers save for an
agreement of the parties to the contrary as explained above.342 This implies that the tribunal’s
determination of themethod of selecting the applicable lawwould likely survive the excess
of powers challenge.343
340 (Silberman & Ferrari, 2010) p.323 (“where parties make an express choice of national law to govern the
substance of their dispute and the arbitrators fail to honor that choice – by applying general principles of
commercial law or disregarding a choice to apply a particular substantive legal regime – that action should
be considered outside the scope of the arbitrators’ authority and regarded as an excess of power by the
arbitrators.”).
341 See, e.g., Art. 31.1 of the 2014 ICDR Rules, Art.19.1 of the 2016 JAMS Rules.
342 Partiesmay also designate the choice of law rule (instead of the applicable law) in their contract. This should
bind the tribunal as well.
343 See, e.g., Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. v. Citigroup, Inc., 557 F. App’x 66, 67 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 137,
190 L. Ed. 2d 45 (2014).
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7.3.2 Decision on applicable law
As pointed out in the previous section, the tribunal, prior to its decision on the merits of
the case, needs to determine what law applies. If no choice of law provision exists, the
tribunal has to either employ a conflict of laws analysis or decide directly what the governing
law is.344 Irrespective of its choice, the tribunal’s selection will inevitably affect its decision
on the parties’ claims. As always, however, it is necessary to reflect if it is possible to
challenge (if at all) the tribunal’s decision on applicable law by invoking the excess of
powers ground.345 Since the decision on applicable law is closely related to the conflict of
laws analysis, the reflections from this and the previous section should be read together.346
On a general note, at the outset of the dispute, a tribunal may be faced either (i) with
an express choice of law provision provided in a contract or (ii) find the necessary guidance
in the parties’ pleadings on applicable law. Only if it cannot distill the parties’ intentions
from these sources will it initiate the procedure to find an “appropriate” law.347
In case the parties’ intent has been explicitly articulated, it goes without saying that the
tribunal should follow the parties’ agreement (on applicable law).348 Consequently, an
express choice of law should be considered as a bar for the tribunal to decide to the
contrary.349 In the absence of the parties’ express choice, the parties’ submissions frame
the issue at hand. The most anticipated scenario is that the parties submit opposing views
as to what law applies.350 If that happens, on the one hand, it is reasonable to expect the
tribunal to follow one of the parties’ views and not to seek the applicable law
independently.351 On the other hand, the institutional rules (e.g. the ICDR Rules or the
JAMSRules)352 give a broad discretion for the tribunal to determine the “appropriate” law.
Therefore, arguably, the tribunal’s decision that does not follow the parties’ submissions
344 Most likely the tribunal will directly choose the applicable law. See section 7.3.1. Also see (CraigW. L., The
arbitrator’s mission and the application of law in international commercial arbitration, 2010) p.259.
345 At this point, it is also necessary to recognize that the tribunal might need to grant two separate decisions,
namely (i) on the law applicable to the agreement to arbitrate and (ii) on the law applicable to the merits
of the dispute. Such a distinctionmight be relevant because itmight affect the court’s approach to the excess
of powers challenge. Arguably, the analysis dealing with the law applicable to the agreement to arbitrate
will relate to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, whereas the decision on the law applicable to the merits will be a
first step of the decision on the merits. Consequently, the scope of the court’s review might differ. See also
(Silberman & Ferrari, 2010) p.318.
346 See section 7.3.1.
347 See section 7.3.1.
348 See also the Restatement (second tentative draft) pp.219-220.
349 See section 7.3.1.
350 If parties are unanimous on the subject of governing law, they do not leave any leeway for the tribunal to
decide otherwise.
351 Since theU.S. is a common law systemwhere the principle of iura novit arbiter does not apply. See (Rutledge,
Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.920. Also (International Law Association, 2008).
352 Art. 31 of the 2014 ICDR, Art. 19 of the 2016 JAMS Rules. Importantly, the ICDR Rules allows also for
application of “Rules of Law” and not only law.
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(and is based on the tribunal’s own legal findings) might still survive the challenge. The
better view for the tribunal is, however, to follow the parties’ lead and restrict its choice of
law to law(s) suggested by the parties. In any event, the tribunal’s choice of law will likely
survive the “excess of powers” challenge.353
7.3.3 Ascertaining the content of applicable substantive law by the arbitral
tribunal
The tribunal’s ultimate task, when asked to decide upon the legal principles, is to subsume
legal norms to the facts of the case and render the award. One view is that the tribunal
should follow the parties’ legal reasoning or face the challenge that it exceeds its powers
by deciding differently than parties have pleaded. In the alternative, since the parties
choosing arbitration are contracting (among other things) for the finality of the tribunal’s
decision, the process of application of law by the tribunal should be, by and large,
non-reviewable.354 Put differently, (alleged) errors in application of law should not lead to
a successful vacatur on the “excess of powers” ground.355 In any case, some reflections on
the process of determining the content of the applicable law need to be put forward.
First of all, as highlighted earlier,356 parties may rely on a general choice of law clause
in order to evidence which law applies. If that happens, the tribunal would be, in principle,
bound to follow the parties’ selection. Parties, however, should not assume that the mere
reference to the general choice of law clause in the main contract would suffice to impose
the limits on the tribunal’s powers prescribed by said law (for example, restriction on the
power to award punitive damages, which is prohibited by the law applicable to the
dispute).357 In other words, an express (albeit general) choice of law provision limits the
tribunal’s determinations as to the question which law applies, but does not force the
tribunal to follow substantive limitations (that could be found in applicable law) on its
otherwise broad authority. In order to put restrictions on the tribunal’s powers, parties
need to invoke these constraints explicitly in their agreement.
353 Importantly, the court standard of review for a decision on applicable law might differ, depending on if it
deals with law applicable to the agreement to arbitrate or to the merits of the case. See fn.345.
354 See also section 3.2.
355 Josephthal & Co. v. Cruttenden Roth Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 232, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“An award may not be
vacated under this subsection on the grounds that the arbitrators’ opinion fails to interpret correctly the law
applicable to the issues in dispute in the arbitration proceeding, or misinterprets the underlying contract, even
if that misinterpretation is ‘clearly erroneous.’”), Seed Holdings, Inc. v. Jiffy Int’l AS, 5 F. Supp. 3d 565, 585
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Arbitration awards are not reviewed for errors made in law or fact […] Rather, an award
may only be vacated on extremely limited grounds.”).
356 See section 7.3.2.
357 SeeMastrobuono, 514 U.S. 52, 63-64, 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1219, 131 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1995).
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Secondly, in the context of ascertaining the contents of the applicable law it is impossible
not to mention the doctrine of manifest disregard of the law. As discussed above,358 it is
(was) one of the most frequently used non-statutory grounds to challenge the award.
Nonetheless, since the SupremeCourt’s decision inHall Street it became uncertainwhether
the doctrine can still be used.359 The manifest disregard standard goes beyond the notion
of simple error in interpreting the law. In order to satisfy the court, the challenging party
must not only prove that there was a clear and well-defined legal rule, but also it needs to
show that the tribunal consciously decided to ignore this rule in its decisional process. In
one pre-Hall Street decision one court held that “arbitrators exceed their powers in this
regard not when they merely interpret or apply the governing law incorrectly, but when the
award is completely irrational, or exhibits amanifest disregard of the law.”360 In the post-Hall
Street reality, it is evenmore difficult to substantiate the challenge on themanifest disregard
ground. Therefore, arguably, evenwhen the tribunal ignores a legal rule, the award is likely
to survive vacatur, unless the disregarded rule is of a public policy character. The exception
to the rule would be manifest disregard of mandatory rules of public policy.361
Although the process of ascertaining the contents of the applicable law might escape
from a thorough judicial scrutiny, it is necessary to point out that “[…] while it may well
be true that, except for extreme cases of willful disregard of law amounting to irrationality,
there is little possibility of holding the arbitrator to the application of substantive legal
principles, the wide leap in reasoning that leads to the conclusion that the state and federal
arbitration statutes absolve the arbitrator from the use of law is not justified.”362
Finally, onemaywonderwhether the tribunal needs to follow the parties’ legal pleadings
when deciding on the dispute. Rutlege and others mention that “[c]onsistent with its
common law tradition, the general expectation and practice in US arbitration is for the
parties to provide the tribunal with the applicable legal authorities and written argument
applying those authorities to the specific facts of the case.”363 Conceivably, a tribunal’s decision
that is based on its own legal arguments or theories may still survive the excess of powers
challenge as long as the tribunal gives the parties an equal opportunity to submit their
comments on the legal rules that the tribunal finds relevant.
358 See section 6.1.1.
359 See section 6.1.1.
360 Schoenduve Corp. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 442 F.3d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 2006).
361 See section 6.2.4.
362 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2015) § 30:5.
363 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.920.
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7.3.4 Application of mandatory rules of law (of public policy character) by the
arbitral tribunal
Presumably there are only three hypothetical instances where the process of the application
of mandatory rules of law (of a public policy character)364 by an arbitral tribunal may be
challenged on the basis of excess of powers: (i) the parties tried to limit the application of
legally prescribed restrictions and the tribunal did not conform, (ii) the parties did not
raise arguments based onmandatory provisions and the tribunal applied them irrespectively,
and (iii) the tribunal violated public policy by misapplying mandatory norms.365
In a nutshell, each of these arguments is fallacious and is rarely successful. The ultimate
notion that underlines the rebuttal of all of these assertions is the tribunal’s duty of care
for the well-being of the award at the post-award stage.366 In fact, it is more likely that the
court would vacate the award if the tribunal follows the parties’ ill-founded restrictions
on the application of mandatory rules (and thus refrains from applying the mandatory
rules), rather than punish the tribunal for trying to respect and apply themost fundamental
concepts of law.367
In response to the first and second challenges, as explained above,368 it should be noted
that it is in the very nature ofmandatory rules of public policy that partiesmay not contract
out of them. It furthermeans that the tribunal should determine their impact on the dispute
even if parties seek to avoid it. It has been argued by Craig, with the reference to the
Mitsubishi case, that “[…] case law in the United States […] not only finds that mandatory
law issues are arbitrable, but that the arbitrators have a duty to examine the effect of
mandatory law on contractual obligations.”369 In addition, as pointed out by the International
364 These are the rules that parties may not contract out. See, e.g., (Radicati di Brozolo L., 2012) pp.50-51 who
discusses i.a. the “overriding” character of some mandatory rules.
365 Two qualifications need to be done: (i) misapplication should be considered as an error in determining the
contents of law; therefore, it cannot be framed within the “excess of powers” challenge since, arguably, the
concept of an error in interpretation does not fit comfortably within the scope of the definition of an excess.
For this reason, only public policy considerations are in place (see section 4.3). See, however, the
Restatement’s take on post-award relief, section 5.1 and section 5.3 (which will bring the public policy
violations back to the scope of Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA). Additionally, and arguably, (ii) for the purpose
of this study (and in the context of U.S. law), the distinction between procedural and substantive rules of
public policy character is not relevant.
366 Without going into details whether the tribunal has the duty to render an enforceable award or not, the
tribunal should be at least sensible of what may happen with the award after its production.
367 Arguably, if the tribunal follows the parties’ wishes and refrains from applying clear-cut legal concepts of
public policy character, it might face a challenge on the basis of the manifest disregard of the law. See also
section 6.1.1.
368 See fn.364.
369 (Craig W. L., The arbitrator’s mission and the application of law in international commercial arbitration,
2010) p.278. Importantly, in this passage, Craig discusses the “law ofmandatory application (lois de police)”
which he defines on p. 277 in these words: “Laws of mandatory application are those which by the subject
matter that they address and the intent of the legislature, pre-empt, in the territory of their application, any
agreement by the contracting parties to the contrary.”
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LawAssociation in its report of 2008: “In disputes implicating rules of public policy or other
rules fromwhich the partiesmay not derogate, arbitratorsmay be justified in takingmeasures
appropriate to determine the applicability and contents of such rules, including by making
independent research, raising with the parties new issues (whether legal or factual), and
giving appropriate instructions or ordering appropriate measures insofar as they consider
this necessary to abide by those rules or to protect against challenges to the award.”370
The last challenge tries to accommodate an argument that the tribunal violates public
policywhen it (mis)appliesmandatory rules of a public policy character. Generally, however,
it has been considered that “[…] an incorrect application of mandatory law rules is not
fundamentally different from mis(application) of other rules of law by the arbitral tribunal
and that only in cases involving serious errors of mandatory law, leading to results that
significantly undermine or frustrate statutory objectives in a socially-unacceptable manner,
may an award be annulled. Other errors of law, including mandatory law, do not ordinarily
provide a basis for annulment.”371 Consequently, the tribunal’s exercise of the power to
apply mandatory rules of law will greatly escape the “excess of powers” review.
7.3.5 Decision based on equity or reached ex aequo et bono
Allowing the tribunal to decide on the basis of the general concept of equity and justice
instead of applying the rules of law requires an ultimate trust from the parties. It has been
pointed out that “[p]arties are free to grant the arbitrators the power to decide their dispute
in accordance with general principles of equity (ie ex aequo et bono). In the absence of such
agreement by the parties, and particularly where the parties have agreed to a particular
substantive governing law, the arbitrators are generally obligated to apply a specific system
of law.”372 That is why the only reasonable view and the only instance when the tribunal
has the power to decide on the basis of equity is when parties expressly vest it with the
authority to do so.
Although the statutory framework set out in the FAA is silent on the issue of deciding
ex aequo et bono, the rules of leading arbitration institutes introduce a clear-cut rule that
puts emphasis on the parties’ express authorization being necessary for the tribunal to
decide on the case based on equity.373
370 (International Law Association, 2008) Recommendation 13, p.23.
371 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3330. See, however, (Born, International Commercial
Arbitration, 2014) pp.3330-3331 (“Nonetheless, there are commentators who urge, and national courts which
apply, more extensive judicial review of arbitrators’ mandatory law and public policy decisions, on the grounds
that this is necessary in order to safeguard underlying public values.”).
372 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.920.
373 Art. 31.3 of the 2014 ICDR Rules (“The tribunal shall not decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono
unless the parties have expressly authorized it to do so.”); Art. 31.1 of the 2016 JAMS Rules (“The Tribunal
will decide a dispute ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur only if the parties have expressly authorized
it to do so.”).
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Additionally, one of the leading commentators argue that the rationale behind the
unauthorized determination of ex aequo et bono is similar to the classic approach to the
manifest disregard of the law (i.e. the one that “pertains to a situation inwhich the arbitrators
describe the applicable law cogently and knowledgeably and then deliberately ignore it in
reaching their determination”).374 The comparison is verywell founded. Arguably, however,
having inmind the uncertain fate of themanifest disregard afterHall Street, the challenging
partywould be better off with substantiating its objectionswith the excess of powers ground
and not themanifest disregard.375 In any event, parties considering a challenge of the award
on the basis of the non-authorized application of the ex aequo et bono standard will carry
a heavy burden of proof.376
7.4 Decisions on remedies
Generally speaking, the basic rationale for the parties to bring their dispute before the
tribunal is to seek relief. It can take the form of different types of remedies. The most
traditional forms of remedies will be discussed below. Damages, which are the basic form
of the remedy under U.S. contract law, should be analyzed first (section 7.4.1 and section
7.4.2).377 Then an analysis of specific performance (section 7.4.3) and contract adaptation
(section 7.4.4) will follow. In principle, however, as briefly explained by Born, the tribunal
374 (Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates, 2013) p.604
(“In effect, manifest disregard is roughly equivalent to a finding that the arbitrator engaged in amiable
composition without the disputing parties’ authorization. Amiable composition is a civil law concept that
originated in French arbitration law, allowing arbitrators to rule in equity when the application of the governing
law would yield an unjust or inappropriate outcome given the circumstances of the case. An arbitrator may
rule as an amiable compositor only if the parties specifically grant the arbitrator such authority. Granting the
arbitrators the power to rule as amiable compositors can act as a ‘safety valve’ for commercial parties seeking
to avoid legal conclusions that are antagonistic to their business interests. An arbitral award that recognizes
the governing law but deliberately ignores it can be vacated formanifest disregard of the law.”). See also (Craig
W. L., The arbitrator’s mission and the application of law in international commercial arbitration, 2010)
pp.271-272.
375 For further reading on excess of powers and manifest disregard of the law, see sections 5.1 and 6.1.1.
376 See, e.g., the Restatement (second tentative draft) p.218 (“However, a party challenging an award on this
basis bears a serious burden. It must show that, despite an express prohibition, the tribunal clearly and
unambiguously adopted and applied ex aequo et bono standards, and that the resulting departure from the
agreed-upon manner of proceeding was material within the meaning of Comment d, supra. A party cannot
meet this burden merely by arguing that the tribunal, while purporting to decide the dispute by reference to
the chosen law, in fact interpreted or applied that law so as to reach a result dictated by ex aequo et bono
reasoning rather than by application of the chosen law. The body of law that the parties adopted to govern
the contract, or that the tribunal chose to apply in the absence of a choice by the parties, will in any event
commonly include general principles of equity, good faith, and commercial reasonableness thatmay resemble,
but still not constitute, ex aequo et bono reasoning, thus making it difficult to find that the tribunal decided
the dispute ex aequo et bono rather than by reference to the chosen law.”).
377 Of course, law different from U.S. contract law can be applicable to the issue of damages. This would have
to be resolved by the applicable law analysis. For further reading, see section 7.3.1 and section 7.3.2.
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is given a broad spectrum of remedial powers378 and awards are rarely annulled for excess
of authority based on the way the tribunal uses its remedial authority; notably, it holds
true even if the “award of relief […] violates contractual limitations.”379
7.4.1 Decision on damages in general
As mentioned above, seeking damages is the basic form of relief in U.S. contract law. For
that reason the likelihood that parties will request the tribunal to grant damages is rather
high. Consequently, a party’s request usually entails that the tribunal has a power to grant
the remedy sought. There are, however, instances that need to be analyzed further: (i)
parties in their agreement to arbitrate state that the tribunal cannot grant damages and
the tribunal granted them irrespectively,380 (ii) the tribunal awards damages higher than
requested, and (iii) the tribunal grants damageswhen a different type of relief (for example
specific performance) was sought.
It is difficult to envisage the first scenario happening in practice.381 On the one hand,
an agreement to arbitrate is an ultimate benchmark for the tribunal with regard to the
scope of its powers and thus the tribunal should respect limitations to its powers. On the
other hand, however, the general (but explicit) limitation to the power to grant damages
might make an agreement to arbitrate inoperative to the extent that no other remedies
might be available to the parties.382 Arguably, if this is the case, upon one party’s request
378 See also Timegate Studios, Inc. v. Southpeak Interactive, L.L.C., 713 F.3d 797, 803 (5th Cir. 2013) (“In this
case, the arbitration clause is quite broad and contains no limits relevant to the instant dispute: ‘any dispute
… shall be submitted to binding arbitration.’ […] Moreover, ‘the arbitrator’s selection of a particular remedy
is given even more deference than his reading of the underlying contract.’ […] ‘The remedy lies beyond the
arbitrator’s jurisdiction only if ‘there is no rational way to explain the remedy handed down by the arbitrator
as a logical means of furthering the aims of the contract.’”).
379 This would then likely entail the erroneous “substantive” decision freed from judicial review. See (Born,
International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3305-3306 (“A recurrent issue concerns the consequences
of an arbitral tribunal’s award of relief that violates contractual limitations (e.g., an award of consequential
damages or lost profits, notwithstanding contractual provisions forbidding such relief). In general, most
national courts have (correctly) concluded that these types of awards do not constitute an excess of authority,
but instead involve erroneous substantive decisions, not subject to judicial review.”). Notably and importantly,
the supporting case law is from the U.S.
380 It is far less difficult to foresee parties prohibiting the tribunal to grant reliefs other than damages. Holtzmann
and Donovan in (Holtzmann, Donovan, Tahbaz, & Amirfar, 2013) Chapter VII(2)(a)(6) conclude that
“courts have also found arbitrators to have exceeded their powers when they granted remedies prohibited by
the agreement.”.
381 It is possible, however, in cases of insurance disputes, for example, that the authority has capped on a certain
amount. See, e.g., Brijmohan v. State Farm Ins. Co., 92 N.Y.2d 821, 699N.E.2d 414 (1998) (“[The a]rbitrator
exceeded his authority by awarding $75,000 in uninsuredmotorist (UM) benefits, where the policy’s arbitration
clause provided that the arbitrator would not render an award that exceeded the policy limits and a declarations
page showed that the UM limits were only $10,000, even though the insurer did not produce the declarations
page or otherwise object until the confirmation hearing”).
382 Yet, the agreement is controlling (thus damagesmay not be granted) if the tribunal possesses the alternative
remedial powers. See also Seagate Tech., LLC v. W. Digital Corp., 854 N.W.2d 750, 765 (Minn. 2014) (“In
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for damages, a tribunal might try to circumvent the initial restrictions in order to rescue
an agreement to arbitrate from its created limits and explore the parties’ underlying intent
to arbitrate. It would be, however, highly controversial for the tribunal to cure a
prospectively pathological clause.383 If an agreement to arbitrate does not entail any express
limit to the tribunal’s powers, it is argued that the tribunal has a certain leeway to accept
(or even tailor) reliefs sought.384
As argued by commentators: “[a]n arbitrator is not required to read a contract literally.
While the arbitratormay not award relief expressly forbidden by the agreement of the parties,
the court cannot vacate the award just because the relief granted is not found in the language
of the contract. In other words, subject to the terms of the empowering clause, arbitrators
have latitude in crafting arbitration awards as wide as their latitude in deciding cases.”385
Also institutional rules expressly limit the tribunal’s broad discretion to grant any remedies
to the contents of the parties’ intentions expressed in the parties’ agreement.386 Notably,
the Restatement makes an important distinction between contractual limitation to the
tribunal’s remedial authority and contractual limitation on the available contractual
remedies.387 Only in the case of the former the award may be vacated on the “excess of
powers” ground. The latter would work only as a restriction imposed on the parties
themselves rather than on a tribunal. Consequently, the court will not review the merits
of the case. As concluded by the Restatement: “[…] if the parties intended to preclude or
limit the recovery of certain remedies, a broad arbitration clause would give the tribunal the
authority to rule on the enforceability of the remedy limitation, and a court will not review
the tribunal’s decision.”388
addition, we reiterate that the scope of arbitrator authority is a matter of contract and parties are always free
to fashion arbitration agreements in ways that limit the arbitrator’s power to award certain types of relief.”).
383 See, e.g., Augusta Capital, LLC v. Reich & Binstock, LLP, No. 3:09-CV-0103, 2009WL 2065555, at *4 (M.D.
Tenn. July 10, 2009) (“The Court finds that the arbitration panel in this case exceeded its powers by fashioning
a remedy that added to, altered and/ormodified the terms and conditions of the parties’ agreement in violation
of Section 12.2(a) of that agreement.[…] [B]y limiting the terms of Section 7.5 to make them ‘less harsh,’ the
arbitration panel exceeded its authority specifically set forth in Section 12.2 of the agreement. Therefore, in
fashioning the remedy, the arbitrators exceeded their powers […]”).
384 See fn.378 and fn.379.
385 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2015) § 38:14. For further reading,
see also (Cole, 2016) pp.223-224.
386 See, e.g., Art. 31.1 of the 2016 JAMS Rules (“The Tribunal may grant any remedy or relief, including, but
not limited to, specific performance of a contract, which is within the scope of the agreement of the parties
and permissible under the law(s) or rules of law applicable to the dispute […]”); in a domestic context R-47(a)
of the 2013 AAA Rules (“The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and
equitable andwithin the scope of the agreement of the parties, including, but not limited to, specific performance
of a contract.”).
387 See the Restatement (second tentative draft) pp.195-198 and pp.200-201.
388 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.196.
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The second scenario is rather evident. The tribunal should not exceed the amount of
damages sought by the parties. If a tribunal renders an ultra petita decision, it should
expect that it will be successfully vacated pursuant to Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. It should
be noted, however, that, if possible, the vacating court may decide to vacate not the entire
award but only the part that goes beyond the parties’ requests.389 It is also necessary to
highlight that the tribunal, while awarding damages, should take into account the limits
for damages that could be prescribed by applicable law. In one case it was reported that
“[a]n award violates public policy when it exceeds themaximumamount of recovery allowed
by law.”390
Under the third scenario the tribunal effectivelymodifies the relief sought by the parties.
By doing so (unless a party submitted alternative claims) it will exceed its powers and will
put its award at risk. The tribunal will violate its task to answer the relief sought and instead
will impose its own vision of a just solution.
7.4.2 Decision on punitive damages
By and large, a feature of the arbitration system in theU.S. is the possibility to grant punitive
damages. It has been pointed out, however, that “although punitive damages are regularly
awarded in domestic arbitrations in the US, such awards are quasi-inexistent in the
international arena”391 and that “[o]verall, it appears that punitive damages awards in
arbitration are essentially an American phenomenon.”392 Leaving aside the question of
constitutionality of punitive damages393 and their availability in both a tort and contractual
context,394 the issue at hand is whether the tribunal’s decision on punitive damages can be
successfully challenged on the basis of the excess of powers ground. Not surprisingly, the
analysis should reflect on international and not on domestic commercial arbitration.395
In international commercial arbitration, as has been suggested above, the notion of
the tribunal granting punitive damages is rather theoretical. Nonetheless, for illustrative
purposes, one should assume a hypothetical dispute between foreign parties with the
tribunal having its seat in New York. Following a challenge on the tribunal’s decision
389 See section 3.3; the vacating court may also come to the conclusion that the ultra petita holding is nothing
more than mere miscalculation and use its competence based on Section 11 of the FAA to make an order
modifying or correcting the award.
390 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2013) § 39:9, referring to Matter of
Carty (Nationwide Ins. Co.), 149 A.D.2d 328, 539 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1st Dep’t 1989).
391 (Petsche, 2013) p.89.
392 (Petsche, 2013) p.91.
393 (Farnsworth, Punitive Damages in Arbitration, 1991) p.4, (Petsche, 2013) p.98 and the literature therein.
394 (Farnsworth, Punitive Damages in Arbitration, 1991) p.6, (Petsche, 2013) p.95.
395 The considerations of this section in the domestic arbitration context are evenmore applicable. One cannot
stress enough how important the clear and unambiguous limitation to grant punitive damages is. Especially
taking into account that the AAA Rules do not entail any ban to the tribunal’s powers as compared to the
provisions of the ICDR Rules or the JAMS Rules (see fn.397).
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awarding punitive damages, the vacating court would exercise the regular three-step test
for an excess of powers review.
The first step, therefore, would be to assess the scope of an agreement to arbitrate and
how the parties address the issue of punitive damages (if they do so at all). Sometimes
parties argued that the limitation to award punitive damages was introduced by the choice
of law selection that does not allow the tribunal to grant certain types of damages (i.e.
punitive). As noted above, however, and following theMastrobuono decision, parties may
not rely on their choice of law clause in order to evidence that they intended to follow the
restrictions on the tribunal’s authority envisaged by the chosen law.396 Arguably, parties
may try to rely on the content of the institutional rules which, in the international context,
accommodate an express provision banning the use of punitive damages (unless agreed
otherwise).397 The better view is to follow the suggestion aptly pointed out by Farnsworth:
“[i]f you [i.e. the drafter of an agreement to arbitrate] would strip the arbitrators of the power
to award punitive damages, you should – in so many words – either ban ‘punitive’ (or
‘exemplary’) damages or allow only ‘compensatory’ damages. The drafter who uses plain
English, however, can eliminate the risk of an award of punitive damages.”398 Therefore,
parties wishing to narrow the tribunal’s powers and exclude the possibility of facing the
award of punitive damages should do so explicitly.399
In addition, of particular relevancewith regard to the contractual limits to the tribunal’s
powers, is a part of the Restatement where it is reported that “[a] particularly difficult issue
is whether a provision that precludes the award of a form of damages (such as consequential
damages or punitive damages) is a remedy limitation or a restriction on the arbitrators’
authority. If the provision is a remedy limitation, a broad arbitration clause would give the
tribunal the authority to rule on its validity with only very limited court review. If the
provision is a restriction on the arbitrators’ authority, a court could vacate the award under
§ 10(a)(4) if the tribunal violates the restriction by awarding such damages.”400 The point
396 See section 7.3.1.
397 See, e.g., Art. 31.5 of the 2014 ICDR Rules (“Unless the parties agree otherwise, the parties expressly waive
and forego any right to punitive, exemplary, or similar damages unless any applicable law(s) requires that
compensatory damages be increased in a specified manner. This provision shall not apply to an award of
arbitration costs to a party to compensate for misconduct in the arbitration.”); Art. 31.2 of the 2016 JAMS
Rules (“Unless the parties agree otherwise, the parties expressly waive and forgo any right to punitive, exemplary
or similar damages, unless a statute requires that compensatory damages be increased in a specified manner.
This provision will not limit the Tribunal’s authority to take into account a party’s dilatory or bad faith
conduct in the arbitration in apportioning arbitration costs between or among the parties.”).
398 (Farnsworth, Punitive Damages in Arbitration, 1991) p.14.
399 It is reasonable to suggest that parties wishing to exclude the power to grant punitive damages should do
so on the face of their agreement; it would be true even when they include arbitration rules that limit the
tribunal’s powers. Narrowing the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s powers within the content of the agreement
to arbitrate, might arguably affect whether the vacating court exercises a de novo or deferential review of
the award.
400 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.289.
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made by the Restatement further strengthens the position that (any) limitation on the
tribunal’s authority (and especially the one to grant punitive damages) has to be made
clearly and unambiguously.Moreover, it should be preferred that such a limitation ismade
within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.401
It goes without saying and does not require more elaborate analysis that it is still
necessary for the parties to request the tribunal to grant punitive damages. The tribunal
would exceed its powers if it awards punitive relief on its own motion.402
Finally, it should bementioned, that an award on punitive damageswould likely survive
a public policy challenge in the U.S. In any event, the tribunal should be concerned not
only with the fate of the award in the country of the seat, but also in the country of the
possible enforcement. Since an award on punitive damages in most of the countries (but
for the U.S.) may violate the public policy, arbitral tribunals would be rather reluctant to
grant punitive damages. Even if they do so, it would be prudent and “vital for arbitral
tribunals clearly to distinguish between the amounts of compensatory and punitive damages
awarded.”403
7.4.3 Decision on specific performance
Specific performance as a remedy in the common law tradition is sometimes difficult to
reconcile with the powers of arbitral tribunals to fashion relief. It has been noted that “[…]
the traditional common law rule is that specific performance is available only when damages
are inadequate. The rule is an instance of the more general principle that equitable relief –
specific performance being an equitable remedy – is awarded only when the legal remedy is
inadequate.”404 The discussion here, however, should not focus on the position of a specific
remedy as compared to damages, but rather on the power of the tribunal to grant this type
of relief and the potential challenge against the award if specific performance is granted.
The answer herein should be fairly straightforward: in principle, the tribunal will have
the power to award specific performance.405 A standard, broad agreement to arbitrate
401 Arguably, the standard of review may vary. It will depend on whether the court is convinced that remedial
constraints are limitations to the tribunal’s powers or “mere” remedy limitations. In the former case
(particularly if limitations are included in the scope of the agreement to arbitrate) theymight be considered
as jurisdictional/threshold issues. See also section 7.1.2 and the Restatement (second tentative draft)
pp.195-196 and pp.200-201.
402 It should be pointed out, however, that, for example, both the ICDR Rules and the JAMS Rules provide the
tribunal with an authority to punish the parties for dilatory or bad faith conduct while deciding on the cost
of the proceedings. See fn.397.
403 (Petsche, 2013) p.103; in this way, the tribunal could facilitate the possibility of a partial enforcement of the
award.
404 (Eisenberg & Miller, 2013) p.6.
405 Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal &Musso, P.A. v. MedPartners, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 677, 686 (S.D.
Fla. 2001) aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, 312 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Arbitrators have the
authority to remedy a breach (anticipatory or otherwise) of contract in any way reasonably related to the
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should entail that specific performance is within the range of remedies at the tribunal’s
disposal. If not, however, a closer look at the institutional rules also clarifies that the tribunal
should be equipped with such a power.406 Similarly, the court in Grayson-Robinson Stores
v. Iris Construction Co. held that “[i]t would be quite remarkable if, after these parties had
agreed that arbitrators might award specific performance and after the arbitrators had so
ordered, the courts would, […] frustrate the whole arbitration process by refusing to confirm
the award.”407 Therefore, should the parties wish to limit the scope of relief at a tribunal’s
disposal, they should do so explicitly.
It goes without saying that a tribunal would be powerless with regard to specific
performance if parties do not plead in favor of it (either as a main, alternative or auxiliary
claim). Therefore, in most cases, the decision granting a specific performance will not be
susceptible to the “excess of powers” challenge.
7.4.4 Decision on contract adaptation and filling of gaps in the contract
Onoccasion, an arbitral tribunal is facedwith a variation of a task that it is usually entrusted
with, namely the contract adaptation and/or filling of gaps in the contract. Typically, such
a request (especially contract adaptation) is brought before the tribunal if a dispute arises
out of long-term, complex contracts. In addition, the power to fill gaps or revise contractual
terms is usually perceived as a “creative competence” of an arbitral tribunal and put in
direct opposition to its traditional adjudicatory function.408 As such, arguably, it requires
a direct authorization of parties in order to fulfill the task of contract revision.409 In the
context of American arbitration, however, another view has also been advanced. This
reflection, in a nutshell, posits that the contract revision or filling of the gaps in a contract
is nothingmore than contract interpretation, and as such is presumptively for the arbitrators
contract terms, including money damages or even specific performance.”). See also (Blackaby, Partasides,
Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) p.519.
406 See, e.g., Art. 31.1 of the 2016 JAMS Rules (“The Tribunal may grant any remedy or relief, including, but
not limited to, specific performance of a contract, which is within the scope of the agreement of the parties
and permissible under the law(s) or rules of law applicable to the dispute[…].”); R-47(a) of the 2013 AAA
Rules (“The arbitratormay grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable andwithin
the scope of the agreement of the parties, including, but not limited to, specific performance of a contract.”);
notably, the ICDR Rules do not provide for such a clear-cut proviso regarding specific performance. See
Art. 31 of the 2014 ICDR Rules.
407 Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Iris Construction Co., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 137, 168 N.E.2d 377, 378-79 (1960).
408 See, e.g., (Bernardini P., Stabilization and adaptation in oil and gas investments, 2008) p.107.
409 (Bernardini P., Stabilization and adaptation in oil and gas investments, 2008) p.107 (“The arbitration clause
should therefore expressly confer the power to adapt the agreement and determine the manner for its exercise
as well as the limits of the arbitrator’s authority in that regard”); (Kolkey, Chernick, & Reeves Neal, 2012)
p.242 (“In order to be effective, an arbitration agreement would have to be explicit in conferring on an arbitral
tribunal the power to fill gaps or adapt a contract”).
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to deal with.410 At the same time, however, arbitrators may not be willing to take up the
task of contract revision.411
It is necessary to begin with the recommendation for parties drafting an agreement to
arbitrate: it is better for the parties to frame the powers of an arbitral tribunal unequivocally
so that there is no doubt as to their underlying intent. It is simply because an agreement
to arbitrate would be always the point of departure for the analysis of whether parties
conferred a specific power upon an arbitral panel. It has been suggested that “[w]hen an
arbitral panel is asked to take that step [i.e. to fill gaps in or to adapt contracts], the panel’s
first act should be to examine both the arbitration agreement and the law applicable at the
seat of the arbitration (lex arbitri) for authority to fill gaps in or to adapt the contract.”412
Although this observation is of a more general nature (thus not limited to the American
reality per se), it puts forward a reasonable argument that should be equally valid in the
context of American arbitration. Holtzmann andDonovan on a similar note reflected that
“[b]ecause arbitration in the United States is amatter of contract under generally applicable
principles of contract law, arbitrators have the authority to fill gaps in the contract or adapt
the contract to fundamentally changed circumstances if the contract, the applicable law, or
the arbitration agreement confers the authority to do so.”413
That being said, it should be highlighted that even if an agreement to arbitrate does
not offer the comfort of an arbitral tribunal’s direct authorization, a tribunal’s decision on
contract adaptation or gap-filling is still well suited to survive a challenge at the post-award
stage. As mentioned above, it is suggested that a gap-filling exercise is nothing more and
nothing less than contract application in the event that an agreement to arbitrate has been
drafted broadly.414 Additionally, if the power to adapt a contract (e.g. price revision
provisions) is included in the contract (but outside the agreement to arbitrate), it might
be considered within the scope of the tribunal’s (and the court’s) authority to apply.415 As
a consequence of the Supreme Court decisions in Bazzle, Stolt-Nielsen andOxford Health,
certain gaps, depicted as a silence in the agreement, are for the tribunal to decide as long
410 (Rau, “Gap Filling" by Arbitrators, 2015).
411 Argued in the broader context of international arbitration in general: see, i.a., (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern,
&Hunter, 2015) pp.524-527; (Gaillard i Savage, Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International Commercial
Arbitration, 1999) p.25.
412 (Kolkey, Chernick, & Reeves Neal, 2012) p.241. Other authors underline that not only the law of the seat,
but also the law applicable to the merits might be relevant in order to determine whether the tribunal may
alter the contract. See (Berger, Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts toMake Sense, 2001)
pp.10-11.
413 (Holtzmann, Donovan, Tahbaz, & Amirfar, 2013) Chapter II(3)(b).
414 See, however, (Berger, Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make Sense, 2001) p.8.
415 See, e.g., Gas Nat. Aprovisionamientos, SDG, S.A. v. Atl. LNG Co. of Trinidad & Tobago, No. 08 CIV. 1109
(DLC), 2008 WL 4344525, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2008).
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as it bases its decision on contractual application416 and not on its own notion of public
policy.417
7.5 Decisions accessory to the parties’ main submissions and the merits of
the case
Usually, in the framework of an arbitral award, the tribunal would need to not only present
its determination on the main claims but also to award interest (section 7.5.1) and to
allocate the costs of the proceedings (section 6.4.2). These topics will be analyzed below
with some additional reflections on decisions on procedure (section 7.5.3).
7.5.1 Decision on interest
Since the value of an arbitral tribunal’s decision on interest may be high or, on occasion,
exceed the value of themain claim,418 it is not surprising that partiesmay wish to challenge
it on the excess of powers ground. It is tempting to argue that no authority to award interest
has been granted since the FAA is silent on this point and that an agreement to arbitrate
often does not give express powers for the tribunal to award interest. Generally, however,
such an argument will be ill-founded and unsuccessful.
Traditionally, a broadly worded agreement to arbitrate would only imply that the
tribunal has the power to award interest.419 Conceivably, such an implication should suffice,
because the decision on interest will generally follow the tribunal’s decision on the main
claim.420 Therefore, if the main claim will not be awarded, there will be no decision on
416 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 571–72, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2069–70, 186 L. Ed. 2d 113 (2013).
417 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. 662, 670-72, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767-68, 176 L. Ed. 2d 605 (2010).
418 See (Sénéchal & Gotanda, 2009) p.492, with some illustrative examples of awards therein.
419 It is argued that upon the inclusion of the ICDR or the JAMS Rules, these rules will constitute a source of
the arbitral powers. See Art. 31.4 of the 2014 ICDRRules (“[…], and the tribunalmay award such pre-award
and post-award interest, simple or compound, as it considers appropriate, taking into account the contract
and applicable law(s).”) andArt. 35.7 of the 2016 JAMSRules (“[…] the Tribunalmay award such pre-award
and post-award interest, simple or compound, as it considers appropriate, at such rate and from such date(s)
as the arbitrator(s) may deem appropriate, taking into consideration the contract and applicable law”); cf
Art. 32.7 of the 2011 JAMSRules (“[…] and the Tribunalmay award such pre-award and post-award interest,
simple or compound, as it considers appropriate, taking into consideration the contract and applicable law.”).
For the tribunal’s authority to award interest on an award until the “date of payment”, see also (Reisberg
& Pauley, 2013).
420 Even if a party seeks interest in a separate claim and not together with the main claim, a refusal to grant
the latter will inevitably affect the former. See, e.g., Faison & Gillespie v. Lorant, 187 N.C. App. 567, 579,
654 S.E.2d 47, 55 (2007) (“In the alternative, defendants argue the interest awarded by the arbitrator was
not a remedy, but a separate claim not before him under the Agreement. However, we conclude the interest
awarded in the Arbitration Decision was an element of the remedies sought, rather than a separate claim.
[…] the arbitrator identified the pled claims and the corresponding values upon which the interest would
apply. Further, the interest calculations appeared in the section of the Arbitration Decision in which the
damage awards were listed, which also came after the sections addressing plaintiff’s claims and defendants’
314
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
interest. If, however, parties wish to limit the tribunal’s power to award interest, they should
do so explicitly. As argued by Born, “[t]he authority to award interest is an inherent element
of a tribunal’s adjudicatory authority and is implicitly contained within the terms of
agreements to arbitrate, at least absent contrary indication by the parties.”421 Similarly, it
has been pointed out by Rutledge and others that “US Courts have generally held that
arbitrators have the authority to award interest on arbitral awards. The decision to award
interest and the applicable rate of interest are within the discretion of the tribunal, unless
the parties have provided otherwise.”422
If a tribunal is authorized to award interest, it entails that the tribunal is vested with a
broad spectrum of powers.423 Therefore, for example, a refusal to award interest has been
consideredwithin the tribunal’s authority.424Moreover, it has been pointed out that “[c]ourts
usually uphold an arbitrator’s award of pre-award interest (interest from the time of the
breach or wrongful action up to the final arbitration award) and will not disturb the rate
applied by the tribunal.”425 A closer look at institutional rules shows that an arbitral tribunal
may even consider that not only pre-award, but also post-award interest is due.426 The
decisions on an interest rate, its accrual and the like should not be reviewed by the vacating
counterclaims. Therefore, the interest awarded in this case was not a separate claim, but an element of the
remedies sought, assessed on values awarded on claims properly before the arbitrator.”).
421 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3103.
422 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.921.
423 Notably, in international arbitration, it might be relevant to determine what law applies to the issue of
interest. For an overview see (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3105-3106. Born
explains on p.3106 that “[i]n […] jurisdictions, including the United States, rules governing interest may be
deemed ‘procedural’ or are governed by the law of the arbitral seat.” See, however, (Reisberg & Pauley, 2013)
p.26 (“It is also generally well-accepted that arbitrators should look to the substantive law governing the claims
when deciding whether interest should be awarded, for what period of time, and at what rate. This is because
in most jurisdictions interest for the pre-judgment period is regarded as a matter of substantive law.”), with
a reference to the U.S. cases: In re Exxon Valdez v. Exxon Corp., 484 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is
well settled that prejudgment interest is a substantive aspect of a plaintiff’s claim, rather than a merely
procedural mechanism.”) and Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube Co., 324 F.3d 616, 624 (8th Cir. 2003) (“the
question of prejudgment interest is a substantive one”). The authors also admit that “there remains substantial
debate over the methods used by arbitrators in awarding interest, particularly regarding the use of simple or
compound interest and how the rate of interest should be determined.”
424 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3110 and the case law therein.
425 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.921 and case law therein (fn.218). See also Foulger-Pratt Residential
Contracting, LLC v. Madrigal Condominiums, LLC, 779 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C. 2011).
426 See the rules mentioned in fn.419.
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court because it may not test the merits of the case.427 Also, the way the tribunal frames
the interest (i.e. as a separate claim or not)might affect the fate of the prospective award.428
As usual, parties should request the tribunal to calculate the interest. Nonetheless, Born
observes that “[…] courts have also upheld awards of interest evenwhere the parties’ contract
and submissions did not specifically request it.”429 Arguably, the institutional rules that
provide that “the tribunal may award such pre-award and post-award interest, simple or
compound, as it considers appropriate, taking into consideration the contract and applicable
law(s)”,430 also give carte blanche to the tribunal to award interest as it wishes and not
necessarily subject to the parties’ submissions. The better view is, however, that the tribunal
should refrain from granting interest unless requested. As long as the power to award
interest might be implied or even inherent431 and for this reason an agreement to arbitrate
might be silent on that point, it does not change the fact that it is the parties’ (and not the
tribunal’s) responsibility to seek relief. Therefore, the tribunal simply cannot award interests
on its own volition.432
Finally, it should bementioned that awards on interestmay still be tested against public
policy.433 Thewindow for the success in that regard is, however, extremely narrow.434 Again,
427 See section 3.2. Also in J.A. Jones Const. Co. v. Flakt, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1990) the court
rejected arguments that the tribunal exceeded its powers because: (i) it awarded pre-award interest, (ii)
New Jersey law does not allow arbitrators to impose interest for any period prior to themaking of the award
itself, and (iii) it (the tribunal) calculated interest at a 10% rate which is higher than the lower rate prescribed
by New Jersey Court Rules. The court held that “[…] arbitrators do not “exceed their powers” unless they
rule on matters outside of their proper consideration. […] Thus, a court’s ability to vacate an award under
section 10(d) depends not on the outcome of a particular legal decision but rather on whether the arbitrators
were requested to make the decision at all. [The challenging party] does not argue that the arbitrators lacked
the power to consider the issue of interest as an assessment on compensatory damages. It argues only that the
arbitrators calculated that interest in an improper manner and at an unlawful rate. The court therefore
DENIES [The challenging party]’s motion to vacate the interest award […]”.
428 If it is considered as an independent claim and the court is satisfied that the decision on interest should be
vacated, it might be easier to separate it for the partial vacatur.
429 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3110, with a reference (footnote 600) to Gordon
Sel-Way, Inc. v. Spence Bros., Inc., 475N.W.2d 704, 711 (Mich. 1991) (“arbitrators committed no substantial
or material error in including pre-award interest in their award, even though parties’ contract was silent
concerning right to interest”);Westminster Constr. Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 376 A.2d 708, 711 (R.I. 1977)
(“arbitrators may award interest, even if not claimed, unless otherwise specifically provided by the parties in
the agreement”).
430 Art. 31.4 of the 2014 ICDR Rules. See also Art. 32.7 of the 2011 JAMS Rules.
431 (International Law Association, 2014) p.10 (“With respect to damages, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal noted
nearly thirty years ago that it was already ‘customary for arbitral tribunals to award interest as part of an
award for damages.’ It found the power to award interest ‘inherent in the Tribunal’s authority to decide
claims,’ such that ‘the exclusion of such power could only be established by express provision.’ The tribunal
in Vivendi v. Argentina confirmed that liability for interest remains ‘an accepted legal principle.’”).
432 Unless, arguably, it is customary in the specific field and it is a party’s “inherent expectation” to have interests
award without asking for them.
433 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3109-3110.
434 For further reading on public policy, see section 6.1.2.
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considering the Restatement’s take on Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, the public policy
challenge will be included therein.435 In sum, the tribunal’s decision on interest would
likely survive the “excess of powers” challenge.
7.5.2 Decision on costs
The monetary value of decisions on cost has become increasingly important in current
arbitration practice.436 Additionally, “[c]ost awards, commentators have observed, are […]
by and large entrusted to the broad discretion of the arbitral tribunal appointed in each
particular case – as a result of which cost awards vary wildly from case to case and ‘sometimes
fundamentally without any apparent reason.’”437 Finally, one should also be reminded that,
in the FAA, no statutory provision regulating allocation of costs in arbitration exists.438
For all these reasons, it is not surprising that parties (usually an award-debtor) are so eager
to challenge cost awards. Though it does not change the fact that these parties are rarely
successful.
The discussion on costs in the context of American arbitration law has yet an additional
twist, because of the so-called “AmericanRule” according towhich parties to the arbitration
should bear their own litigation costs439 and U.S. law’s incompatibility with other systems
according to which all costs are to be allocated on the account of an award-debtor (i.e.
“loser pays”).440 Although these two irreconcilable positions need to be duly acknowledged
in the analysis, it is argued that they should not influence the vacating court in its
deliberation process.
As always, the vacating court will first look at the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.
Alas, parties do not very often express their views on the costs allocation in their initial
agreement.441 This will consequently lead to the review of the applicable international
435 See section 5.3.
436 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3099.
437 (Smit & Robinson, 2009) p.267.
438 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) p.924.
439 (Carter, 2012) p.478.
440 For different approaches, see, i.a., (Kreindler R., Final Rulings on Costs: Loser pays all?, 2006) p.42.
441 In any event, a broad agreement to arbitrate might suffice to authorize the tribunal to award fees. See, e.g.,
In re Arbitration Between Gen. Sec. Nat. Ins. Co. & AequiCap Program Administrators, 785 F. Supp. 2d 411,
419 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Here, we conclude that the Arbitration Clause was indeed a broad provision. The
parties used expansive language to define the types of disputes to be submitted to arbitration and they declined
to carve out or limit the types of relief that the Panel was entitled to award. Notably, in drafting the Arbitration
Clause, the parties failed to signal that they intended to limit the authority conferred upon the Panel by
restricting the types of relief that the Panel could award. In light of the breadth of the contractual language,
and in the absence of any contracted-for limitations, we conclude that the Panel had the inherent authority
to award attorney’s fees.”). If the parties expressly exclude the possibility of an award on costs, the court
will give effect to such an agreement. Therefore, in the event costs were granted (notwithstanding an express
exclusion), the court should vacate the award. See (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014)
p.3087.
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arbitration rules; these rules usually entail the provision allowing the tribunal to proceed
with the allocation of costs.442
In the absence of an express agreement of the parties to let the tribunal decide on the
allocation of costs, it has been reported that some courts found that the tribunal lacked
authority to award legal fees.443 Rutledge and others explain, however, that “[t]his approach
is misguided, particularly in the context of international arbitration proceedings, where it
is undisputed that tribunals and courts are not bound by rules of US civil procedure. The
better view – which has been adopted by a number of US courts – is that arbitrators have
inherent authority to award attorneys’ fees in international arbitration proceedings unless
the parties have agreed otherwise.”444 Also Born argues that “[r]ather the presumptive rule
in international arbitrations seated in the United States should be that, absent contrary
agreement, the tribunal will have the authority to award the costs of legal representation.”445
It should be added that allowing the authority to award costs means that the tribunal
will have powers to decide on costs even if claimant withdrew its claim,446 or in case of a
negative jurisdictional award (i.e. the awardwhere the tribunal finds that it is not competent
to decide the case on merits).447
The cost award can be also used as a sanction for the party’s bad faith conduct during
the proceedings.448 In fact, the court in ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. EMC Nat’l Life Co. held
that a “[p]rovision of arbitration agreement between insurers, stating that each party should
bear expense of its own arbitrator and related outside attorney fees, and should jointly and
442 See, i.a., Art. 34 of the 2014 ICDRRules (“The arbitral tribunal shall fix the costs of arbitration in its award(s).
The tribunal may allocate such costs among the parties if it determines that allocation is reasonable, taking
into account the circumstances of the case.”), and Art. 37.4 of the 2016] JAMS Rules (“The Tribunal will fix
the arbitration costs in its award. The Tribunal may apportion such costs among the parties if it determines
that such apportionment is reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case.”).
443 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) pp.924-925 and p.926.
444 (Rutledge, Kent, & Henel, 2009) pp.926-927.
445 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3091.
446 (Rutledge, Kent, &Henel, 2009) p.904 (“[i]t is also within the tribunal’s discretion to award costs in connection
with the claimant’s withdrawal of the action”), referring toHoward,Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs Inc. v. Tower
Hill Trading Co Ltd, no 94 Civ 4709, 1995 WL 548846 (SDNY 1995).
447 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3101-3102.
448 Art. 31.5 of the 2014 ICDR (“Unless the parties agree otherwise, the parties expressly waive and forego any
right to punitive, exemplary, or similar damages unless any applicable law(s) requires that compensatory
damages be increased in a specified manner. This provision shall not apply to an award of arbitration costs
to a party to compensate for misconduct in the arbitration.”); Art. 31.2 of the 2016 JAMS Rules, Art. 30.2 of
the 2011 JAMS Rules (“Unless the parties agree otherwise, the parties expressly waive and forgo any right to
punitive, exemplary or similar damages unless a statute requires that compensatory damages be increased in
a specifiedmanner. This provision will not limit the Tribunal’s authority to take into account a party’s dilatory
or bad faith conduct in the arbitration in apportioning arbitration costs between or among the parties.”).
Importantly, see also the power to sanction as provided in Art. 33 of the 2016 JAMS Rules.
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equally bear with other party expenses of third arbitrator, did not limit arbitrators’ authority
to award attorney and arbitrator fees as sanction for bad faith conduct.”449
It is reasonable to expect the parties to request an award on costs.450 Arguably, however,
based on the wording of the relevant provisions of the institutional rules, the tribunal’s
broad discretion to award costs will authorize the tribunal not to follow the parties’
submissions on cost.451 Therefore, as long as a tribunal acts within the limits of an agreement
to arbitrate,452 in case of awarding costs, it does not necessarily have to give deference to
the parties’ submissions.453
With respect to public policy it has been concluded that “[t]he “AmericanRule” regarding
costs of legal representation does not rise to the level of U.S. public policy, so as to forbid a
tribunal’s exercise of its authority under the parties’ arbitration agreement or applicable
institutional rules to award legal costs.”454
Finally, one should be reminded that although the court should, under no circumstances,
review themerits of the case, a remand455 ormodification456 of the awardmay be in certain
circumstances regarded as an appropriatemeasure to cure alleged deficiencies of the award.
449 ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. EMC Nat’l Life Co., 564 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2009). See also Art. 33 of the 2016 JAMS
Rules.
450 See also GPR, Inc. v. Phoenix Petroleum Co. (1995, SDNY) 1995 US Dist LEXIS 7015, where the court
rejected the argument that the tribunal exceeded its powers by awarding attorney’s fees to petitioners. It
concluded that since all parties sought costs and attorney’s fees the tribunal has the authority to award
them.
451 See the cited rules in fn.442.
452 See, however, ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. EMC Nat’l Life Co., 564 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2009).
453 Especially when used as a sanction against a party. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. EMC Nat’l Life Co., 564 F.3d
81 (2d Cir. 2009). Arguably, in case of using costs as a sanctioning mechanism, even the reasonable costs
which were not requested (by the adversary of the sanctioned party) might be awarded in exceptional
circumstances. See also, extensive sanctioning powers under Art. 33 of the 2016 JAMS Rules.
454 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3091.
455 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2015) § 40:11 (“It is not necessary to
remand to the arbitrator when the court can resolve any alleged ambiguities in the award as to form bymeans
of modification, particularly “where the true intent of the arbitrator is apparent.” However, it has been held
that a court cannot modify an award in a manner which is completely contrary to the arbitrator’s intent.
Thus, a court should not award interest and costs where the arbitrator’s specific intent was to deny such
interest and costs based on his interpretation of the terms of the agreement. Similarly, the court should not
order the matter remanded to the arbitrator for an additional hearing to determine the costs and interest
where a party who had the opportunity to present evidence of prejudgment interests and costs to the arbitrator
during the proceeding failed to do so.”).
456 (Domke, Wilner, & Edmonson, Domke on Commercial Arbitration, 2015) § 40:9 (“Where the arbitrator
committed an error in deciding that the allocation of costs of the arbitration had been submitted to arbitration,
the proper remedy was the modification of the award.”), referring to Bernard v. Kuhn, 65 Md. App. 557, 501
A.2d 480 (1985).
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7.5.3 Decisions on procedure
At first glance, it seems possible to argue that most of the procedural decisions that are
not in line with a contractually agreed framework fits in comfortably with the “excess of
powers” challenge. “[S]trictly speaking, this is inappropriate.”457 The better view is, as
explained earlier in this chapter, (i) to limit the application of the “excess of powers” ground
to the tribunal’s violations of its adjudicative function.458 Even if one allows (ii) the
alternative view and to accept the application of the “excess of powers” objection with
regard to the violations of the parties’ agreements on the procedure, the burden of proof
needs to bematerial and thus challenges should be accepted only in very limited instances.459
In principle, the reign over the procedure should be the tribunal’s (managerial) prerogative
once it is constituted and should not be allowed a second look at the post-award stage.
This is particularly true, (iii) because decisions on procedure are used to enhance the
efficiency of the process and eventually sanction bad faith conduct.
The reason why the concept of excess of powers prescribed by the FAA should be
limited to the adjudicative powers of the tribunal is because it comprises two notions,
namely “excess of powers” and “imperfect execution of [powers]”. Conceptually, if the
term “powers” has been used accordingly with references to “the excess” and “imperfect
execution”, it can be reasonably concluded that the meaning of the term “power” in both
instances is the same. Importantly, Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA refers only to the use of
the tribunal’s powers that ultimately cause that the mutual, final, and definite award is
made. It shows that the use of the tribunal’s powers needs to have a well-defined causal
link with the production of an arbitral award. Consequently, it should mean that the
reference ismade to the tribunal’s adjudicatory powers and not somuch to its powers over
the procedure, which are often viewed as “incidental” to the adjudicatory powers.460
457 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3306 (“In principle, an excess of authority should be
limited to instances where an arbitral tribunal exceeds the substantive scope of the arbitration agreement (or
parties’ submissions in the arbitration), and not be extended to procedural irregularities (or noncompliance
with the parties’ agreement). Nonetheless, local lawmay adopt a different approach in particular jurisdictions.”).
458 See section 5.1.
459 See section 5.3.
460 (International Law Association, 2014) p.7, referring to the tribunal’s powers to shape the conduct of the
proceedings (“Depending on the circumstances, arbitrators may have the inherent or implied authority to
establish rules for the conduct of hearings and to fix the forms of argument permitted (i.e., written or oral).
Such exercises of authority, readily viewed as incidental to the adjudicatory function of tribunals, are often
exercised without debate or serious question.”). See also section 5.1.
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Arguably, the procedural misconducts should then (to the extent possible) be subsumed
by Section 10(a)(3) of the FAA461 or the evergreen public policy exception.462
The alternative view, allowing the extension of the interpretation of the excess of powers
ground for the procedural decisions that are not in accordance with the parties’ agreement,
would be the prevailing one, however. One of the reasons is the lack of other grounds to
address these issues.463 This is also alignedwith the broad reading of the “excess of powers”
ground adopted by the Restatement. In any event, the procedural irregularities have to be
serious to trigger a successful challenge. Consequently, the Restatement reads that “[t]he
tribunal also exceeds its powers if the arbitral procedure is contrary in material respect to
the agreement of the parties, including gap-fillers added by the arbitral rules the parties may
have incorporated into their agreement or by the applicable law.”464 Therefore, if the
procedure selected by the tribunal is materially different from the one designed by the
parties, the award granted by said tribunalmay be vacated on the excess of powers ground.465
The Restatement also followsHayford’s argument that “[i]f an arbitrator fails to comply
with an express requirement set forth in the arbitration agreement as to the form, nature,
or content of the arbitration award, the award will be vacated.”466 Some authors point out
that “arbitrators also exceed their authority when they contravene express provisions in an
arbitration clause governing how their award should be issued, such as a requirement that
the award be accompanied by finding of fact and conclusions of law, or that arbitration be
mandatory but the award non-binding, where arbitrators then purported to issue a binding
award.”467 In one reported case, it was held that “it is clear that the provisions of the
461 Pursuant to Section 10(a)(3) of the FAA, the award may be vacated “where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced.” Although on its face value it does not address, for example, violation of the party-agreed
procedure, but it makes a reference to the right to be heard which can potentially be violated if the
party-agreed procedure is not followed.
462 See section 6.1.2.
463 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3306 (“In jurisdictions with no statutory equivalent
to Article 34(2)(a)(iv) [i.a. the United States], serious procedural irregularities are sometimes considered as
an excess of authority (although, strictly speaking, this is inappropriate).”).
464 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.290.
465 TheRestatement (second tentative draft) p.290makes a reference toCargill Rice, Inc. v. EmpresaNicaraguense
de Alimentos Basicos, 25 F.3d 223, 226 (4thCir. 1994) (“Arbitration awardsmade by arbitrators not appointed
under the method provided in the parties’ contract must be vacated.”). Also, Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 832 22 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Because the arbitrators violated the provisions of the arbitration
agreement requiring arbitration before at least three arbitrators, they exceeded their authority under the
arbitration agreement.”).
466 (Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 1995-1996)
pp.753-754.
467 (Holtzmann, Donovan, Tahbaz, & Amirfar, 2013) Chapter VII(2)(a)(6).
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Agreement required the arbitrator to render a reasoned award, and if he failed to do so he
thus exceeded his power and therefore vacatur is proper.”468
In a nutshell, taking into account the arguments raised above, two conditions have to
be met in order to successfully challenge an award based on the excess of powers ground
and in connection with some procedural decisions of the tribunal: (i) parties need to
expressly, clearly and unambiguously shape the procedure (preferably) in their agreement
to arbitrate,469 and (ii) the tribunal’s procedural actions need to be materially different
from the ones provided by the parties.470 Importantly, “an intentional deviation from the
parties’ agreed-upon procedures to protect the safety of the parties, to ensure the enforceability
of the award, or to comply with the mandatory law of the seat (a violation of which might
trigger [the setting] aside of the award)would not ordinarily be considered amaterial violation
of the parties[’] agreement. Although such deviation may violate certain provisions of the
parties’ agreement, it arguably is intended to serve the parties’ larger purposes in submitting
their dispute to arbitration and within the arbitrators’ discretion and duty to render an
enforceable award.”471
Finally, it is necessary to respect the tribunal’s autonomy in leading the arbitral process,
which means that its procedural decisions should greatly escape the court’s scrutiny. It is
ultimately in the tribunal’s hand to ensure that the dispute resolution process is efficient.
It is also the tribunal’s task to discipline parties for theirmisbehavior. Arguably, this power
is inherent to the tribunal’s task to administer the proceedings. Nonetheless, it is also
provided in institutional rules. Possibly the broadest authority is given under the new
JAMSRules which provide that “[t]he Tribunal may order appropriate sanctions for failure
of a party to comply with its obligations under any of these Rules or with an order of the
Tribunal. These sanctions may include, but are not limited to, assessment of Arbitration
Fees and Arbitrator compensation and expenses; assessment of any other costs occasioned
by the actionable conduct, including reasonable attorneys’ fees; exclusion of certain evidence;
468 Rain CII Carbon LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68994, at *15 (E.D. La. June 27, 2011),
as reported in the Restatement (second tentative draft) p.290.
469 In principle, there is the possibility that parties came to some procedural arrangements after the tribunal
is constituted.
470 If parties do not deviate from the procedure envisaged by the institutional rules, or their agreement is moot
on the procedural aspects of the case, the tribunal, by and large, will be given wide authority to shape the
procedure as it deems fit (save for the general notion of due process) thanks to the tribunal’s inherent powers
over the procedure. See, i.a., (International Law Association, 2014) p.7, referring to the tribunal’s powers
to shape the conduct of the proceedings (“Depending on the circumstances, arbitratorsmay have the inherent
or implied authority to establish rules for the conduct of hearings and to fix the forms of argument permitted
(i.e., written or oral). Such exercises of authority, readily viewed as incidental to the adjudicatory function of
tribunals, are often exercised without debate or serious question.”).
471 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.218. See also (International Law Association, 2014) p.19 (“In
deciding to arbitrate, parties consent to a legal process involving certain minimum standards of due process
and fairness uponwhich they should not be able, consistent with that agreement, to renege. Arbitrators should
be seen as having the authority to enforce these standards.”).
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drawing adverse inferences; or, in extreme cases, determining an issue or issues submitted
to Arbitration adversely to the party that has failed to comply.”472
All in all, it is preferred to read the “excess of powers” ground only as the recourse
against the tribunal’s adjudicative function. Even if this is not the case and the interpretation
is broadened due to some deficiencies in the FAA framework, the tribunal’s procedural
rulings should greatly survive the “excess of powers” challenge considering the broad
managerial authority of the tribunal. In certain circumstances, decisions may also survive
even when they contrast with the parties’ procedural agreements, provided that they are
in accordance with the due process requirement and public policy.
8 Concluding remarks
The Federal Arbitration Act will soon celebrate its centennial. It still remains, however, a
vital piece of legislation, that offers a fairly effective framework for the present arbitration
system in the U.S., irrespective of its age. Throughout its long life, and following the
SupremeCourt’s interpretation, the pro-arbitration, pro-enforcement standing of the FAA
is regularly reaffirmed. The Court interpretations are not always free from controversy,
however. For example, although the Supreme Court managed to highlight and enhance
the supremacy of the FAA over the states’ arbitration statutes, it is not necessarily clear
whether the intention of the Congress at the beginning of the twentieth century was to
create a body of substantive law on arbitration that would prevail over the competing
provisions of state law. As highlighted by numbers of authorities, it is more plausible that
the FAAwas created as a procedural vehicle to be used in the federal courts and is nowadays
reinvented by the Supreme Court.
In any event, federal arbitration law, restructured by the Supreme Court and applied
nowadays has characteristics of a modern arbitration statute, which includes (among
others): the general (federal) policy favoring arbitration, very limited (and arguably
exclusive) grounds to challenge the award upon vacatur, a narrow (deferential) standard
of review of the arbitral award and the possibility to cure the award if only partially flawed
(by correcting it, remanding or confirming it in part).
The court deciding upon the challenge that the tribunal exceeded its “powers” will
need to determine the applicable restrictions on the tribunal’s powers. At first it will focus
on the contractual underpinnings for arbitration, namely it will review the agreement to
arbitrate and the parties’ intention therein. Since agreements to arbitrate are, usually,
drafted broadly, the vacating court may seek further guidance in the applicable arbitral
rules and in the parties’ subsequent requests, which also frame the arbitrators’ powers.
472 See Art. 33 of the 2016 JAMS Rules.
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Finally, it is necessary to point out that tribunal’s powers cannot violate the mandatory
rules of public policy.
The concept of “excess of powers” that is based on the three pillars mentioned above
(an agreement to arbitrate, the parties’ requests and public policy) effectively shapes the
analysis as to the limits to an arbitral tribunal’s undertakings. The second prong of Section
10(a)(4) of the FAA, thus “imperfect execution of powers”, addresses a failure to render a
final and binding award.
It is important to note, however, that the alternative view for the post-award relief has
been projected by the Restatement that concludes that the foreign awards that are rendered
in the U.S. should be challenged under the grounds introduced in the New York
Convention. It is yet to be seen, if the courts follow such an interpretation.
Additionally, over the years, the understanding of the notion of “excess of powers” has
been expanded by the judiciary. The courts provided i.a. that confirmation of the award
can be refused when it manifestly disregards the law or violates public policy. As discussed
in detail in this chapter, however, only the public policy challenge should survive theHall
Street aftermath, that restricted the grounds for vacatur on the federal level to the statutory
grounds prescribed by the FAA. Consequently, it means that any non-statutory grounds
(but for public policy) should cease to exist or at the very most should be reconciled with
the grounds pursuant to the FAA. As also reflected, the reconciliation should not be
followed with an unnecessary expansion of the current understanding of the statutory
grounds.
Some of the reflections that follow the analysis of the application of the excess of powers
challenge to selected issues that might fall outside the arbitral tribunal’s authority should
be repeated. Firstly, the tribunal’s ultimate undertaking is contract interpretation. In any
case when the vacating court is satisfied that the tribunal’s decision follows the arbitral
panel’s understanding of the contract, it will defer to the tribunal’s findings and will likely
confirm the award. It leads to the second conclusion that it is preferable for the parties to
clearly and unambiguously restrict the tribunal’s powers over contract interpretation or
other aspects of arbitration that will fall outside the scope of the tribunal’s authority.
Thirdly, the exception to this basic rule occurs when the very existence of an agreement
to arbitrate and, thus, of the tribunal’s powers is at stake. In cases of jurisdictional/threshold
issues, the mechanism reverses. It means that parties need to clearly and unambiguously
vest the tribunal with power over the interpretation of the jurisdictional/threshold issues.
If the transfer of powers over these gateway questions is not evident, the vacating court
will exercise a full and independent review of the challenge (therefore, without any deference
to the tribunal’s decision on the issue). Finally, it is necessary to point out that some of the
tribunal’s procedural decisions will effectively fit within the excess of powers grounds.
Although, the “excess of powers” challenge is better viewed as accommodating only the
excess of adjudicatory powers of the arbitral tribunal, it is also acknowledged that in
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accordancewith the current interpretation of the excess of powers challenge, the tribunal’s
departure from the contractually agreed (explicit) rules shaping the procedure may be
successfully vacated pursuant to Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA.
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VI The New York Convention of 1958
1 Introduction
The preceding analysis focused on the national frameworks designed to challenge the
arbitral tribunals’ awards at the seat of arbitration. Yet, the scrutiny of the award made in
the country of enforcement might be equally perilous for the fate of the award. At the
enforcement stage, theNewYorkConvention of 1958 on theRecognition andEnforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereafter “the New York Convention” or “the Convention”)
is the most influential international instrument that should be taken into account.
Although theConvention does not refer to the concept of the arbitral tribunal’smandate,
it is important to have a closer look at Article V(1)(c) of the Convention that inspired a
similar provisionwhich has been included in theModel Lawon International Commercial
Arbitration.1 Pursuant to Article V(1)(c) of the Convention, an award may be refused
recognition and enforcement if “[t]he award deals with a difference not contemplated by
or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of
the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized
and enforced […]”.
This provision is descriptive in nature, which makes it vulnerable to different ways of
interpretation and (potentially) invites the actors to transplant their national concepts for
challenging the award (on the basis of “excess ofmandate” in particular) on the international
level at the enforcement stage. Consequently further analysis is required with respect to
the application of Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention, which, for the purpose of
this chapter would also be considered as the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
This introduction is followed by four sections. The first two sections give a brief overview
of the system of enforcement and the (primarily) consensual nature of the “tribunal’s
mandate”. The last two sections are essential for the discussion at hand.
The first section will deal with the general approach in which the courts undertake the
review at the enforcement stage. The second one focuses on the recognized limits to the
tribunal’s mandate. The third section explains the New York Convention’s approach to
the “excess of mandate” type of challenge and the evolution of the international system of
enforcementwill be explained, startingwith the preceding systemof theGenevaConvention
1 For further reading on the Model Law, see Chapter II.
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of 1927 on the Execution of ForeignArbitral Awards (hereafter “theGenevaConvention”).2
It will be followed by the analysis of the preparatory work of the New York Convention
and concluded with an overview of the hypothetical draft convention introduced by van
den Berg in 2008 (“hereafter theMiamiDraft”).3What follows is a brief take on the tension
between the different linguistic (authentic) versions of the text of theNewYorkConvention
and an analysis of the language used in Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention. The
last subsection is devoted to the issue of the interplay between different grounds to resist
enforcement.
The final section gives an overview of the application of the “excess of mandate” type
of challenge to selected types of arbitral tribunal’s decisions and uses the same division as
in the previous chapters. It means that, initially, it is tested whether the tribunal’s decision
on selected types of parties’ claims fits within the scope of the “tribunal’s mandate”. It is
then followed by a “mandate” discussion on the process of the application of law by the
arbitral tribunal, a discussion regarding different types of remedial authority and, finally,
reflections on authority over different issues auxiliary to the parties’ main claims.
2 Court standard of review at the enforcement stage
The enforcement courts generally endorse the pro-enforcement philosophy of the New
York Convention (section 2.1). They will do so by limiting the scope of the review (section
2.2) and by using available remedies in favor of enforcement (section 2.3). Consequently,
the award-debtors must defeat the heavy presumption that the award is final and binding.
2.1 Approach favoring enforcement of arbitral awards
The so-called “pro-enforcement bias” was described as a key to the appropriate reading
of theNewYork Convention.4 According to the opening part of Article V of theNewYork
Convention, “[r]ecognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of
2 For the text, see, e.g., http://www.newyorkconvention.org/11165/web/files/ document/1/5/15939.pdf [last
accessed 27 April 2018].
3 For the text of the Miami Draft, see http://www.newyorkconvention.org/11165/web/files/document
/1/6/16017.pdf [last accessed 27 April 2018].
4 (ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook for Judges, 2011)
p.14. (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3412 (“[n]ational courts and other authorities
have uniformly recognized the foregoing purposes, often referring to the Convention’s “pro-enforcement”
objectives or purpose.”). See, for example, Int’l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera,
Indus. Y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“the basic thrust of the convention was to limit
the broad attacks on foreign arbitral awards that had been authorized by the predecessor Geneva Convention
of 1927”).
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the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority
where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that […].” Two words used in the
provision deserve a closer look. Firstly, the term “only” (as in “only if […] party […] furnishes
proof that”) suggests that an arbitral award should be recognized and enforced but for the
situations (and only in those situations) where the award-debtor is able to prove that the
conditions of one of the listed Article V grounds are met.5 Secondly, the use of the verb
“may” (as in “may be refused”) may imply that the enforcement court has a discretion to
enforce the award notwithstanding the existence of the Article V grounds.6 Consequently,
in the light of its purpose, it is the finality of the award that needs to be cultivated. It means
that the challenges against the award (i) can only be based on the exhaustive list of the
Article V grounds, and (ii) even if the challenge fits within the scope of the enumerated
grounds, it should only be accepted if it is grievous.
As mentioned above, the pro-enforcement philosophy of the New York Convention
requires one to construe the list of Article V exhaustively.7 It means that national systems
cannot supplement the system with any additional grounds.8 The UNCITRAL Secretariat
Guide concludes that “[t]he conditions for recognition and enforcement in the Convention
establish a ‘ceiling’, or maximum level of control, which Contracting States may exert over
arbitral awards and arbitration agreements.”9 It is an important feature of the New York
Convention, especially in the context of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge which
is interpreted differently in various jurisdictions.10
5 The reversal of the burden of proof from the party who seeks enforcement to the party resisting an arbitral
award was an additional positively appraised amendment to the Geneva Convention framework of
enforcement. It means that an arbitral award is enforceable prima facie unless proven otherwise. It has been
argued that the standard of proof is rather high and that the alleged violation has to be substantive in order
for the court not to reject it. See also (Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform
Judicial Interpretation, 1981) p.9 an also p.264, (ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York
Convention: A Handbook for Judges, 2011) p.79, also (Nacimiento, 2010) p.210.
6 The interpretation of the verb “may” generated a heated debate amongst scholars. See, i.a., (Paulsson J.,
May or Must Under the New York Convention: An Exercise in Syntax and Linguistics, 1998), (Paulsson J.,
Enforcing arbitral awards notwithstanding a local standard annulment (LSA), 1998), (Van den Berg,
Enforcement of Annuled Awards?, 1998). See also section 2.3.
7 See, e.g., (Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform Judicial Interpretation,
1981) p.265, (Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview, 2008) p.56, (Lew, Mistelis,
& Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, 2003) p.706 and (Nacimiento, 2010) p.209
(“the objections to recognition and enforcement listed in Article V are meant to be exhaustive and national
law cannot be the basis for any additional defense.”), (Kronke, 2010) p.5, (ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation
of the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook for Judges, 2011) p.80.
8 This design has been maintained and reinforced in the Miami Draft. See article 5(1) of the Miami Draft
(“[e]nforcement of an arbitral award shall not be refused on any other ground that the grounds expressly set
forth in this article”).
9 (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2016) p.2.
10 See Chapter II-Chapter V.
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It is significant to add that even though the list of Article V grounds is rather short,
not every violation would result in a successful challenge of the award. The UNCITRAL
Secretariat Guide is adamant in saying that: “[t]he objective of the New York Convention
is to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards to the greatest extent
possible and to provide amaximum level of control which Contracting States may exert over
arbitral awards. In accordance with this objective, the Convention grants courts of the
Contracting States the discretion to refuse to recognize and enforce an award on the grounds
listed in article V, without obligating them to do so.”11
The question whether the court has a discretion or an obligation to refuse recognition
and enforcement of the award has been the subject of a debate between scholars. In light
of the abovementioned UNCITRAL recommendation, the better view is to accept the
discretionary power of the enforcement courts. In any event, however, Nacimento aptly
concluded that “[…] in practice, the results in jurisdictions permitting judicial discretion
hardly differ from those in jurisdictions precluding discretion.”12 The discretion should be
therefore used as a way to accept only material violations that affect the award.13
2.2 The scope of the court’s review
As highlighted by Nacimiento, “[t]he control of the enforcing court is limited to verifying
whether a ground under Article V exists.”14 Consequently, one will find that “[t]he grounds
for refusal under article V do not include an erroneous decision in law or in fact by the
arbitral tribunal.”15 It means that the merits of the arbitral decision are beyond the courts’
control.
The enforcement courts follow this principle and accept the limited scope of their
control over arbitration. For example, as persuasively concluded by a U.S. court: “[w]e
cannot understand how the Convention, created to assure consistency in the enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards, would not be gravely undermined, if judges sitting in each of the
many jurisdictions where enforcementmay be obtained, were authorized by the Convention
to undertake a de novo inquiry into whether the law the arbitrators said they were using
was or was not properly applied by them. The plain answer is that the Convention does not,
11 (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2016) pp.125-126.
12 (Nacimiento, 2010) p.209.
13 (Reisman & Richardson, 2012) p. 28: “In keeping with our understanding of the architecture of the [New
York] Convention, we suggest that the discretionary part of Article V ought to be understood as a policy
decision by the drafters to adopt what has been called elsewhere a “material violation” rather than ‘technical
discrepancy’ approach.” See also article 5(2) of the Miami Draft (“[e]nforcement shall be refused on the
grounds set forth in this article in manifest cases only”).
14 (Nacimiento, 2010) p.210.
15 (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2016) p.126.
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and could not, contemplate such a chaos.”16 Courts in other jurisdictions share the vision
that the merits of the case are delegated to the tribunal and that its conclusions should be
final.17
As long as this principle seems rather clear, its application in the case of the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge as envisaged in Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention
may create some difficulties, because the scope of the tribunal’s mandate is closely
intertwinedwith the decision rendered by the tribunal. As observed by van den Berg: “[t]he
principle that a court may not subject an arbitral award to a review on the merits is not
unfettered, in the sense that the court may examine the award for the purposes of verifying
the grounds for refusal of enforcement, e.g., excess by the arbitral tribunal of its authority.”18
This is also the reason why the award-debtor will likely be tempted to disguise its merits
review as an “excess of mandate” type of challenge. Consequently, the mechanism that
allows the court to look at the tribunal’s decision comes with the obligation of judicial
self-control.
2.3 Remedies at the court’s disposal
In principle, since the enforcement court does not supervise and oversee the arbitral
process, it is not required to have extensive remedial mechanisms at its disposal.
Consequently, the New York Convention does not include an elaborate catalogue of
remedial powers. It gives, however, sufficient tools to the enforcement courts to prevent
the use of the Article V defenses as a challenge against technical and immaterial violations.
It is particularly the case in the context of the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge, because
ArticleV(1)(c) of theNewYorkConvention allows the partial recognition and enforcement
16 Int’l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. Y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
17 See, e.g., Ukrainian dealer v. German manufacturer, Oberlandesgericht, Munich, 30 July 2012 and
Bundesgerichtshof, 23 April 2013, XXXIX Y.B. Comm. Arb. 394 (2014), Joint Stock Company A v. Joint
Stock Company B,Higher Regional Court ofMunich, 34 Sch 10/11, 14November 2011, XXXVII Y.B. Comm.
Arb. 231 (2012), Sovereign Participations International S.A. v. Chadmore Developments Ltd., Cour d’Appel
[Court of Appeal], 28 January 1999, XXIVa Y.B. Comm. Arb. 714, 721 (1999) (“Even if the arbitral tribunal
makes a gross mistake of fact or law, this is not a ground for refusing enforcement of the award.”), AB
Götaverken v. General National Maritime Transport Company (GMTC), Libya and others, Svea Court of
Appeal (5th Dept.) Stockholm; Swedish Supreme Court, SO 1462, 13 December 1978; 13 August 1979, VI
Y.B. Comm. Arb. 237, 240 (1981) (“[…] when a request for enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is
considered, there should, in principle, not be a review of the substance of the award”). See also (UNCITRAL
Secretariat, 2016) p.126 and the case law therein.
18 (Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview, 2008) p.56 also (Van den Berg, The New
York Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 1981) p.270.
331
VI The New York Convention of 1958
of an award. This mechanismwill work in addition to the discretionary power of the court
to refuse recognition and enforcement only in cases of serious violations.19
The possibility to save a healthy part of the arbitral award has been expressly given to
the courts in the New York Convention. Pursuant to the last part of Article V(1)(c) of the
New York Convention, “[…] if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be
separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on
matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced.”20 Van den Berg, based
on the analysis of the travaux préparatoires, explained that “[…] partial enforcement may
be granted if the matter in excess of the arbitrator’s authority is of very incidental nature
and the refusal of enforcement would lead to unjustified hardship for the party seeking
enforcement”.21 The most recent UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide, however, confirms that
the “[…] application is much broader.”22
The possibility of splitting the award into an enforceable andnon-enforceable (defective)
part is a powerful one, especially considering the great endorsement it receives.23 In addition,
it is consistent with the pro-enforcement spirit of theNewYorkConvention. Some authors
even argue that the “partial recognition and enforcement of an award is mandatory where
a clear separation is possible between the parts of the award that are covered by the arbitration
agreement from those which are not.”24 This argument is appealing indeed if it is clear which
parts of the award falls outside of the scope of the underlying agreement to arbitrate. This
is not often the case, however.
Perhaps, imposing an obligation on the courts is not themost sensible solution. Firstly,
nothing in the text of Article Vwould suggest that the partial enforcement is a court’s duty
(and there is no sanction to enforce such a duty on the courts). Secondly, imposing a duty
to partially enforce might create conditions where the courts would be more prone to
(partially) refuse recognition and enforcement, which would be against the underlying
19 See also section 2.1.
20 The discussion onwhether the partial enforcement also applies to the other grounds for refusal falls outside
the scope of this book. For more on this topic see, e.g., (Borris & Hannecke, Article V: Grounds for Refusal
of Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards. General, 2012) pp.266-267, and (Born, International
Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3558.
21 (Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 1981) p.319.
See also (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3558 (“The drafting history of Article V(1)(c)
indicates that the provision was meant, in particular, to ensure that recognition of valid portions of an award
would not be denied ‘merely because a small detail fell outside the scope of the arbitral agreement.’”).
22 (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2016) p.181.
23 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3558 (“Consistent with this provision, courts have
granted partial recognition to awards, or made clear that they would be prepared to do so in appropriate
cases.”).
24 (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.329. See also (Born,
International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3434 (“Indeed, there is a substantial argument that the
Convention not only permits, but also requires, recognition and enforcement of separable, valid portions of
an award.”).
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goals of the Convention. It further means that the duty of partial enforcement would be
counterproductive, because it would encourage the (enforcement) courts to (fully) review
the scope of the agreement to arbitrate and eventually be more critical about it, whereas,
arguably, full discretion gives more flexibility to the courts to enforce the whole award.25
3 Limits to the arbitral tribunal’s “mandate” at the enforcement
stage
As has already been explained in the national chapters, there are, in principle, three relevant
sources for a tribunal’s “mandate”.26 The agreement to arbitrate is always a starting point
(section 3.1). It is supplemented, however, by the parties’ subsequent submissions (section
3.2). Finally, at the enforcement stage, rules of public policy at the place of enforcement
may also play a role in determining whether the tribunal was well within the boundaries
of its powers (section 3.3). These three concepts, in general, form the three keyholes test
(section 3.4).
3.1 Agreement to arbitrate
It does not come as a surprise that the most important foundation of an arbitral tribunal’s
“mandate” is an agreement to arbitrate. It is not only the source, but also the restraint to
the arbitral tribunal’s powers.27 Therefore, as long as the New York Convention sets out
the internationally recognized standards with regard to the validity of the agreement to
arbitrate,28 in the context of themandate it is thewording of the agreement that is essential.29
Parties, when drafting the contract, are free to choose the style in which they draft their
arbitration clause. It can be broad and flexible or narrow and restrictive, depending on the
scope that the parties are willing to submit to arbitration. Parties need to be aware, however,
25 See also section 2.1.
26 (Jarvin, The sources and limits of the arbitrator’s powers, 1996) p.140 (“The arbitrator’s authority is no
broader than that defined by the parties and some of his duties are defined by law”).
27 (Haas, 2002) p.499. Also (Jarvin, The sources and limits of the arbitrator’s powers, 1996) p.142.
28 See Art. II(1) of the New York Convention (“Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which
may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.”).
29 (ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook for Judges, 2011)
pp.93-94 (“[t]he language of the arbitration agreement that sets out what the parties have agreed to submit
to the arbitral tribunal for determination is critically important; issues must remain within that scope.”).
Irrespectively of whether it is an arbitration clause to resolve future disputes or a submission agreement
concluded after the dispute has arisen, both will be recognized under the Convention. See Art. II(1) of the
Convention.
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that the courts – following the underlying principle of the Convention30 – will likely favor
a broad interpretation of the agreements to arbitrate.31
Additionally, parties need to observe what the impact is of the applicable law and
institutional rules on the scope of the tribunal’s mandate. For example, Jarvin argues that
“[p]arties are not totally unrestricted in drawing up clauses submitting disputes to arbitration
(or rather they may be unrestricted in what they agree but the effects of their agreement may
be limited). First arbitration rules applicable may restrict the kind of disputes for which the
rules have been envisaged and by referring to the rules of an institution the parties’ agreement
will include the limitations contained in the rules proper.”32 It is also possible, however, that
these supplementary sources of powers will provide for a more elaborate structure of the
arbitral mandate,33 especially in the context of its procedural authority. Consequently, it
might affect the chances of success of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
3.2 Parties’ (subsequent) submissions
At the enforcement stage, similar to the setting-aside review, the arbitral tribunal’s
“mandate” should be evaluated not only with reference to an abstract agreement to
arbitrate,34 but also with reference to the actual dispute that it needs to resolve. It means
that the parties’ claims and submissions will play a role in shaping the arbitral tribunal’s
“mandate”. In this context, arguably, it is necessary to reflect (i) on the potential effect that
the parties’ submissions have on the mandate,35 and (ii) on the exceptional character of
the ICC Terms of Reference.
The parties’ claims as formulated in their submissions are essential in the context of
the Article V(1)(c) challenge. Consequently, one should not be satisfied only with the
30 See section 2.1.
31 See, e.g., Mgmt. & Tech. Consultants S.A. v. Parsons-Jurden Int’l Corp., 820 F.2d 1531, 1534–35 (9th Cir.
1987) (“Here, the parties agree the arbiters had authority to determine whether the gross billings exceeded
$350 million. They disagree on whether the arbiters had the further authority to determine the amount of
additional compensation due. The letter agreement indicates that ‘[a]ny dispute’ which could not be ‘settled
amicably’ would be resolved by arbitration.We construe the word ‘any’ broadly. Cf.Mediterranean Enterprises,
708 F.2d at 1463 (‘any dispute’ read narrowly where limiting language of ‘arising hereunder’ immediately
followed). An agreement to arbitrate ‘any dispute’ without strong limiting or excepting language immediately
following it logically includes not only the dispute, but the consequences naturally flowing from it – here, the
amount of additional compensation.”).
32 (Jarvin, The sources and limits of the arbitrator’s powers, 1996) p.142.
33 One more elaborate than the agreement to arbitrate itself.
34 See section 3.1.
35 One should know that there are different interpretations of Art. V(1)(c) of the Convention. In some
jurisdictions this ground is considered only in the context of the scope of the underlying agreement to
arbitrate without consideration of the parties’ subsequent submissions. In these cases, however, ultra petita
will be likely subsumed by other grounds for challenge, which will make the parties’ submissions relevant
in any event. For further reading, see section 4.2 and section 4.3.
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limits as set out by the arbitration agreement, but rather (also) consider subsequent
submissions of the parties as the standard that shapes the arbitral tribunal’s mandate.36 It
is important to note that not only the initial exchange of submissions might be relevant
in the context of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. In cases where a modification
of the claims is allowed during the proceedings, the “mandate” becomes a dynamic concept
and a moving target whenever its excess is being alleged.
The ICC Terms of Reference might be considered as yet another source of the arbitral
tribunal’s mandate. On the one hand, it makes the concept of the mandate more static,
because the parties will not be able to modify the scope of the issues submitted without
the tribunal’s approval.37 On the other hand, the Terms of Referencemight be an important
source when the issues introduced therein go beyond the initial agreement to arbitrate
and, yet, all parties agree.38
All in all, it is not only the agreement to arbitrate that needs to be consulted in case of
the Article V(1)(c) challenge. It should always be kept in mind that the initial agreement
to arbitrate, together with the parties’ subsequent submissions, work in tandem.
3.3 Mandatory rules of public policy character
Due to the fact that the enforcement court may raise (ex officio) the argument of public
policy,39 public policy is also (potentially) relevant for the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge. This would particularly be the case when the tribunal exercises certain powers
that are unknown at the place of enforcement (e.g. granting punitive damages).
Consequently, even if an award is well within the limits of the tribunal’s “mandate” at the
36 (Van den Berg, TheNewYorkConvention of 1958: AnOverview, 2008), p.59 (“[i]n certain cases, thematters
submitted by the parties to the arbitral tribunal’s decision (i.e., its mandate) may be narrower than the scope
of the arbitration clause. The distinction is, at least theoretically, important as ground c of Article V(1) is in
the final analysis to be determined on the basis of the tribunal’s mandate. However, the tribunal’s mandate
may be broadened by the parties’ submissions beyond the scope of the arbitration clause if during the arbitration
both parties explicitly or tacitly agreed to such an extension”). See also (Bernet & Meier, 2013) p.214 (“The
enforcement of an arbitral awardmay be refused if it determines legal or factual issues which do not fall within
the scope of the arbitration agreement. The parties may, however, expand the arbitral tribunal’s competence
upon mutual agreement and a resulting award will be enforced despite the narrower initial scope of the
arbitration agreement.”).
37 See Art. 23(4) of the 2017 ICC Rules, and Art. 23(4) of the 2012 ICC Rules. The tribunal’s approval is
arguably important if one considers that the mandate creates a legal tie between three equal entities (i.e.
parties and the tribunal).
38 For a discussion relating to the modification of claims submitted after the Terms of Reference are signed,
see section 5.1.5.
39 See Art. V(2)(b) of the Convention.
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seat of arbitration, it may offend the public policy of the country where enforcement is
sought.40
The definition of public policywill differ from jurisdiction to jurisdictionwhichmeans
that apart from flagging the issue, no general conclusion can be given at this point. At the
same time, however, the narrow interpretation of the public policy rules as a bar for
enforcement should be endorsed. It means that Article V(2)(b) of the Convention should
be understood as referring to international public policy.41
In the same vein, theUNCITRAL Secretariat Guide concludes that “[a]lthough different
jurisdictions define public policy differently, case law tends to refer to a public policy basis
for refusing recognition and enforcement of an award under article V (2)(b) of the New York
Convention when the core values of a legal system have been deviated from. Invoking the
public policy exception is a safety valve to be used in those exceptional circumstances when
it would be impossible for a legal system to recognize an award and enforce it without
abandoning the very fundaments on which it is based.”42
It is sensible to consider that the Article V(2)(b) standard is one of international public
policy, because it allows the tribunal to self-reflect on its mandate. Consequently, it would
entail that in order to render an enforceable award the tribunal needs to comply with one
considerably consistent standard of public policy without focusing on the peculiarities of
each potential country of enforcement.
3.4 The relevance of the parties’ consent, their requests and the law: the
three keyholes test
Since the “mandate” is not defined in the Convention it is necessary to independently
identify the sources of the arbitrators’ powers. Unsurprisingly it is primarily based on the
parties’ consent and their request(s). For example, pursuant to the ICCA Guide, “[i]n
determining what the parties have submitted to the arbitral tribunal, regard must be had
to the arbitration agreement and the claims for relief submitted to the arbitral tribunal by
40 For example, in cases of punitive damages. See, e.g., (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or
Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.325.
41 See (International Law Association, 2002) pp.2-5.
42 (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2016) p.240. See also (ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York
Convention: A Handbook for Judges, 2011) p.71 (“[t]he general rule to be followed by the courts is that the
grounds for refusal defined in Article V are to be construed narrowly, which means that their existence is
accepted in serious cases only. This is especially true with respect to claims of violation of public policy, which
are often raised by disappointed parties but very seldom accepted by the courts.”).
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the parties.”43 All in all, one should not forget, however, that the parties’ own design44
should not conflict with the basic values of the legal system at the place of enforcement.45
4 The New York Convention approach to the “excess of mandate”
type of challenge
As already highlighted at the beginning, the Convention does not operate with the notion
of themandate. At the same time, Article V(1)(c) of the Convention, arguably, constitutes
a type of post-award challenge towards the alleged “excess of mandate”. Pursuant to this
provision, the awardmay be refused recognition and enforcement if “the award deals with
a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration […].”
Before applying the challenge to selected decisions of an arbitral tribunal, it is necessary
to reflect briefly on the historical development of the enforcement system (section 4.1).
Furthermore, one should analyze the (elusive) text of Article V(1)(c) of the Convention
(section 4.3), including its different (equally authentic) linguistic versions (section 4.2)
and finally analyze the potential tensions between competing defenses available under the
architecture of Article V of the New York Convention (section 4.4).
4.1 Historical overview
To understand the meaning of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge under the New
York Convention system it is useful to put the NewYork Convention enforcement regime
in context. It entails that one should take into account (i) the shape of the same challenge
under theGenevaConvention, (ii) the travaux préparatoires of theNewYorkConvention,
and (iii) the design of the challenge in the Miami Draft.46
Article 2(c) of the Geneva Convention provides that the recognition and enforcement
of the award shall be refused if the national court is satisfied the “the award does not deal
with the differences contemplated by or falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration or that it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
43 (ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook for Judges, 2011)
p.93.
44 See section 3.1 and section 3.2.
45 See section 3.3.
46 For the sake of convenience, of the reader all texts of the relevant provisions have been set together in
Table 3 at the end of this section.
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arbitration.”47 What can be thus easily observed is that, at the enforcement stage, the
wording of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge remains in principle unchanged for
almost a century now. Since it generates certain interpretative difficulties, the text will be
closely reviewed below.48
Although the final version of the New York Convention is very similar to the text of
theGeneva Convention, the travaux préparatoires show that other concepts have also been
taken into consideration. For example, the ICC Draft Convention49 provided simpler
wording by stating that the award will not be recognized and enforced if: “[…] the award
deals with a difference not contemplated by the agreement of the parties or that it contains
decisions on matters not submitted to the arbitrators.”50 Notably, according to the ICC
Draft, two concepts would be covered by the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. The
first one requires a court to check if a dispute submitted was covered by the agreement to
arbitrate, the second one was designed to see if the award conforms with the parties’
requests.
The ICC’s proposal did not survive, however, and was amended by the UN Draft.51
The UN Draft reflected the rule expressed in the Geneva Convention.52 Article IV(d) of
theUNDraft reads that the courtmay refuse recognition and enforcement if satisfied “that
the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the
submission to arbitration or that it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration […].”53 The cryptic wording of the UN Draft made its way into
the final version of the New York Convention and requires further analysis below.54
47 For the text of the Convention, see http://www.newyorkconvention.org/11165/web/files/document
/1/6/16020.pdf [last accessed 27 April].
48 See section 4.3.
49 The ICC issued its draft Convention aimed at facilitating the enforcement of awards related to international
commercial disputes in 1953 and was a basis for the further work on the New York Convention. For the
text of the ICC Draft Convention see http://www.newyorkconvention.org/11165/web/files/document/
1/5/15940.pdf [last accessed 27 April 2018].
50 Art. IV(d) of the ICC Draft.
51 U.N. Doc. E/AC.42/4/Rev. 1 Annex p.2. See http://www.newyorkconvention.org/11165/web/files/
document/1/5/15953.pdf [last accessed 27 April 2018]. The main differences between the ICC and UN
Drafts related – among other things – to the concerns regarding the character of arbitral awards
(‘international’ arbitral awards in the ICC Draft and ‘foreign’ arbitral awards in the UN Draft) or to the
principle of reciprocity (enforcement of the award regardless of where it has been made in the ICC Draft,
and an ‘opt-in’ system for applying the Convention only to the awards made in another Contracting State
in the UN Draft. For more, see (Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform
Judicial Interpretation, 1981) pp.6-10 and (Briner & Hamilton, 2008) pp.9-14.
52 It was explained by the ad hoc Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards that: “the
first half of this clause reproduces Article 2(c) of the Geneva Convention, and is similar to Article IV(d) of the
ICC draft”. No reason was given why the ICC proposal could not survive. For more, see U.N. Doc.
E/AC.42/4/Rev.1 28 March 1955, p.10.
53 Art. IV(d) of the UN Draft.
54 See section 4.3.
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Before concluding, it is also necessary to explain van den Berg’s proposal to the
prospective changes in the New York Convention regime. For the fiftieth birthday of the
New York Convention, a lively debate was provoked by van den Berg and his proposal for
the revision of the New York Convention (i.e. “theMiami Draft”). In his critique, van den
Berg considered that the Convention should be modernized in order to remedy
shortcomings that had become evident during years of interpreting the Convention.55
Among other inadequacies, hementioned that a number of provisions are of an unclear
characterwhich raises difficultieswith understanding theirmeaning. In this regard reference
to Article V(1)(c) has also beenmade.56 Consequently, theMiami Draft proposes the new,
simplified wording of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge that obliges the court to
refuse parties an enforcement request if “[…] the relief granted in the award is more than
or different from, the relief sought in the arbitration and such relief cannot be severed from
the relief sought and granted.”57 This shape of the provision would, in turn, narrow the
scope of application of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge to the ultra and extra
petita scenarios.
Marike Paulsson suggested that “the Miami draft seeks to contribute to validate the
Drafter’s intent and the meaning of little words like ‘only’ or ‘may’. It is a pair of spectacles,
a ‘how to read this text’ instrument”.58 If one accepts her argument, it would mean that the
“excess of mandate” type of challenge should not be interpreted excessively broad. It is yet
to be determined, however, if enforcement courts indeed limit the application of the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge to the ultra and extra petita scenarios.59
55 (Van denBerg,Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement ofArbitrationAgreements
and Awards. Explanatory Note, 2009) pp.649-650 and also p.661.
56 (Van denBerg,Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement ofArbitrationAgreements
and Awards. Explanatory Note, 2009) p.650: “a number of provisions are unclear […] [for instance] the
words “terms of submission” and “scope of submission” to arbitration in art. V(1)(c) […]”.
57 Art. 5(3)(c) of the Miami Draft.
58 (Paulsson M. R., 2012) p.12.
59 See section 5.
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The evolution of Article V(1)(c) of the New York ConventionTable 3
The Miami DraftThe New York
Convention
The UN DraftThe ICC DraftThe Geneva
Convention
Art. 5(3)(c)Art. V(1)(c)Art. IV(d)Art. IV(d)Art. 2(c)
the relief granted
in the award is
“the award deals
with a difference
“that the award
deals with a
“that the award
deals with a
“the award does
not deal with the
more than ornot contemplateddifference notdifference notdifferences
different from, theby or not fallingcontemplated by orcontemplated bycontemplated by or
relief sought in the
arbitration […].”
within the terms of
the submission to
not falling within
the terms of the
the agreement of
the parties or that
falling within the
terms of the
arbitration, or itsubmission toit containssubmission to
contains decisionsarbitration or thatdecisions onarbitration or that
on matters beyondit containsmatters notit contains
the scope of thedecisions onsubmitted to the
arbitrators”
decisions on
matters beyond the submission to
arbitration, […].”
matters beyond the
scope of thescope of the
submission to
arbitration […].”
submission to
arbitration.”
4.2 Differences in the authentic versions of the text of the New York
Convention
Since the Convention has been drafted in five equally authentic texts60 it might be sensible
to have a closer look at whether the language of Article V(1)(c) of the Convention is the
same in its different language versions. Alas, due to the language capacities of the author
the two remaining (authentic) versions of the Convention are not included in the
comparison (Chinese and Russian). At the same time, however, the analysis of the three
shows that certain distinctive elements exist in the text of the provision. For the sake of
convenience, the three language versions have been reproduced below and divided into
two separate hypotheses envisaged by Article V(1)(c) of the Convention.61
Different authentic versions of Article V(1)(c) of the New York ConventionTable 4
The Spanish versionThe French versionThe English version
Que la sentencia se
refiere a una diferencia
Que la sentence porte
sur un différend non
the award deals with a difference not
contemplated by or not falling within
1.
no prevista en elvisé dans le compromisthe terms of the submission to
arbitration, compromiso o noou n’entrant pas dans
comprendida en lasles prévisions de la
clause compromissoire, disposiciones de la
60 See Art. XVI(1) of the Convention.
61 A similar exercise has been undertaken in the chapter on the Model Law. The texts of both instruments
slightly differ, however.
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The Spanish versionThe French versionThe English version
cláusula
compromisoria,
contiene decisiones que
exceden de los términos
qu’elle contient des
décisions qui dépassent
or it contains decisions on matters
beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration
2.
del compromiso o de la
cláusula compromisoria
les termes du compromis
ou de la clause
compromissoire
There are, in principle, two noticeable differences between the authentic versions of the
“excess ofmandate” provision. The first one relates to the fact that the French and Spanish
versions of the Convention explicitly refer to two forms of the agreement to arbitrate,62
whereas the English version does not. The second difference refers to a puzzle included
in the English text, where the reference is made to “terms of the submission to arbitration”
under the first hypothesis and to the “scope of the submission to arbitration” under the
second hypothesis. This distinction will be discussed further below.63 The French and the
Spanish versions are somewhat different in this regard.64 In the first hypothesis, the reference
to prévisions (in the French version) or to disposiciones (in the Spanish version) is made
only with regard to the arbitration clause.65
This comparative exercise of the different authentic versions of the Convention might
suggest that the “excess of mandate” type of challenge under the New York Convention
regime is in fact the challenge against the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction rather than
against the mandate, because the term “submission to arbitration” used in the English
version is substituted with the explicit reference to two forms of the agreement to arbitrate
(i.e. submission agreement and arbitration clause) in its French and Spanish versions.66
Such a reading of the text, however, will exclude the possibility of reviewing the parties’
petita under Article V(1)(c) of the Convention, whereas, arguably it has been drafted to
tackle precisely these violations.
62 See also fn.29.
63 See also section 4.3.2.
64 See Table 4.
65 It is true that the French and Spanish versions of the Convention also use different terms in the first and
the second hypotheses. Arguably, however, the difference is less confusing. The first hypothesis refers to le
compromis (el compromiso) and la clause compromissoire (la cláusula compromisoria) and the second
hypothesis refers to les termes du compromis (los términos del compromiso) and les termes de la clause
compromissoire (los términos de la cláusula compromisoria).
66 As argued by Van den Berg on several occasions, there is no explanation in the literature why the difference
between the English and French text of the New York Convention (as well as the Geneva Convention) even
occurred. See (Van denBerg, TheNewYorkConvention of 1958: TowardsUniform Judicial Interpretation,
1981) p.315, and (Van den Berg, Failure by Arbitrators to Apply Contract Terms from the Perspective of
the New York Convention, 2005) p.68.
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4.3 Textual interpretation of Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention
As highlighted above, the text of Article V(1)(c) of the Convention is rather descriptive.67
Ambiguity of the terms used thereinmight hinder the understanding and conceptualizing
of the “excess of mandate type of challenge”.68 Therefore, it is necessary to focus on each
term separately. The analysis will be therefore divided into sections. The first section will
focus on the term “submission to arbitration” (section 4.3.1), then one will discuss the
potential difference between “terms of the submission to arbitration” and the “scope of
the submission to arbitration” (section 4.3.2). Finally, it would be useful to explore the
notions of “a difference” (section 4.3.3) and “matters” (section 4.3.4).
4.3.1 The meaning of the “submission to arbitration”
The term “submission to arbitration” is the core element of Article V(1)(c) of the
Convention, especially because it is included under both hypotheses of said provision.69
Additionally, it is occasionally discussedwith a reference to the arbitral tribunal’smandate,70
which may create confusion. On the one hand, as already suggested above, it should be
given a broad interpretation of covering both forms of the agreement to arbitrate. On the
other hand, one should reflect whether the terms submission to arbitration go beyond the
notion of agreement to arbitrate and therefore beyond the issue of excess of jurisdiction.
These will be discussed further below.
The notion “submission to arbitration” should be deemed to cover not only a (formal)
arbitration clause concluded prior to any dispute arising between the parties, but also
subsequent agreements referring to arbitration in an already existing dispute (i.e. submission
agreements).71 At least three arguments have been advanced to support such a claim. First,
67 For the sake of convenience, it might be useful to repeat the text of the provision. According to Art V(1)(c)
of theConvention the awardmay be refused recognition and enforcement if “the award deals with a difference
not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions
on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.”
68 It should be also noted that defining the meaning of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge might be
difficult because different authors introduce different concepts explaining the meaning of Art. V(1)(c) of
the New York Convention. See, for example, (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction,
Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.311 (excess of jurisdiction and excess of competence), (Azeredo da Silveira & Lévy,
2008) (excess of jurisdiction and excess of mandate), (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014)
pp.3541-3559 (excess of authority), (Lew,Mistelis i Kröll, Comparative InternationalCommercialArbitration,
2003) p.714 (decisions extra/ultra petita), and (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) pp.629-631
(excess of authority, i.e. ultra petita and excess of jurisdiction).
69 See also section 4.3.2, which discusses the notions of the “terms” and the “scope” of the submission to
arbitration.
70 (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) p.259 (“[a]rticle V(1)(c) refers to the “submission to arbitration,” which is
synonymous with the arbitrator’s mandate. This phrasing implies that V(1)(c) is applicable whenever the
tribunal issues an award that goes beyond what the parties formally requested the tribunal to decide.”).
71 (Haas, 2002) p.499, and (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) p.265.
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one should reflect that the broad term (i.e. “submission to arbitration” instead of “arbitration
agreement” or “arbitration clause”) has been introduced intentionally by the drafters of
the New York Convention.72 Second, the wording of Article V(1)(c) differs from the
expression used in the provisions V(1)(a) (“agreement referred to in article II”) andV(1)(d)
(“agreement of the parties”).73 Third, the simultaneous reading of the English, the French
and the Spanish texts implies that the “submission to arbitration” should cover both the
arbitration clause and the submission agreement.74
The simultaneous analysis of the authentic texts of the New York Convention might,
however, unnecessarily narrow the interpretation of “submission to arbitration”. As
suggested above, since the French and the Spanish textsmake direct reference to submission
agreement and arbitration clause, it might suggest that Article V(1)(c) of the Convention
reflects only issues related to the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.75
Similarly, the UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide highlights that: “[t]hough some authors
have argued that article V (1)(c) provides a second, separate ground for refusal to enforce
an award rendered ultra petita, courts have rejected challenges to recognition or enforcement
under article V (1)(c) based on the fact that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority by
deciding on issues or granting forms of relief beyond those pleaded by the parties.”76 The
limited case law supporting theUNCITRALSecretariat’s argumentmight not be sufficient
and might not constitute the best approach.77
In discussing Article V(1)(c) of the Convention, it is sensible to take into account not
only the scope of the agreement to arbitrate, but also the subsequent parties’ submissions.
Arguably, the provision of the Geneva Convention that mirrors the text of Article V(1)(c)
of theNewYorkConventionwas designed to tackle the petita related issues.78 Additionally,
72 See the historical overview in section 4.1. See also (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) p.265.
73 (Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 1981) p.315,
(Haas, 2002) p.499, and (Borris&Hannecke, ArticleV:Grounds for Refusal of Recognition andEnforcement
of Arbitral Awards. General, 2012) p.311.
74 (Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 1981)
pp.314-316, (Azeredo da Silveira & Lévy, 2008) pp.645-646, (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) p.265. See also
fn.66.
75 See section 4.1. See also (Azeredo da Silveira & Lévy, 2008) p.649) (“[n]either the English nor the French
text of the Convention explicitly mentions that the limits of the arbitrators’ authority are also to be set by the
reference to the parties’ claims. As a result, one can conclude, a priori, that Article V(1)(c) only pertains to
the issue of the transgression, by the arbitrators, of the limits of the scope of their jurisdiction.”) It should be
mentioned, that although the authors mentioned this line of argument, they also criticized it at the same
time.
76 (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2016) p.175 cf, e.g., (Haas, 2002) p.499 (“whether the arbitrator has stayed within
the limits of his mandate or not depends, according to the language in Art. V(1)(c), on the congruence between
the ‘terms of submission to arbitration’ and the award, rather than congruity between the arbitration agreement
and award.”).
77 Reference is made, assumingly for illustrative purposes, to the two U.S. cases.
78 See Art. 2 of the Geneva Convention that refers also to the infra petita decisions (“If the award has not
covered all the questions submitted to the arbitral tribunal, the competent authority of the country where
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the ICC Draft recognized that there are two hypotheses that might be tackled under the
third ground for recourse.79
In a similar vein, according to the ICCAGuide: “[i]n determining what the parties have
submitted to the arbitral tribunal, regard must be had to the arbitration agreement and the
claims for relief submitted to the arbitral tribunal by the parties.”80 It is therefore aligned
with the two stages of the three keyholes test.81 It means that the text of Article V(1)(c) of
the Convention covers excess of the initial consent to arbitrate as well as the reference to
the relief sought by the parties.
If one looks at the Convention through the lens of theMiamiDraft, one would observe
that the simplified language of the corresponding provision changes the term “submission
to arbitration” into “relief sought in arbitration”.82 In his explanatory notes van den Berg
suggests that “[t]he matter of the relief granted outside the relief sought (extra petita) must
be distinguished from the relief granted outside the scope of arbitration agreement but within
the relief sought. In such a case, ground (a) of Art. 5(3) (invalid arbitration agreement)
applies, and not ground (c).”83
All in all, users of international arbitration should bewell aware of these two competing
definitions of “submission to arbitration” and their potential consequences. If they are to
be understood only as the reference to the agreement to arbitrate, the ultra or extra petita
challenges will need to be subsumed by the other grounds.84 The alternative may entail
that two different hypotheses will be subsumed under the same provision which would,
in turn,mean that the standard for the court’s review of challenges under the same provision
recognition or enforcement of the award is sought can, if it think fit, postpone such recognition or enforcement
or grant it subject to such guarantee as that authority may decide.”). If in this second part of the article the
hypothesis refers to the infra petita, it is reasonable to assume that the first part of this article (i.e. “[…] the
award does not deal with the differences contemplated by or falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration or that it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.”) refers
to the ultra and extra petita scenarios.
79 See Art. IV(d) of the ICC Draft (“that the award deals with a difference not contemplated by the agreement
of the parties or that it contains decisions on matters not submitted to the arbitrators”).
80 (ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook for Judges, 2011)
p.93.
81 See section 3.4.
82 Art. 5(3)(c) of the Miami Draft.
83 (Van denBerg,Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement ofArbitrationAgreements
andAwards. ExplanatoryNote, 2009) p.661.However, followingVan den Berg’s previouswritings, it seems
acceptable for the parties’ submissions to extend the arbitrators’mandate beyond the scope of the arbitration
clause if both parties agreed to such an extension. For further reading, see (Van den Berg, The New York
Convention of 1958: An Overview, 2008) p.59; similarly (Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitration
Law and Practice, 2001) p.957, where he notes that the arbitrators have exceeded their ‘contractual’
jurisdiction when the award contains a decision outside the ambit of the arbitration clause, even if the
decision has not gone beyond the claims, counterclaims or defenses of a party to the proceedings.
84 Most likely under the public policy challenge (Art. V(2)(b) of the Convention). This creates, however,
additional uncertainties, because amongst other things public policy can be raised by the court ex officio.
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might differ. Neither option is desirable which explains why the revision suggested by van
den Berg should be welcomed.
4.3.2 The difference between the “terms” and the “scope” of the submission to
arbitration
One of the arguments advanced by van den Berg when explaining the necessity of
modernizing of the New York Convention is its unclear language.85 Examples of the
ambiguous wording presented by the author included the “terms of the submission to
arbitration” as well as the “scope of the submission to arbitration”.86 The outstanding
question therefore is, if it is possible to make sense of this difference and, if so, how?
There are, in principle, two extremes, neither of which is a truly comforting solution.
On the one hand, one could argue that the difference between these terms is relevant to
identify two distinct concepts that are included in Article V(1)(c) of the Convention. On
the other hand, it is possible to treat both terms (i.e. “the terms” and “the scope”) as
synonyms.
If one accepts that Article V(1)(c) makes a reference to two distinct concepts, one
would need to tie the “terms of the submission to arbitration” to the reference to “dispute”
and “the scope of the submission to arbitration” to the “matters”.87 When illustrated in
the table, it would have the following design:
Table 5
the terms of the submission
to arbitration
not contemplated by or not
falling within
the award deals with a
difference
1.
the scope of the submission
to arbitration
beyond[or] it contains decisions on
matters
2.
The general understanding of this division is explained as relating to both the excess of
jurisdiction (under the first hypothesis) and the excess of reference (under the second
hypothesis).88 Such an interpretation is, however, dangerous because it may create
discrepancy in approaches to the challenges brought under Article V(1)(c) of the
85 (Van denBerg,Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement ofArbitrationAgreements
and Awards. Explanatory Note, 2009) p.650.
86 (Van denBerg,Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International Enforcement ofArbitrationAgreements
and Awards. Explanatory Note, 2009) p.650.
87 If one looks, for example, at the ICC Draft, this distinction would be more compelling. See Art. IV(d) of
the ICC Draft (“that the award deals with a difference not contemplated by the agreement of the parties or
that it contains decisions on matters not submitted to the arbitrators”). At the same time, however, it will
prove that this provision was not designed to tackle only the scope of jurisdiction issues. Instead it had a
two-layered design in mind. See also section 3.4.
88 See also fn.87.
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Convention. In other words, the matter related to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, arguably,
might invite a closer court scrutiny than the ones related to themandate. The enforcement
courts should, however, shy away from this differentiation and apply the deferential test
only.89 Arguably, they ought to remember that, contrary to the courts at the seat, their
supervisory role is more limited in that they are not the appropriate forum for lengthy
discussions about the scope issues (be it as it may the scope of jurisdiction or reference).90
Importantly, theMiamiDraft eliminates difficulties and reduces the necessary interpretation
to the minimum.91
The alternative is to treat these terms (i.e. “terms” and “scope” of the submission to
arbitration) as synonyms. Generally, treating the terms as synonymswill not affect the two
layers of theArticleV(1)(c) test92 because it is rooted in the interpretation of the “submission
to arbitration” itself. In other words, even if “terms” and “scope” of the submission to
arbitration are given the samemeaning, it will require the review of both (i) the agreement
to arbitrate93 and (ii) the subsequent submissions.94 At the same time it would facilitate
the shift of a discussion towards the meaning (and differences) of the terms “a difference”
and “matters”.95 These terms will be explained immediately below.
4.3.3 The meaning of “a difference”
In comparison to the interpretation of the “submission to arbitration” and other words
used in Article V(1)(c) of the Convention, the words of “a difference” seems to draw
relatively little attention. Nonetheless, linguistic choices when interpreting this term can
predetermine what constitutes “a difference” that is covered by the submission to
arbitration, as every option will have a different operating range.
Most commonly, “a difference” is equatedwith a “dispute” or a “claim”.96 For example,
van den Berg suggests that “the first type of allegation is that the arbitrator has dealt with
a dispute which does not fall within the scope of the arbitral clause”.97 Also if one looks at
89 See section 2.2.
90 Especially taking into account that it might be necessary to determine the law applicable to the scope (of
jurisdiction) issues.
91 See Art. 5(3)(c) of the Miami Draft (“the relief granted in the award is more than or different from, the relief
sought in the arbitration […].”).
92 See section 3.4.
93 See section 3.1.
94 See section 3.2.
95 See section 4.3.3 and section 4.3.4.
96 Interestingly enough, on occasion, it is also explained as a “matter”. See, e.g., (Rubino-Sammartano,
International Arbitration Law and Practice, 2001) p.957 (“[t]his ground for refusal covers awards which have
decided matters which are outside the ambit of the arbitration clause”).
97 (Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 1981) p.314.
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the corresponding provision of the Model Law, one will also see the reference to a
“dispute”.98
In the alternative, Di Pietro and Platte, while referring to the first part of Article V(1)(c)
of the Convention, note that “[it] deals with cases where the arbitrators are […] alleged to
have entertained a claim which parties did not want to refer to arbitration.”99 Similarly,
Azeredo da Silveira and Lévy contemplate that “[r]ecognition and enforcement may be
refused under Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention only if the award deals with a
‘difference’ (in the French text ‘differénd’) not contemplated by or not falling within the terms
of the submission to arbitration: with respect to the arbitrators’ mandate, the ‘difference’ is
determined by reference to the parties’ opposing claims (or prayers for relief), not by reference
to the issues.”100
These terms demarcate themeaning of a “difference” well by referring to a contentious
element existing between parties. At the same time, however, they bring around the
interpretative difficulties as to the questionwhether Article V(1)(c) deals with jurisdictional
challenges (i.e. scope of the agreement to arbitrate) alone or rather with the jurisdictional
challenges as well as with a different creature, namely the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge.101
As a consequence of the vague and unclear language102 a provision corresponding to
Article V(1)(c) of the Convention has been redrafted in theMiamiDraft. Therefore, Article
5(3)(c) reads (in the relevant part) that the enforcement shall be refused if “the relief granted
in the award is more than, or different from, the relief sought in the arbitration.” The
provision is clear-cut as it requires a comparison between the relief sought by the parties
(thus its competing requests for relief) and the relief granted by the tribunal.103 Arguably,
it reintroduces the application intended by the Geneva Convention.
4.3.4 The meaning of “matters”
It is necessary to point out at the outset that the analysis below is based on the supposition
that the “terms” and the “scope” of the submission to arbitration have the same meaning
98 See Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) and Art. 36(1)(a)(iii) of the Model Law. For further reading, see also Chapter II.
99 (Di Pietro & Platte, 2001) p.158.
100 (Azeredo da Silveira & Lévy, 2008) p.660.
101 See also section 4.3.1 and section 4.4.
102 Apart from the phrases discussed in this section, also the expression “not contemplated by or not falling
within” might cause certain interpretative difficulties, considering it being unnecessarily repetitive. One
could argue that the wording of the English text comes from oversimplification of the French text of the
Convention, which distinguishes that a difference can be either (i) “not contemplated by the submission
agreement” or (ii) “not falling within the terms of arbitral clause” (“un différend non visé dans le compromis
ou n’entrant pas dans les prévisions de la clause compromissoire”). Translation after (Van den Berg, The
New York Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 1981) p.315.
103 For the author’s explanation, see (Van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Awards. Explanatory Note, 2009) p.661.
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under Article V(1)(c) of the Convention.104 If this argument is accepted, one should further
investigate the meaning of the term “matters” (or “decisions on matters” to be precise)
and its potential distinction from the term “difference” which is also used in the context
of the “submission to arbitration”.105
The UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide suggests that the “matters” referred to in Article
V(1)(c) of theConvention should be broadly defined and cover “subjectmatter jurisdiction”
and “personal jurisdiction”.106 This argumentation, however, presupposes that the whole
of Article V(1)(c) of the Convention (thus even its second hypothesis) deals with the
jurisdictional challenges as opposed to the views presented herein.107 The best fit for
jurisdictional challenges (other than the scope of the agreement to arbitrate) is Article
V(1)(a) of the Convention.108
An alternative to theUNCITRALSecretariat’s views to interpret the distinction between
a “difference” and “decisions on matters” goes back to the suggested division included in
the three keyholes test.109 In principle, “a difference” is then given an interpretation of an
abstract dispute that may occur between the parties, whereas “decisions onmatters” relate
to specifically submitted claims.110 As reflected by Kurkela: “‘[m]atters’ beyond the scope
of submission may include the difference although a difference as a word is perhaps closer
to a disagreement or a larger subject matter. A ‘matter’ is closer to an issue. For instance the
difference may be a distributorship agreement and ‘the matter’ failure to deliver on time or
damages relating to unjust termination of the agreement. Further, ‘the matter’ may relate
to a remedy sought by a party, e.g. declaratory relief, specific performance, injunction or
damages. Within ‘the difference’ there may be various issues or matters, some of which are
closely related to the difference itself but, which despite the closeness are not necessarily
always directly within the scope of submission.”111
It is rather undisputed that “decisions onmatters” have to be something different than
dealing with the “difference” submitted by the parties. Consequently, one may treat the
“decisions on matters” as the tribunal’s decisions on issues brought for determination
which, however, lack the contentious component, for example, undisputed claims. Similarly,
104 See section 4.3.2.
105 Considering that the synonymous terms “terms of the submission to arbitration” and “the scope of the
submission to arbitration” are tied, either with the reference to a “dispute” (the former) or with the “matters”
(the latter).
106 For further reading, see (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2016) pp.177-180.
107 See section 4.3.1.
108 Even the UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide admits that the issues of “personal jurisdiction” are subsumed by
the first ground for challenge. See (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2016) p.177 (“In relation to the latter
interpretation, it is notable that in any event, article V (1)(a) directly addresses consent of the parties.”).
109 See section 3 and section 3.4 in particular.
110 For a discussion on the meaning of the “submission to arbitration”, see also (Van den Berg, The New York
Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 1981) pp.314-316.
111 (Kurkela, Due Process in International Commercial Arbitration, 2007) p.28.
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“decision on matters” might then include the tribunal’s decisions on contract adaptation
or on filling the gaps.112 In turn, itmeans that these types of decisions will also be susceptible
to the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
The last interpretation, arguably, explains that different types of tribunal’s decisions
will be subsumed by the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. The tribunal’s mandate,
in any event, finds its limits in the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, which is further limited
by their subsequent submissions.113 The text of Article V(1)(c) does entertain two separate
hypotheses for challenge (excess of jurisdiction and excess of mandate), even though it
would be better to narrow the challenge to the assessment of the award against the submitted
parties’ petita.114
4.4 Competing defenses: the interplay between the grounds for resisting
recognition and enforcement under Article V(1) of the Convention
The mechanism introduced in Article V(1)(c) is not independent from the other grounds
of Article V(1) of the Convention. It can be generally stated that the defenses mentioned
in Article V(1) complement each other. The interaction between Article V(1)(c) of the
Convention and other grounds can, in principle, be structured on two levels: the first level
refers to the basis of the authority of the arbitral tribunal, thus to the arbitration agreement
and the second level refers to the general principles of the procedural fairness. One should
note, however, that as a consequence of the interplay, it is not always easy to delineate
which defense(s) should apply in order to effectively challenge an arbitral award.
Accordingly, parties resisting enforcement usually decide to test an arbitral award against
all (or almost all) the grounds listed in Article V of the Convention.
The first instance where the challenges are intertwined relates to the arbitral tribunal’s
jurisdiction. As observed above, Article V(1)(c) of theConvention requires the assessment
of the scope of the agreement to arbitrate which means that it focuses on the tribunal’s
jurisdiction. For this reason, it competes with Article V(1)(a) of the Convention which
squarely deals with (and is better fitted to tackle) jurisdictional objections.115
It is generally argued that the New York Convention separates situations where the
challenge is directed towards the validity of the agreement to arbitrate116 and those directed
112 See section 5.3.3.
113 See section 3 (and section 3.4 in particular).
114 See also section 4.3.1 and section 4.3.2.
115 Art. V(1)(a) of the Convention reads that an arbitral award may be refused recognition and enforcement
if “the parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under law applicable to them, under some
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or failing
any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made.”
116 Art. V(1)(a) of the Convention.
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towards the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.117 “Thus, Article V(1)(c) complements
Article V(1)(a).”118 Both of these challenges will be jurisdictional in nature.119 Perhaps the
biggest struggle in identifying the appropriate ground of theConvention lies in the question
whether a party was bound by the agreement to arbitrate. As observed by the UNCITRAL
Secretariat Guide, “[s]everal courts have therefore considered that ratione personae is also
a “matter” within the meaning of article V (1)(c) and can therefore constitute a valid basis
for an article V (1)(c) challenge to recognition or enforcement of an award.”120 The better
view is, however, to address these objections under Article V(1)(a) of the Convention.121
The second instance where Article V(1)(c) of the Convention competes with other
grounds of Article V of the Convention reflects the tension between the concept of the
“excess of mandate” and due process. In principle, the second and the fourth defense of
Article V(1) of the Convention refer to the fundamental fairness of the arbitral process.
Whereas Article V(1)(b) of the Convention reads that the recognition and enforcement
may be refused if “the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice
of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable
to present his case”. Article V(1)(d) of the Convention provides that recognition and
enforcement of the award may be refused if “the composition of the arbitral authority or
the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration
took place.” Some illustrations will be given below, which show the tension between both
of these grounds.
For example (in the context of the competitionwithArticle V(1)(b) of the Convention),
since the right to be heard plays a fundamental role in any dispute resolution process, it
cannot be disregarded by arbitrators. An arbitral tribunal’s decision which comes to the
parties unexpectedly might infringe the parties’ right to present their case. Therefore, as
rightly pointed out: “[…] if a tribunal bases its award on considerations that are capable of
surprising the parties, the arbitral tribunal exceeds its competence it if does not give the
parties the opportunity to respond to these considerations. In this case, the defense under
117 Art. V(1)(c) of the Convention.
118 (Azeredo da Silveira & Lévy, 2008) p.640.
119 The severance of the validity and the scope questions raises a number of difficulties, one of them being the
question of applicable law. As long as Art. V(1)(a) of the Convention clarifies what law applies to the
question of the validity of the agreement to arbitrate, Art. V(1)(c) of the Convention is silent on the issue.
See also (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3550-3552.
120 (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2016) p.178. For the case law, see pp.178-180 therein. See also Fiat S.p.A. v.Ministry
of Fin. & Planning of Republic of Suriname,No. 88 CIV. 6639 (SWK), 1989WL 122891, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
12, 1989). For further reading, i.a., (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) pp.277-279.
121 See, i.a., (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2016) p.183 (“[…] addressing whether a party has consented to arbitrate
under article V (1)(a) is ultimately consistent with the distinct purposes [that] articles V (1)(a) and V (1)(c)
[…] were given by the drafters of the Convention.”).
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Article V(1)(c) with respect to the agreement of the parties overlaps with the scope of Article
V(1)(b) concerning the parties’ right to be heard.”122
In addition, Borris andHannecke, point out the usefulness of invoking Article V(1)(b)
of the Convention in cases where the award is made infra petita.123 The authors advance
the opinion that “[i]n any case, where the failure of an arbitral tribunal to deal with questions
submitted by the parties constitutes a violation of due process, refusal of recognition and
enforcement may be justified under Article V(1)(b).”124
In a similar vein, in some instances it might be potentially difficult to choose whether
Article V(1)(c) or Article V(1)(d) of the Convention is the appropriate ground for a
challenge. Reference to the irregularity of the arbitral procedure might be particularly
tempting when testing the arbitral tribunal’s decisions on applicable law which might be
somewhat different from the parties’ expectations.125 It has been concluded, however, that:
“[t]he procedural-irregularity defence is seldom applied in the context of choice of law. A
tribunal’s disregard of the parties’ instructions pertaining to the governing law does not, as
a rule, fall within the scope of procedural irregularity; it is an excess-of-power defence.”126
Moreover, one might question under which ground the power of acting as amiable
compositeur should be subsumed. In the view of most scholars, acting as amiable
compositeur without the parties’ authorization might simultaneously trigger defenses
pursuant to Article V(1)(c) and Article V(1)(d) of the Convention as it violates approved
procedural rules and constitutes a transgression of the mandate.127 Haas argues that
“[w]hether and under which conditions the arbitral tribunal is authorized to grant an award
based on equity is a question of the applicable procedural rules determined pursuant to
Art.V(1)(d).”128 Conversely, Di Pietro and Platte consider that “only application of procedure
that was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement may be remedied under Article
V(1)(d). Thus, if the parties’ agreement to vest the arbitrator with the power to act as amiable
compositeur had no impact on procedure, it seems that Article V(1)(d) is not the proper
122 (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.327, also (Azeredo da
Silveira&Lévy, 2008) p.655 (the authors, however, seem to suggest Art. V(1)(d) of theNewYorkConvention
as the basis for violation of due process and proper defense in the face of a “surprise decision”). See also
(Scherer, Violation of Due Process, 2012) pp.307-308, and (Born, International Commercial Arbitration,
2014) p.3518.
123 See also section 5.1.6.
124 (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.326.
125 See also section 5.2.
126 (Moss, Can an arbitral tribunal disregard the choice of law made by the parties?, 2005) p.15. As reported
by Jarvin not all countries take such an approach. See (Jarvin, Irregularity in the Composition of the Arbitral
Tribunal and the Procedure, 2008) p.730.
127 (Haas, 2002) p.502, (Borris &Hannecke, Improper Tribunal Composition and Flawed Proceedings, Article
V(1)(d), 2012) pp.351-353. See also section 5.2.5.
128 (Haas, 2002) p.502.
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remedy.”129 All in all, the better view is to include the challenges against the non-authorized
use of ex aequo et bono under Article V(1)(d) of the Convention, because it relates to the
method of the tribunal’s reasoning andnot to the question related directly to the compliance
with the submission to arbitration.
Notably, it has also been suggested that the violation of the principle ne ultra petita
might constitute a defective arbitral procedure and as such be open for a challenge under
Article V(1)(d) instead of Article V(1)(c) of the Convention.130 This is perhaps not the
most sensible solution. If the tribunal awards more than has been requested, it will violate
the disposition given to it by the parties and not the procedure to be followed (this
hypothesis would fit squarely with the Article V(1)(c) defense). Even in cases where Article
V(1)(c) of the Convention is considered a jurisdictional (and not a mandate) challenge,
one should argue that ne ultra petitawould fit better under the hypothesis of Article V(2)(b)
of the Convention (i.e. public policy) rather than be subsumed under Article V(1)(d). All
these examples show that it is not always easy to pinpoint what ground is suitable for the
“excess of mandate” type of challenges.
5 Application of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge to
selected decisions of the arbitral tribunal
Having explained the limits of the arbitral tribunal’s authority131 and the general NewYork
Convention take on the “excess of mandate” type of challenge,132 it is necessary to evaluate
this challenge accordingly by applying the test to the selected types of decisions that the
tribunal will inevitably take during the arbitral process. The division is made thematically
and will start with decisions on parties’ claims (section 5.1). What follows is the review of
the tribunal’s application of law (5.2). Subsequently, the tribunal’s decision on remedies
will be discussed (section 5.3) with some additional reflections on the tribunal’s decisions
on issues that are accessory to the main claims made by the parties (section 5.4).
5.1 Decisions on parties’ claims
The first category of the tribunal’s decisions that are being analyzed focuses on the nature
of the claim, namely on its origin. Therefore, the following sections will concentrate on
129 (Di Pietro & Platte, 2001) p.164.
130 (Borris & Hannecke, Improper Tribunal Composition and Flawed Proceedings, Article V(1)(d), 2012)
p.351.
131 See section 3.
132 See section 4.
352
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
contractual claims and counterclaims (section 5.1.1 and section 5.1.2), tribunal’s decisions
dealing with set-off (section 5.1.3) and claims based on torts (section 5.1.4). Finally, the
decision on the modification of the initially submitted claims (section 5.1.5) as well as
decisions infra petita (section 5.1.6) will be reviewed.
5.1.1 Decision on contractual claims
In principle, claims arising out of contractual relationships are themost typical of all claims
that could be brought by the parties in arbitration. After all, agreements to arbitrate are
inserted in the contracts precisely because the mechanism for dealing with the potential
(contractual) disputes is needed. In turn, the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge requires
the enforcing court to see whether the (contractual) claims submitted fit within the scope
of the initial agreement to arbitrate. Itmeans that an enforcement court needs to determine
(i) whether the contractual claims comply with the limits imposed by the agreement to
arbitrate and (ii) whether the claims awarded are the same that have been requested by
the parties.133 Of course, the contractual claims granted should not violate public policy
in the country of enforcement.134
It is rather unlikely that the contractual claimswill fall outside the scope of the agreement
to arbitrate, especially if the parties use the available framework of the institutional model
clauses. These are generally designed to cover a broad spectrum of disputes, having
contractual disputes at their core.135 Consequently, “[…] parties seeking to limit the tribunal’s
decision to a narrow matter should do so with precision in the formal submission.”136
Additionally, the enforcement courts should give a great deference to the tribunal’s findings
as to the scope of the agreement to arbitrate,137 especially taking into account that their
supervisory role over the arbitration process is limited.138
133 See also (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) p.260.
134 See section 3.3.
135 See, e.g., the UNCITRALModel Arbitration Clause for contracts (“Any dispute, controversy or claim arising
out of or relating to this contract, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration
in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.”), the Standard 2017 ICC Arbitration Clause (“All
disputes arising out of or in connection with the present contract shall be finally settled under the Rules of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance
with the said Rules.”), the 2014 LCIA Model Clause (“Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this
contract, including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and finally
resolved by arbitration under the LCIA Rules, which Rules are deemed to be incorporated by reference into
this clause.”).
136 (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) p.266.
137 (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) p.261 (“In addition to narrow construction, many jurisdictions apply a
presumption that an arbitral award was issued within the scope of the arbitrator’s authority.”).
138 This would be one of the roles of the court at the seat of arbitration.
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The second hypothesis of Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention requires an
enforcing court to assess if the award responds to the claims submitted.139 For this reason,
however, the prayers for relief should be drafted in a clear and tangible manner in order
to condition the limits of the arbitral tribunal’s authority.140 Conversely, ambiguous prayers
for relief will burden the determination of the arbitral tribunal’s authority instead of
providing guidance.141 Consequently, in cases of vague contractual claims, the tribunal
should benefit from the exclusive power to interpret the claim.142 Additionally, Haas
observes that: “[i]f parties did not stipulate what issues may be submitted to arbitration,
then the powers to adjudicate are not exceeded if the arbitration panel awards the parties
more, less, or something other than that which the parties petitioned or argued for as long
as the award is covered by the scope of the arbitration agreement.”143 The parties’ conduct
during the arbitral process is essential in this regard. In case of contractual claims, if
respondent fails to address that the tribunal goes beyond the scope of the initial agreement
to arbitrate or that the claims submitted are vague, it might lose its right to invoke the
Article V(1)(c) defense at the enforcement stage.
Finally, it should be noted that contractual claims, even within the scope of the
agreement to arbitrate and properly submitted for the tribunal’s consideration might be
beyond the scope of what the parties may delegate for the arbitral adjudication. The
enforcement court will be able to control the (contractual) claims against its own public
policy.144
5.1.2 Decision on contractual counterclaims
Counterclaims are a distinct category of claims that are brought by respondent. It means
that they are independent from the claims brought by claimant. Generally, out of the three
keyholes questions, the issue of (contractual) counterclaims triggers particularly the first
139 (Haas, 2002) p.500 (“The arbitrator exceeds the limits of his competence if he adjudicates on points of dispute
which the parties have not agreed to assign to him (ultra petita).”).
140 See, e.g., (Karrer, Must an Arbitral Tribunal Really Ensure that its Award is Enforceable?, 2005) p.431
(“[m]any parties find it difficult to state their prayers for relief in an intelligible way. For instance, they will
use the word, ‘alternatively’ when theymean ‘subsidiarily’. One also sees far toomany requests for declaratory
awards, legal grounds for particular types of relief that may limit the relief requested to those grounds alone,
and other such mistakes. The arbitral tribunal can help here.”).
141 In that case, arguably, the arbitral tribunal or the enforcement court that examines theArt. V(1)(c) application
ambit of the arbitral tribunal’s authority based on the two-level test should take a step back from the second
level and satisfy itself with the first level conclusions. See also section 4.3.1.
142 (Karrer, Must an Arbitral Tribunal Really Ensure that its Award is Enforceable?, 2005) p.431 (“claims that
the arbitral tribunal has ruled ultra petita come mostly from parties incapable of defining their petita in the
first place. If the award states first what the arbitral tribunal understands the petita to be, and then proceeds
to deal with all of them and only them, claims of ultra petita will fail.”).
143 (Haas, 2002) p.501.
144 See section 3.3.
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question relating to the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.145 The answers to the remaining
two, although equally relevant, will not differ from the ones already submitted above.146
In principle, counterclaims will need to satisfy the same requirements as the claims
brought by the claimant.147 Itmeans that contractual counterclaims should fit comfortably
in the scope of the broad agreements to arbitrate, for example, when the institutionalmodel
clauses are used. The additional controversy arises, however, in cases where the
counterclaims have their legal basis under a different contract.
Where the counterclaims are brought based on the other contractual relationship, the
outstanding question therefore would be whether it will be within the scope of the
agreement to arbitrate. Borris and Hannecke conclude that “[a] counterclaim can be
considered as encompassed by the arbitration agreement if the contract from which the
counterclaim arises is closely connected to the contract containing the arbitration agreement
[…].”148 It would be especially the case when the agreement to arbitrate is sufficiently broad
(particularly if one uses the “in connection with” formula). It is important to note, however,
that the parties’ choices of arbitration rules149 and their conduct in arbitration might be
contributing factors in assessingwhether counterclaims can be entertained by the tribunal.150
Additionally, Borris and Hannecke argue that: “[f]or reasons of procedural economy, it
has been argued that in addition to the requirement of a close connection between the relevant
contracts, counterclaims should only be admitted if the counterclaims themselves are closely
connected to the main claim. By imposing the additional requirement of a close connection
between claim and counterclaim, the respondent is supposed to be prevented from raising
only vaguely related counterclaims in an attempt to delay the arbitral proceedings. However,
unless the parties agree on procedural rules imposing such an additional requirement, the
better reasons speak for admitting counterclaims – insofar as they are covered by the
arbitration agreement.”151 This is a reasonable approach. It is rather an argument addressed
145 (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.315.
146 See section 5.1.1.
147 See also section 5.1.1.
148 (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.315.
149 See, e.g., Art. 19(3) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules with a strict requirement (“In his statement of defence,
or at a later stage in the arbitral proceedings if the arbitral tribunal decides that the delay was justified under
the circumstances, the respondent may make a counter-claim arising out of the same contract or rely on a
claim arising out of the same contract for the purpose of a set-off”). See, however, Art. 21(3) of the 2010
UNCITRAL Rules which (in the relevant part) reads that “[…] the respondent may make a counterclaim or
rely on a claim for the purpose of a set-off provided that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction over it.”
150 (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.315 (“[u]nless the
applicable arbitration rules explicitly provide for the admissibility of (particular) counterclaims, or the claimant
agrees on the admissibility of the counterclaim(s) raised by the respondent, any counterclaim has to be covered
by the existing arbitration agreement between the parties.”).
151 (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.316.
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to the arbitral tribunal, however, and not to the enforcement court. The latter is not (or
should not) be occupied with the assessment of the efficiency of the arbitral process.
As mentioned above, and similar to the contractual claims, the parties’ request will be
condition sine qua non for the tribunal’s authority to award the claim.152 This will also be
reviewed by the enforcement court under the Article V(1)(c) mechanism. Finally, it is also
necessary that contractual counterclaims do not violate public policy at the enforcement
stage.153
5.1.3 Decisions on set-off
Claims for the purpose of set-off can be distinguished from other (counter)claims brought
by respondent.154 Generally, set-off is a defensive mechanism against the claim. For the
research at hand, it is considered a substantive law device that allows for reduction in the
value of the monetary claim by extinguishing the initial claim with a mutual, liquid
monetary claim.155 Importantly, considering the defensive character of set-off claims, they
cannot exceed the value of the initial claim.
In the context of the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge, set-off claimswill bemostly
reviewed by considering them in the context of the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. It
means that one must observe if the Article V(1)(c) challenge might be successful if (i) the
set-off is governed by the same agreement to arbitrate, (ii) in a multi-contract reality, the
set-off claim is brought based on a different contract not covered by the underlying
agreement to arbitrate, and finally (iii) the tribunal decides to set-off the initial claim ex
officio. All of the above is built under the assumption that set-offs are properly objected
to (by the opposing party).
The first scenario does not trigger any controversies considering that a set-off has been
requested by a party. It would be equally true in case of a multi-contract reality where
multiple contracts are governed by a single agreement to arbitrate (for example when the
“in connection with” formula is used).156 It would be a flaw to accept the challenge over
152 See also section 3.2 and section 5.1.1.
153 See section 3.3.
154 Of course, set-off claims are not exclusively for the respondent to raise, they can also be brought by claimant.
155 Set-off claims have been the subject of many major studies. For further reading, see in particular
(Fountoulakis, 2011) and (Pichonnaz&Gullifer, 2014). For articles, see also, i.a., (CraigW. L., The arbitrator’s
mission and the application of law in international commercial arbitration, 2010), (Karrer, Jurisdiction on
set-off defences and counterclaims, 2001), (Pavić, 2006), (Schöll, 2006), (Poudret&Besson, 2007) pp.274-280,
(Mourre, The Set-off Paradox in International Arbitration, 2008), (Fortún, 2010), (Carbonneau, The Rise
in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates, 2013), and (Scherer, Chapter III: The
Award and the Courts, Set-Off in International Arbitration, 2015).
156 Additionally, Port, Bowers and Noll analyze the temporal aspect of related contracts and the extension
effect if no conflicting provisions occur. See (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) p.279 (“Although analyses in this
area tend to be highly fact-specific, a broad arbitration clause in an agreement may apply to a later, related
agreement between the same parties, if the later agreement does not contain an arbitration clause and does
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the decision granting set-off in cases where the (set-off) claim itself is covered by the
underlying agreement to arbitrate.
The second scenario is somewhat different. It entails that the initial agreement to
arbitrate does not cover claims brought for the purpose of set-off. Consequently, it would
go squarely to the issue of the scope of the parties’ consent andwould disallow the tribunal
to entertain the set-off claim.157 At the same time, however, one should not forget the
defensive character of set-offs and the procedural efficiency of dealing with all claims (the
concept of the “one-stop arbitration”). After all the parties’ consent is to contract out the
resolution of their disputes and have them resolved promptly. Assuming that the set-off
claim is already liquid and respondent itself is willing to use the proceedings already in
place (instead of commencing new ones), there is a good reason to allow the resolution of
disputes at once.158 One should also keep in mind that the enforcement court does not
supervise the arbitral process. Therefore, it should be for the court at the seat of arbitration
to assess if the set-off claim should be allowed or not.
Under the third scenario the tribunal independently decides to extinguish the claim
with the mutual liquid debt. As always, however, the “[…] ultra petita claim became the
activity of the arbitral tribunal, though starting within the limits imposed by the mandate
given by the parties, [it] has gone beyond what was originally allowed.”159 Consequently,
setting-off claims independently (ex officio)might potentially lead to the non-enforcement
of the award. It will be equally true in cases where the tribunal finds that there is a set-off
claim and invites parties to comment on it,160 as well as in cases where the tribunal surprises
parties with the non-invoked ipso iure set-offs.161 These cases, however, are better suited
to be discussed under other (due process oriented) grounds for recourse.162
not repudiate that of the first. Courts thus have rejected V(1)(c) defenses brought on the grounds that the
tribunal exceeded its authority by applying an arbitration clause from an earlier agreement to disputes
concerning a later agreement.”).
157 (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.315 (“Generally, a
crossclaim asserted by way of set-off does not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement where no close
connection to the contract containing the arbitration agreement can be assumed. Since the arbitral process
rests entirely on the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, the scope of the arbitration cannot be extended beyond
the parties’ shared intention. In case of a contravening intention of the parties, considerations of procedural
economy cannot provide a sufficient basis for assuming the competence of the arbitral tribunal to consider
the claim for set-off.”).
158 (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.315 (“However, it has
been argued that the arbitral tribunal is also justified in assuming its jurisdiction in cases in which the amount
of the counterclaim raised as a set-off defense is not disputed or in which the counterclaim is already liquid
(e.g. because it has been conceded or has already been finally decided by a court or arbitral tribunal). Under
such (rare) circumstances, there is no reasonwhy the arbitral tribunal should not consider the set-off defense.”).
159 (Di Pietro & Platte, 2001) p.160.
160 In this case the tribunal risks a challenge of pleading for the party.
161 In this case the tribunal may face another challenge focused on a due process violation. See section 4.4.
162 See, e.g., Art. V(1)(b) or Art. V(2)(b) of the Convention. See also section 4.4.
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5.1.4 Decisionon claims/counterclaimsbasedon torts orpre-contractual liability
Another issue worth discussing in the context of the legal basis for the claim is the fate of
the award granting relief not based on the contract itself, but rather on torts or
pre-contractual liability. Unsurprisingly, this mostly touches upon the issue of the scope
of the agreement to arbitrate. At the same time, an additional problem arises. In essence
it relates to the possibility for the tribunal to requalify the legal basis for the claim (from
a contractual one to torts).
In principle, the first issue has already been discussed in detail above.163 Ultimately,
the question whether the tort claims are within the scope of the submission to arbitration
will depend primarily on the wording of the agreement to arbitrate. Generally, however,
the broadly drafted agreements to arbitrate (such as model institutional clauses)164 will
cover claims of non-contractual nature provided that they are “in connection with” or
“related to” the underlying contract. In these cases, the enforcement court should be guided
by the pro-enforcement philosophy and should not accept the challenge against the award.165
The second issue relates to the freedom of the tribunal in finding the legal basis for the
relief granted. It entails that the tribunal considers that the claim requested should be
granted. At the same time, however, it disagrees with theway the claim is brought. In other
words, the tribunal awards the party with its request, but it justifies the award differently
(for example by relying on its own legal expertise).166 This should be avoided. Similar to
what has been discussed in the context of set-off claims,167 irrespective of whether the
tribunal invites the parties to comment on the issue or “surprises” them with its
“requalification”, it will violate due process. These arguments do not fit the hypothesis of
“excess of mandate” type of challenge, however.
5.1.5 Decisiononnewclaims/counterclaims and changeof claims/counterclaims
Since the arbitral tribunal’s mandate is structured by the claims submitted,168 any addition
or alteration to the parties’ submissions effectively modifies the scope of the tribunal’s
power to adjudicate. In the context of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge, in turn,
it might have an impact on the fate of the award at the post-award stage. In particular, it
is necessary to reflect on the impact of (i) the parties’ conduct and (ii) the (ICC) Terms of
Reference (if applicable).
163 See sections 5.1.1-5.1.3.
164 See fn.135.
165 Arguably, even in the absence of the “in connection with” formula, the award might still survive the
post-award challenge, considering that (in the absence of the contrary intention) parties are likely to bring
all disputes to be resolved to the same forum.
166 See also section 5.2.
167 See section 5.1.3.
168 See section 3.2.
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As discussed above,169 although the Convention does not operate with the concept of
the arbitral tribunal’s mandate, it does allow the enforcement court to assess what claims
have been introduced for the tribunal to decide. The tribunal’s decision is reviewed on the
second level of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.170 It needs to be observed that
the amendment of the initially submitted claims affects this level of review. Consequently,
if there is not sufficient reaction to the change of claim, one might consider that the
modification is (impliedly) accepted.171 This is why the parties’ conduct in the proceedings
is essential and will affect the chances for successful challenge at the post-award stage.
Yet another issue relates to the tribunal’s power over the amendment of the claim. Put
differently, the question arises if the tribunal is able to reject the submitted change of
claims. On the one hand, it should have a say, because it affects the scope of its duties (and
the mandate). On the other hand, however, there is a risk of the violation of the parties’
right to present its case if the tribunal rejects amendment or the addition of a new claim,
especially if the modification is accepted by all disputants. In any event, the better view is
to allow the tribunal to decide on the modifications to the claims submitted. Ideally, the
tribunal designates a cut-off date for any possible alterations at the outset of the proceedings.
Even without it having the efficiency of the arbitral process in mind, the tribunal should
be able to impose limitations to the parties’ actions that affect the structure of their (initially
submitted) claims. Without such a power, the tribunal may risk an ever-increasing flow
of new claims. All in all, violation of the right to be heard will be subsumed by another
ground for resisting recognition and enforcement, and thus will not be considered as the
“excess of mandate” violation.172
Additionally it is necessary to briefly discuss the (ICC)Terms of Reference. As explained
above,173 the Terms of Reference are a source of the tribunal’s adjudicative authority and
they may add a layer of complexity in the context of the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge. Azeredo da Silveira and Lévy have concluded that, in principle, the Terms of
Reference will not be considered to be a fresh agreement to arbitrate for the purposes of
the Article V(1)(c) defense,174 unless the enforcement court is satisfied that both parties
have intended to modify their initial agreement to arbitrate.
At the same time, however, the Terms of Reference cause some complications in cases
where the claims are modified after the Terms of Reference have been signed and
169 See section 3.4.
170 See section 3.2.
171 Although, generally, themodification of the claims should fit within the scope of the underlying agreement
to arbitrate, at times one may find that lack of opposition to the amendment amounts to a tacit acceptance
of the extension of the scope of the initial agreement to arbitrate.
172 See Art. V(1)(b) of the Convention.
173 See section 3.2.
174 See section 3.1 and section 3.2.
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approved.175 Taking the ICC Terms of Reference as an example, one should observe that
the tribunal has been given a stronger mandate to control the scope of changes to the
claims initially submitted and evidenced by the Terms of Reference.176 It means that on
the one hand, the parties’ conduct is essential, on the other hand, however, the tribunal
has a procedural tool to restrict the expansion of the initially submitted petita.
5.1.6 Decisions not covering all claims
If the tribunal fails to address all of the issues submitted by the parties, it renders its award
infra petita. This creates an inconvenience for the parties, as it fails to provide them with
all the answers they were seeking. Consequently, one may argue that the tribunal neglects
its adjudicative role and, thus, the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge should be available
for the parties. Article V(1)(c) of the Convention, however, is not fit to entertain such an
objection.177
The first argument against an application of the Article V(1)(c) defense to infra petita
decisions is a historical one. Arguably, the historical context is important in the
interpretation of Article V(1)(c) of the Convention considering how much the language
of the provision resembles the corresponding text of the Geneva Convention.178 Further,
although the two provisions are very similar, Article V(1)(c) does not include the part of
Article 2 of the Geneva Convention that reads that “[i]f the award has not covered all the
questions submitted to the arbitral tribunal, the competent authority of the country where
recognition or enforcement of the award is sought can, if it think[s] fit, postpone such
recognition or enforcement or grant it subject to such guarantee as that authority may
decide.” Consequently, “[a]s recorded in the travaux préparatoires of the New York
Convention, the omission of language in the 1927GenevaConvention allowing postponement
of recognition or enforcement, or granting enforcement subject to a guarantee, of any award
that ‘has not covered all the questions submitted to the arbitral tribunal’, was a ‘significant
change’ from the wording of the 1927 Geneva Convention.”179
The second argument follows the first one and stems from the textual interpretation
of Article V(1)(c) of the Convention.180 Put differently, thewording of Article V(1)(c) does
not include any reference to the infra petita decisions, which is a departure from its
predecessor. In turn, considering the underlying pro-enforcement philosophy behind the
175 In the case of the ICC Proceedings approved by the ICC Court. See Art. 23(4) of the 2017 ICC Rules, and
Art. 23(4) of the 2012 ICC Rules.
176 See Art. 23(4) of the 2017 ICC Rules, and Art. 23(4) of the 2012 ICC Rules.
177 See, e.g., (Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform Judicial Interpretation,
1981) p.321, (Haas, 2002) p.501, and (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) p.277.
178 See also section 4.1.
179 (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2016) p.177, with a reference to U.N. Doc. E/2822/Add. 4, p.6.
180 Or even, arguably, of the Art. V in general.
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Convention and the exhaustive character of the list of challenges,181 nothing in the text of
Article V supports the notion that recourse against the infra petita award is still possible.182
Two reported Luxembourg cases are to the same effect.183
Another reason that is usually advanced against the inclusion of infra petita is a remedial
power of partial enforcement given to the enforcement courts.184 As argued by van den
Berg, “the “replacement” of Article 2(2) of the Geneva Convention resulted in a different
proviso in Article V(1)(c) which concerns the partial enforcement of an award ultra or extra
petita”.185 Similarly, other authors observe that “[t]he Article V grounds for refusal of
enforcement are considered exhaustive, and none mention awards infra petita. Indeed, the
fact that partial enforcement of awards is permissible under V(1)(c) lends credence to the
enforceability of infra petita awards.”186 Importantly, one should not forget that the
enforcement court is the court of a secondary jurisdiction. For this reason, the remedial
power of partial enforcement should suffice to address the infra petita decisions.187
The argument that infra petita decisions should be challengeable at the enforcement
stage is not voiced by many authors. It does exist, however.188 Perhaps most evocatively
Born suggests that “[…] at least some infra petita arguments should be permitted under
Article V(1)(c). In at least some instances, an arbitral tribunal’s failure to address an issue
(or issues) can affect the decisions on those claims which the award does address. By failing
to consider particular claims or issues, the arbitral tribunal’s award on other issues may be
fundamentally flawed or unjust, warranting non-recognition under Article V(1)(c).”189 It is
181 See also section 2.1.
182 See also (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2016) p.177 (“Nothing in the language of article V (1)(c) grants enforcing
authorities the discretion to refuse or otherwise limit the recognition or enforcement of an award which has
failed to address all issues submitted by the parties, but which is otherwise enforceable as to the issues
addressed”), and (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) p.277.
183 Kersa Holding Company Luxembourg v. Infacourtage, Famajuk Investment and Isny, Cour Superieure de
Justice, not indicated, 24 November 1993, XXI Y.B. Comm. Arb. 617, 625 (1996) (“As to the reproach that
the arbitral tribunal did not decide on all the points of the dispute …, this ground, even if established, could
not hinder the recognition of the awards, as an infra petita decision is not sanctioned by the New York
Convention.”), Sovereign Participations International S.A. v. Chadmore Developments Ltd., Cour d’Appel
[Court of Appeal], 28 January 1999, XXIVa Y.B. Comm. Arb. 714, 721 (1999) (“In so far as this ground for
appeal reproaches the arbitrators for not deciding on all issues of the dispute, this ground, even if proven,
could not prevent the recognition of the award, as the case of ‘infra petita’, which is, on the contrary, a ground
for setting aside under Art. 1023 CCP, is not provided for in the Convention.”).
184 See section 2.3.
185 (Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 1981) p.320.
186 (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) p.277.
187 See also the Restatement (second tentative draft) p.201 (“The text of Article V(1)(c), however, does not support
extending the Section to an incomplete award. Indeed, an ‘incomplete’ award might be characterized as a
partial award – an award that resolves some but not all issues in dispute – and be enforceable as such.”).
188 See, e.g., (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3557, and (Kreidi, 2013) pp.51-52.
189 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3557. See also (Haas, 2002) pp.500-501 (“Some hold
the view that the arbitration powers are exceeded (in the form of abstention) in cases where the tribunal’s task
can only be properly accomplished by handing down a single award covering the entire dispute and an award
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true that the inconvenience of the infra petita award should not pass unnoticed.190 The
better view, however, is to tackle it at the place of arbitration in the setting-aside
proceedings191 and not at the enforcement stage.192 The same conclusions can be reached,
considering that theMiamiDraft does not reintroduce the possibility to refuse recognition
and enforcement of the arbitral award infra petita.
5.2 Process of application of law by the arbitral tribunal
The following sections focus on the different legal rules the tribunal is required to apply.
One should therefore initially reflect on the tribunal’smethodology in finding the applicable
law (section 5.2.1) and on the tribunal’s decision regarding which law applies (section
5.2.2). Consequently, it is necessary to analyze the process of application of the substantive
law including application of itsmandatory provisions by the arbitral tribunal (section 5.2.3
and section 5.2.4). Finally, it is necessary to briefly contemplate the issue of decisions
reached ex aequo et bono (section 5.2.5). All of the above is discussed in the context of the
“excess of mandate” type of challenge at the enforcement stage.
5.2.1 Decision on the method of determining applicable law
Deciding the method of selecting the applicable law may have been the first action the
arbitral tribunal will undertake. This is a relevant step whenever the parties fail to expressly
designate the law applicable to the substance of the case.193 It leaves two hypotheticals.
Under the first one, parties themselves choose an applicable method of selecting the
governing law. Under the second one, the tribunal needs to find the method of selection
itself, based on its expertise and opposing submissions of the parties. The outstanding
cannot be made concerning the remaining issue still pending arbitration.”), and (Borris & Hannecke, Excess
of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.326 (“[…] a different view may be justified in
(exceptional) circumstances, namely in cases in which only comprehensive decision on all submitted issues
can be regarded as a sensible compliance with the arbitrators’ duties under the arbitration agreement.”).
190 See (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) p.585 (“Where an arbitral tribunal fails to deal with
all of the issues referred to it for determination, it is usually said that the award should at least be held valid
in respect of the issues with which it does deal. However, this is perhaps too simplistic. The significance of the
issues that were not dealt with must be considered in relation to the award as a whole. For example, it is not
difficult to envisage a situation in which the issues that were overlooked were of such importance that, had
they been dealt with, the whole balance of the award would have been altered and its effect would have been
different.”).
191 See, i.a., Chapter II-Chapter V.
192 Even if the infra petita challenge is accepted at the enforcement stage, it might very well trigger other Art.
V defenses. For example, the violation of the right to be heard and Art. V(1)(b). See also section 4.4. The
alternative introduced by Born is to apply Art. V(1)(d) of the Convention, see (Born, International
Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3557.
193 In case parties choose the law that will apply to their dispute, the step discussed under this section will be
omitted. This situation will be further discussed under the following section. See section 5.2.2.
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question is whether the tribunal’s decisionmay be challenged under the “excess ofmandate”
type of challenge.
In the first hypothetical one would assume that the parties did not make a choice of
applicable law and instead they “only” agreed on the specific conflict of laws rules to be
used as a tool for finding the applicable law. If the tribunal follows the parties’ choice, yet
makes a mistake, its decision should escape the review under Article V(1)(c) of the
Convention, because the merits of the award should not be reopened by the enforcement
court.194 Even when the tribunal disregards the express choice of the conflict of laws rules,
its decision should survive theArticle V(1)(c) challenge. Instead, itmight trigger theArticle
V(1)(d) mechanism, considering that the tribunal failed to follow the procedure agreed
by the parties.
The second hypothetical presupposes that the parties are not in agreement on what
law applies to the substance of the dispute, nor are they in agreement as to the approach
the tribunal should undertake to find the governing law. In this case it is likely that the
parties will submit opposing views on the issue of applicable law. At the same time, the
arbitration law of the seat often offers a fallback rule that gives the tribunal authority (and
discretion) to determine what law shall apply to the merits of the dispute.195 Sometimes it
will require to follow the conflict of laws analysis, on other occasions it will allow for a
direct choice of applicable law.196 Importantly, such an authority is tied to the place where
the arbitration takes place and not where the award is being enforced. Under the second
scenario, finding the appropriate conflict of laws rules will be well within the tribunal’s
adjudicative powers and will be exempted from the court’s review on the merits.197 This
is particularly true with the enforcement court’s review. All in all, the tribunal’s decision
on selecting the method of determining the applicable law should escape the challenge of
Article V(1)(c) of the Convention.
5.2.2 Decision on applicable law
The question whether Article V(1)(c) of the Convention applies as well to the tribunal’s
decision on applicable law is not a new one. Already more than twenty years ago, De Ly
reflected that “[i]t has hardly been analyzed whether this provision [Article V(1)(c) of the
Convention] is purely procedural or whether it may also be interpreted in a substantive sense
allowing the refusal of recognition or enforcement if the arbitrators have failed to apply the
proper conflict or substantive rules.”198 This requires the analysis of three hypotheticals,
194 See also section 2.2.
195 See, for example, Art. 28(2) of the Model Law.
196 See, e.g., Art. 28(2) of the Model Law (for the conflict of laws route) and Art. 1511 of the French CCP (for
the direct approach). See also Chapter II, Chapter III, and Chapter VII.
197 See section 2.2.
198 (De Ly, Judicial Review of the Substance of Arbitral Awards, 1994) p.355.
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namely (i) the parties agreed upon the choice of law provision in their contract, (ii) there
is no choice of law clause, but parties submit their views on what law should apply, or (iii)
the parties have not included a choice of law clause, nor do they indicate what law governs.
In principle, the reflections discussed under this section are closely connected to (sometimes
inseparable from) the tribunal’s choice for a method of selection of applicable law.199 For
these reasons, these two sections should be read together.
If the parties introduce in their contract what law will govern it, this choice should be,
in principle, conclusive for the arbitral tribunal.200 At the same time, however, deciding
against the parties’ choice might not be easily exposed to the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge at the enforcement stage. In order to determine the availability of the recourse,
one might distinguish a situation where the tribunal fails to apply the express choice by
mistake and deliberately.
With regard to the former, as long as the authorities seem to agree that the tribunal’s
decision will escape the court’s scrutiny due to the fact that the award is not susceptible to
the merits review,201 there is less compromise with regard to the question what happens if
the tribunal disregards a controlling choice of the parties.
On the one hand, as explained above, the parties’ instructions should be decisive to
the tribunal,202 on the other hand, Born argues that “[…] an erroneous choice-of-law decision,
including disregarding a choice-of-law agreement, is an error of substance, not an excess of
authority. Some authorities have adopted contrary views, but this is clearly in error: amistake
as to the choice of applicable law, including a failure to apply the parties’ choice-of-law clause,
is only amistake concerning themerits of the parties’ dispute. Evenwhere an arbitral tribunal
wrongly concludes that a choice-of-law clause does not apply, or is unenforceable, or should
199 See section 5.2.1.
200 (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.321 (“In particular,
where the parties have agreed on a specific substantive law to be applied to the substance of the dispute and
the arbitral tribunal applies a different set of rules, the arbitral tribunal acts in excess of its competence within
the meaning of Article V(1)(c).”). See also (Haas, 2002) p.503 (“If the parties instruct the arbitral tribunal to
decide the dispute under a particular national law, the award will not be enforceable if the arbitral tribunal
clearly and arbitrarily applies another municipal law to the substance of the dispute or to the arbitration
proceedings.”).
201 See, i.a., (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.321 (“[…] if
the arbitral tribunal interprets the choice of law incorrectly and thus erroneously applies incorrect rules, this
does not constitute a ground for refusal under Article V(1)(c). In [this] case a review of the arbitral tribunal’s
interpretation of the parties’ choice of law would lead to a prohibited review of the reasoning in substance
(révision au fond).”), (Haas, 2002) p.503 and (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3554.
See also Int’l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. Y Comercial, 745 F. Supp.
172, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“We cannot understand how the Convention, created to assure consistency in the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, would not be gravely undermined, if judges sitting in each of themany
jurisdictions where enforcement may be obtained, were authorized by the Convention to undertake a de novo
inquiry into whether the law the arbitrators said they were using was or was not properly applied by them.
The plain answer is that the Convention does not, and could not, contemplate such a chaos.”).
202 See fn.200.
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not be given effect for other reasons, its decision is not an excess of jurisdiction, but amistake
of substance on matters within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.”203 Even Born, however,
acknowledges that “[c]ases where an arbitral tribunal refused to give effect to an applicable,
enforceable choice-of-law clause, manifestly refusing to uphold the parties’ agreement in
favor of its own notions of equity, could give rise to excess of authority or public policy
objections.”204 Therefore, the parties’ explicit (and undisputed) choice of law should be
controlling. Otherwise, the award might be challenged under Article V(1)(d) of the
Convention (failure to follow the agreed procedure)205 or Article V(2)(b) of the Convention
(violation of public policy) in cases where the tribunal fails to follow the parties’ choice of
applicable law.
The second hypothetical presupposes that the parties do not include the choice of law
provision in their contract, but they introduced arguments in support of their view ofwhat
law applies. Usually, the parties would not be in agreement on what law applies. In this
instance, it would be the tribunal’s prerogative to decide on the issue of governing law.
Consequently, even in cases of error, the tribunal’s decision would not be reviewable.206
In the third, highly rare scenario, where no instructions or guidance is given by the
parties as to the law governing themerits of the case,207 the tribunal will need to determine
the applicable law on its own. The tribunal’s decision should not be reviewable under
Article V(1)(c) of the Convention. As long as the arbitral panel consults its findings with
the parties it should survive also other prospective challenge avenues at the enforcement
stage.208
5.2.3 Ascertaining the content of applicable law by the arbitral tribunal
The adjudicative aspect of the tribunal’s activity in themajority of cases requires the tribunal
to apply the law. In contrast with the traditional court’s proceedings, however, the tribunal’s
legal conclusions should, in principle, escape the court’s merits review.209 It entails that by
203 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3554.
204 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3554.
205 This is, however, a minority view. See (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany,
2016) p.345.
206 It is likely that the tribunal will follow one of the views presented. In all cases, it should avoid surprising
the parties as to their decision on applicable law, since it might violate the parties’ right to be heard. This
would be arguably reviewable under Art. V(1)(b) of the Convention and not under Art. V(1)(c). See also
section 4.4.
207 Therefore, no choice of law clause is included in the contract nor do the parties submit their views as to
what law applies.
208 See also section 4.4. For further reading, see also (International Law Association, 2008), p.16.
209 See section 2.2. (Kaufmann-Kohler, The Arbitrator and the Law: Does He/She Know It? How? And a Few
MoreQuestions, 2005) p.635 (“[i]ndeed,matters involving the application of substantive law by the arbitrators
largely escape any control by the courts, be it at the annulment or the enforcement stage, except perhaps under
the US standard of manifest disregard of the law […].”).
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no means should the Article V(1)(c) challenge be invoked to test the tribunal’s legal
conclusions properly brought by the parties in arbitration. A few reflections need to be
given on (i) the tribunal’s independent investigations (and the parties’ duty to educate the
tribunal) and on (ii) surprising the parties with the legal findings.
The well-known adage iura novit curia (the court knows the law) that is applicable in
many court proceedings, illustrates the phenomenon of the ascertaining of the law by a
judge. According to this principle a judge is free to determine applicable law ex officio,
thus independent from the parties’ submissions.210 The application of iura novit curia, or,
as some suggest, iura novit arbiter in international commercial arbitration remains the
subject of a lively debate.211 For the purpose of the analysis at hand, one should advocate
that leaving the arbitral tribunal with the discretion tomake its own findings on applicable
law is a sensible solution.212 At the same time, it should not go as far as imposing the
obligation of finding the lawupon the arbitral tribunal, since such a dutymight bemisplaced
and excessively burdensome.213 It should be noted, however, that an arbitral panel should
exercise its discretion to make independent findings only if necessary in order to verify or
supplement what the parties in their submissions may have left open or unclear.214
At the same time, the parties – in their own interest – should educate the arbitral panel
and acquaint it with the relevant legal provisions in order to avoid – as suggested byKurkela
– the risk of themisapplication of (foreign) law or errors in its interpretation by the arbitral
panel.215 Generally, such a burden of education can be aligned with the burden of proof.216
210 (Kurkela, ‘JuraNovit Curia’ and the Burden of Education in InternationalArbitration –ANordic Perspective,
2003) p.489 (“The jura novit curia principle empowers the courts to qualify the issues in a manner departing
from that proposed by the parties. The courts also have the freedom to identify and apply such rules of
substantive law as are deemed applicable by the court even in the absence of any reference to those rules or
claims as to their application by the parties.”).
211 See, e.g., (Kurkela, ‘Jura Novit Curia’ and the Burden of Education in International Arbitration – ANordic
Perspective, 2003), (Kaufmann-Kohler, “Iura Novit Arbiter" – est-ce bien raisonnable? Réflexions sur le
statut du droit de fond devant l’arbitre international, 2004), and (Lew, Iura Novit Curia and Due Process,
2011).
212 (Kaufmann-Kohler, The Arbitrator and the Law: Does He/She Know It? How? And a FewMoreQuestions,
2005) p.636 (“The Parties shall establish the contents of the law applicable to themerits. The Arbitral Tribunal
shall have the power, but not the obligation, tomake its own inquiries to establish such contents. If the contents
of the applicable law are not established, the Arbitral Tribunal is empowered to apply any rules of law which
it deems appropriate.”).
213 (Kaufmann-Kohler, The Arbitrator and the Law: Does He/She Know It? How? And a FewMoreQuestions,
2005) p.636, also (Lew, Iura Novit Curia and Due Process, 2011) p.411.
214 (Kurkela, ‘JuraNovit Curia’ and the Burden of Education in InternationalArbitration –ANordic Perspective,
2003) p.496.
215 (Kurkela, ‘JuraNovit Curia’ and the Burden of Education in InternationalArbitration –ANordic Perspective,
2003) p.494.
216 (Kurkela, ‘JuraNovit Curia’ and the Burden of Education in InternationalArbitration –ANordic Perspective,
2003) p.494 (“The division of this duty [burden of education] may be allocated by the Tribunal between the
parties and the arbitrators applying mutati mutandis the rules of the burden of proof perhaps slightly tilted
towards the arbitral tribunal”).
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It does not mean, however, that the law should be treated as a fact and applicable only
when proven. It only means that the parties shall assist the tribunal with understanding
the foreign legal system. Conversely, if the parties fail to establish the contents of the
applicable law themselves, it is reasonable for the arbitral tribunal to take over and use its
discretion in order to ascertain and apply the law.217 It can be argued that the arbitral
tribunal’s discretion can go as far as to the application of lex mercatoria in the absence of
a clear choice of law provision.218
As a general rule, it is therefore concluded that the decision by an arbitral tribunal
based on the legal arguments different from the parties’ submissions will not amount to
the violation challengeable under Article V(1)(c) Convention.219 For example, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California rejected as misguided the party’s
assertions that the tribunal issued a ruling based upon legal theories not contemplated by
and/or asserted by the parties. It held that “[t]his Court cannot refuse to confirm the Award
simply because the legal theories and conclusions presented in the Award differ from those
contemplated by the Parties in their pleadings. Legal theories used by adjudicators to resolve
contract disputes are not considered oral amendments to the contract or the arbitration
agreement.”220
The abovementioned general rule will not apply, however, according to Azeredo da
Silveira and Lévy in two instances, namely (i) when the parties expressly prohibit the
arbitral tribunal to reach its decision on grounds different than those raised by the parties
and (ii) when “the arbitrators’ legal findings are entirely unrelated to the parties’ submissions,
and if it appears, as a consequence, that such findings would ‘take the parties by surprise’
[…].”221 Arguably, however, “surprise” decisions will violate the right to be heard, and will
thus trigger Article V(1)(b) of the Convention222 and not the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge.
217 (Azeredo da Silveira & Lévy, 2008) p.653, and (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) p.273.
218 BankA. v. Bank B, Landesgericht [Court of First Instance], Hamburg 18 September 1997, XXVY.B. Comm.
Arb. 714 (2000).
219 (Port, Bowers, & Noll, 2010) p.272 (“Arbitral tribunals are not limited to rendering an award based on the
legal theories brought forward by the parties. An award rendered on the basis of a legal theory other than the
theories argued by the parties will not, on that basis alone, run afoul of [Article] V(1)(c). A tribunalmay apply
law not referenced in the pleadings, as long as in so doing, the tribunal does not exceed the scope of the
arbitration agreement.”), and (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c),
2012) pp.326-327.
220 Ministry of Def. & Support for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp.
2d 1168, 1173–74 (S.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Ministry of Def. &
Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.
2011). One should note, however, that the argument was raised under Art. V(1)(a) of the Convention.
221 (Azeredo da Silveira & Lévy, 2008) p.655.
222 See section 4.4.
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5.2.4 Application of mandatory rules of law by the arbitral tribunal
From the arbitrators’ perspective, it should be clear that it is within their mandate to apply
mandatory laws.223 Additionally, in the light of professional scrutiny, such an application
may be even indispensable. Paulsson convincingly argues that “the mandate of arbitration
agreements – unless they are couched in unusually narrow terms – is the fair resolution of
disputes, not the vindication of contracts.”224 Therefore, the arbitral tribunal should revise
the implication and the relevance of the applicablemandatory legal provisionswhen issuing
the award to circumvent the likelihood of the award being challenged at the post-award
stage.225 That being said, one should further (briefly) address two hypotheticals: (i) the
tribunal raises a mandatory law issue ex officio or (ii) the tribunal wrongly applies rules of
mandatory nature.
In principle, the arbitral award should survive the Article V(1)(c) challenge, even if the
tribunal does apply mandatory legal provisions on its own initiative. Such an undertaking
should not be considered to go beyond the tribunal’s submissions to arbitration. At the
same time the tribunal should provide the parties with an opportunity to comment on its
findings.226
Also, misapplication of the law should escape the court’s scrutiny, because of the
deferential status of the enforcement court’s review.227 Arguably, it would equally apply
to both the “excess of mandate” type of challenge and the challenge against public policy
violation at the enforcement stage.228 In the context of the violation of public policy at the
enforcement stage, one should not forget that “[…] Contracting States are permitted to
invoke Article V(2)(b)’s public policy defense only exceptionally, as a narrow and specific
departure from the Convention’s generally-applicable requirement of recognition.Moreover,
Article V(2)(b) should be invoked only in order to safeguard fundamental, mandatory policies
of a Contracting State, which are clearly articulated in constitutional, legislative, or judicial
instruments, and which are not contrary to the Convention’s basic purposes or to state
practice under the Convention.”229 Generally speaking, the wrongful application of
223 (Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV, Arbitration, 2011) pp.477-479. It is particularly true if one considers
that “[s]tate courts have a tendency to focus on the law. It should therefore be made easy for State judges to
see that ‘their’ law has been complied with.” See (Karrer, Must an Arbitral Tribunal Really Ensure that its
Award is Enforceable?, 2005) p.430.
224 (Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV, Arbitration, 2011) p.477.
225 It would be particularly important in the context of a potential challenge at the seat of arbitration. At the
same time, however, arguments might be equally raised at the enforcement proceedings.
226 It would otherwise face the challenge under Art. V(1)(b) of the Convention.
227 See section 2.2 and section 5.2.3.
228 See, however, (Hwang&Lai, 2005) p.24 (“A supervisory or enforcing court should not second-guess a tribunal,
and the risk of arbitral error is inherent in the acceptance of the process. However, parties do not bargain for
a perverse and manifest error that calls out for correction. To ignore such errors would be to accept that the
arbitral process can condone miscarriages of justice.”).
229 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3663.
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mandatory (applicable) law might have nothing to do with the law and policies of the
enforcement country which should, in turn, exclude the possibility of the enforcement
court to reassess the tribunal’s conclusions.
5.2.5 Decision reached ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur
When looking back in time, one could distinguish the different roles played by judges and
arbitrators. Whereas the role of the former was the one of applying the law, the role of the
latter was the one of achieving equity.230 In the context ofmodern international arbitration,
the role of the arbitrator greatly evolved. “A new kind of arbitration, based on law, has
emerged, as part of which the arbitrator is supposed to apply the rules of law laid down by
the legislator. ‘Amiable composition’ (i.e. arbitration based on equity) has become the
exception and arbitration statutes treat it as such, sometimes even ignoring it.”231 Importantly,
although addressed by the national arbitration acts, the notion of the decision reached ex
aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur232 is not included in the framework of the
Convention. This, in turn, triggers the question if and how the tribunal’s decision reached
ex aequo et bono can be challenged at the enforcement stage.
In principle, (i) the tribunal’s ex aequo et bono decision can be challenged at the
enforcement stage if it is reached without the parties’ authorization. One should accept,
however, (ii) that holding the authority to decide in equity does not prevent the tribunal
from applying the law. Finally, as already highlighted elsewhere,233 a decision reached ex
aequo et bono might simultaneously trigger different challenges. These points will be
analyzed below.
230 (Mayer, Reflections on the International Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the Law –The Freshfields Lecture 2000,
2001) p.235.
231 (Mayer, Reflections on the International Arbitrator’s Duty to Apply the Law –The Freshfields Lecture 2000,
2001) p.235.
232 Although some authors acknowledge that there is a difference between the notion of amiable compositeur
and the notion of ex aequo et bono, the in-depth analysis of such a difference for the purpose of the current
research would be misplaced (especially taking into account that the definitions of both terms vary). As
mentioned by Born in (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.2772, “[t]he essential principle
of each term is that arbitrators are not obliged to decide the parties’ dispute in accordance with a strict
application of legal rules; rather, the arbitrators are expected to decide in light of general notions of fairness,
equity and justice.” Therefore, the general concept of achieving equity (which is common for both principles)
will be considered jointly under the term of ex aequo et bono. For further reading, see, e.g.,
(Rubino-Sammartano, Amiable Compositeur (JointMandate to Settle) andExBono etAecquo (Discretional
Authority to Mitigate Strict Law): Apparent Synonyms Revisited, 1992), (Maniruzzaman, The Arbitrator’s
Prudence in Lex Mercatoria: Ambiable Composition and Ex Aecquo Et Bono in Decision Making, 2003),
and (Suchoža & Hučková Palková, 2012) pp.268-273.
233 See section 4.4.
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The underlying condition for the arbitral tribunal to decide ex aequo et bono or to
reach its conclusion as amiable compositeur is the unequivocal agreement of the parties.234
It is so required because of the exceptional character of the ex aequo et bono power. For
example it has been explained that an express consent of the parties to act as amiable
compositeur will give the arbitrators the power to “soften the mechanistic application of
statutory or other provisions of national law; they could not, however, be used to vary a term
or condition of the contract.”235 Although, as explained above, the power to decide ex aequo
et bono is not addressed in the Convention itself, the parties’ explicit authorization to
decide ex aequo et bono is usually required by national laws236 and arbitration rules.237
A separate question relates to the instances where the arbitral tribunal is vested with
the power to act as amiable compositeur but reaches its conclusions by applying the law.
Generally, if the award can be produced in accordance with law (which should, as a rule,
represent principles of equity, justice and fairness) it would be unreasonable to force the
arbitral tribunal to find equity outside the law. It has been argued that “[a]miable
composition does notmean that an arbitrator cannot apply rules of substantive law, it simply
removes the imperative or obligatory character of such law and allows the arbitrator to
choose that which he wishes to apply.”238 In turn, “if the parties grant the arbitral tribunal
the authority to render an award based on equity, in most cases this authorizes but does not
require the arbitral authority to base his award on principles of equity.”239
Although it is uncontroversial to say that the decision ex aequo et bono will be at risk
at the enforcement stage when granted without the parties’ express authorization, the
outstanding question is which defense will apply. In these cases, generally, the choice exists
between Article V(1)(c) (the “excess of mandate” type of challenge) and Article V(1)(d)
of the Convention (procedure incompliant with the parties’ agreement).240
234 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3554-3555 (“As discussed above, most national
arbitration legislation and institutional rules permit arbitration ex aequo et bono and amiable composition,
where arbitrators are not constrained by applicable rules of substantive law, but require an express agreement
to this effect.”).
235 (Craig W. L., The arbitrator’s mission and the application of law in international commercial arbitration,
2010) p.268.
236 See, e.g., Art. 28(3) of the Model Law, Art. 1512 of the French Code of Civil Procedure or Section 46(1)(b)
of the English Arbitration Act.
237 See, e.g., Art. 35(2) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 33(2) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, Rule 31.2 of
the 2016 SIAC Rules, Section 23.3 of the 1998 DIS Rules, Art. 21(3) of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art. 21(3) of the
2012 ICC Rules, Art. 22(4) of the 2014 LCIA Rules, Art. 31(3) of the 2014 ICDR Rules, Art. 31.1 of the 2016
JAMS Rules.
238 (Poznanski, 1987) p.79.
239 (Haas, 2002) p.502, also (Borris & Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012)
p.322.
240 See also section 4.4.
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If one considers that the decision ex aequo et bono is a separate form of the tribunal’s
mandate, then one might be tempted to apply for the Article V(1)(c) defense.241 At the
same time, however, an ex aequo et bono decision affects the tribunal’s reasoning, an
explanation of the tribunal’s conclusions. Consequently, it can be argued that this is the
issue which is unrelated to question the scope of the parties’ submission.242 If this argument
is accepted, Article V(1)(d) of the Convention might be of relevance in the context of the
tribunal’s ex aequo et bono decision.243 Arguably, the latter solution fits the structure of
Article V of the Convention better. Indeed, it is more compelling to consider that under
Article V(1)(c) of the Convention the reviewing court should check onlywhat “differences”
and “matters” have been submitted to arbitration.
In any event, convincing that the national court whether the arbitral tribunal acted as
amiable compositeur can be difficult. In a case before theU.S. enforcement court, the court
held that taking into account that the arbitral panel “relied upon a distinguished legal expert
on thematter in issue”, it did not act as amiable compositeur.244 Further, the court observed
that the “[…] amiable compositeur argument is a not especially elegant masque that seeks
to conceal the fatal weakness of ISEC’s defense: we are forbidden under the Convention to
reconsider factual findings of the arbitral panel.”245 In another case of the U.S. enforcement
proceedings, the defendant contested the arbitral award arguing that the arbitral tribunal
241 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3555 (“Where arbitrators act ex aequo et bono or as
amiable compositeurs, without such an agreement by the parties, they exceed their authority, rather than
merelymaking errors in the exercise of their authority. Put simply, as national legislation establishing safeguards
regarding such arbitral proceedings makes clear, an arbitration ex aequo et bono and amiable composition
is a different form of proceeding, involving a different type of authority, than other types of arbitration; it is
not merely an error in application of relevant substantive legal rules or interpretation of the parties’ contract
or choice-of-law clause. An arbitral tribunal’s exercise of such authority, without the parties’ agreement, is
an excess of authority under Article V(1)(c).”). See also (Haas, 2002) p.502, (Craig W. L., The arbitrator’s
mission and the application of law in international commercial arbitration, 2010) pp.269-270, and (Borris
& Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.321.
242 (Azeredo da Silveira & Lévy, 2008) p.665 (“that the arbitrators have acted as amiable compositeurs despite
the absence of agreement thereon between the parties is a substantive issue which does not constitute a ground,
in the sense of Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention, for refusing to enforce an award. Indeed, if they
decide ex aequo et bono without authorisation, the arbitrators exceed neither their jurisdiction (which pertains
to the subject matter of the dispute) nor their mandate (which pertains to the parties’ respective claims).
Deciding ex aequo et bono neither relates to the arbitration agreement, nor concerns the operative of the
award. It rather concerns the reasoning of the arbitrators, which is not a matter to be reviewed under Article
V(1)(c) of the Convention. This view is however not unanimously accepted.”). See also (Haas, 2002) p.502,
(Kreindler,Wolff, &Rieder, Commercial Arbitration inGermany, 2016) p.345 (in the context of theGerman
Arbitration proceedings, equally applicable to the enforcement procedeedings, see therein p.370)
(“[…] a decision ex aequo et bono without express authorization is considered a violation of procedure.”).
See also section 4.4.
243 See also fn.242.
244 Int’l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. Y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
245 Int’l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. Y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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“did not base its damage award on the evidence presented and instead acted as an amiable
compositeur, which tries to reach merely an equitable, and not necessarily legal, result.”246
The enforcement court, in turn, found that “[i]n fashioning its damages award, the Tribunal
carefully considered both the EPSA and Libyan law, as well as the submissions and arguments
of the parties. The Court finds that there is nothing ‘completely irrational’ about the Tribunal’s
award or its reading of the parties’ contract.”247 The court also concluded that determining
if the tribunal “exceeded its powers” cannot lead to the reexamination of the merits.248
5.3 Decisions on remedies
The penultimate category of decisions investigates if the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge can be potentially applicable to tribunals’ decisions on remedies. In this context,
three types of remedies have been distinguished: damages (section 5.3.1), specific
performance (section 5.3.2), and contract adaptation and filling the gaps (section 5.3.3).
5.3.1 Decision on damages
Damages claims are perhaps the most commonly sought remedies. In general, they are
the basic remedy available under any legal system for a breach of contract and should be,
in principle, easily available for the arbitral tribunal. In the context of the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge, one should reflect, however, whether the tribunal’s decision
can be challenged (under the Article V(1)(c) ground) if the tribunal awards (i) more
damages than claimed or (ii) something different than claimed. Additionally, the question
arises if the decision is subject to a challenge in cases where the tribunal grants damages
(iii) excluded by the parties’ agreement or (iv) unknown at the place where the enforcement
should take place.
The first hypothetical touches upon the ne ultra petita (not beyond request) principle.
Obviously, the situationwhere the relief granted is higher than sought should be remedied
at the post-award stage. This requires an assessment of what disputes and matters have
been submitted to the arbitrators and if their conclusions go beyond what has been
requested. As such, arguably, it fits within the scope of the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge.249 For example, one German enforcement court while admitting that the ultra
246 Nat’l Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 800, 816 (D. Del. 1990).
247 Nat’l Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 800, 818–19 (D. Del. 1990).
248 See Nat’l Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 800, 819 (D. Del. 1990) (“[i]t is not this Court’s role
… to sit as the panel did and reexamine the evidence under the guise of determining whether the arbitrators
exceeded their powers […] the Court will not inquire any further.”).
249 See (Haas, 2002) p.500 (“The arbitrator exceeds the limits of his competence if he adjudicates on points of
dispute which the parties have not agreed to assign to him (ultra petita).”). See, however, (UNCITRAL
Secretariat, 2016) p.175.
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petita award would be susceptible under Article V(1)(c) of the Convention, ultimately
rejected the argument that the claimant had been awardedmore damages.250 Importantly,
the broader relief than the party had expectedmight be provided by the statutory provision
of the law governing the arbitration. In this regard decisions grantingmore damages, even
if not requested, can still be enforced.251
In the case of the second scenario, conclusions similar to the first one would apply. In
principle, a situationwhere the tribunal granted a remedy different than requested (provided
that the parties did not submit alternative claims) should fit within the scope of Article
V(1)(c) of the Convention, because in this case the tribunal’s undertaking will be
incompliant with the parties’ request.252 For example, in one case, a Canadian court
concluded that: “[i]n addition to rendering an unreasoned award – against the express
wishes of the parties – the arbitrators cancelled ab initio the distribution contract when this
was not required of them. In addition, they appear to have ordered the respondent to pay
punitive damages, which exceeded their jurisdiction. […] Therefore, even if the recognition
250 Seller v. Buyer, Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal], Stuttgart, 1 Sch 12/01, 6 December 2001, XXIX Y.B.
Comm. Arb. 742, 746 (2004) (“Enforcement of the arbitral award must not be denied because the award
granted the claimant more than it claimed. The claimant did indeed seek payment of DM 119,621, according
to the defendant’s statement of the facts, [whereas] the defendant was directed to payDM129,621. The [award
in] excess of the claim falls under the [objection of] excess of the arbitration agreement in Art. V(1)(c) [of the]
Convention […]. However, the arbitral award does not exceed the claim. The amount of the claim is not
determined by the wording of the request; rather, the dispositive part of the decisionmust objectively correspond
to the relevant presentation of the facts. According to the arbitral award, the sum of DM 129,621 results from
adding up the invoices claimed, so that the arbitral tribunal correctly assumed that the request for DM119,621
was a writing error that could easily be corrected.”).
251 M& C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, 87 F.3d 844, 850 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Because the damages are
considered compensatory, the arbitrator correctly concluded that payment of such compensation pursuant to
M.C.L. § § 600.2961(5)(b) was envisioned by the terms of reference. Those terms broadly state that Connelly
‘has suffered monetary damages as a result of [Behr’s] failures [to pay the full amount of commissions due].’
Terms of Reference, Article III(A)(c). Although Connelly does then seek monetary damages estimated to be
$750,000, that request specifies that the damage amount represents only the actual amount of the ‘unpaid
commissions to Plaintiff, without deduction or offset.’ The terms of reference also explicitly provide that
Connelly seeks ‘other relief’ that is available under the applicable law to compensate it for losses ‘as a result
of [Behr’s] failures [to pay the full amount of commissions due].’ We conclude that the M.C.L. § § 600.2961
damage award thus was within the scope of the arbitrator’s terms of reference, that it did not raise a new
theory of liability, and that it did not impose a new evidentiary requirement upon Behr.”). See also (Port,
Bowers, & Noll, 2010) pp.268-269, also (Azeredo da Silveira & Lévy, 2008) pp.655-656, similarly (Borris &
Hannecke, Excess of Competence or Jurisdiction, Article V(1)(c), 2012) p.325 (“In spite of the principle of
ne ultra petita, an arbitral tribunalmay be justified, depending on the applicable (substantive) law, in granting
higher damages than the nominal amount claimed.”).
252 See, e.g., ABGötaverken v. General NationalMaritime Transport Company (GMTC), Libya and others, Svea
Court of Appeal (5th Dept.) Stockholm; Swedish Supreme Court, SO 1462, 13 December 1978; 13 August
1979, VI Y.B. Comm.Arb. 237 (1981). In this case, the court was facedwith the assertion that the arbitrators
exceeded their authority as they decided to reduce the price although they had never been asked to determine
whether there should be a price reduction. The court concluded that the arbitrators’ authority included
power to adjust the price, as “[…] the reduction was not an unsolicited award of damages to GMTC but
rather a price adjustment connected with the general determination that GMTC owed the last instalment.”.
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of the award is not against public order, it seems clear that homologation of the award could
be refused on the basis of art. 950(4) […] C.C.P.”253
The thirds scenario reflects instances where the argument is raised that certain remedies
have been excluded by the parties’ agreement in the underlying contract. Often, however
these challenges are based on objections to the arbitrators’ substantive contract
interpretations or legal conclusions and as such do not present the true Article V(1)(c)
defense. As explained by Azeredo da Silveira and Lévy “the argument that the arbitrators
have awarded remedies that were not foreseen by the contract or that were specifically
excluded by it only relates to the arbitral tribunal’s substantive findings and cannot justify
a refusal to enforce the award under Article V(1)(c).”254 Consequently, when the
award-debtor seeks to improperly characterize a substantive objection to the merits of the
arbitral tribunal’s decision, its defense should fail underArticleV(1)(c) of theConvention.255
As one of the leading examples one could mention Parsons & Whittemore Overseas
Co., Inc. v. Société Générale de L’Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), where theU.S. enforcement
court concluded that “[a]lthough the Convention recognizes that an award may not be
enforced where predicated on a subject matter outside the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, it does
not sanction second-guessing the arbitrator’s construction of the parties’ agreement. The
appellant’s attempt to invoke this defense, however, calls upon the court to ignore this
limitation on its decision-making powers and usurp the arbitrator’s role. The district court
took a proper view of its own jurisdiction in refusing to grant relief on this ground.”256 The
challenge was brought in the situation where the contract stipulated ‘neither party shall
have any liability for loss of production’ and $185,000 was awarded for loss of production.
The court held that “[t]he tribunal cannot properly be charged, however, with simply ignoring
this alleged limitation on the subject matter over which its decision-making powers extended.
Rather, the arbitration court interpreted the provision not to preclude jurisdiction on this
matter.”257
Similarly, in another case the enforcement court concluded that “[i]n ignoring the
limitation of damages clause the arbitrators were clearly attempting to give effect to the
essential terms of the contract and the intent of the parties. Accordingly, the Court is satisfied
253 Smart Systems Technologies Inc. c. Domotique Secant inc., 2008 QCCA 444 (CanLII), par. 31,
<http://canlii.ca/t/284nq#par31>, [last accessed 27 April 2018].
254 (Azeredo da Silveira & Lévy, 2008) p.665.
255 See section 2.2.
256 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L’Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d
969, 977 (C.A.N.Y. 1974).
257 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L’Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d
969, 976 (C.A.N.Y. 1974).
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that their disregard of the limitation of damages provision drew its essence from the
contract.”258 Other court decisions are to the same effect.259
At the same time, however, van den Berg is of the position that “with respect to the first
part of ground (c) an award that ‘deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration’ is not confined to consideration of the
claims asserted by the parties, but may also include the circumstance that the arbitrators
have seriously ignored, in their analysis, the application of the terms of the contract, as
pleaded by the parties. Thus, if an arbitrator ignores express provisions in a contract, it can
be argued that he fails to deal with the difference between the parties”260 In rebuttal to his
arguments Azeredo da Silveira and Lévy observed that: “Van den Berg’s suggestion is that,
faced with an exceptionally untenable award, the judge may find in Article V(1)(c) of the
New York Convention a basis to refuse enforcement. His view is that, in rendering such an
award, the arbitrators did exceed theirmandate, given that the parties had not commissioned
them to disregard logic (of facts and law). This motive is praiseworthy but would defeat the
spirit of Article V(1)(c).”261 Indeed, if the enforcement court is allowed to scrutinize the
contract interpretation undertaken by the arbitral tribunal, the court’s review will be far
from deferential.262
The fourth scenario where the tribunal applies the type of damages that are unknown
in the country of enforcement needs to be addressed only briefly. In principle, the focus
thereinwould not be directed at the comparison between the relief sought and that granted.
Rather, the court will inquire if the type of damages that is to be enforced is in accordance
with the public policy of the country of enforcement.263 This would be particularly the case
with punitive damages.
5.3.2 Decision on specific performance
The second, common type of remedy is specific performance. Although it is a different
remedy, and its relevance and scope of application might vary in different jurisdictions,
258 Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc.,No. 1:02-CV-479, 2003WL 24267645, at *4 (W.D.Mich.
Oct. 22, 2003), aff’d, 401 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2005).
259 See, e.g., Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F.Supp. 948 (D.C.Ohio, 1981) (“Under the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, arbitrators did not exceed their
authority in granting consequential damages in [the] arbitral award, even though an express c[l]ause in the
contract of which the arbitration arose excluded such damages.”). Also In re Arbitration Between Millicom
International V N.V. andMotorola, Inc., Proempres Panama, S.A., 2002WL 472042, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.,2002).
(The award was confirmed in the case where the arbitral tribunal granted a remedy not specified in the
contract despite the objection of one party).
260 (Van den Berg, Failure by Arbitrators to Apply Contract Terms from the Perspective of the New York
Convention, 2005) p.69.
261 (Azeredo da Silveira & Lévy, 2008) p.662.
262 See section 2.2.
263 See section 3.3.
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for the purpose of the Article V(1)(c) challenge the analysis will not differ much from the
one above. Therefore, the conclusions presented in the previous section would apply to
decisions on specific performance.264 In principle, it means that the award might not be
enforced if specific performance is granted (i) without the parties’ request or (ii) against
the explicit limitation prescribed in the agreement to arbitrate. As explained above, even
in those instances refusal of recognition and enforcement will not be automatic however.265
5.3.3 Decision on contract adaptation and filling of gaps
The last type of remedy discussed is perhaps the most controversial one. The outstanding
question related to the tribunal’s power to adapt the contract or to fill the contractual gaps
is whether it is “simply” a dimension of contract interpretation or, rather, it extends beyond
the adjudicative function of the tribunal giving the arbitral panel the power to shape the
parties’ legal relationship. All in all, such a power will be highly dependent on the law of
the arbitral seat as well as the law applicable to the merits of the case.266 In principle, as
always when assessing the challenge under Article V(1)(c) of the Convention, the court
will have a look at the limits to the tribunal’s “mandate” expressed in (i) the parties’
agreement to arbitrate and (ii) the parties’ subsequent submissions,267 and finally, (iii) the
public policy of the enforcement state may also play a role.268
The scope of the initial agreement to arbitrate will be, arguably, the most relevant one
in the context of the tribunal’s power to adapt the contract or fill the contractual gaps. Yet,
the parties rarely define the tribunal’s powers to adapt the contract in their agreement to
arbitrate. The contract adaptation clauses, however, may be found in the contract itself
(thus outside the agreement to arbitrate). Because of the exceptional character of this
power, the tribunal should refrain from exercising this power even if the agreement to
arbitrate is drafted broadly. Arguably, if the limitation of the tribunal’s power, however,
is located outside the agreement to arbitrate, it might be considered part of the contract,
and as such, left for the arbitrators and the court to interpret.269
As always, the tribunal’s decision should be based on the parties’ request. The
enforcement court needs to be satisfied that the tribunal does not act on its own volition
when it comes to the contract adaptation. If the tribunal goes beyond what is requested
and adapts the contract on its own initiative, it might indeed be considered as shaping the
legal relationship between the parties without their consent. Such an award will be open
for challenge under Article V(1)(c) of the Convention.
264 See section 5.3.1.
265 See analogous hypothetical in section 5.3.1.
266 See also Chapter II-Chapter V.
267 See section 3.
268 See section 3.3.
269 See also section 5.3.1.
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Since different legal systems view the contract adaptation powers differently, in the
context of theConvention no universal answer can be given. In principle, not all jurisdiction
may even allow the parties to delegate such a power to the arbitral tribunal. Therefore,
tinkering with the contract beyond the mere contract adaptation might be challenged
against public policy at the country of enforcement.270
5.4 Decisions accessory to the parties’ main submissions
The last categories of decisions are inherent to the adjudicative process at large, but are at
the same time, separate from the tribunal’s decision on the main parties’ claims. These
include the tribunal’s decision on interest (section 5.4.1), costs (section 5.4.2) and procedural
decisions (section 5.4.3).
5.4.1 Decision on interest
Awarding interest might constitute a substantial monetary value and, at the same time,
might require a complex legal analysis independent from the one on the main claim. The
issues that might be relevant when the enforcing court is faced with the challenge against
the tribunal’s decision on interest, will include, amongst other things, the determination
of the applicable law (to the issue of interest), the starting date for accrual, the rate and the
type of the interest. The analysis herein, however, should be limited to the question when
would the enforcement court accept the challenge against the decision on interest under
Article V(1)(c) of the Convention.
In general, the approach to the decision on interest would be similar to the tribunal’s
decisions on remedies that were discussed above.271 It means that, in principle, if the parties
agree to limit the tribunal’s authority to award interest, or the tribunal grantedmore interest
than claimed, or when the interest itself violates the public policy of the country of
enforcement, the tribunal’s award should be susceptible to challenge.
It is necessary to highlight, however, that the decision on interest have a special status
that distinguishes it from the abovementioned analysis. A power to award interest is rarely
addressed in national arbitration acts or even in institutional arbitration rules.272 The New
York Convention is also silent on the issue of interest. Often it is concluded, however, that
awarding interest is an inherent power273 closely associated with the adjudicative function
of the arbitral tribunal.
270 Additionally, the tribunal should, when exercising its contract adaption powers, keep the applicable
mandatory rules in mind.
271 See section 5.3.1.
272 See further Chapter VII.
273 See, e.g., (International Law Association, 2014) p.10.
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For example, a German court enforced the tribunal’s decision awarding more interest
than claimed. The court concluded that “[…] the arbitral tribunal can in its discretion and
on its own initiative award interest and compound interest for the time until the rendition
of the award and for the time after the rendition of the award. The fact that more interest
was awarded than it was claimed is not at odds with the [shipowner’s] claim, since this claim
clearly cannot be read to limit the power of the arbitral tribunal to award more interest.
Hence, the arbitrators did not exceed their authority in the sense of Art. V(1)(c).”274
Even though the tribunal’s award on interest might have higher chances of surviving
challenges even if the interest is more than requested, the tribunal should, as always, make
sure that the parties are heard. At the enforcement stage, public policy might also be of
relevance, especially in countries that do not recognize awards on interest.275
5.4.2 Decision on costs
Decisions on costsmight be financially significant. Additionally, the rules on cost allocation
varies between jurisdictions. It is important to note, however, that decisions on costs, in
the same way as decisions on interest, might be (inherently) left out for the tribunal to
decide, especially considering that it could be the ultimate tool for the tribunal to discipline
parties for their behavior during the proceedings.
When faced with the Article V(1)(c) challenge against the decision on costs, the
enforcement court would inevitably review the scope of (i) parties’ underlying agreement
to arbitrate276 as well as (ii) parties’ submissions.277 It will also take into account public
policy of country of enforcement. This analysis will be similar to the one already explained
above.278 Therefore, generally speaking, the tribunal will award costs in accordance with
the tribunal’s agreement to arbitrate, when asked and if it does not violate public policy.
Consequently, the award on costs was enforced in a case when “[…] petitioners agreed
to the award of such fees by placing a request for “reasonable attorney’s fees” in their demand
for arbitration. […] Petitioners also acquiesced in the award of such fees by requesting
attorney’s fees in their post-hearing briefs […] as well as by failing to object to such fees
during the final arguments on April 15, 1993. […] [P]etitioners objected to the award of
attorney’s fees only after the arbitrators had rendered theMay Award, at which point it was
clear that any attorney’s fees to be awardedwould be awarded to respondents.”279 In another
case it was held that “[s]ince we find the arbiters’ authority to reach the main decision was
274 Shipowner v. Time charterer, Oberlandesgericht [Court of Appeal], Hamburg, 30 July 1998, XXV Y.B.
Comm. Arb. 714, 716 (2000).
275 (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) pp.527-528. See also section 4.4.
276 See section 3.1.
277 See section 3.2.
278 See section 5.3.1 and section 5.4.1.
279 Spector v. Torenberg, 852 F. Supp. 201, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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within the scope of the letter agreement, it follows [that] the arbiters also had the authority
to award costs and fees for obtaining the arbitral decision.”280
Importantly, the tribunal’s decision on costsmay take into account the parties’ conduct
during the proceedings. A decision on costs will be therefore a managerial decision of the
arbitral tribunal, who should be able to sanction delaying tactics of the parties.
Consequently, the tribunal’s decision on costsmay survive the challenge at the enforcement
stage even if it is not in line with the parties’ request.281
5.4.3 Decision on procedure
The procedural decisions of an arbitral tribunal serve a significant role in the arbitral
process. They are, generally, of managerial nature. By no means shall Article V(1)(c) of
the Convention be considered as a backdoor for the review of the merits of the award or
the arbitral tribunal’s procedural rulings.282 The procedural rulings do not fit within the
scope of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.283 In the context of the challenge at the
enforcement stage, one should consider Article V(1)(d) of the Convention instead.284 In
the relevant part, Article V(1)(d) of the Convention reads that the award may be refused
recognition and enforcement when “[…] the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with
the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law
of the country where the arbitration took place […].”285
A similar conclusion was reached by an English enforcement court. In Minmetals
Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel Ltd, the court held that: “The function of this exception [i.e.
Art. V(1)(c) of the Convention] is to exclude from enforcement awardsmade on issues falling
outside those which were referred for decision to the arbitrators. The vice of the awards upon
which Ferco rely is the arbitrators’ reliance on evidence derived from their own investigations
280 Mgmt. & Tech. Consultants S.A. v. Parsons-Jurden Int’l Corp., 820 F.2d 1531, 1534–35 (9th Cir. 1987).
281 More andmore, the tribunal will find the power to sanction the parties’ conduct in the applicable arbitration
rules. See, e.g., Art. 38(5) of the 2017 ICC Rules, and Art. 37(5) of the ICC 2012 Rules. See also [the
comparative law chapter]
282 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2009) p.2801 (“Challenges to awards under Article V(1)(c)
are sometimes (but mistakenly) based on objections to the arbitrators’ substantive contract interpretations
or legal conclusions, or to the arbitrators’ procedural rulings. In neither instance is a true Article V(1)(c)
defense present. Rather, the defendant seeks to characterize a substantive objection to the tribunal’s decision
(which is not permitted by Article V) or a complaint about the fairness of the arbitral procedures (which is
dealt with by Articles V(1)(b) or V(1)(d)) as a jurisdictional claim. In particular, arbitral awards are not
infrequently challenged on the grounds that the arbitrators exceeded their authority in awarding particular
damages or other relief.”). See also section 4.4.
283 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3555 (“The same basic analysis applies to claims that
recognition should be denied under Article V(1)(c) because of the arbitrators’ procedural rulings. This is in
fact a complaint about the fairness of the arbitral procedures or the arbitrators’ compliance with the parties’
agreed arbitral procedures, which is properly dealt with under Articles V(1)(b) or V(1)(d).”).
284 Or else, Art. V(1)(b) of the Convention. See also section 4.4.
285 See Art. V(1)(d) of the Convention.
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and not previously provided to Ferco. That evidence, however, went to a central issue within
the overall dispute referred to arbitration, namely what loss had been caused to Minmetals
by Ferco’s breaches of contract. Whether in relying upon that evidence or in omitting to
disclose it to Ferco the tribunal acted in accordance with the CIETAC rules or with any other
procedural requirements of Chinese law is entirely irrelevant to the question whether the
tribunal’s decision was inside or outside ‘the scope of the submission’. That scope falls to be
defined by reference to the issues to be resolved by the arbitrators and not by reference to the
procedure to be adopted for that purpose. This is clear beyond doubt from the wording of s.
103(2)(c) which expressly covers deviation of the actual procedure from the agreed
procedure.”286 All in all, parties resisting recognition and enforcement should be cautious
what grounds they employ for challenge; in the case of the tribunal’s procedural decisions,
Article V(1)(d) of the Convention is a more sensible solution.
6 Conclusions
Article V of the New York Convention is often perceived as the heart of the Convention.
It protects parties from grievous mischief of the arbitral tribunal. It is only logical that the
mechanism against the “excess of mandate” type of violation is also introduced within the
ambit of said provision.
It is noteworthy, however, that the enforcement courts respect the underlying principles
of the New York Convention and apply Article V narrowly, giving a great deference to the
tribunal’s legal findings. Additionally, the starting point for the enforcement courts’ analysis
is the presumption that the arbitral tribunal had acted within its authority. Taking into
account the limited review of the content of the award, the low success rate of the Article
V(1)(c) challenge is not surprising. It can be therefore argued that defeating the arbitral
tribunal’s conclusions upon the alleged “excess of mandate” type of challenge is rather
theoretical.
Article V(1)(c) of the Convention does not have a uniform interpretation. It is because
the language remains unclear, repetitive and vexatious, which unnecessarily burdens the
process of interpretation. On the one hand, it has been suggested that Article V(1)(c) of
the Convention focuses on the issue of the scope of jurisdiction only, on the other hand,
arguably, the broad notion of “submission to arbitration” may cover not only the notion
of the agreement to arbitrate but also the parties’ subsequent submissions. The better view
is to follow the second interpretation allowing theArticle V(1)(c) challenge to be employed
in ultra or extra petita context.
286 Minmetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel Ltd [1999] C.L.C. 647 at [656].
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Not least important is the fact that the “excess of mandate” type of defense can be
successfully invoked only against substantial findings of the arbitral tribunal which are
different or higher than the parties’ claims. Therefore, the court’s review should be restricted
to the mere comparison of what the parties claimed and what they have been awarded. It
has been recapped by the clear-cut provision in the Miami Draft which reads that the
award shall be refused recognition if “the relief granted in the award ismore than, or different
from, the relief sought in the arbitration.” By nomeans should theArticle V(1)(c) challenge
amount to appeal against the arbitration award, nor should it be allowed against procedural
findings of the arbitral tribunal.
Additionally, the analysis of the case law indicates that even when the allegations of
the party resisting enforcement are sound (for examplewhen the tribunal awarded damages
whichwere explicitly excluded from the contract), the courts are rather unwilling to refuse
enforcement of the arbitral award.
As tempting as it may be, the arbitral tribunal’s decisions regarding applicable law as
a part of the arbitral tribunal’s substantive findings should not be tested by the enforcement
courts. Having in mind that modern arbitration is a legal process (based on law), it is
within the arbitral tribunal’s discretion to choose the applicable law. Arguably, although
it is a discretion in a legal sense, finding the applicable law is the professional duty of the
arbitral panel. For this reason, the arbitral tribunal willing to produce an enforceable award
should carefully motivate and explain the legal underpinning of the decision. This
professional duty will remain intact even when the arbitral tribunal is allowed to decide
in equity (therefore acting as amiable compositeur or deciding ex aequo et bono).
Reaching decisions based on the general notion of equity or fairness without express
consent from the parties will generally be open for a challenge at the enforcement stage.
The better view, however, is to challenge such a tribunal’s excessive undertaking under
the Article V(1)(d) challenge rather than under the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
One should note, however, that even when the tribunal is duly authorized by the parties,
it will be appropriate for the arbitrators, before accepting the mandate of amiable
composition, to examine whether the parties are actually able to vest the arbitral tribunal
with the power to decide in equity.
From time to time the defense introduced inArticleV(1)(c) of theConvention competes
with the other defenses mentioned in Article V(1) of the Convention. Determining which
defense should applymight be decisive for a successful challenge. Again, taking into account
the narrow interpretation ofArticleV(1)(c) of theConvention, a party resisting enforcement
might consider invoking the isolated “excess of mandate” defense only when the relief
granted is different or somewhat higher than the relief sought.
Last, but not least, the importance of public policy should be highlighted. Due to the
fact that the notion of public policy is dynamic and elusive, it is very appealing to the
parties that apply public policy defense as their last line of defense. It can be argued that
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the impact of public policy on the “arbitral tribunal’s mandate” is limited to instances
where the relief granted violates the very basic notion of justice in the country of
enforcement. In rare circumstances, it might be the case when the award infringes
mandatory laws (however not all of them) or is based on legal instruments unknown to
the legal system of the country of enforcement (for example granting punitive damages).
Considering the rather unclear scope of application and the pro-arbitration philosophy
that underlies the Convention, one should conclude that Article V(1)(c) of the Convention
will be successful only in exceptional circumstances.
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Part II

VII The Comparative Law Analysis
1 Preliminary remarks
1.1 Setting the scene
The previous chapters were dedicated to explaining howdifferent national courts approach
allegations that the tribunal exceeded the mandate given to it. As already explained in the
introductory chapter the (non)compliance with the mandate can be tested at two stages
of the post-award process: during the setting-aside proceedings at the seat of the arbitral
tribunal and during the enforcement phase in the country where the award is brought for
enforcement.1 This, in turn, makes both the national arbitration acts and the New York
Convention relevant for the research at hand: the national legislation becomes primarily
relevant when the award is being challenged at the setting-aside phase, with the New York
Convention being the ultimate tool for resisting enforcement at the enforcement stage.2
Taking into account that the challenge against an arbitral award can be brought at two
different post-award stages, the comparison should correspond to such a two-level division.
In principle, the analysis will not follow the classical comparative law divide between
common law and civil law systems, because it is not as useful as in other areas of law.
Instead, arguably, a line should be drawn between the Model Law jurisdictions (that
includes both civil and common law countries i.a. Canada, Germany, Poland, Singapore
etc.) and jurisdictions that do not follow the Model Law structure (i.a. France, England,
the U.S., the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden etc.). One may observe that the states
that do not follow theModel Law scheme are themajor arbitration centers with established
arbitration practice.3 The rationale for not following the Model Law might be explained
with the goal of preserving their competitive edge, providing for a unique set of tools
1 See Chapter I.
2 Generally, an arbitral award can be enforced, even if it does not adhere to all requirements envisaged by
the New York Convention, when a party is able to rely on other enforcement mechanism, for example, on
national legislation. See Art. VII of the New York Convention, with a comment i.a. by (Van den Berg, The
New York Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform Judicial Interpretation, 1981) pp.81-90. In cases of the
“excess of mandate” challenge this solution will be rather moot and for that reason will not be discussed
further.
3 (De Ly, Paradigmatic Changes – Uniformity, Diversity, Due Process and Good Administration of Justice:
The Next Thirty Years, 2016) p.23 (“Notwithstanding the major breakthrough brought about by the Model
Law, the picture remains one of divergence in the western world with major arbitration centres in London,
Paris, New York, Zurich or Geneva having arbitration laws based on different traditions, assumptions,
approaches and rules.”).
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sought by the users of international arbitration.4 Selected representatives of these countries
constitute a sample for the comparison at hand.
As explained above, the comparison should be made at two levels. At the first level,
the comparison between different mechanisms to challenge the alleged excess needs to be
carried out on the national level. Itmeans that, one should examine theModel Law, which,
as explained, constitutes the framework that national legislators (from both civil and
common law countries) may rely upon while drafting their arbitration acts. The Model
Law approach, in turn, needs to be contrasted with the rules applicable to the setting-aside
procedure in France,5 England6 and the U.S.7 These four legal systems may be evaluated
horizontally at the same level.
The second level, which is the enforcement stage, requires an analysis of the application
of the New York Convention. Mostly, national courts, while interpreting the Convention,
do that in a uniform and consistent manner.8 In principle, they also resist the temptation
of transplanting the national concepts at the international level. It does not change the
fact, however, that the challenging parties often keep insisting on relying on those alluring
(national) notions. Therefore, the vertical comparison might be also relevant.
The comparison, to a large extent, will follow the structure used in the previous chapters.
It will start with a brief summary of the prerequisites for filing the motion to challenge the
arbitral award and the reflections on the national courts’ standards of review of said awards.
Further, it is necessary to describe the different sources for the tribunal’s mandate.
Consequently, one should identify and contrast different mechanisms available for
challenging the arbitral tribunal’s excess of mandate. Finally, the application of these tools
should be tested against different decisions undertaken by the arbitral tribunal during the
arbitral process.
Before going further into details, it is reasonable to put the comparison in context,
which may explain how the different systems evolved (section 1.2) and operate (sections
1.3 and section 1.4).
1.2 “If it ain’t broke don’t fix it” and the legislative timeline
Chronologically, the Federal Arbitration Act is the oldest arbitration act analyzed herein
that is still in force. It was enacted in 1925, based on the similar (New York) state statute,
which was tailored specifically to address the need of merchants. At the time, England
4 See also section 1.3.
5 See Chapter III.
6 See Chapter IV.
7 See Chapter V.
8 See Chapter VI.
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already had its arbitration act but the courts in England were known for the “judicial
hostility” which Americans wanted tominimize.9 The FAA applies ever since and includes
annulment mechanisms against an arbitral award that was made with the excess of the
tribunal’s powers or the imperfect execution of their powers.
The second mature instrument that is being compared here is the 1958 New York
Convention. It superseded the 1927 Geneva Convention and it intrinsically contributed
to the development of international arbitration by limiting the burden that is imposed on
the enforcement of the arbitral bargain and by harmonizing the interpretation of issues
surrounding arbitration.10 Notably, however, the challengemechanism regarding the excess
of the terms and the scope of the submission to arbitration has not been clarified in the
New York Convention, which means that it did not improve the vagueness of the proviso
in national law which has remained unchanged for almost a century now.
The success of the New York Convention led the UNCITRAL to introduce in 1985 the
framework legislation known as the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Model Law has been
further revised in 2006, but those changes, in principle, do not affect the research at hand,
because they did not relate to the challengemechanism at the post-award stage. Importantly,
however, the Model Law setting-aside mechanism has been structured on the text of the
New York Convention which guaranteed (or at least aimed to guarantee) the convergence
in application of both instruments.
Following the chronology of enactment, the English Arbitration Act of 1996 is another
legal system reflected upon. The historical context is, however, of particular importance
here. Before the enactment of the 1996 Act, the English arbitration system and its judicial
review mechanism were criticized as being incomprehensible and inaccessible to
international users.11 In particular, it allowed the courts to hear the challenge not only on
the elusive statutory grounds (i.e. where the tribunal had misconducted itself or the
proceedings)12 but also under the courts’ inherent jurisdiction. The English arbitration
regime dramatically changed with the introduction of the 1996 Act. The Act includes an
exhaustive catalogue of grounds uponwhich the award can be challenged including, among
others, the “excess of powers” ground.
The most recent arbitration statute that is being compared is the French Arbitration
Act, a part of the French Code of Civil Procedure. It was amended in 2011 in order to
reflect modern arbitration practice and it does so successfully. Yet, in the context of a
9 The evolution of the English setting-aside procedure has been discussed in Chapter IV.
10 For further reading, see (Van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards Uniform Judicial
Interpretation, 1981).
11 For further reading, see Chapter IV.
12 See Chapter IV.
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challenge against the tribunal’s failure to complywith itsmandate, notmuch has changed.13
The elusive and potentially capacious concept of “the excess of mandate” introduced at
the beginning of the 1980s14 has survived the changes in the system.
The first preliminary observation is that the “excess of mandate” challenges remain
unchanged notwithstanding other alterations made in the legal instruments analyzed.
Possibly this is because courts in respective jurisdictions are reluctant to accept the
arguments that are brought by dissatisfied parties to arbitration and do not allow a broad
interpretation of the relevant provisions. At the same time, the need for change is recognized
by some scholars and in some jurisdictions.15
1.3 Harmony and divergence: the impact of the Model Law
As highlighted above in the first section,16 international arbitration regimes can be divided
into those that follow (even in verbatim) the text of the Model Law and those that prefer
tomaintain their owndistinctive shape and status. The lattermostly applies to the developed
arbitration systems (such as theU.S., France and England) with a longer historical standing
than that of the Model Law.
At the same time, the impact of the Model Law remained unprecedented, even with
regard to countries that did not decide to adopt it. It is important to note, for example,
that the drafters of the English Arbitration Act took into careful consideration the work
of the UNCITRAL and the solutions introduced in its Model Law. Consequently, many
of the principles that underlie the Model Law have also been included in the English
Arbitration Act. Accordingly, the English Arbitration Act envisages that the setting-aside
mechanism consists of a closed catalogue of grounds to challenge. Aswill be shownhowever,
it nonethelessmaintained its distinctive features from theModel Law challengemechanism.
Additionally, if one looks at the (draft) Restatement on International Commercial
13 At least to the jurisprudence and leading scholars. See, however, Chapter III where it is argued that the
cosmetic changes made to the provision may give rise to the new legal arguments and more excessive use
of the “excess of mandate” provision.
14 For the analysis of the 1980s reform including a comparisonwith the prior legislation, see, i.a., (Carbonneau,
The Reform of the French Procedural Law on Arbitration: An Analytical Commentary on the Decree of
May 14, 1980, 1981) pp.273-339.
15 Briefly speaking, see for example, Albert Jan Van den Berg proposal for the new New York Convention
(available at http://www.newyorkconvention.org/draft+convention [last accessed 28 April 2018]. In the
context of the “excess of mandate” challenge see also changes implemented in the (new) Dutch Arbitration
Act (see Art. 1065(1)(c) and Art. 1065(4) of the Dutch CCP) requiring the “violation” of the mandate to be
serious in nature and the changes proposed in the Swedish Arbitration Act (see, e.g.,
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/10/17/time-to-upgrade-review-of-the-swedish-arbitration-act/ [last
accessed 29 April 2018] and http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/04/09/the-swedish-
government-revives-efforts-to-modernise-the-arbitration-act/ [last accessed 29 April 2018].
16 See section Chapter VII.
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Arbitration prepared by the American Law Institute, one may conclude that the
recommendations therein would effectively lead to the alteration of the existing system of
the post-award relief into the mechanism that follows the Model Law structure.
Similarly, in the U.S., the (draft) Restatement advocates the use of the New York
Convention’s grounds for resisting enforcement as grounds for setting aside in international
arbitration cases with the seat in theU.S. Such a recommendation leads to themodification
of the existing system of post-award relief in a way that effectively transforms the U.S.
annulment system into a Model Law one.
This leads to the second opening reflection, i.e., the importance and the harmonizing
effect of the apparatus prepared by the UNCITRAL (and drafters of the New York
Convention beforehand) as well as the appreciation for the principles contained in these
uniform instruments.
1.4 Apples and oranges: distinctive features of analyzed systems
Notwithstanding the effect that the Model Law has had globally, it is necessary to explain
a few particularities of the non-Model Law arbitration systems in order to understand how
these regimes operate.17
At the outset, one should look at the U.S. arbitration system. First, it is organized
judicially on two levels: state and federal.18 Secondly, arbitration legislation is also organized
on state and federal level.19 Thirdly, due to so-called “Arbitration Trilogies” introduced by
the U.S. Supreme Court since the 1980s, the arbitral system in the U.S. has changed
significantly and, nowadays, the FAA does not resemble the same instrument that was
introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century. Instead, following the meaning that
was given to the FAA by the U.S. Supreme Court’s Justices it rather preempts the use of
state legislation on arbitration.20
Importantly, the U.S. arbitration regime nowadays covers not only commercial but
also (i.a.) consumer and employment disputes which constitutes a relevant factor in the
way the system operates. For some time now, attempts are being made to limit the
availability of predispute agreements to arbitrate i.a. consumer or employment disputes.21
Yet, the Arbitration Fairness Act has not been enacted by Congress despite the fact that it
17 In this section the systems will be considered in the order of their enactment.
18 See Chapter V.
19 See, for example, the Federal Arbitration Act and the California (state) legislation based on the Model Law
(http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html [last
accessed 27 April 2018].
20 See Chapter V.
21 See Chapter V.
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was introduced several times for a discussion and it is unlikely that it will catch its
momentum any time soon.
As pointed out above, the Restatement on International Commercial Arbitration, when
completed, will be a strong persuasive authority. In turn, itmay influence thewayAmerican
courts will apply the FAA. If the ALI’s postulates are accepted, the arbitration system will
effectively become a dualistic one with a separate set of rules applicable to domestic and
international arbitration.
A similar dualistic approach is a distinctive feature of the French system.22 The division
is made in order to attract the users of international arbitration. The French international
arbitration regime is broadly praised for its liberal stand allowing a great freedom for
parties to shape their arbitrations as they see fit. It may be contrasted with the domestic
system which has a more traditional undertone.23 Importantyl, the international system,
however, is not completely independent from the domestic one.24
Finally, the English system is known, for example, for its (opt-in) mechanism allowing
the parties to appeal on point of law. This solution, albeit nowadays limited in scope, can
be traced to the former arbitration regimewhere national judges hadmuch greater powers
over the conduct of arbitration and the way arbitrators were fulfilling their mandate. It
also leads to the conclusion that history plays a great role in understanding the interaction
between courts and arbitral tribunals in England.
The final preliminary observation is that non-Model Law systems are structured based
on their own ideas and values that also need to be taken into account during the comparison,
despite the relevance of the Model Law and its approach.
2 Court standard of review of arbitral awards
One of the key features of the international arbitration system is the deference given by
the national courts’ judges to the arbitral tribunals’ conclusions (section 2.1). In consequence
of the pro-arbitration bias, courts refrain from reviewing the merits of the award (section
2.2) and, to the extent possible, make efforts to remedy deficiencies in the arbitral awards
(section 2.3). These points will be briefly addressed below.
22 Also see, e.g., the Singaporean arbitration regime.
23 The question that follows is whether itmay influence the perception of themandate. In other words, whether
there is a difference in the tribunal’s mandate in domestic and international arbitration.
24 See Chapter III.
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2.1 The pro-arbitration approach of national courts in the context of the
challenge
All analyzed systems are renowned for their pro-arbitration standing. This pro-arbitration
standing is not included under a single proviso, however. Instead, it is an underlying spirit
of the international arbitration regime that persuades the courts to limit their intervention
in the arbitral process. At the post-award stage, it means that the possibility of challenge
is limited in time, with only an exhaustive list of grounds that can be invoked for a challenge.
Additionally, the listed grounds are to be interpreted narrowly. Importantly, courts accept
the exceptional character of the post-award revision and they respect the finality of the
award as well.
In theModel Law jurisdictions, the exhaustive character of the grounds to set the award
aside is confirmed, for example, by the travaux préparatoires of the German Arbitration
Act. As explained by scholars, “[t]he grounds for setting aside are exhaustively listed in
s.1059 para 2 ZPO as the wording (‘only’) demonstrates.”25 Also national courts from the
Model Law jurisdictions adhere to the narrow standards of judicial control at the post-award
stage.26
Similarly, Article 1518 of the FCCP reads that an action to set aside is the only available
recourse against an award. It is also confirmed that the list under Article 1520 of the FCCP
is exhaustive27 and themerits of the award should not be reviewed.28 The leading principle
of the EnglishArbitrationAct is the “non-interventionist” approach of the courts in arbitral
matters.29 The drafters of the EAA ensured therefore that the list of irregularities against
which the award can be challenged is limited,30 with the irregularity having a high standard
of being “serious” and causing “substantial injustice”.31 In one case, even before the 1996
25 (Kreindler,Wolff, &Rieder, Commercial Arbitration inGermany, 2016) p.335. The authors refer the travaux
préparatoires of the German Arbitration Act, namely to the Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274 p.58.
26 See, e.g., Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corporation, 1991 CanLII 5708 (BC CA), par. 32,
<http://canlii.ca/t/231lq#par32>, [last accessed 27 April 2018], Bayview Irrigation District #11 v. United
Mexican States, 2008CanLII 22120 (ONSC), par. 63, <http://canlii.ca/t/1wwtf#par63> [last accessed 27April
2018], CRW Joint Operation v. PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] SGCA 33, [2011] 4 SLR
305 at [25].
27 See, e.g., (albeit under the previous setting-aside mechanism) CA Paris, 10 January 2012, Rev. Arb. 2012,
p.203 that reads that “the action to set aside in international matters is available only under grounds
exhaustively listed in Article 1502 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” (“Le recours en annulation d’une sentence
arbitrale rendue en matière internationale n’est ouvert que dans les cas limitativement énumérés par l’article
1502 du Code de procédure civile.”). For further reading, see (Bensaude, 2015) p.1176, and (Loquin É., 2015)
p.420.
28 See also Chapter III. See also section 2.2 below.
29 See Section 1(c) of the EAA.
30 (Departamental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law, 1996) para 282. For the summary, see also
Petroships Pte Ltd v. Petec Trading and Investment Corporation and Ors [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 348.
31 For further reading, see Chapter IV and section 3 below.
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reform, the court held that “[…] as amatter of general approach, the courts strive to uphold
arbitration awards. They do not approach them with a meticulous legal eye endeavoring to
pick holes, inconsistencies and faults in awards and with the objective of upsetting or
frustrating the process of arbitration.”32 Similarly, the U.S. SupremeCourt held that “courts
may vacate an arbitrator’s decision ‘only in very unusual circumstances’.’”33 Such a strong
federal policy favoring arbitration guides lower courts in their decisions on the vacatur of
arbitral awards.34
Unsurprisingly, the ultimate goal of theNewYorkConvention is to ensure that foreign
arbitral awards are recognized and enforced in the territory of the Contracting States.
Accordingly, “[c]ourts approach enforcement under the New York Convention with strong
pro-enforcement bias and a pragmatic, flexible and non-formalistic approach. This
commendable liberal attitude fully exploits the potential of this most successful treaty […].”35
For example, a U.S. court persuasively held that: “The 1958 Convention’s basic thrust was
to liberalize procedures for enforcing foreign arbitral awards[.]While the Geneva Convention
placed the burden of proof on the party seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitral award and
did not circumscribe the range of available defenses to those enumerated in the convention,
the 1958 Convention clearly shifted the burden of proof to the party defending against
enforcement and limited his defenses to seven set forth in Article V.”36 It has been also
established that the recognition and enforcement can only be refused under the limited
grounds listed in the Convention, with no availability of review of the merits.37
The general pro-arbitration thrust of the analyzed legal systems leads many of the
challenges against the tribunal’s actions to inevitable failure. At the same time, the
exceptional recourse against the award gives the courts a possibility to remedy the grievous
wrogndoings of the arbitral tribunals.
2.2 The scope of the court’s review
The principle that the courts should not review the merits of the tribunal’s decisions is
closely aligned with the pro-arbitration policy discussed above.38 As noted, the courts
usually accept their limited role in the arbitral process and acknowledge that reassessment
32 Zermalt Holdings v. Nu-Life Upholstery Repairs [1985] 2 EGLR 14, as referred to in ABB AG v. Hochtief
Airport GMBH, Athens International Airport S.A. [2006] EWHC 388 (Comm), 2006 WL 755473 at [64].
33 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 186 L. Ed. 2d 113 (2013).
34 For further reading, see Chapter V.
35 (ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook for Judges, 2011)
p.71.
36 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L’Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d
969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974).
37 See also Chapter VI.
38 See section 2.1.
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of the merits should not be made. Generally, such a narrow scope of the review can be
implied from the exhaustive list of irregularities that may give rise to the parties’ challenge
at the post-award stage.39 The problem at hand, however, is how “the excess of mandate”
type of challenge is reviewed by the court.
The considerable amount of traction arises from the fact that the grounds for challenge
are generally non-exclusive in the sense that the same factual underpinning may give rise
to different venues for the post-award challenge. In particular, the challenge against the
mandate might not be immediately distinguishable from the challenge of the tribunal’s
jurisdiction. Yet, the way it is tested, i.e. the scope of the court’s review, might be (and
should be) different. In instances where there are legitimate concerns as to the tribunal’s
jurisdiction (namely, no valid or existing agreement to arbitrate) the court’s scrutiny may
be exceptionally enhanced. If, however, the objections relate to the tribunal’s mandate, the
heightened level of a court’s review may effectively result in a review of the merits of the
award.
Difficulties in balancing the scope of the review as to the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge exist in the Model Law jurisdictions. The reason is that the rule of Article
34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law is usually implemented without any changes despite the
fact that it is not easy to comprehend.40 The question therein is whether this proviso deals
with the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction or the tribunal’s mandate.41 As explained
elsewhere, the better view is to restrict the interpretation of this provision to the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge and to deal with all jurisdictional concerns under Article
34(2)(a)(i) of the Model Law. This way, the sensible solution for the courts when faced
with the Article 34(2)(a)(iii) challenge would be to apply the general rule and to give
deference to the tribunal’s findings (and refrain from reevaluating the tribunal’s decision).
Under the French international arbitration regime, “le principe de non-révision au fond”
is also a leading principle. Accordingly, the courts’ control going beyond the scope of
Article 1520 of the CCP is prohibited.42 Importantly, the French setting-aside court will
be able to analyze all the legal and factual elements having implications on the mandate
of the arbitral tribunal.43 Usually, however, the tribunal’s findings remain respected. The
English system proves to be, again, themost detailed one. Section 67 of the EAAdeals with
the tribunal’s jurisdiction and, according to authorities, many courts consider that they
owe no deference to the tribunal’s jurisdictional findings (including the question of the
39 See section 2.1 above.
40 See, e.g., Art. 1059(2)(1)(c) of the GCCP. See also Section 3(1) and Section 24 of the SIAA.
41 For further reading, see Chapter II.
42 For further reading, see Chapter III.
43 See, e.g., Cour de Cassation Civ 1re, 6 October 2010, Fondation Albert Abela Family v. Fondation Joseph
Abela Family, Rev. Arb. 2010, p.969.
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scope of the substantive jurisdiction)44 and prefer to rely on their own independent findings
on facts and law.45 Conversely, Section 68 of the EAAwhich includes an exhaustive catalogue
of serious irregularities,46 including the “excess of powers” ground for challenge, was
introduced to limit judicial interference with the award. In addition, it imposes two
conditions (the irregularity has to be serious and cause substantial injustice) that have to
be satisfied in order for the court to accept the challenge. In theU.S., the standard of review
under Section 10 of the FAA is extremely narrow as well. What naturally follows, is that
the courts may not review and correct the tribunal’s conclusions.47 They will be allowed,
however, to independently determine if the grounds for vacatur exist. It is necessary to
add, however, that the excess of powers ground has a rather broad scope, including
jurisdictional/threshold issues,48 which means that, similar to the Model Law system,
certain difficulties may occur with regard to the level of scrutiny exercised by the courts.49
Arguably, possible complicationsmay also arise in the context of judicially created grounds
for vacatur (assuming they are still available to the parties)50 that have a potential to interfere
with the tribunal’s conclusions on the merits.51
Finally, national courts52 at the enforcement stage routinely refuse to review themerits
of the case.53 In the words of one court: “[…] the animating principle of the [New York]
Convention, that the Courts should review arbitrations for procedural regularity but resist
inquiry into the substantive merits of awards, is clear from the notes on this subject by the
44 Notably, the question of the scope of the substantive jurisdiction includes the determination of “what
matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the agreement to arbitrate”. See Section 30(1)
of the EAA. For further reading, see also Chapter IV.
45 See Chapter IV.
46 Therefore, it is prohibited for the court to add more irregularities to the list.
47 See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36, 108 S. Ct. 364, 370, 98
L. Ed. 2d 286 (1987) (“the courts play only a limited role when asked to review the decision of an arbitrator.
The courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may allege that
the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.”). For further reading, see Chapter
V.
48 See Chapter V.
49 One has to assess if the objections raised under the excess of powers challenge are of jurisdictional or
non-jurisdictional nature. The latter resembles the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge. See also reflections
regarding Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML under this section.
50 See Hall Street Assocs, LLC v. Mattel, Inc. 552 U.S. 576, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008).
51 For example, testing whether the arbitral award “manifestly disregarded the law”, “drew its essence from
the agreement of the parties”. For further reading, see Chapter V.
52 Especially courts from the jurisdictions analyzed herein.
53 See, for example,Ukrainian dealer v. German manufacturer,Oberlandesgericht, Munich, 30 July 2012 and
Bundesgerichtshof, 23 April 2013, XXXIX Y.B. Comm. Arb. 394 (2014), Joint Stock Company A v. Joint
Stock Company B,Higher Regional Court ofMunich, 34 Sch 10/11, 14November 2011, XXXVII Y.B. Comm.
Arb. 231 (2012), Int’l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. Y Comercial, 745
F. Supp. 172, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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Secretary-General of the United Nations.”54 Another court added that “[e]xtensive judicial
review frustrates the basic purpose of arbitration, which is to dispose of disputes quickly and
avoid the expense and delay of extended court proceedings.”55 Since Article V(1)(c) of the
New York Convention has almost the same wording as Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model
Law, the risks related to the scope of the review are, arguably, similar.56 Potentially, however,
the friction may even be bigger, because the enforcement proceedings of the same award
might be brought to a number of enforcement courts. If different courts adopt different
standard of review, it will keep up with expectations of the spirit behind the New York
Convention. Consequently, a high degree of deference should be welcomed with regard
to court’s control under Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention.
Similar to the previous section, it is concluded that court should be able to control and
remedy serious deficiencies of arbitral decision-making process. It does not change the
fact, however, that such a control should not trigger deciding the case anew by the court.
2.3 Remedies at the national courts’ disposal
In the analyzed jurisdictions, the courts are given similar set of remedial tools, which
essential aim is to save the award if only possible. The more detailed analysis has been
provided under chapters discussing each legal system separately.57 In principle, the courts
may (i) save a “healthy” part of the award if it is severable from the part affected by default.
Depending on the jurisdiction the courtsmay also be authorized, for example, (ii) to remit
the award back to the tribunal to eliminate the defect, or even (iii) to correct the award in
limited and exceptional circumstances.
The Model Law system, based on the idea already developed under the New York
Convention regime is representative for the scope of remedial powers given to the courts.
According toArticle 34(2)(a)(iii) of theModel Law,58 if it is possible to separate the decisions
on matters submitted to arbitration from decisions on matters not so submitted, “only
that part of the awardwhich contains decisions onmatters not submitted to arbitrationmay
be set aside […].” Additionally, the power to remit the case to the arbitral tribunal is also
made available, but only upon the parties’ request.59
54 Int’l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera, Indus. Y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 178
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
55 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L’Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d
969, 977 (2d Cir. 1974).
56 See reflections as to the Model Law above.
57 See chapters Chapter II-Chapter V.
58 The question, whether this standard should apply also to other grounds for setting aside falls outside the
scope of this research.
59 See Art. 34(4) of the ML. Singapore did not alter this provision. Germany included the provision, albeit
with a modification (Art. 1059(4) of the GCCP). Essentially, it allows the court to remit the case back to
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In France, partial setting aside is also available. According to Article 1527(2) of the
FCCP the part of the award not overturned by the court shall be deemed enforced. This
would be a principal remedy for the courts. Conversely to theModel Law courts, the French
courts will not, in principle, have a power to remit the case back to the tribunal (under the
French international arbitration regime).60 Notably, however, the French courts do not
hesitate to sanction the abusive use of the right to set aside.61 The English catalogue of
remedies is the broadest one (of all reviewed jurisdictions) and it varies depending on
whether the challenge is brought under Section 67 of the EAA (substantive jurisdiction),
Section 68 of the EAA (serious irregularity) or Section 69 of the EAA (appeal on point of
law). The whole catalogue has been introduced elsewhere.62 In principle, however, one
should note (i) that saving the healthy part of the award is always possible under the English
regime,63 irrespective of which challenge is used and (ii) that the courtmay remit the award
back to the tribunal following the objections under Sections 68 and 69.64 Finally, in the
U.S., the Federal Arbitration Act, under Section 11, allows the courts to (i.a.) “make an
ordermodifying or correcting the award”.65 Effectively, however, it leads to the same results
as a partial vacatur.66 According to Section 10(b) of the FAA, the remand67 is available but
only when “an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the
award to be made has not expired”. Following arguments of the the Restatement, in
exceptional circumstances, the courts will be able to use the power to remand evenwithout
vacating the award first.68 Importantly, according to authorities, the courts in the U.S. can
exercise such a power on their own motion.69
The enforcement courts, applying the New York Convention will also be allowed to
sever and enforce the healthy part of the award even if some objections resulting from the
the tribunal after the setting aside of the award and not pending setting-aside proceedings as suggested in
theModel Law.Not all jurisdictions adopted this provision, however. See as reported by (Born, International
Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3153.
60 See Chapter III. That being said, one should observe that, in exceptional cases, application for revision
(“recourse en révision”) will be given to the parties. Then the tribunal should be addressed directly (Art.
1502(2) of the FCCP).
61 CA Paris, 21 January 1997, Société Nu Swift PLC v. Société White Knight et autres, Rev. Arb. 1997, p.429,
CA Paris, 6 May 2004, Carthago Films v. Babel Productions, Rev. Arb. 2006, p.661.
62 See Chapter IV.
63 Either by setting aside only a part of the award or declaring only a part of the award to be of no effect. For
further reading, see Chapter IV.
64 See Section 68(3)(a) and Section 69(7)(c) of the EAA. These provisions differ slightly in their wording.
65 See Chapter V.
66 For further reading, see Chapter V.
67 Which is the term used in the U.S. contemplating the court’s reference back to the tribunal with the aim of
eliminating the deficiencies in the award in order to salvage it.
68 Even though the FAA itself does not expressly authorize them to do so. See the Restatement (third tentative
draft) pp.80-85. See also Chapter V.
69 See the Restatement (third tentative draft) p.82 and p.85.
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“excess of mandate” type of the challenge were accepted. This can be found under Article
V(1)(c) of the New York Convention.70 Since the enforcement court does not exercise a
supervisory role over the arbitration, other powers become redundant.
In conclusion, although some differences exist (e.g. whether powers can be exercised
by the courts on its own motion or only following the parties’ motion), the overarching
aim of salvaging the award to the utmost is achieved in all jurisdictions.
3 Different standards for the “arbitral tribunal’s mandate” and
variations of recourse against its excess
In order to determine when (and whether) the “tribunal’s mandate” is exceeded it is first
necessary to identify its sources and limits (section 3.1). An initial observationworth noting
is that in all reviewed jurisdictions said sources and limits remain the same. Only by having
them defined is it possible to assess when the excess takes place. Secondly, it is sensible to
discuss the use of different concepts within the analyzed legal regimes (section 3.2). Notably,
although the structure of the mandate (i.e. what it is based on) is in principle the same,
the concepts for challenging the excessive use of the mandate by the tribunal may vary
(section 3.3). In addition, it is important to analyze how these grounds for challenge fit in
the overall framework for testing the award for alleged deficiencies before the annulment
or enforcement courts (section 3.4).
3.1 Limits to the arbitral tribunal’s “mandate”
As highlighted in the introductory chapter of this study, the tribunal’s mandate can be
considered in two dimensions.71 In the first one, the focus is on the contractual delegation
of the parties to have their disputes resolved by (private) arbitral tribunals and not by
national courts. The parties, however, would have lacked the authority to assign dispute
resolution powers to the tribunal if the states had not accepted that arbitral tribunals are
capable of exercising the role of the judiciary. Sharing the state monopoly (of finally
resolving the disputes between the parties) with the arbitral tribunals is the second
dimension of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate. Consequently, one can list the agreement to
arbitrate (section 3.1.1), the parties’ submissions (section 3.1.2) and mandatory rules of
public policy character (section 3.1.3) as the sources structuring the tribunal’s mandate.
70 As mentioned above, it has been a basis for the text of Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML.
71 See Chapter I.
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3.1.1 Agreement to arbitrate
It is rather uncontroversial that the inquiry determining the confines of the arbitral
tribunal’s mandate should start with an investigation of the underlying agreement to
arbitrate. On the one hand, the parties’ initial consent to arbitratemostly defines the limits
to the actions the parties themselves may undertake or claims they themselves may bring
before the arbitral tribunal at the later stage rather than explicitly define the scope of the
tribunal’smandate. On the other hand, reference to the institutional rules in the agreement
to arbitrate may shed some light on the parties’ expectations as to the actions the tribunal
may undertake.
As a brief summary, both the Model Law systems and non-Model Law ones recognize
that the agreement to arbitratemay be concluded both before and after the disputes arises.
If it is the former it will (usually) take the form of an arbitration clause,72 if it is the latter
it will take the form of a separate submission agreement.73 Notably, if the agreement to
arbitrate is introduced after the dispute arises, it may provide a more elaborate structure
of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate.
Additionally, it is necessary to point out that broadly drafted agreements to arbitrate
will be given a generous interpretation by the reviewing courts in all analyzed legal systems.
In the absence of a clear statement to the contrary (i.e. unless the agreement to arbitrate
is drafted narrowly), the tribunal’s discretionwould often include all the disputes that have
been brought by the parties.74 Furthermore, as hinted above, it is generally accepted that
the reference to the institutional rules in the agreement to arbitrate extends the framework
on which the parties structure their intent and may further clarify the envisaged scope of
the tribunal’s mandate.75
Overall, the agreement to arbitrate is an essential element to determine the scope of
the intended mandate. Yet, since it is usually drafted in a rather expansive manner, it
requires additional inquiry into the parties’ subsequent submissions in order to fully grasp
what the tribunal is allowed.
3.1.2 Parties’ (subsequent) submissions
Having in mind that the agreement to arbitrate provides only a scaffold for the arbitral
tribunal’s mandate, it is truly the parties’ submissions that set the boundaries to the scope
72 A separate agreement to arbitrate before the dispute arises is of course possible as well.
73 See for the Model Law: Art. 7(1) of the 1985 ML, Art. 7(1) of the 2006 ML (option I) or Art. 7 of the 2006
ML (option II). For the Germany Arbitration Act, see Art. 1029 of the GCCP (Art. 1029(2) in particular).
For Singapore, see Section 2A(2) of the SIAA. For non-Model Law jurisdictions see Art. 1507 of the FCCP
in France (albeit implicitly), Section 6(1) of the EAA in England and Section 2 of the FAA in the U.S. For
further reading, see also Chapter II-Chapter V. At the enforcement stage, courts are also obliged to recognize
agreements to arbitrate of existing or future disputes (Art. II(1) of the NYC).
74 See also sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. For further reading, see Chapter II-Chapter V.
75 For further reading, see also Chapter II-Chapter V.
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of the tribunal’s mandate. Notably, however, these submissions may affect the mandate
in twoways: either by limiting the scope of the initial (usually broad) agreement to arbitrate
or potentially expand it.
All reviewed jurisdictions recognize the importance of the parties’ submissions for
defining the tribunal’s adjudicative powers.76 Furthermore, it is a general understanding
that all the matters in dispute (thus claims over which the tribunal has a power) should be
submitted (therefore defined) at the initial stage of proceedings, because it gives a clear
indication of the constraints of the tribunal’s mandate at the outset of the arbitration.
Additionally, the parties’ claims should fit within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate.
If they do not, all the parties involved should unambiguously consent to such amodification.
Importantly, expressing a consent to the alteration of the agreement to arbitrate should
be approached cautiously. If a party does not wish to extend the adjudicative powers of
the tribunal, it should expressly voice its objections.Otherwise, its silencemay be considered
as a tacit acceptance and disqualify any challenge to such an extension at the post-award
stage. This conclusion will equally be valid in cases where the new submissions do not go
beyond the scope of the initial agreement to arbitrate, but expand claims originally
submitted.77 In this case, the opposing party should also react immediately or else risk that
its challenge at the post-award stage will not succeed.
All jurisdictions recognize also the exceptional character of the ICCTerms of Reference.
In principle, it is considered as an additional instrument that structures the agreed scope
of the parties’ submissions and, in turn, the tribunal’s adjudicative mandate in a more
definite manner. Even with the ICC Terms of Reference, however, modifications of the
claim may occur.
One should therefore conclude that all of the parties’ submissions are relevant in
determining the ultimate framework on which the tribunal may rely in its decisions. It
will hold true both at the setting-aside stage and enforcement stage.78
3.1.3 Mandatory rules of public policy character
As highlighted above, the tribunal’s mandate is based primarily on the parties’ consensus.
Yet, it should not be forgotten that the party autonomy finds its limits in the underlying
principles of each legal system. In other words, the essential concepts of each system, which
take the form of public policy rules, cannot be overridden by the parties’ agreement.79
76 The outstanding question is whether it limits the tribunal’s jurisdiction ormandate or a yet entirely different
concept. This will be discussed in section 3.2.
77 The issues surrounding changes of claim will be discussed further in section 4.2.5.
78 Under the New York Convention regime.
79 Additionally, the provisions of the applicable arbitration laws even, if notmandatory,may provide a certain
structure for the tribunal’s mandate, because they will include fallback mechanisms on which the tribunal
may rely (for example, power to grant interim measures, power to award costs etc.).
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The notion that public policy rules have to be respected is recognized both in Model
Law and non-Model Law jurisdictions. All jurisdictions have a similar understanding that
public policymay be violated only in exceptional circumstances. Nonetheless, similar does
notmean the same, whichmay lead to differences in interpretation of public policy rules.80
At this point, it suffices to say that the most basic values of the legal system (for example
the right to be heard or prohibition of bribery) have to be infringed in order to trigger a
public policy violation.81
In addition, one should observe who can raise an argument that the excess of the
tribunal’s mandate violates public policy. In the Model Law jurisdictions, public policy
can be raised ex officio.82 Arguably, the consequences of the setting-aside procedure in
France are the same, because the court will take the task of applying the law to the facts
presented by the parties.83 Conversely and arguably, in England the public policy violation
should be raised by the parties.84 In the U.S., the public policy challenge is a judicially
created ground for vacatur. It should be noted, however, that its future after Hall Street
remains uncertain.85 If it does survive in the post-Hall Street reality, following the
Restatement’s view, the court on its ownmotionwill be able to check if the award complies
with public policy.86
The mandate of the tribunal to resolve the disputes between the parties is given by the
parties. Yet it should never be forgotten that the power of the parties to delegate the dispute
resolution has ultimately been granted by the states themselves. That is why they should
be able to test if the values they find important have been respected.
80 For further reading, see Chapter II-Chapter V. Since it is not always applicable (or of immediate relevance),
public policy (conversely to the agreement to arbitrate and parties’ submissions, i.e. the first two sources
of the tribunal’s mandate) will only be mentioned in selected subsections of section 4.
81 An elaborate analysis, however, escapes the scope of the research at hand.
82 See Chapter II.
83 See Chapter III.
84 Public policy is mentioned in the list of “serious irregularities” under Section 68(g) of the EAA and as such
may be pleaded by the parties. Under the Section 67 challenge, one may also, arguably, look at the general
clause subjecting party autonomy to limits safeguarding “public interest” (see Section 1(b) of the EAA).
There are, however, different views on the meaning of Section 1(b) of the EAA. For further reading, see
Chapter IV.
85 See Chapter V.
86 See the Restatement (second tentative draft) p.313. It is based, however, on the philosophy advocated by
the Restatement where the NewYork Convention system is used for vacatur purposes in the U.S. Arguably,
the courts should be able to review if the award violates public policy even if vacatur is governed by Section
10 of the FAA. For further reading, see Chapter V.
400
Excess of Powers in International Commercial Arbitration
3.2 The analysis of different concepts of “mandate”, “mission”, “powers”,
“authority”
As highlighted above, the different national concepts reviewed herein are structured on
the same sources: the agreement to arbitrate, the parties’ submissions and the public policy
rules stemming from the applicable law. Since the framework onwhich they are built upon
is the same, they are often discussed together under the heading “excess of powers”,87
“excess of authority”,88 “excess of mandate”89 or the like. Nevertheless, one should not
readily infer that the scope of application of these concepts is identical. Therefore, it is
necessary to identify (i) what type(s) of formulae different legal regimes employ and (ii)
what exactly they entail. Consequently, (iii) one should seek to establish how the excess
of such formulae is sanctioned. These will be discussed below under sections 3.2.1-3.2.3.90
3.2.1 The notion of “mandate” and “mission”
The first relevant notion is the “mandate”. It finds its way into two of the studied legal
regimes: in the Model Law and in French international arbitration law.91
In the Model Law, it is mostly relevant to determine the temporal aspect of the
adjudicative powers that the tribunal has over the parties’ dispute, because the term is only
used while the termination of the mandate is being discussed. Importantly, “termination”
is the term used to discuss a situation where an arbitrator withdraws from the office or
parties agree to the termination of the mandate92 or to explain that the arbitral tribunal’s
role is over when the arbitral proceedings are terminated.93 In other words, it means that
the “termination” has nothing to do with any type of post-award recourse against the
tribunal’s wrongdoing.94
87 See, for example, (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) pp.584-585.
88 See, e.g., (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3287-3309.
89 See, e.g., (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, &Hunter, 2015) p.92 (“An arbitration agreement confers amandate
upon an arbitral tribunal to decide any and all of the disputes that come within the ambit of that agreement.
It is important that an arbitrator should not go beyond this mandate. If he or she does so, there is a risk that
his or her award will be refused recognition and enforcement under the provisions of the New York
Convention.”). The authors refer to Art. V(1)(c) of theNYC aswell as Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) andArt. 36(1)(a)(iii)
of the ML.
90 The comparison of all these standards will be undertaken in section 3.3. The placement of the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge within the architecture of the post-award review is also relevant and will be
discussed in section 3.4.
91 Considering that the French term “mission” will be translated as “mandate” as it is usually the case. The
better view would be, however, to leave the term mission.
92 See in particular Art. 14 of the ML. Also Art.15 of the ML. For further reading, see Chapter II.
93 See Art. 32(3) of the ML
94 The Model Law approach to the “excess of mandate” type of challenge will be discussed further below, in
section 3.3.
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Under the French international arbitration regime (in its French version), the term
“mission” is used. It is regularly translated into English to as “mandate”; hence, it is discussed
together with theModel Law.95 On the one hand, it also reflects the temporal characteristic
of the tribunal’s adjudicative powers by delineating when it begins and ends and in this
sense does not have anything to do with the annulment of the arbitral award.96 On the
other hand, it also explicitly allows for the post-award recourse in cases when “the tribunal
ruled without complying with the mandate conferred upon it.”97 The mandate, therefore,
can be tested against its envisaged limits98 after the award is rendered. Additionally, one
should argue that acting in amiable composition should be considered as a separate type
of tribunal’s mandate (that can be also tested at the setting-aside stage).99
3.2.2 The notion of “powers”
The second relevant notion is the notion of the tribunal’s “power” or “powers”. It is used
in the Model Law,100 in the French (international) arbitration statute,101 in the English
Arbitration Act102 and in the Federal Arbitration Act103 in the U.S. If put in context, the
term very often refers directly to the tribunal’s procedural powers,104 amongst others, to
grant interim reliefs,105 to rule on the request for verification of handwriting106 or to order
a party or witness to be examined on oath or affirmation.107 In the U.S., importantly, the
term “powers” is used only in the context of “excess”.
95 For further reflections on the use of “mandate” and “mission”, see Chapter III.
96 See Art. 1456(1) and Art. 1457(1) of the FCCP. Yet, and importantly, the award will be annulled if it is
rendered after the allocated time. See also Chapter III.
97 See Art. 1520(3) of the FCCP. Notably, in the draft version prepared by the Comité Français de l’Arbitrage,
it has been suggested to also include the recourse in cases when the tribunal “ruled after its mandate has
expired.”
98 See section 3.1.
99 See Art. 1512 of the FCCP (“Le tribunal arbitral statue en amiable composition si les parties lui ont confié
cette mission.”). Notably, the translation used herein reads that: “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall rule as amiable
compositeur if the parties have empowered it to do so.” Consequently, it loses the direct reference to the
arbitral tribunal’s mandate. In this case, perhaps it is better to follow the one offered by Bensaude in
(Bensaude, 2015) p.1157, who suggested that “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide as amiable compositeur if
the parties have entrusted the tribunal with such mission.”
100 See Art. 17 and Art. 19 of the ML.
101 As “pouvoir”; see Art. 1470 of the FCCP. “Pouvoir juridictionnel” is also used in the context of the tribunal’s
competence-competence, see Art. 1465 of the FCCP.
102 See, i.a., Sections 33(2), 37, 38, 39, 41, 56, 65 of the EAA. Section 31(4) of the EAA uses “power to rule on
its own jurisdiction”.
103 Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA.
104 See in general Art. 19 of the ML.
105 See, e.g., Art. 17 of the ML, Section 39 of the EAA. In France, see Art. 1468 of the FCCP (the term “power”
is not used in this context, the meaning of the provision is the same, however).
106 See Art. 1470 of the FCCP.
107 See Section 38(5) of the EAA.
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Notably, however, only in the last two jurisdictions (in England and in the U.S), excess
of powers is sanctioned. The scope of application of those standards differs greatly between
these two common law countries. For example, the English Arbitration Act defines quite
a few of the tribunal’s “powers”,108 whereas as pointed out above, the FAA itself does not
refer to any powers that are given to the arbitral tribunal and it only provides for the
challenge if “powers” of the tribunal are exceeded. In turn, itmakes this ground potentially
broad in the scope of application.
In England, the “excess of powers” challenge is introduced in the exhaustive list of
“serious irregularities affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the award.”109 Additionally,
it is explicitly mentioned that “excess of powers” is different from “excess of jurisdiction”.
Therefore, it is closely connected with procedural aspects of the fulfillment of the tribunal’s
adjudicative duty.110
In the U.S., conversely, the “excess of powers” challenge corresponds to the vast array
of objections and not only to the procedural powers of the arbitral tribunal. It is necessary
to point out, that as long as the challenges under this ground are accepted only exceptionally,
it is invoked inmany circumstances. It so happens, because, asmentioned above, “powers”
are not defined in the FAA, which creates a potential risk of the applicant expanding the
definition of the “powers” and its alleged “excess”.111 An additional problem arises from
the fact that the FAA does not include a separate ground for the tribunal’s excess of
jurisdiction, making the “excess of powers” ground appropriate to address
“jurisdictional/threshold”112 and non-jurisdictional objections under the same ground for
vacatur.113 It leads to the conclusion that excess of jurisdiction, adjudicative and procedural
powers will be tested under the same “excess of powers” ground in the U.S., which makes
this ground more significant than in the English context.
3.2.3 The notion of “authority”
The “authority” of the arbitral tribunal is mentioned only in two acts discussed: in the
Model Law and in the EnglishArbitrationAct. In theModel Law, the tribunal’s “authority”
is used in the context of Article 16(2) which deals with the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the
moment the party raises objections; in the relevant part it reads that “[a] plea that the
108 See fn.102.
109 See Section 68(1) of the EAA.
110 For further reading, see Chapter IV.
111 See Chapter V.
112 See Chapter V.
113 See the Restatement (second tentative draft) pp.283-297 and (Bermann, ‘Domesticating’ the New York
Convention: the Impact of the Federal Arbitration Act, 2011) pp.317-332. In a nutshell, the Restatement’s
philosophy is to make use of the New York Convention grounds at the vacatur stage (in the context of
international arbitration awards rendered in the U.S.). It will effectively bring the FAA vacatur mechanism
closer to the Model Law approach. For further reading, see Chapter V.
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arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter
alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings.”114
In the EnglishArbitrationAct, the term “authority” is usedwhen “revocation of authority”115
and “death of arbitrator”116 is discussed.
Arguably the use of this notion in the Model Law context is more (albeit indirectly)
useful for the research at hand, because it deals with the parties’ right to object to the
tribunal’s actions exceeding the scope of authority.117 Acknowledging that “authority”
should be interpreted as “jurisdiction”,118 this proviso may prove to be relevant while
exercising the right to challenge under Article 34 of the Model Law.119
3.3 Different approaches to the “excess of mandate” type of challenge
The initial conclusion arising from the previous section120 is that all of the terms are used
in more than one system, even if they do not operate in the context of challenging the
award. The table below shows which terms are implemented in the specific legal act(s).
Table 6
“authority”“power(s)”“mandate”121
xxxThe Model Law
-xxThe French International Arbitration
Law
xx-The English Arbitration Act
-x-The Federal Arbitration Act
---The New York Convention
Notably, one may observe that all of these elusive notions are introduced in the Model
Law. Yet, in theModel Law (and theNewYorkConvention) context, none of them applies
to the tribunal’s violations that could be qualified as a type of “excess of mandate”.122 In
114 Art. 16(2) of the ML.
115 Section 23 of the EAA.
116 Section 26 of the EAA.
117 Theway the term “authority” is used in the EAA resembles theway the term “mandate” is used in theModel
Law. In fact, Section 23 of the EAA is based on Art. 14 of the ML. See also section 3.2.1.
118 Art. 16 of the ML is the only element of Chapter IV of the ML entitled: “Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal”.
119 See further section 3.3 and section 3.4.
120 See section 3.2.
121 This is the term used in the English versions or translations. For further reading, see in particular Chapter
II and Chapter III.
122 See Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML.
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the French International Arbitration Law, the notions of “mandate” and “powers” are used
but only the former is sanctioned under one of the grounds for setting aside, namely, when
the tribunal fails to comply with its mandate.123 The English Arbitration Act refers to the
tribunal’s powers and its authority. The challenge, however, can be filed only against the
“excess of powers”.124 Under theU.S. arbitration system, only the reference to the “tribunal’s
powers” is made and, importantly, only when the challenge against “the excess of powers”
is introduced. It means that the Federal Arbitration Act itself does not define what the
term “powers” entails, leaving it for the courts to decipher its meaning. Finally, it is
necessary to stress that the New York Convention avoids using any of these concepts.
TheModel Law as well as theNewYork Convention approach the “excess ofmandate”
type of challenge by confronting the tribunal’s award with the parties’ “submission to
arbitration”.125 On the one hand, the whole proviso is rather long and opaque, on the other
hand it eliminates the need of using the elusive concepts (such as the mandate).126
Additionally, however, it ensures a certain degree of coherence between setting aside system
in the Model Law jurisdictions and enforcement under the New York Convention.127 In
principle, therefore, the “excess ofmandate” type of challengemay be successfully invoked
only in cases where the relief granted is higher or different than sought. If applied in such
a narrow fashion, it makes the chances of a successful challenge very limited.128
The French international arbitration regime is the only systemwhere an award-debtor
may challenge the tribunal’s failure to complywith itsmandate. It covers not only instances
where the tribunal awardsmore or something different than it was asked to. It also applies,
i.a., when the tribunal fails to comply with the contractually agreed procedural rules or
with the parties’ choice of rules applicable to the merits of the case.129 The French courts
regularly prevent the parties frombroadening the interpretation of this ground of recourse.
The English and the U.S. arbitration regimes operate with a recourse against “excess
of powers”. The scope of the application differs greatly, however. As pointed out above,130
in England, the excess of powers is contrasted with the excess of substantive jurisdiction
to make sure that these terms are not treated as synonyms. In turn, and in contrast with
the abovementioned systems (i.e. the Model Law and French international arbitration
123 See Art. 1520(3) of the FCCP.
124 See Section 68(2)(b) of the EAA.
125 See Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML and Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC.
126 If the concept of “excess of mandate” or “excess of powers” were to be used in the ML or the NYC, it may
increase the risk of a divergent application in different jurisdictions.
127 See further Chapter II and Chapter VI.
128 For a more detailed analysis, see also Chapter II and Chapter VI.
129 See Chapter III. Parenthetically it is noted that Poudret and Besson in their seminal work, classified the
“excess of mandate” ground (present in the French, Dutch and Swedish legal systems) under the bigger
heading of recourse against of procedural issues. See (Poudret & Besson, 2007) pp.741-747 (under the
subheading 9.5.5.3 which is nested under the heading 9.5.5 “Procedural grounds for challenge”).
130 See section 3.2.2.
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regime), if the tribunal grants a relief higher or different than sought, it will exceed its
jurisdiction rather than its powers.131 Moreover, the “excess of powers” challenge can be
successfully invoked against the tribunal’s use of powers that it never possessed. In other
words, wrongful use of powers does not constitute its “excess”.132 It makes the scope of
application of this ground extremely narrow.However, it is important to observe thewhole
list of serious irregularities when seeking the recourse for the tribunal’s failures.133 In the
U.S., conversely, the “excess of powers” challenge accommodates not only instances where
the tribunal awards more than sought, but also when it exceeds its jurisdiction
(jurisdictional/threshold issues),134 decides on matters that are inarbitrable or violates
agreed procedure or public policy. It means that it covers a plethora of cases. It does not
change the fact that the courts accept only most grievous, exceptional challenges.
National courts approach the challenge in a robust, pro-arbitration fashion which is
praiseworthy, because the “excess of mandate” type of challenge has the potential of
accommodating many of the objections that a dissatisfied party may have (including the
review of the merits). Consequently, although the scope of application of the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge may vary between jurisdictions, it is in any event seldom
accepted by the judiciary.
3.4 The place of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge in the post-award
architecture of selected systems
The “excess of mandate” type of challenge should always be considered in the matrix of
the post-award recourse that is at the parties’ disposal. It means that one should observe
where the “excess of mandate” type of challenge is placed.135 Additionally, a party wishing
to challenge the award should always consider all available avenues in order to determine
which is the most suitable. That being said, some factual underpinnings may give rise to
more than one challenge at a time. Consequently, for practical reasons parties challenging
the arbitral award often argue that the same tribunal’s actions trigger different grounds
for setting aside. As long as it may hold true, parties should carefully pick the weapon of
their choice since it may influence their chances for a successful challenge.
There are twomain areas of friction between the “excess of mandate” type of challenge
and other different grounds for setting aside. The first one has already been briefly discussed
131 For further reading, see Chapter IV.
132 For further reading, see Chapter IV.
133 See section 3.4.
134 See Chapter V and section 4.1 below.
135 For example, in the Model Law, this type of challenge is placed amongst grounds that need to be brought
by the parties themselves. In England, the “excess of powers” is situated in the list of “serious irregularities”
and made explicitly distinct from the excess of jurisdiction.
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above and deals with the distinction between the excess of mandate and of jurisdiction.136
The second one relates to the conflict with the grounds applicable to the procedural
wrongdoings of the arbitral tribunal.
As to the first point, once again, one should note that the limits to the arbitral tribunal’s
mandate are the same as the limits to the tribunal’s jurisdiction. In the context of the
research at hand, therefore, it is sometimes difficult to recognize which issues should be
treated as jurisdictional ones and which should be distinguished as issues of the mandate.
It is particularly the case with the question as to the scope of jurisdiction and the scope of
themandate.137 The distinction is important, because it changes (or at least it may change)
the way setting-aside courts approach the arbitral award at the post-award review.138
The problem arises in many jurisdictions, albeit in different forms. For example, it
remains debated to date whether the third ground for setting aside listed in theModel Law
deals with the scope of jurisdiction or the scope of the “mandate” (or both).139 The prevailing
view is to deal with the jurisdictional objections under the first head of the setting-aside
proviso (Article 34(2)(a)(i) of the ML) and with excess of the scope of submission under
the third head (Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML) but not all agree.140 Under the French
International Arbitration Law the issue does not raise many questions, since, as explained
by Bensaude: “Art. 1520(1) provides that a party may obtain the setting aside of an award,
or the annulment of the enforcement order, where the arbitral tribunal has wrongly retained
or denied jurisdiction.”141 Since the EnglishArbitrationAct introduces a separatemechanism
for the review of substantive jurisdiction (including “what matters have been submitted to
arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement”142) and for “excess of powers”,
these concerns should not arise.143 In the U.S. the problem is evident because the “excess
of powers” ground for vacatur can be invoked in various instances, also in cases of so-called
“jurisdictional/threshold issues”.144 These types of questions (and only them) allow the
court to exercise an enhanced level of scrutiny while reviewing the arbitral award. The
136 See also section 2.2 of this chapter (on the scope of the court’s review).
137 Arguably, the problemwith the distinction between the tribunal’s jurisdiction and itsmandate in the context
of the agreement to arbitrate goes closely in line with Paulsson’s observations on jurisdiction and
admissibility. See (Paulsson J., Jurisdiction andAdmissibility, 2005); also (Paulsson J., The Idea ofArbitration,
2013) pp.82-90.
138 For further reading, see the Chapter II-Chapter V.
139 See Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML. See further Chapter II.
140 (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) pp.338-340. See further Chapter
II.
141 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1179. See, however, (in the context of the old FCCP) (Poudret & Besson, 2007) p.730
(“French case law has filled this gap by considering that the arbitrator who wrongly declines his jurisdiction
violates his mission so that the ground of NCPC, Art.1502(3) is admissible”). At the same time, Art. 1520(1)
of the new FCCP is better suited for this purpose.).
142 See Section 30(1)(c) of the EAA.
143 See also Chapter IV.
144 See further Chapter V.
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issue as to the scope of the submission to arbitration is amongst “jurisdictional/threshold”
issues; whether it should allow the courts to independently (from the tribunal’s conclusions)
asses the scope of the submission to arbitration remains debatable.145 The New York
Convention system brings about the same difficulties as the Model Law, therefore the
analysis above applies to it as well.
The second area where friction may occur is arguably less frequent. On occasion,
however, it might be difficult, for example, to qualify the challenge against the tribunal’s
ex aequo et bono decision without the parties’ explicit authorization or the tribunal’s
decision that “surprises” parties. In theModel Law (and theNewYorkConvention) system
such decision might be placed either under Article 34(2)(a)(iii) or (iv) of the Model Law
(Article V(1)(c) or (d) in the context of the New York Convention).146 In France, those
challenges will likely be subsumed under the “excess of mandate” challenge147 or under
violation of “due process”.148 In England, it may trigger different types of irregularities
(other than the “excess of powers”) listed under Section 68 of the Act.149 In the U.S., yet
again, the excess of powers will come into play. It may be supplemented, however, by the
judicially createdmanifest disregard of the law, albeit its uncertain fate afterHall Street.150
These issues, and more, will be comprehensively discussed in the section that follows.151
In a nutshell, however, while challenging the award, parties should not forget about the
systemic context of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
4 The application of different standards of the “excess of mandate”
type of challenge to selected issues that might fall outside the
arbitral tribunal’s adjudicative authority
The “excess ofmandate” type of challenge has the potential of being useful against different
categories of tribunal’s decisions. These decisions can be grouped depending on whether
they reflect the tribunal’s conclusions on the parties’ claims (section 4.2) and requested
remedies (section 4.4). Additionally, it is necessary to reflect the way the tribunal applies
the law (section 4.3) and how it deals with the parties’ requests accessory to themain relief
sought (section 4.5). Before deciding on themerits of the case, however, the tribunal needs
145 See Chapter V.
146 See Chapter II and Chapter VI.
147 When usurping the ex aequo et bono powers. See also Chapter III.
148 In the context of “surprising” parties. Art. 1520(4) of the FCCP. See also Chapter III.
149 For example, for the surprising of parties, the challenge under Section 68(2)(a) of the EAA might be more
appropriate. See Chapter IV.
150 Hall Street, 552 U.S. 576, 585, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254, 2008, A.M.C. 1058 (2008). For further
reading, see Chapter V.
151 See section 4.
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to establish its own jurisdiction. As much as decisions on jurisdiction escape the scope of
the research at hand, it is necessary to highlight few difficulties that they may cause
(particularly in the U.S. setting) (section 4.1).
4.1 Decisions on jurisdiction
As already suggested above,152 the challenge of the tribunal’s jurisdiction should be
distinguished from the challenge of the tribunal’s mandate. This is important, because it
may alter the level of the court’s scrutiny over the award. This is also why, in principle, the
challenge against the tribunal’s jurisdiction and “the mandate” should be dealt with
separately and not under the same setting-aside ground.
One should observe, however, that the U.S. arbitration regime qualifies jurisdictional
objections under the “excess of powers” ground for vacatur. It is a way to overcome the
deficiency of the system, namely the absence of the positive competence-competence rule.
There is a risk involved with such a development. Namely, on a case-by-case basis, it is
necessary to establish which challenge falls into the category of a jurisdictional “excess of
powers” challenge and which is an ordinary “excess of powers” challenge. The issues
involved are:matters of existence, validity or scope of the agreement to arbitrate, availability
of class arbitration or subject matter arbitrability. In this sense, the so-called
jurisdictional/threshold issues (or “gateway issues”) are a unique feature of the U.S.
arbitration system.153
Generally, in other systems, themain difficulty arises in connection with the questions
as to the scope of the agreement to arbitrate and the scope of the parties’ submissions and
delineating whether they fit in with the category of jurisdictional questions or not. As such,
it has been discussed briefly above and will be discussed, if necessary, below.154 Other than
that, decisions on the tribunal’s jurisdiction fall outside the scope of the research at hand.
4.2 Decisions on parties’ claims
The analysis will follow the division already used in the previous chapters. Therefore, the
connecting factors under this section will be the legal nature of the claim andwho brought
it. Consequently, the separate sections will be devoted to reflect on decisions on contractual
claims and counterclaims (section 4.2.1 and section 4.2.2), set-off claims (section 4.2.3),
and tortious claims (section 4.2.4). In addition, it is necessary to analyze the tribunal’s
152 See section 2.2 and section 3.4.
153 For further reading, see Chapter V.
154 See section 2.2 and section 3.4.
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decisional powers over new and modified claims (section 4.2.5), as well as the fate of
decisions not covering all claims/counterclaims (section 4.2.6).
4.2.1 Decision on contractual claims
Contractual claims are perhaps the most natural relief sought. Consequently, deciding on
contractual claims is arguably the arbitral tribunal’s raison d’être. As such, it will be at the
core of the tribunal’smandate to resolve those claims and the tribunal’s conclusions should
generally survive post-award challenges.
That being said, if the limits to the tribunal’s mandate are trespassed, the tribunal’s
decision is susceptible to a setting-aside procedure. Thismay happen (i) when the tribunal
grants a contractual claim that, allegedly, has not been requested or (ii) when contractual
claims of a party go beyond the envisaged scope of the agreement to arbitrate. All of the
reviewed legal systems provide a recourse for these types of violations. Notably, however,
they are sometimes classified as issues of jurisdiction rather than of mandate.
The first scenario envisages that the contractual claim has not been requested, yet was
granted by the tribunal. Under the Model Law (and the New York Convention), it will be
dealt with under the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.155 Similarly, in France, Article
1520(3) of the FCCP will be invoked.156 In England, however, the approach would be
different. According to the English Arbitration Act, the question as to what matters have
been submitted to arbitration would involve the review of the tribunal’s substantive
jurisdiction rather than any other challenge mechanism.157 In the U.S., the concept of
“excess of powers” in its traditional meaning will be used.158
Under the first scenario one should observe two variations, namely whether the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge would be available (i) if a party alleges that the tribunal
granted a claim that has not been requested and where in fact the tribunal has “just”
interpreted a vague claim or (ii) if the tribunal granted a claim that has been requested but
based on a modified legal basis.
The first variation would get the same treatment as any other objections dealing with
the excess of the relief granted. It means that the same mechanism as mentioned above
may be invoked. In any event, however, it is necessary to stress that the tribunal should be
given autonomy in interpreting the claimwithout the setting-aside court reassessing what
the vague claimmeant.159 In other words, the tribunal’s decision on the vague claim should
survive the challenge.
155 Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML and Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC. See also Chapter II and Chapter VI.
156 See Chapter III.
157 See Section 67 of the EAA in connection with Section 30(1)(c) of the EAA. For further reading, see
Chapter IV.
158 Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. See Chapter V.
159 See also section 4.2.4.
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The second variation (of the first scenario) relates to the requalification of the relief
sought. Put differently, it concerns the situation where the claimant seeks a relief but
substantiates it with, for example, tortious liability. In turn, the tribunal grants it, but on
the basis of the contract infringement (rather than on tortious liability as pleaded). Such
a tribunal’s undertakingmight not fit into the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge. Under
theModel Law (aswell as theNewYorkConvention), itmay verywell trigger the procedural
grounds for recourse (violation of due process).160 The same goes for France161 and
England.162 In the U.S., due to the wide range of the “excess of powers” challenge, it will
remain under the scope of Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA.163
The second scenario envisages that the relief has been requested, but goes beyond the
initial agreement to arbitrate and that the tribunal violates the scope of its mandate. In
principle, in the context of the contractual claims, such a hypothetical is unlikely to occur
if one assumes that arbitration is a way to resolve (at least) contractual disputes. Logically,
what follows is that all contractual disputes should be subjected to the tribunal’s
determination. It might happen however, that the agreement to arbitrate is evidently
narrow and consequently, the tribunal should comply with the limits imposed. This type
of objection is likely to be classified as a jurisdictional challenge relating to the scope of
the agreement to arbitrate.164 This way, not only the “excess of mandate” type of challenge
but also different grounds in the Model Law (as well as the New York Convention)165 and
in France166 may be relevant. In England, the substantial jurisdiction challenge will remain
applicable.167 In the U.S., yet again, the violation may constitute “excess of powers”, but
be considered as a jurisdictional/threshold issue.168
4.2.2 Decision on contractual counterclaims
Contractual counterclaims – as contractual claims – also have their legal basis in contract.
They deserve separate attention, however, because they are brought in response to the
initial claims. At the same time, they are independent from them. Consequently, for
example, their value may be higher than the claim to which they respond.
The tribunal’s decision on contractual counterclaims might be approached from two
angles. On the one hand, it is necessary to reflect on counterclaims as parties’ submissions
160 See Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) and Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) of the ML and Art. V(1)(b) and Art. V(1)(d) of the NYC. See also
Chapter II and Chapter VI.
161 Art. 1520(4) of the FCCP. See also Chapter III.
162 Section 68(2)(a) or Section 68(2)(b) of the EAA. See Chapter IV.
163 See Chapter V.
164 See section 2.2, section 3.4, and section 4.1.
165 See Art. 34(2)(a)(i) of the ML and Art. V(1)(a) of the NYC. See also Chapter II and Chapter VI.
166 Art. 1520(1) of the FCCP. See also Chapter III.
167 See Section 67 of the EAA. See also Chapter IV.
168 See section 4.1 above and Chapter V.
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limiting the role of the arbitral tribunal. On the other hand, counterclaims should be
considered in the context of the respondent’s ability to present its case, especially if rejecting
the counterclaim would influence the party’s right to be heard.
If counterclaims are approached as a submission that shapes the role of the arbitral
tribunal,169 then, in turn, the tribunal’s decision on contractual counterclaims can be
challenged in the sameway as its decisions on contractual claims. Therefore, the reflections
from the previous section apply in this context in full.170 Essentially, it would be rare to
find an instance where the tribunal exceeds its mandate by deciding on a counterclaim. It
is so, because of the character of the counterclaim, which would make it more of a
jurisdictional rather than a mandate question.
As hinted above, the decision on counterclaims may also trigger different grounds for
recourse however. This might be particularly the case in a multi-contract reality. When a
counterclaim arises from a contract that is different from the one used by claimant, one
must reflect, on the one hand, whether the tribunal is competent to decide on issues arising
from a different contract (as requested by respondent) and, on the other hand, whether
rejecting the counterclaim will influence the party’s right to present its case. In these
instances, the general notions of excess of jurisdiction171 or violation of due process172
would be the more appropriate recourse against the award.
4.2.3 Decision on set-off
The initial problem with the analysis on set-off arises from the fact that it can operate as
a procedural or substantive device. As can be seen in the previous chapters, the analysis
has been primarily directed at set-off considered as a substantive tool.173 It consequently
means that set-off has been treated as a defensivemechanism available to extinguishmutual,
payable claims between the parties. Additionally, (substantive) set-off shares the fate of
the initial claims and cannot exceed its value. These features distinguish set-off from the
counterclaim.174 Leaving aside the “simple” scenarios, where set-off is based on or related
to the same contract,175 one should reflect whether the tribunal’s decision allowing (or
169 See section 3.1.2.
170 See section 4.2.1.
171 Art. 34(2)(a)(i) of the ML, Art. 1520(1) of the FCCP, Section 67 of the EAA, Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA
(as a jurisdictional/threshold issue). See also Art. V(1)(a) of the NYC.
172 Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) of the ML, Art. 1520(4) of the FCCP, Section 68(2)(a) of the EAA, Section 10(a)(3) and
Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. See also Art. V(1)(b) of the NYC.
173 See Chapter II-Chapter V. Arguably, if the tribunal relies on the powers of setting-off treated as a judicial
remedy that is available under the law of the seat (see, e.g., statutory set-off or compensation légale), the
potential challenge against its decision may be different than the challenge in cases where the decision is
based on substantive set-off.
174 For further reading on counterclaims, see section 4.2.2.
175 Either on a contractual or non-contractual basis. In these instances, conclusions from other sections will
apply. In principle, this will again triggermostly jurisdictional considerations. Therefore, if the set-off claim
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rejecting) set-off may be found in excess of the tribunal’s mandate in (i) a multi-contract
reality and (ii) when the tribunal deals with set-off issues ex officio.
At the outset, there are three important preliminary observations that need to be
properly introduced to narrow the range of the issues discussed below. First, yet again, the
difficulty may arise to determine whether a challenge to a set-off decision is aimed at the
tribunal’s jurisdiction or mandate.176 In principle, the conclusions offered in the previous
sections177 would apply to set-off claims as well. In amulti-contract reality, however, there
might be additional arguments in favor of the tribunal accepting set-offs even when based
on a different contract.178 Second, invoking set-offs may trigger complex applicable law
questions that the tribunal will be required to answer.179 These will not be dealt with at
this point.180 Third and interrelated to the second point raised, if set-off is to be considered
as of a procedural nature (instead of being a substantive defense) then the power of the
tribunal to grant it is based on a different source and consequently the challenge against
such a power should also be formulated differently.181 The issues concerning procedural
set-off will be briefly addressed at the end of this section.
In a multi-contract context, set-off may be based on a different contract than the one
including the agreement to arbitrate. It can even be more complicated if contracts have
competing dispute resolution clauses. In these instances, there are strong arguments to
consider that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction to entertain set-off claims.182 At the same time,
however, it is reasonable to conclude that the tribunal should allow all substantive defenses
that it is presented with. Arguably, the onus of successfully pleading set-off is rather high,
which means that the tribunal would only accept it in profoundly clear circumstances.
is based on (or related to) the same contract, it is likely that the tribunal will be able to accept jurisdiction
over this claim. The tribunal’s decision could be subsequently challenged under Art. 34(2)(a)(i) of the ML,
Art. 1520(1) of the FCCP, Section 67 of the EAA, Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA (as a jurisdictional/threshold
issue). Also Art. V(1)(a) of the NYC. See further section 4.2.1, section 4.2.2 and section 4.2.4. Importantly,
in theModel Law (and theNewYork Convention) context also Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of theML andArt. V(1)(c)
of the NYC might be potentially applicable. See Chapter II and Chapter VI.
176 See, e.g., section 3.4.
177 See other sections under section 4.2. See also e.g. fn.175.
178 The issue will be discussed immediately below.
179 The tribunal faced with a dilemma on what law applies to the set-off will inevitably determine the legal
character of set-off (if it is indeed a substantive defense or rather if it should be treated “only” as a procedural
tool) and how set-off operates. For further reading, see also (Pichonnaz & Gullifer, 2014) pp.69-106.
180 If a tribunal finds that the set-off is of substantive law character, its decision should resist any subsequent
challenge following the “no review on the merits” principle. See further section 2.2 and section 4.3.3.
181 It means, that a different ground for challenge might be then relevant, for example the one related to the
agreed procedure or due process.
182 For further reading, see section 4.2.1 and section 4.2.2. In cases of lack of jurisdiction claims the award
might be challenged under Art. 34(2)(a)(i) of the ML, Art. 1520(1) of the FCCP, Section 67 of the EAA,
Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA (as a jurisdictional/threshold issue). Also Art. V(1)(a) of the NYC. Art.
34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML and Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC might be potentially applicable as grounds for testing
the “scope” question. See further Chapter II and Chapter VI.
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Finally, (the tribunal’s) acknowledging (substantive) set-off leads to the final resolution
of the dispute which is the ultimatemission of the arbitral tribunal. Pichonnaz andGullifer
have aptly suggested that: “[…] the best practice is for an arbitral tribunal also to adjudicate
the cross-claim, despite the absence of original jurisdiction. One reason is linked to the
efficiency of arbitral proceedings but, moreover, it takes into account the fact that refusing
to take account of a set-off of a substantive nature, which has possibly already been triggered
outside of court proceedings, places too much weight on the right of the cross-debtor to have
his arguments heard by the judge who would have had jurisdiction. By relying on set-off, the
cross-creditor has, at least de facto, renounced the original jurisdiction. Finally, an arbitral
tribunal avoids the schizophrenic situation of rendering an awardwhich is already inadequate
as a matter of substantive law, since the main claim may have already been reduced by the
effect of (extrajudicial) set-off.”183 Leaving aside a discussion regarding excess of
jurisdiction,184 the better view is to conclude that the discretion on set-offs should be within
the scope of the tribunal’s adjudicative authority, making a decision on set-off resistant to
the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
The tribunal’s adjudicative authority, however, does not give it the power to grant
set-off without a party’s request. That would likely violate the principle of equal treatment
of the parties and trigger the relevant due process ground for challenge.185
4.2.4 Decision on claims/counterclaims based on torts and pre-contractual
liability
Not all claims186 brought in arbitration arise out of contract. Occasionally, an aggrieved
party argues that the tribunal is not authorized to adjudicate non-contractual issues even
if brought to the attention of the tribunal by its adversary. In principle, most of the
abovementioned analysis will apply here equally.187 Yet, in the context of decisions on
torts, it might be useful to briefly readdress the questions: (i) if the non-contractual claims
fit within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate and (ii) whether the tribunal is able to
modify the legal basis of the claim from a tortious to a contractual one.
The answer to the first question, primarily and inevitably, depends on the parties’
drafting abilities. In other words, if the agreement to arbitrate is sufficiently narrow, there
should be no problem in determining that the parties’ intentionwas to limit the availability
183 (Pichonnaz & Gullifer, 2014) p.59.
184 In principle, although the award should survive a potential attack on the basis of “excess of mandate”, it
might still be susceptible to the “excess of jurisdiction” challenge.
185 See Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) and Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) of the ML and Art. V(1)(b) and Art. V(1)(d) of the NYC; Art.
1520(4) of the FCCP, Section 68(2)(a) or Section 68(2)(b) of the EAA. See also Chapter II, Chapter III,
Chapter IV, and Chapter VI. Under the FAA, it is likely that Section 10(a)(4) will be applicable as much as
Section 10(a)(3) seems to be of relevance. For further reading, see Chapter V.
186 For the purpose of this section “claims” will entail both “claims” and “counterclaims”.
187 See section 4.2.1 in particular.
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of an arbitral recourse only to certain category of disputes.188 Conversely, model
(institutional) arbitration clauses are designed to cover all disputes including those that
are non-contractual in nature.189 In addition, and importantly, parties must be reminded
of the general pro-enforcement position of the national courts in the studied legal systems.190
It entails that in case of doubts, it is likely that the agreements to arbitrate will be interpreted
broadly, because it will be presumed that parties intended to resolve all disputes related
to the transaction in dispute by the same arbitral panel.
For example, in one of the Model Law countries it was decided that the language “any
disputes between [the parties] shall be “settled by” or “determined by” arbitration” was broad
enough to include tort claims.191 Similarly, it has been argued that under French law “[a]
broadly worded clause will generally be found to cover both contract and tort claims arising
out of or in connection with the contract at issue.”192 Under the English arbitration regime,
following the House of Lords decision in Premium Nafta Products Ltd v. Fili Shipping
Ltd,193 the parties will be presumed to opt for a “one-stop method of adjudication”, and
therefore have intended to have all disputes resolved by the same (arbitral) forum.194 U.S.
courts regularly accepted that an arbitral tribunal had power to decide on tort claims.195
At the enforcement stage (under theNewYorkConvention), an award-debtor would have
to defeat the presumption that the tribunal had acted within its authority which is aligned
with the pro-enforcement sentiment of the New York Convention.196
In response to the second question, the tribunal may be able to requalify the legal basis
for the claim either when (i) alternative bases of claims have been submitted, or (ii) if the
requalification is a result of the interpretative exercise undertaken by the tribunal when
facedwith vague or ambiguous claims (whichwere not properly contested by the adversary).
In those instances, an “excess ofmandate” type of challengemight be invoked (albeit rather
188 For example, contractual disputes or disputes relating only to the quality of goods etc.
189 See, e.g., the UNCITRALModel Clause (“Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
contract, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration […].”), the SIAC
Model Clause (“Any dispute arising out of or in connectionwith this contract, including any question regarding
its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration […].”), the ICC
Standard Clause (“All disputes arising out of or in connection with the present contract shall be finally settled
[…].”), the LCIA Recommended Clause (“Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract,
including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and finally resolved
by arbitration […].”), the ICDR Short Form Standard Clause (“Any controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be determined by arbitration […].”).
190 See section 2.1.
191 Dunhill Personnel System Inc. v. Dunhill Temps Edmonton Ltd., 1993 CanLII 7171 (AB QB), par.6
<http://canlii.ca/t/28p21#par6> [last accessed 27 April 2018]. See Chapter II.
192 (Bensaude, 2015) p.1181. See Chapter III.
193 Premium Nafta Products Ltd v. Fili Shipping Ltd [2007] UKHL 40.
194 See Chapter IV.
195 See Chapter V. In particular the case law under fn.327.
196 See Chapter VI.
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unsuccessfully). The situation slightly differs when a party did not submit an alternative
legal argumentation supporting a claim, yet the tribunal decides to grant this claim on a
different legal basis as pleaded, without hearing the parties. This may be considered as a
violation of due process.197 All in all, any mechanisms triggered are the same as in the
context of contractual claims presented above.198
4.2.5 Decisiononnewclaims/counterclaims and changeof claims/counterclaims
The parties’ claims delineate an arbitral tribunal’s mandate at the outset of the arbitral
process. If the tribunal is already constituted, any change in the parties’ submissions
(including submitting new claims or themodification of claims submitted)would inevitably
affect the parties’ expectations and, in turn, the tribunal’s obligations (as a part of its
mandate). This unfolds into three questions: what if new submissions go beyond (i) the
agreement to arbitrate or (ii) the parties’ initial submissions, and finally (iii) whether acting
on the new claims may be considered in excess of the mandate.
The first question has been discussed in detail above.199 Therefore, it is sufficient to say
that the (new) claims should fit within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. Even if they
go beyond the scope of the agreement to arbitrate, however, the parties’ conduct is
important. The absence of an objection might be considered as an implied acceptance of
the expansion of the tribunal’s jurisdiction and its mandate.200
In response to the second question, one should conclude affirmatively that new claims
may go beyond the parties’ initial submissions. One should not forget, however, that from
the moment when the tribunal accepts its mandate, it is not only the parties but also the
arbitral panel that should have a say in the shape of itsmandate. In other words, the change
in request sought should be conditioned upon the tribunal’s consent. This, in turn, leads
to the third point of inquiry.
Acting on the newly submitted claims should fit well within the tribunal’s adjudicative
function. At the same time, one should observe that all reviewed legal systems (save one)
are silent on the issue. Only the Model Law, under Article 23(2), provides that “[u]nless
197 See also section 4.2.1. If, however, due process is respected, it is likely that the tribunal’s decision will stand,
unless contrary to (international) public policy.
198 See section 4.2.1.
199 As discussed above in section 3.1.1 and sections 4.2.1-4.2.4.
200 Importantly, the issue of amended claims is addressed in the arbitration rules. When it happens, it is
sometimes stated that the amendments should fit within the limits of the agreement to arbitrate. See, e.g.,
Art. 20 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules (“However, a claim may not be amended in such a manner that the
amended claim falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause or separate arbitration agreement.”), Rule 20.5
of the 2016 SIAC Rules, Art. 9 of the 2014 ICDR Rules, Art. 6.1 of the 2016 JAMS Rules. Sometimes the
reference ismade directly to the tribunal’s jurisdiction and not to the agreement to arbitrate. See for example
Art. 22 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules (“[…] However, a claim or defence, including a counterclaim or a
claim for the purpose of a set-off, may not be amended or supplemented in such a manner that the amended
or supplemented claim or defence falls outside the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.”).
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otherwise agreed by the parties, either party may amend or supplement his claim or defence
during the course of the arbitral proceedings, unless the arbitral tribunal considers it
inappropriate to allow such amendment having regard to the delay inmaking it.”201 Arguably,
however, under this rule the tribunal may refuse to accept amendments only if there is a
risk of delays in the proceedings (and if the provision is not contracted out by the parties).202
Although the reviewed legal systems (but for the Model Law) are silent on the matter
of admission of new claims, the institutional rules are not. In principle, all modern
arbitration rules contemplate the tribunal’s power to act on the amendments of the claims.203
At the same time, they do differ on the way the tribunal is allowed to execute its power.204
In any event, the decision on new claims will likely resist the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge.205
4.2.6 Decision not covering all claims/counterclaims
The core function of the arbitral tribunal is to resolve the disputes between parties. In
other words, the adjudicative function is to decide all claims that have been brought to the
tribunal’s attention. That is why it is occasionally argued that the failure to render a decision
on all claims amounts to the rewriting of the tribunal’s mandate. The question that follows
this argumentation is whether an infra petita situation should lead to the annulment of
the arbitral award at the post-award stage.
At the outset one should consider that an infra petita decision will be tested mainly
against the parties’ submissions.206 Moreover, deciding upon the parties’ dispute does not
mean that all arguments brought by the parties have to be addressed in the award. Further,
it will generally be presumed that the tribunals fulfill their adjudicative function in full.
Arguments to the contrary would be particularly difficult to plead in cases where the
tribunal concludes its award with a phrase “reject any and all other claims” or the like.
Even if such a closing statement is not used, it might be difficult to attribute the intention
of reformulating the scope of themandate to the tribunal.207 Finally, if the abovementioned
presumption is not rebutted, the tribunal’s decision will have a res iudicata effect and will
be enforceable. Generally, those conclusionswill apply equally under each system reviewed.
That being said, one should review how the issue of infra petita is addressed.
201 For further reading, see Chapter II.
202 For further reading, see Chapter II.
203 See Art. 20 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 22 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, Rule 20.5 of the 2016
SIAC Rules, Art. 23.4 of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art. 23.4 of the 2012 ICC Rules, Art. 22.1(a) of the 1998 LCIA
Rules, Art. 22.1(i) of the 2014 LCIA Rules, Art. 9 of the 2014 ICDR Rules, and Art. 6.1 of the 2016 JAMS
Rules.
204 Cf the broadest powers are under the LCIA Rules along with the ICC Rules and the UNCITRAL Rules.
205 The outstanding question would be if it will survive due process challenges.
206 It means that the scope of the agreement to arbitrate and public policy are of secondary importance.
207 Arguably, it should show that the tribunal knew about the issue and intentionally left it undecided.
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The reflections are divided as follows: (i) whether infra petita is an independent ground
for annulment, (ii) if not, whether the infra petita arguments may be subsumed by any of
the grounds available, and finally (iii) what are the available remedies for combating the
inconvenience of an award that is infra petita.
Apart fromEngland, none of the reviewed systems provides for the infra petita ground
as a reason for annulment of the award. While drafting the Model Law, it was suggested
to include infra petita within the list of grounds for recourse against the award, but the
proposal was eventually rejected.208 In France, while it may be argued that a failure to
decide on all issues is a failure to comply with the mission, the argument will not be easily
convincing for the courts, because the standard mechanism would be to apply to the
tribunal for an additional award.209 As explained, only in England “failure by the tribunal
to deal with all the issues that were put to it” may amount to a serious irregularity that
causes substantial injustice whichmay, in turn, lead to the successful challenge against the
award.210 In the U.S., there is no infra petita ground for recourse.211 Similarly, the New
York Convention does not envisage infra petita in its exhaustive list of grounds for refusal
which was a departure from the text of the Geneva Convention, which did consider what
the enforcement court ought to do when faced with an infra petita decision.212
One should always bear in mind that the setting-aside procedure is only allowed in
limited instances.213 This means that grounds for recourse that are not listed are not
available. Arguably, this is particularly true when a ground has been contemplated by the
drafters but eventually excluded in the final text, as in the case of the Model Law. Yet,
occasionally it has been held that the infra petitamay resurface in the context of an “excess
of mandate” type of challenge.214 The better view is to reject the possibility to invoke this
line of arguments unless it amounts to the violation of (international) public policy215 and
rely on other remedial mechanisms such as an additional award.
Although the setting-aside avenue is (in principle) foreclosed for parties faced with an
arbitral decision that does not address all relevant prayers for relief, parties have other
tools available at the arbitral seat to mitigate this failure.216 In three systems, the Model
Law, France and England it is possible to request the tribunal to render an additional award
208 See Chapter II.
209 See Art. 1485(2) of the FCCP. See also Chapter III.
210 See Section 68(2)(d) of the EAA.
211 See Chapter V.
212 See Art. 2(2) of the 1927 Geneva Convention. Also Chapter VI.
213 See section 2.1.
214 BLB and another v. BLC and others [2013] SGHC 196 at [94-99]. See Chapter II.
215 Or other grounds if available. For example, “breach of natural justice” under Section 24(b) of the SIAA.
216 It means that the New York Convention relies on the powers available in the national arbitration systems.
See Chapter VI.
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on the issues omitted.217 Conversely to other systems, however, the FAA does not provide
any mechanism of direct application to the tribunal with regard to an additional award.
Instead, it seems that parties should make use of the corrective powers of the court and
ask that the award be remanded back to the tribunal.218 The power to remit will also be
available to the courts in the Model Law219 countries and in England.220 In France, the
power to remit would be generally unavailable.
4.3 Process of application of law by the arbitral tribunal
As will be observed in the sections that follow, the process of application of law is inherent
to the tribunal’s adjudicative function. Having in mind that no appeal on the merits is
available, the tribunal’s decision will not be easily susceptible to challenge.
The process of application of law by the arbitral tribunal in principle can be divided
into the following steps: initially, the tribunal may need to choose the method it will use
to ascertain which law is applicable (section 4.3.1); consequently the tribunal will need to
decide on applicable law (section 4.3.2) and decipher its content (section 4.3.3). While
interpreting the rules of the applicable substantive law, the tribunal may need to carefully
weigh in rules of public policy nature (section 4.3.4). The last section will reflect on the
tribunal’s powers to bypass the application of rules of law (section 4.3.5).
4.3.1 Determining the method of selection of applicable law
Determining what law applies to the dispute has a substantial impact on the outcome of
the case.221 This is why the most desirable solution is for the parties to designate the
applicable law in their contract. However, if the parties fail to choose the applicable law,
the tribunal needs to make a choice between one of two selection methods: either conflict
of laws rules or direct choice of law (“voie directe”).
217 See Art. 33(3) of the ML, Art. 1485(2) of the FCCP and Section 57(3)(b) of the EAA. Importantly, the EAA
includes other remedial instruments, for example the request for clarification under Section 57(3)(a);
exhausting the corrective measures available under Section 57 of the EAA (e.g. correction of award or
additional award) is a prerequisite to challenge the award in England, where the recourse against infra petita
is allowed. Arguably, courts in other systems will also take into account whether parties attempted to cure
the award albeit not as a formal step for the post-award challenge procedure.
218 See Chapter V.
219 Art. 34(4) of the ML.
220 See Section 68(3) of the EAA. Notably, it should be the first remedial mechanism used by the court. See
The Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Raytheon Systems Limited [2015] EWHC 311 (TCC) at
[3] (“It is clear that remission is the ‘default’ option and the Court cannot set aside unless it would be
‘inappropriate’ to remit.”). See also Chapter IV.
221 As it has been observed in the previous chapters the tribunal may be forced to determine what law applies
(i) to the substantive validity of the agreement to arbitrate and (ii) to the merits of the case. This distinction
will not be immediately useful for the purpose of the research at hand and will not be discussed further.
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Three of the reviewed systems, theModel Law, England and France, provide a fallback
mechanism onwhich the tribunalmay rely: in theModel Law and in England, the tribunal
should follow the conflict of laws analysis in order to determine the applicable law,222
whereas in France the tribunal would be allowed to decide directly which rules of law
apply.223 In theU.S., there is no defaultmethod. Arguably, this leaves room for the tribunals
to opt for the freedom of voie directe.224
TheNewYorkConvention has not been designed to resolve issues on how the tribunal
should determine applicable law.
Arguably, if parties (jointly) designate certain conflict of laws rules for the purpose of
determining the applicable law,225 the tribunal should follow their wish. If the tribunal
ignores the parties’ choice, the subsequent award might be at (limited) risk. Under the
Model Law (and theNewYorkConvention), themost sensible solutionwould be to classify
the tribunal’s decision as a procedural wrongdoing.226 In France, the issue would remain
under the excess of mandate challenge.227 Under the English and the U.S. regimes the
excess of powers ground would be vital.228
Similarly, in a highly unlikely scenario, the tribunal’s decision might be annulled,229 if
the tribunal seated in the Model Law jurisdictions or England uses a direct approach
without the parties’ authorization. Those failures, however, would fit more convincingly
under other grounds for challenge, different from the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge.230 In the English context one should also keep in mind the appeal on point of
law.231 The requirements (for a successful appeal on point of law) are, however, extremely
high.
222 See Art. 28(2) of the ML and Section 46(3) of the EAA. See Chapter II and Chapter IV.
223 Art. 1511 of the FCCP. See also Chapter III.
224 Especially taking into account that institutional rules fill the gap and do not require any recourse to private
international law rules. See, e.g., Art. 31.1 of the 2014 ICDR Rules and Art.19.1 of the 2016 JAMS Rules.
See also Chapter V.
225 It would be an extremely rare occurrence. If parties already make an effort to determine governing rules,
it would bemuchmore efficient to include a choice of law clause rather than a choice of private international
law rules.
226 See Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) and Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) of the ML and Art. V(1)(b) and Art. V(1)(d) of the NYC. See also
Chapter II and Chapter VI.
227 Section 1520(3) of the FCCP. See also Chapter III.
228 Section 68(2)(b) of the EAA and Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. See further Chapter IV and Chapter V.
229 Or eventually refused recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention. See fn.230.
230 See Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) and 34(2)(a)(iv) of the ML and Section 68(2)(a) or Section 68(2)(b) of the EAA. See
Chapter II and Chapter IV. For the recognition stage, see Art. V(1)(b) and Art. V(1)(d) of the NYC and
Chapter VI.
231 See further Chapter IV.
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4.3.2 Decision on applicable law
In principle, the reflections presented above232 will equally apply to the tribunal’s decision
on applicable law. The focus is slightly shifted, however, from the methods of finding the
applicable law to the decision on the applicable law itself. As has been observed in the
previous section, determining what law applies might greatly influence the final decision
on the merits. As always, the parties’ choice is decisive. Otherwise the tribunal has a wide
discretion to decide what law applies.233
The tribunal’s independence is based on the fallback mechanisms available in the
reviewed legal systems. As already explained, the tribunal should follow the conflict of
laws analysis under theModel Law and the English arbitration regime,234 andmay directly
select governing rules of law under the French system. The FAA is silent on the issue. The
international arbitration rules of theU.S. arbitral institutes fill this gap by giving the tribunal
similar powers as in France.235
It is important to notice that under the French and (arguably) the U.S. systems, the
tribunal is free to opt for both the law and the rules of law it considers appropriate.
Conversely, the Model Law and the English Arbitration Act only make reference to the
law. It means that under the Model Law and the English system the tribunal’s decision to
apply rules of law on its ownmotion could be challenged. Arguably, it should be considered
as a procedural violation in theModel Law jurisdictions (and at theNewYorkConvention
enforcement stage).236 In England, the challenge might fall under the “excess of powers”
ground.237 The parties’ conduct, when addressed with the suggestion of the application of
the rules of law will be essential.238
Ultimately, the tribunal misuses its discretion if the parties are surprised by the law
chosen by the tribunal. It may happen when the tribunal, after having heard the parties’
pleadings on applicable law, decides to opt for law not presented by any of the parties.
This, again, would most likely be a due process violation. Therefore, it will likely trigger
232 See section 4.2.1.
233 In case parties have designated the applicable law and their choice has been subsequently ignored it might
trigger the “excess of mandate” type of challenge in the non-Model Law jurisdictions (i.e. Art. 1520(3) of
the FCCP, Section 68(2)(b) of the EAA, Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA) and a procedural violation under the
Model Law and the New York Convention systems (Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) of the ML and Art. V(1)(d) of the
NYC).
234 See Art. 28(2) of the ML and Section 46(3) of the EAA. See Chapter II and Chapter IV.
235 See, e.g., Art. 31.1 of the 2014 ICDR Rules and Art. 19.1 of the 2016 JAMS Rules.
236 See Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) and Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) of the ML. For the recognition stage, see Art. V(1)(b) and Art.
V(1)(d) of the NYC. See further Chapter II and Chapter VI.
237 Section 68(2)(b) of the EAA. Considerably, Section 68(2)(a) of the EAAmight also be of relevance. See also
Chapter IV.
238 Arguably, if asked (by the tribunal) for comments, and the parties do not advance any arguments, theymay
broaden the scope of the tribunal’s powers.
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other procedural grounds for a challenge,239 including public policy.240 Perhaps the only
exception is the U.S. system, where Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA (the excess of powers
ground) might be vital.
4.3.3 Ascertaining the content of applicable substantive law by the arbitral
tribunal
The function of the tribunal, i.e. its mandate, is to resolve the dispute between the parties,
which inherently involves applying the (substantive) law to the facts of the case. Taking
into account that courts in a post-award stage are not allowed to review the merits of the
case,241 the tribunal’s interpretation of the applicable legal rules should, in principle, escape
the scrutiny of the courts’ reviewunder all systems. Consequently, the erroneous application
of legal rules by the tribunal should not be accepted by national courts.242
Yet, since the process of the interpretation of the law is in the functional core of the
tribunal’s mandate, it is necessary to reflect if and to what extent the tribunal may rely on
its own legal knowledge.
All systems acknowledge that the tribunal may and should rely on its own legal
knowledge when the dispute is to be decided in accordance with legal rules. It is always
important, however, that the tribunal gives the parties an opportunity to respond to its
own legal findings. In other words, surprising the parties with its own legal findings may
give rise to a challenge.
At the same time, to some extent this will be considered a procedural wrongdoing
rather than the tribunal’s excess of mandate. In the Model Law jurisdictions, surprising
parties will likely trigger Article 34(2)(a)(ii) (inability to present one’s case) or Article
34(2)(b)(ii) (public policy), whereas in France it will be reasonable to invokeArticle 1520(4)
of the FCCP (violation of the principe de la contradiction). In England, instead of the excess
of powers, surprising parties will be subsumed by Section 68(2)(a) of the EAA (giving
parties an opportunity to present their case). In the U.S., the excess of powers ground will
239 Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) and Art. 34(2)(a)(iv) of the ML. Art. 1520(4) of the FCCP, Section 68(2)(a) of the EAA.
For the recognition stage, see Art. V(1)(b) and Art. V(1)(d) of the NYC. See further Chapter II, Chapter
III, Chapter IV and Chapter VI.
240 Art. 34(2)(b)(ii) of theML, Art. 1520(5) of the FCCP and at the recognition stage, Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC.
241 See section 2.2.
242 The limited exception is an appeal on point of law (Section 69 of the EAA) under the English system. See
further Chapter IV. Additionally, one should remember the uncertainty created by the “manifest disregard
of the law” as a vacatur ground in the U.S. As argued elsewhere, even if “manifest disregard of the law”
survived the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hall Street, it would eventually be available only when a
“disregarded rule” is of public policy character (see section 4.3.4). For further reading, see Chapter V.
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still be the ground best suited for a challenge.243 Under the NewYork Convention, Articles
V(1)(b) and V(2)(b) will be vital.244
4.3.4 Application of mandatory rules of law (of public policy character) by the
arbitral tribunal
Mandatory rules of law constitute important architectural elements of each legal system.
Not all mandatory rules are alike, however. “Simple” and “overriding” mandatory rules
can be distinguished.245 The tribunal should ensure the compliance of its award with the
former (that is simple mandatory rules, if they form part of the applicable law) and with
the latter (i.e. the overriding mandatory rules) at all times.
As already explained above,246 the process of application of the law will greatly escape
the court’s scrutiny. Yet, having in mind the special status of mandatory rules, one should
reflect further, whether it is possible to successfully challenge the award when (i) the
tribunal invokes mandatory rules on its own motion or (ii) when it wrongly applies
mandatory rules.
All systems recognize that the tribunal should identify and apply mandatory rules of
a public policy character even if this means that the tribunal invokes them ex officio or
even contrary to the parties’ agreement247 or their pleadings. Of course, the tribunal should
communicate the decision to the parties or else it will not conform to its due process
obligation.248 The difference with the tribunal’s decision on other legal rules is that the
tribunal’s decision that disregards or fails to identify and apply applicable public policy
rules will be susceptible to the challenge on public policy grounds.249 One should be careful,
however, what standards of public policy the court in question applies.250
In principle, the wrong application of mandatory rules by the arbitral tribunal will not
be reviewable under the “excess of mandate” type of challenge, because the courts in a
243 Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. See Chapter V.
244 See Chapter VI.
245 For further reading, see, i.a., (International Law Association, 2008) p.21, and (Radicati di Brozolo L., 2012)
p.50.
246 See section 4.3.3.
247 If parties choose law A in order to circumvent the application of otherwise applicable rules of public policy
character of law B, then the tribunal should be able to address this and decide on the basis of the public
policy rules of law B if it (the tribunal) considers that they might have an effect on the fate of the award.
248 As elaborated further under the previous section, see section 4.3.3.
249 See Art. 34(2)(b)(ii) of the ML and Art. 1520(5) of the FCCP. In England, public policy is listed in Section
68(2)(g) of the EAA among other serious irregularities that constitute substantial injustice. In the U.S. one
may be tempted to invoke the “manifest disregard of the law” doctrine or (the non-statutory ground of)
public policy. The better option is to follow the Restatement’s interpretation of the FAA and to base one’s
challenge on Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. At the enforcement stage Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC will be of
relevance. It should be also pointed out that public policy might be raised ex officio by the court at the
post-award stage.
250 See Chapter II-Chapter V.
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post-award stage should not be involved in the review of the merits of the case.251 In
exceptional circumstances, however, one may argue that when the mistake made by the
tribunal is serious, the awardmight be potentially exposed to the public policy challenge.252
Additionally, and only in extremely limited circumstances, an appeal on point of lawmight
be available in England. Finally, in the U.S. context one should not disregard “manifest
disregard of the law”, even if its viability post-Hall Street is doubtful.253
4.3.5 Decision based on equity or reached ex aequo et bono
The final point that needs to be addressed under this section is the possibility for the
tribunal to render a decision without a reference to the legal rules themselves. In other
words, the tribunal’s mandate to resolve the dispute no longer relies on a legal framework,
but rather on the tribunal’s understanding of what solution is just and fair under the
circumstances of the case. One should not forget that, in these rather unusual and rare
instances, it is the parties themselves that grant the power to the tribunal to decide in this
fashion, namely ex aequo et bono or acting as amiable compositeur.
This power is exceptional254 and this is why parties need to express a clear intention
that they entrust the tribunal with it. This rule is explicitly stated in three of the studied
legal systems, namely in the Model Law, in the French legal system and in the English
Arbitration Act.255 In the U.S., the issue has not been dealt with within the FAA itself. Nor
251 See section 2.2.
252 As explained in fn.249. This argument, however, contradicts the underlying principle of no review on the
merits and is generally rejected. See Born in (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3707,
arguing in the context of enforcement proceedings, that “[i]t is an almost sacrosanct principle of international
arbitration that courts will not review the substance of arbitrators’ decisions contained in foreign or nondomestic
arbitral awards in recognition proceedings. Virtually every authority acknowledges this rule and virtually
nobody suggests that this principle should be abandoned.” The room for a different view has been opened
by Hwang and Lai in (Hwang & Lai, 2005) p.24, who concluded that “[a] supervisory or enforcing court
should not second-guess a tribunal, and the risk of arbitral error is inherent in the acceptance of the process.
However, parties do not bargain for a perverse and manifest error that calls out for correction. To ignore such
errors would be to accept that the arbitral process can condone miscarriages of justice.”.
253 By and large, the wrongful application of the “overriding” public policy rules (as a “public policy” violation)
might be tested, albeit unlikely successful, against Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. See Chapter V.
254 Arguably, the power to decide ex aequo et bono is so exceptional that it forms a separate “genre” of the
tribunal’s mandate, which should not be reconciled with its traditionalmeaning. This should be particularly
true with reference to the French system (see further section 3.2.1). If this argument is accepted, it would
mean that the mandate to decide ex aequo et bono is there not “only” to mitigate the effects of strict
application of the law, but rather to free the tribunal from any reference to the law. Consequently, only the
strict application of the lawwould constitute non-compliancewith the tribunal’smandate (unless the “strict”
application leads to “just” results and has been reasoned as such). The tribunal will be therefore able to
apply the law, but should be always mindful of its ex aequo et bono hat.
255 See Art. 28(3) of the ML, Art. 1512 of the FCCP and Section 46(1)(b) of the EAA.
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has it been at the enforcement stage based on the New York Convention regime. This
lacuna, however, is filled by most (if not all) leading institutional rules.256
If the tribunal usurps the power to decide ex aequo et bono (i.e. without the parties’
express authorization), its decision will likely be set aside. Under the Model Law (and the
New York Convention) regime, there are two competing challenges. Deciding ex aequo
et bonowithout express authorizationmay be qualified either under the “excess ofmandate”
type of challenge (i.e.Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of theModel Law andArticle V(1)(c) of the New
York Convention) or as a question of procedure and challenged under Article 34(2)(a)(iv)
of the Model Law and Article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention. The better view is to
qualify this wrongdoing as a procedural one. At the same time, however, excess of mission
(in France) or excess of powers (in England and in the U.S.) would be used.257
Notably, however, considering the no-merits review principle at the post-award stage,
it might be difficult to successfully challenge the tribunal’s ex aequo et bono decision,
especially when it is disguised with a reference to legal rules.
Finally, even if the tribunal is granted the power of ex aequo et bono, it should, at all
times, adhere to the principles of due process and (international) public policy. The violation
of these principles will be susceptible to a successful challenge at the post-award stage on
grounds not related to the “excess of mandate”.258
4.4 Decisions on remedies
Ultimately, in order to complete its adjudicative mandate, the tribunal needs to reach (in
its award) a decision on remedies sought by the parties. In the context of the research at
hand one should reflect, however, when the tribunal’s decisionmight be attacked with the
“excess of mandate” type of challenge. The study focuses mostly on three distinctive
categories of remedies: damages (section 4.4.1), specific performance (section 4.4.2), and
contract adaptation (section 4.4.3).259
256 See Art. 35(2) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 33(2) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, Rule 31.2 of the
2016 SIAC Rules, Section 23.3 of the 1998 DIS Rules, Art. 21(3) of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art. 21(3) of the
2012 ICC Rules, Art. 22(4) of the 2014 LCIA Rules, Art. 31(3) of the 2014 ICDR Rules, and Art. 31.1 of the
2016 JAMS Rules.
257 Art. 1520(3) of the FCCP, Section. 68(2)(b) of the EAA and Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. In theU.S. context,
one might also consider the doctrine of “manifest disregard of the law”. For further reading, see the
Chapter V.
258 See therefore (for due process violations) Art. 34(2)(a)(ii) of the ML, Art. 1520(4) of the FCCP, Section
68(2)(a) of the EAA, Section 10(a)(3) and Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA and (for public policy violations)
Art. 34(2)(b)(ii) of the ML and Art. 1520(5) of the FCCP. In England, public policy is listed in Section
68(2)(g) of the EAA, in the U.S. in Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA and Art. V(2)(b) of the NYC at the
enforcement stage. See also fn.249.
259 Although many more remedial powers may be available in the different legal systems, arguably these
additional powers might be subsequently analyzed under one of the three categories proposed.
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4.4.1 Decision on damages
The first type of decision on remedies that requires further analysis is the tribunal’s decision
on damages sought. Arguably, damages are the primary relief available for the parties in
international arbitration. Consequently, due to their universal character, it is somewhat
expected that a tribunal will have the power to award them. Nonetheless, in certain
circumstances, a tribunal’s decision on damages might be potentially at risk at the
post-award stage. These instances include situations where the tribunal grants damages
(i) higher than sought, (ii) different than sought, (iii) specifically excluded by the parties,
or (iv) unknown to the systemwhere the post-award review takes place (for example, when
punitive damages are granted).
The first scenario is a classic example of ultra petita. It means that if the amount of the
awarded damages is higher than requested the award might be challenged, because the
tribunal is allowed to use its adjudicative powers only within the limits of the parties’
requests. In principle, all reviewed systems tackle this hypothetical under the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge.260 If the post-award court accepts the challenge, it is likely that
it (the challenge) will affect only the part that has been requested above the petita.261
Under the second scenario, a party in arbitration anticipates being granted damages
(as requested) and, instead, the tribunal awards the specific performance of the contract.
Undoubtedly, unless the parties have submitted alternative claims, such a tribunal’s decision
will not be in conformity with the parties’ petita262 and consequently may be effectively
challenged at the post-award stage based on the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.263
The third hypothetical envisages a situation where the parties limited the tribunal’s
remedial power in the underlying agreement to arbitrate, and the tribunal did not comply.
Once again, these types of tribunal’s actions might qualify as an “excess of mandate” and
be subsequently challenged.264
Yet, it may also be the case that the contract includes a separate clause (independent
from an agreement to arbitrate) that excludes certain types of damages from being sought.
This type of clause imposes a restriction on the parties and not on the tribunal. Therefore,
260 Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of theML,Art. 1520(3) of the FCCP, Section 10(a)(4) of the FAAand also at the enforcement
stage Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC. In the Model Law context, not all authors agree that it should be subsumed
under Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML. See, for example (Kreindler, Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration
in Germany, 2016) p.340. For further reading, see Chapter II. In England, Section 68(2)(b) of the EAA
should apply. See also Chapter IV.
261 Therefore the “healthy” part of the award will be severed and saved for enforcement. See section 2.3.
262 This would likely be qualified as an extra petita violation. Sometimes it might be difficult to define if the
violation is more of an ultra or extra petita nature. Arguably, this distinction is not essential, because both
violations will be successfully challenged.
263 See fn.260.
264 See fn.260. See, however, (in particular) Chapter IVwhere, potentially, also Section 67 of the EAA (challenge
to the substantive jurisdiction) might be applicable.
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this slight modification will have a lesser effect on the tribunal’s mandate, because it refers
to the tribunal’s remedial powers only indirectly. Consequently, since contract interpretation
is an exclusive prerogative of the arbitral tribunal, the courts might be averse to accept the
challenge over the tribunal’s decision granting such a requested remedy.265
The final issue that needs to be discussed is the instance where the tribunal awards
damages that are foreign to the systemwhere the arbitration takes place or where the award
is being enforced. This hypothetical is based on the assumption that the damages are being
properly requested by the parties. In these circumstances, the national court at the
post-award stagewouldmost likely be required to answer the question if the award granting
(for example) punitive damages does not violate the (international) public policy, rather
than the question whether the tribunal exceeded its mandate by granting them.266 In any
event, as suggested elsewhere,267 it would be sensible for the tribunal to distinguish the
punitive portion of damages as a separate claim in order tomake sure that it can be severed
from the other part of the award at the enforcement stage.
4.4.2 Decision on specific performance
Specific performance has been the second category of remedies selected for this analysis.
The initial hypothesis was that it may be necessary to distinguish specific performance as
a separate category of remedy due to the fact that it is approached differently in the countries
with a civil law and common law tradition. Yet, the research has shown that the arbitral
tribunals will have ample discretion to grant specific performance both in civil law and
common law countries.268 Consequently, it will rarely happen that its decision on specific
performance will be open to an “excess of mandate” type of challenge. The only instances
that will be relevant have been already discussed in the previous section.269 In principle,
the tribunal will not be allowed to grant specific performance if not requested by the parties
or if such a remedial power has been expressly excluded in the underlying agreement to
arbitrate.
4.4.3 Decision on contract adaptation and filling of gaps in the contract
The last type of remedial power that needs to be discussed is the contract adaptation and
the tribunal’s gap-filling exercise. It is an important tool, because (if available) it allows
the tribunal to modify the contract if changed circumstances undermine the initial spirit
of the agreement or it allows the tribunal to eliminate ambiguities existing in the contract.
265 See for example Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale De L’Industrie Du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1974). For further reading, see Chapter VI.
266 For further reading, see Chapter II-Chapter V.
267 (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) p.519.
268 For further reading, see Chapter II-Chapter V.
269 See section 4.4.1.
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It may be particularly relevant in long-term and complex contracts where it is not possible
to agree on all aspects of the agreement.
On the one hand, it has been pointed out that, in cases of contractual gap-filling, the
tribunalwill step into the parties’ shoes and create the legal relationship anew.Consequently,
some argue that it goes beyond the tribunal’s adjudicative function, because no dispute
exists between the parties. On the other hand, it has been suggested that contract adaptation
and gap-filling is no more than the mere exercise of traditional contract interpretation
and even if it goes beyond that, the parties should be allowed to grant this extra power to
the tribunal.
None of the reviewed systems include any express rule on the power to fill the gaps in
the contract by the arbitral tribunal. It has been discussed during the drafting process of
the Model Law, but was left outside the structure of the final text.270 In France, arbitrage
juridictionnel (being a dispute resolution mechanism) is distinguished from arbitrage
contractuel (beingmore of a creative device).271 Nevertheless, the French arbitration regime
does not include any explicit provisions authorizing the tribunal (in arbitrage juridictionnel)
to fill the gaps. Similarly, the English Arbitration Act and the Federal Arbitration Act are
silent also on the issue.272
One should, therefore, conclude that if the parties wish to vest the tribunal with the
power to adapt the contract or to fill the gaps in the contract, it is sensible for them to
include express contractual provision to that effect. Otherwise, the tribunal’s decision
might be open to attacks under the “excess of mandate” type of challenge in all systems.273
Even in the absence of the express contractual disposition granting the tribunal the power
to fill gaps, its decision might still survive the challenge, because it might be considered
that the tribunal “only” interprets the contract (by giving the meaning to the gaps in the
contract) based on the parties’ submissions. Similar to what has been discussed above,274
the tribunal’s decision might be successfully challenged if the tribunal’s decision goes
beyond what has been requested or if it defies an explicit contractual limitation to their
gap-filling powers.275
270 See A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.41 para 11, A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.44 para 32. See also Chapter II.
271 See Chapter III.
272 See Chapter IV and Chapter V. Yet, it is often argued that Section 46(1)(b) of the English Arbitration Act,
that allows the parties to confer powers on the tribunal, recognizes that a gap-filling authority may be
entrusted to the tribunal. The argument will be equally true in the U.S. context.
273 See Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML, Art. 1520(3) of the FCCP, Section. 68(2)(b) of the EAA, Section 10(a)(4)
of the FAA and Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC.
274 See section 4.4.1.
275 Even then, however, it would very much depend on the circumstances of the case. It is possible that, for
example, parties included in their contract a clause limiting the powers of the tribunal tomodify the contract.
In turn, the tribunal, while distilling the true intention of the parties, interpreted the contract in a way that
it can be considered as its modification. In this case, arguably, the tribunal’s decision might still survive the
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4.5 Decisions accessory to the parties’ main submissions and merits of the
case
The last category that has been given importance relates to decisions that do not affect
decisions onmain claims per se but are inherent to the arbitral adjudicative process. Three
main categoriesmay be therefore identified: decisions on interest (section 4.5.1), decisions
on costs (section 4.5.2), and procedural decisions undertaken during the process (section
4.5.3).
4.5.1 Decision on interest
Interest remains a vital part of the compensation recoverable through arbitration. Similar
to other elements, the tribunal’s decision-making process regarding interest can be divided
into several steps. The most important would include determining the applicable law (to
the issue of interest),276 deciding what should be the starting date for accruing interest and
setting up an appropriate rate and type of interest. Although these elements often require
elaborate analysis, the reflections presented herein should be limited to the extent that the
tribunal’s decision on interest might be susceptible to the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge.277
At the outset, it is necessary to highlight that only one of the reviewed legal systems
addresses the issue of interest: the English Arbitration Act in Section 49 provides a
comprehensive explanation as to what powers the tribunal has with regard to awarding
interest (in the absence of the contrary agreement of the parties). To the contrary, the
Model Law itself,278 the French Code of Civil Procedure, the Federal Arbitration Act and
theNewYorkConvention are silent on the issue. “Even in the absence of the express statutory
authority, there should be no doubt concerning the authority of an arbitral tribunal to award
interest.”279
Moreover, it is difficult to recognize consistency in the approach in the leading
institutional rules (that have been reviewed): some of them do contain rules regarding the
challenge. Otherwise, the parties will limit the tribunal’s adjudicative powers to the extent of tying the
tribunal’s hands in contract interpretation and in the search of the underlying spirit of the parties’ agreement.
276 And an additional question, whether they are of procedural or substantive character.
277 For further reading on awarding interest in international commercial arbitration, see, i.a., (Blackaby,
Partasides, Redfern, &Hunter, 2015) pp.527-532, and (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014)
pp.3102-3112.
278 Notably, some of the Model Law countries decided to include a provision on interest in their statutory
framework. See, e.g., Art.12(5)(b) of the SIAA.
279 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3103.
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power to award interest280 and others do not.281 It has been suggested that “[m]ost
institutional rules of arbitration do not contain express provisions for the payment of interest,
largely because their drafters assumed that an arbitral tribunal has the power to make an
award in respect of interest in just the same way as it has the power to make an award in
respect of any other claims submitted to it.”282 In addition, the text of the ILA Report on
Inherent and Implied Powers ofArbitral Tribunalsmay lead to the conclusion that awarding
interest in international commercial arbitration belongs to an arbitral tribunal’s inherent
power.283
Even if the power to award interest is inherent or implied (and as such is not addressed
neither in the agreement to arbitrate itself (including applicable arbitration rules), nor in
the applicable arbitration act), a decision on interest, as always, needs to be tested against
the agreement to arbitrate, the parties’ submissions and public policy rules if it is being
challenged under the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. Consequently, the tribunal’s
decision may be set aside if: (i) the interest issue is not in accordance with the parties’
explicit agreement (i.e. when the parties decide to limit the powers to award interest and
the tribunal does not comply), (ii) the tribunal awards interest higher or different than
sought, or (iii) the (type of) interest violates the public policy rules of the seat (or the place
of enforcement). It means that, in principle, a decision on interest would be challengeable
in the same circumstances that have been already discussed above in the section on
damages.284
Contrary to the tribunal’s decision on damages, however, it is important to highlight,
that the decision granting interest might still survive the challenge at the post-award stage
even when it is made on the tribunal’s own motion (thus without a party’s request). It
might be the case, for example, in cases where the applicable (substantive) law includes
the rule allowing (or even requiring) the tribunal to grant statutory interest automatically
when the main claim is granted. There are reported courts’ decisions that upheld the
tribunals’ decisions on interest even in the absence of the parties’ request.285 In any event,
it is sensible for the tribunal to follow the parties’ petita.
280 Particularly from the arbitral institutions originating from the common law jurisdictions. See, e.g., Art. 26.4
of the 2014 LCIA Rules, Art. 31.4 of the ICDR Rules and Art. 32.7 of the JAMS Rules. See also Rule 32.9 of
the 2016 SIAC Rules.
281 The 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, the 2017 ICC Rules, the 2012 ICC Rules and the
1998 DIS Rules are silent on the power of the tribunal to award interest.
282 (Blackaby, Partasides, Redfern, & Hunter, 2015) p.528. The authors explain further that “[t]he right to
interest will therefore flow from the parties’ underlying contract (that is, from a contractual provision for the
levying of late payment interest), or by virtue of the applicable law.”
283 (International Law Association, 2014) p.10.
284 See section 4.4.1.
285 See a discussion on the issue (in particular) in (Giraud, 2017) pp.272-275. Also see (Born, International
Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3110 with a reference (in fn.600) toGordon Sel-Way, Inc. v. Spence Bros.,
Inc., 475N.W.2d 704, 711 (Mich. 1991) (“arbitrators committed no substantial ormaterial error in including
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4.5.2 Decision on costs
The decision on costs deserves separate attention for (at least) several reasons: first, its
monetary valuemight be substantial; second, the standard for allocating costs differs greatly
between jurisdictions;286 third, very often tribunals enjoy a broad discretion with respect
to awarding costs; and finally, the decision on costs is an important procedural tool available
to the tribunal to discipline parties and to promote good faith in the conduct of the
proceedings.
Once again, only one legal system, namely the English Arbitration Act, provides a set
of default rules governing the tribunal’s powers to deal with costs.287 TheModel Law itself288
and the other reviewed legal systems are silent on the issue. This lacuna is usually filled
by the arbitral institutions that address the tribunal’s powers regarding the costs in their
arbitration rules.289 As observed in the first paragraph, the discretion given to the tribunal
is rather broad and for this reason the post-award challenge would be rather futile.
When testing a decision on costs against the “excess of mandate” type of challenge,290
onemight reflect on three basic hypotheticals: (i) the tribunal’s decision disregards express
contractual provisions regarding costs (e.g. allocating costs, limiting the tribunal’s powers
to grant costs etc.), (ii) the tribunal awards costs not requested, or (iii) the costs granted
violates public policy rules. These conclusions are similar towhat has been discussed above.
Consequently, the previous conclusions would apply to the tribunal’s decision on costs as
well.291 A few additional remarks regarding the decision on costs should be given, however.
In principle, it is rather unusual to constrain the tribunal’s authority in awarding costs.
For this reason, and taking into account the broad powers given by the institutional rules,
pre-award interest in their award, even though parties’ contract was silent concerning right to interest”);
Westminster Constr. Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 376A.2d 708, 711 (R.I. 1977) (“arbitratorsmay award interest,
even if not claimed, unless otherwise specifically provided by the parties in the agreement”).
286 For example (i) “cost follow the event” or (ii) the so-called American Rule. See further (Kreindler R., Final
Rulings on Costs: Loser pays all?, 2006) p.42.
287 See Sections 59-65 of the EAA. For further reading, see Chapter IV.
288 Although the Model Law itself is silent on the issue, countries adopting the Model Law may implement a
provision on costs themselves. See, e.g., Art. 1057 of the GCCP. Importantly, as explained in (Kreindler,
Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration in Germany, 2016) p.295, the tribunal will be able to decide on
costs evenwithout the parties’ request. See furtherChapter II. Additionally, one should note thatUNCITRAL
considered including express provision on costs. For further reading, see A/CN.9/460 paras 107-114.
289 See, i.a., Arts. 40-43 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 38 of the 2017 ICC Rules, Art. 37 of the 2012 ICC
Rules, Section 35 of the 1998 DIS Rules, Rule 35-37 of the 2016 SIAC Rules, Art. 28 of the 2014 LCIA Rules,
Art. 34 of the 2014 ICDR Rules and Art. 37 of the 2016 JAMS Rules.
290 Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML, Art. 1520(3) of the FCCP, Section 68(2)(b) of the EAA, Section 10(a)(4) of the
FAA and also at the enforcement stage Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC.
291 See section 4.4.1 and section 4.5.1.
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each modification intended by the parties (aimed at limiting a tribunal’s powers to award
costs) should be made clear. If such a variation is made, the tribunal should respect it.292
As suggested at the outset, the decision on costs will possibly be the tribunal’s last
remedy through which it can penalize parties for their behavior during the proceedings.
This sanction is an essential procedural mechanism at the tribunal’s disposal and deserves
a special status, because it is directed against a party frustrating the proceedings and
functions as a defense for the proper fulfillment of the tribunal’s adjudicative mandate.
Consequently, under certain circumstances, the tribunal should be allowed to deviate from
the parties’ submissions on costs and to award the costs differently than requested (or
arguably even if not requested).293 In exceptional circumstances, also a tribunal’s decision
disregarding the parties’ contractual stipulation on allocating of costs may also survive the
challenge at the post-award stage.294
Finally, one should observe that an express power to punish a bad faith conduct while
awarding costs becomes one of the increasingly popular tools included in the recent round
of amendments made to the institutional rules.295 These changes have been introduced by
292 The exception to this rulemight be the parties’ bad faith procedural conduct. See further, the next paragraph
of this section and ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. EMC Nat. Life Co., 564 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2009).
293 This is however unlikely, since in most cases the parties submit their costs. If the parties’ costs are not
submitted (thus not requested), the tribunal will face the problem of estimating the amount of the costs
and for that it is not competent. This hypothetical would therefore include two assumptions: (i) party A
misbehaves during the proceedings and the tribunal can only discipline it with the award on costs, and (ii)
party B does not request any legal costs. One option is that party A will need to cover costs of arbitration,
but for party B’s legal costs. An alternative would be that it also covers the costs of legal representation of
party B (still as a sanction for bad faith conduct). Yet, arguably, the tribunal would not be competent to
estimate the costs of legal representation (even “reasonable” ones). It would then have to turn back to the
parties or, again arguably, might award to party B the costs of legal representation up to the amounts of the
statutory lawyer’s fees under the regime in the seat of arbitration.
294 See ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. EMC Nat. Life Co., 564 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2009). For further reading, see
Chapter V.
295 See Art. 38(5) of the 2017 ICC Rules. Also Art. 37.5 of the 2012 ICC Rules (“In making decisions as to costs,
the arbitral tribunal may take into account such circumstances as it considers relevant, including the extent
to which each party has conducted the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective manner.”), Art. 28.4
of the 2014 LCIA Rules (“[…] The Arbitral Tribunal may also take into account the parties’ conduct in the
arbitration, including any co-operation in facilitating the proceedings as to time and cost and any
non-co-operation resulting in undue delay and unnecessary expense. Any decision on costs by the Arbitral
Tribunal shall be made with reasons in the award containing such decision.”). The most recent 2016 JAMS
Rules go even further by not limiting the disciplining power only to the award on costs; see Art. 33.1 of the
2016 JAMS Rules (“The Tribunal may order appropriate sanctions for failure of a party to comply with its
obligations under any of these Rules or with an order of the Tribunal. These sanctions may include, but are
not limited to, assessment of Arbitration Fees and Arbitrator compensation and expenses; assessment of any
other costs occasioned by the actionable conduct, including reasonable attorneys’ fees; exclusion of certain
evidence; drawing adverse inferences; or, in extreme cases, determining an issue or issues submitted to
Arbitration adversely to the party that has failed to comply.”); cf Section 35(2) of the 1998 DIS Rules, Art.
42(1) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules and Art. 34 of the 2014 ICDR Rules. These rules allow the tribunal to
take “the circumstances of the case” into account when awarding costs. Arguably, such wording would also
allow the tribunal to discipline parties, albeit impliedly.
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the major institutions in France, England and the U.S. Arguably, however, also in the
Model Law jurisdictions (and under the New York Convention regime) the authority to
discipline the party with the costs’ award will be given full effect.296
4.5.3 Decisions on procedure
The tribunal’s raison d’être is to resolve the dispute between the parties. This is observed
by the adjudicative dimension of the tribunal’s mandate.297 Conversely to thismain role,298
its procedural decisions have a completely different function, namelymanaging the arbitral
process. In other words, the procedural decisions are, therefore, themeans for the tribunal
to control the efficient fulfillment of its adjudicative mandate. As such they are (only)
complimentary to the core, dispute resolution function of the arbitral tribunal and falls
within the scope of the tribunal’s autonomy.
If these arguments are accepted, the procedural decisions of the arbitral tribunal should
not be easily susceptible to the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. Yet, in certain
jurisdictions, it would be still possible to invoke this ground for challenge against the
tribunal’s procedural wrongdoings under the presumption that the tribunal failed to comply
with the limits to its mandate, i.e. the agreement to arbitrate, the parties’ submissions and
public policy rules (of the seat).299 Therefore, the issue deserves further analysis.
In principle, the Model Law as well as the New York Convention envisage a system
where procedural decisions (that are not in accordance with the limits to the “arbitral
tribunal’s mandate”) escape the courts’ scrutiny under the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge.300 The reason for that is simply because the subsequent ground on the list (in
both challenge procedures) gives the parties an opportunity to object to the award if the
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties301 or not in accordance
with the law of the seat (if parties did not agree on the procedure).302 Therefore, testing
the tribunal’s procedural decisions might be better suited under a different ground than
the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
296 See, e.g., (Kreindler,Wolff, &Rieder, Commercial Arbitration inGermany, 2016) p.297. It will be particularly
true if the 2012 ICC Rules are applicable. Arguably, however, even in the case of the 1998 DIS Rules or the
2010 UNCITRAL Rules that only provide that the tribunal may take “the circumstances” of the case into
account when awarding costs, should be sufficient. See fn.295.
297 See further section 1.3 of Chapter VIII (on the adjudicative dimension of the tribunal’s mandate).
298 See section 3.1; also Chapter I.
299 Depending on the factual underpinning of the case it is likely, however, that the tribunal’s procedural
decision will be also susceptible to review under other, competing grounds for challenge such as violation
of due process or violation of (international) public policy.
300 Which is prescribed under Art. 34(2)(a)(iii) of the ML and Art. V(1)(c) of the NYC.
301 Importantly, however, even if the parties had agreed on the procedure, their agreement cannot be in conflict
with the mandatory provisions of the Model Law.
302 See Art. 34(a)(iv) of the ML and Art. V(1)(d) of the NYC.
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In the remaining jurisdictions, however, the decisions on proceduremight be very well
suited for the challenge under the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. In France, if the
parties explicitly agree that a certain procedure should be followed, the tribunal is obliged
to comply. Otherwise its award might be set aside on the basis of a failure to comply with
themandate. Other grounds, however, might be also relevant and, importantly, the French
courts might decide to requalify the challenge if needed.303 In England, Section 68 of the
EAA (serious irregularity) might be available for the same reasons. Although the EAA
offers an independent ground for the tribunal’s failure to comply with the procedure
selected by the parties,304 as observed by scholars, “[i]n practice, this head will be of little
significance […].”305 Therefore, it may leave some room for applying other grounds listed
as serious irregularities, including the “excess of powers”.306 In theU.S., the prevailing view
is that the “excess of powers” groundwill be at the parties’ disposal, particularly considering
the broad interpretation given to this ground by the Restatement.307 Even though these
systems allow the challenge, the burden of proof is rather high, because the party bringing
the challenge has to show that “[…] the alleged deviation from prescribed procedures is
material.”308
One should reflect further, however, on the one specific hypothetical. In this scenario,
parties agree to modify (or add) certain procedural rule(s) after the tribunal had accepted
its mandate. By doing so, the parties, in principle, would expect the tribunal to comply
with their procedural demands. The outstanding question would be, what if the tribunal
does not follow their instructions? Is a tribunal’s non-compliance in this case sufficient to
trigger the “excess of mandate” type of challenge (or other applicable ground)?
Although many would answer the last question in the affirmative, having in mind the
scope of grounds for recourse, such a conclusion should not be automatic nor immediately
drawn. Instead one should balance twoprinciples: party autonomy and tribunal’s autonomy.
The former is an underlying foundation of modern international arbitration and allows
303 In these cases, Art. 1520(4) and Art. 1520(5) of the FCCP might be particularly relevant.
304 Section 68(2)(c) of the EAA.
305 See (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014) p.312.
306 Section 68(2)(b) of the EAA (excess of powers). See also (Merkin & Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 2014)
p.312. Another possibility may include Section 68(2)(a) of the EAA (duty to act fairly).
307 Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. See also section 3.2.2 above, discussing the meaning of “powers”. In the U.S.
Chapter it has been argued, contrary to the prevailing opinion, that Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA should be
limited only to challenges against the tribunal’s adjudicative powers or to powers that affect the shape of
the final award. For further reading, see [the U.S. Chapter].
308 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.206. The Restatement’s description would be equally true in the
context of the French and the English systems. Under the French regime, an aggrieved party needs to
establish that the tribunal’s procedural decision caused it harm. According to the English Arbitration Act,
the basic requirements under the Section 68 challenge are that a party furnishes proof that the “irregularity”
is serious and causes substantial injustice. For further reading, see Chapter III and Chapter IV.
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the parties to create a bespoke procedural vehicle for resolving their dispute. The latter is
important for the tribunal to properly (and efficiently) fulfill its adjudicative mandate.
It is undisputable that party autonomy gives the parties the right to structure the arbitral
process as they will. Nonetheless, arguably, this right should not be unlimited. Possibly
the best cut-off point is the moment when the tribunal accepts its mandate, because the
new legal relationship is created at that time between three entities – the tribunal and the
two parties.
Consequently, from this point in time, the tribunal should have a right to its own vision
and expectations regarding the endeavor based on the available legal framework (i.e. the
agreement to arbitrate, the parties’ submissions and the arbitration law of the seat). This
is important, because it allows the tribunal to plan and structure (thus, to manage) the
proceedings in the way it deems the most efficient in order to resolve the dispute between
the parties, hence to fulfill its adjudicative mandate.309 Consequently, the tribunal, faced
with the parties’ joint procedural request (made after acceptance of its mandate), should
have an opportunity to reject it without risking its award being challenged for
non-compliance with the mandate.
In any event, the tribunal’s power to disregard the parties’ (joint) request made after
acceptance of the mandate should not be treated lightly. It is only reasonable to give such
a power to the tribunal in cases where the joint request may frustrate the proceedings. In
other words, having inmind that the priority for the tribunal is to carry out its adjudicative
mission, the disregard should only be permitted if the tribunal finds that the proper
fulfillment of its adjudicative function is threatened by the parties’ (joint) procedural
request (for example by delaying the process or by adding layers of complexity which one
could have not foreseen at the outset of the process).
Inmost cases, however, the parties’ (procedural) requests will not impose such a risk.310
Indeed, inmost cases, cooperationwith the parties and a dialoguewill be themost efficient
methods for the tribunal to fulfill its adjudicative function uninterruptedly. These tools,
mostly based on the tribunal’s managerial skills, therefore, should be used by the tribunal
at first. Only in exceptional circumstances, may it opt to disobey parties’ (joint) procedural
directives. If the power is exceedingly or unjustifiably used, both parties may decide to
terminate the mandate.311
309 See further section 1.3 of Chapter VIII (on the adjudicative dimension of the tribunal’s mandate).
310 It is likely that the parties in dispute reach a procedural agreement in the midst of the proceedings (only)
if they find that the tribunal’s procedural or managerial guidance is insufficient. If their undertakings are
indeed caused by the tribunal’s weakness it might be considered as a warning. Consequently, the tribunal
may humbly follow the parties’ suggestions or discuss with the parties any alternative it has in mind. In the
latter case, it will show its intention to reclaim the reign over the proceedings.
311 See Art. 14 of theML, Art. 1458 of the FCCP and Section 23 of the EAA. Neither the FAA nor the NYC has
any provision on the issue.
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If the argument allowing the tribunal to disregard the parties’ joint procedural request
is rejected, the tribunal’s options are limited. The most evident (and extreme) one is for
the tribunal to resign.312 It is, however, highly unsatisfactory, because it will frustrate the
procedure evenmore than the (potentially frustrating) party’s joint request. In exceptional
circumstances, it might also trigger an issue of civil liability of the tribunal. Another option
is for the tribunal to use its persuasive authority and to convince the parties of the better
way forward. All in all, it is the tribunal who manages the procedure and it should be one
of its skills to reclaim the power over the procedure even if it is occasionally frustrated by
the parties and their ideas.
5 Comparative assessment
Having explained the approach of the different systems to the “excess of mandate” type
of challenge it is necessary to outline themain similarities and differences observed (section
5.1) and to explain them (section 5.2 and 5.3).313
5.1 Leading similarities and differences
A comparative analysis of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge has shown that many
features of the post-award review have proved to be similar. Nonetheless, this recourse
does not enjoy a homogenous interpretation under all legal systems.
The first of the leading similarities is the pro-arbitration (or pro-enforcement) drive
of all the analyzed legal systems. All these instruments recognize that the review on the
post-award stage is the extraordinary means of recourse and that the challenge against the
arbitral award can only be successful in exceptional circumstances, which are listed in the
provisions dealing with post-award recourse. Virtually in all systems, these lists are
considered to be exhaustive (arguably, even in the U.S. in the post-Hall Street reality).
Secondly, in all systems, it is a party (usually an award-debtor) that needs to bring the
“excess ofmandate” type of challenge before the court. In none of the reviewed jurisdictions
will a court assess a tribunal’s compliancewith itsmandate ex officio. Importantly, however,
all courts will take into account the parties’ conduct during the arbitration, which means
that the challenging parties should react to the tribunal’s alleged violation of the mandate
312 See Art. 14 of theML, Art. 1457 of the FCCP and Section 25 of the EAA. Neither the FAA nor the NYC has
any provision on the issue.
313 As explained at the outset (see section 1), generally, the comparison comprises the national legal systems
and the Model Law that are being used as a basis for adopting arbitration laws. The New York Convention
is analyzed only in the second stage of the comparison, since it requires a vertical comparison.
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the moment they find it happened. Otherwise, they might be estopped from raising the
same arguments at the post-award stage.
Thirdly, it is also similar how the courts approach the award when faced with it at the
post-award stage. In principle, they will be guided by the systemic pro-validity and
pro-enforcement approachwhichmanifests itself in several ways. For example, it has been
confirmed that the “excess of mandate” type of challenge will not be accepted as a vehicle
to review themerits of the case. Additionally, even if a challenge has somemerits, national
courts in all analyzed legal systems will likely use their remedial power to minimize the
effects the challenge has on the arbitral award. Put differently, courts will, generally, try
to sever the defective part of the award and enforce a healthy part whenever possible.
Fourthly, although with divergent approaches to the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge (which will be explained below), all jurisdictions recognize the same constraints
to the tribunal’s mandate. Under each legal system (thus both at the setting-aside and
enforcement stage), the analysis will be based on three pillars: the agreement to arbitrate,
the parties’ (subsequent) submissions and the public policy rules (in the case of setting-aside
proceedings – rules of the seat, in the case of enforcement proceedings – rules of the place
of enforcement). It shows the importance of party autonomy and public policy rules which
complement the shape of the mandate introduced by the parties.
Fifthly, one should note that the “excess of mandate” type of challenge is just a piece
of a post-award review mechanism. It means that it might be occasionally difficult to
identify whether a challenge should be subsumed under an “excess of mandate” or under
a different basis. “The usual suspects” that would compete with an “excess of mandate”
ground include the “excess of jurisdiction” and the “due process violation” type of grounds
(which can be named differently in the different systems). This clash exists in all the
reviewed systems, arguably, but for the U.S. if the FAA’s “excess of powers” ground is
interpreted according to the (draft) Restatement arguments (which advocates for the
incorporation of all of the New York Convention grounds for challenge under the “excess
of powers” head).
The final similarities can be observed on the level of the application of the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge.
For example, and in principle, in all systems (but for the English regime), if the tribunal
grants a claim that has not been requested (ultra petita), it will be identified as an “excess
of mandate” violation (in England it would be an “excess of jurisdiction” violation under
Section 67 of the EAA). There are variations on this hypothetical, however, which might
induce the application of other grounds for recourse (as suggested in the preceding
paragraph). Another example, i.e. when the tribunal failed to decide on all claims (infra
petita), it will not have the potential to be successfully challenged at the post-award stage
under any system except for the EnglishArbitrationAct (see Section 68(2)(d) of the EAA).
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Decisions regarding the application of law by the tribunal would generally escape a
court’s scrutiny under the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge in all the reviewed systems.
Possibly, the only exception is the U.S. system in its shape as offered by the (draft)
Restatement. In this case, as explained above, all of the New York Convention grounds
will be available under the FAA’s “excess of power” ground, which makes its application
rather broad. In other systems, possible wrongdoing in the process of application of law
would likely be classified under other grounds of recourse.
Decisions on remedies are intertwinedwith the parties’ claimwhich has been discussed
above. It therefore means that they might be subjected to the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge under the ultra petita scenario in all systems.
In principle, in the last category of decisions, decisions on interest and costs will have
similar treatment in all systems. It means that they will be susceptible to the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge in cases where they do not comply with the defined limits (the
agreement to arbitrate, the parties’ requests and the rules of public policy). At the same
time, however, these decisions have a somewhat “special” status which increases their
chances of surviving the “excess of mandate” type of challenge even when they go beyond
the parties’ petita. In the case of decisions on interest, the tribunal might, for example, rely
on the statutory interest regulation allowing it to grant interest as a default option even if
not explicitly demanded by the parties. In the case of decisions on costs, the enhanced
powers of the tribunal (to award costs differently than agreed and/or requested) will be
recognized by all systems when the tribunal needs to discipline the parties.
Having discussed the similarities, it is necessary to reflect on the characteristic features
that distinguish the reviewed legal systems from each other.
The first noticeable difference relates to the diversity of the concepts used at the
post-award stage to challenge the tribunal’s mandate. The Model Law and the New York
Convention, in principle, refer to the tribunal’s decisions going beyond the submission to
arbitration; the interpretation as to the scope of this proviso differs among states adopting
the Model Law. Furthermore, the French regime is the only system (out of those selected
for the comparison) that allows the challenge in cases where the tribunal fails to comply
with the mandate given. Finally, the common law jurisdictions – the English Arbitration
Act and theU.S. federal arbitration law – refer to the notion of “excess of powers”. Notably,
however, the understanding of the meaning of the “excess of powers” ground in England
and in the U.S. is completely different.
Additionally, there are minor differences as to the structure of the post-award
challenging mechanism. For example, Article 34 of the Model Law (as well as Article V of
the New York Convention) distinguishes two categories of grounds, one that has to be
brought by the parties and the other one that can be raised by the court on its ownmotion.
Other systems do not make such a distinction. The French courts on the other hand will
be able to requalify the challenge if raised under an incorrect head of Article 1520 of the
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FCCP. The English ArbitrationAct distinguishes three separate recoursemechanisms (the
tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction, serious irregularities and appeals on point of law). Each
of those has its own character. In other systems, the grounds are listed within one set of
grounds for recourse. In the U.S. one should still be careful with regard to the viability of
judicially created grounds for recourse, notwithstanding their uncertain future post-Hall
Street.
The second difference is the degree of deference granted by the judiciary to the tribunal’s
decision at the post-award stage (when the challenge is brought based on the “excess of
mandate” argument). In Model Law jurisdictions, the scope of the court’s review when
faced with the “excess of mandate” type of challenge is not uniform. Arguably, however,
the better view is to expect the court to give deference to the tribunal’s findings. Conversely,
in France (when the award is challenged for the tribunal’s non-compliance with the
entrusted mandate), the courts will be able to exercise a full and independent analysis.
Similarly, in England (particularly in cases where the challenge is brought against the
tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction), the courts will have an opportunity to rehear the case.
Although the power of full review is also available when “serious irregularities” are involved
(thus i.a. “excess of powers”), the test is filtered by the standard of “seriousness” of the
irregularity and the substantial injustice it causes. In the U.S. everything depends on
whether the “excess of powers” challenge reflects the jurisdictional/threshold objections
or any other objections. If the objections are not jurisdictional ones, then the standard of
review is extremely limited and deferential. In cases where the challenge deals with the
jurisdictional/threshold issues, the default rule is that courts will be able to undertake a
full review unless the parties’ clearly and unmistakably consent to delegate the powers to
deal with jurisdictional/threshold issues to the tribunal. In those cases, the tribunal’s
decision will be given the same (deferential) treatment as other non-jurisdictional
objections. On the enforcement level, the pro-enforcement drive of the New York
Convention also promotes the high degree of deference to the tribunal’s decision.
On the level of application of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge some
discrepancies can also be observed.
The first difference has already been suggested earlier in this section: the Englishmodel
encompasses that the ultra petita challenges are better suited under Section 67 of the EAA,
which is designed to seek a recourse against the tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction. Other
models envisage the ultra petita scenario in the core of the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge. Additionally, only the English regime provides for recourse against infra petita
awards. Interestingly, however, the infra petita challenges will be brought under a different
challenge procedure than the ultra petita ones (challenge against serious irregularity, thus
the Section 68 challenge instead of the Section 67 challenge).
The second general difference relates to the next type of tribunal’s decisions. This type
deals with the process of application of law by the tribunal. It has been explained above
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that the exercise of application of law will largely escape the court’s scrutiny (at least if
brought under the excess of mandate type of challenge). Nonetheless, the situation will
change the moment the tribunal relies on the power to decide ex aequo et bono. Under the
Model Law (and the New York Convention) regime there are different views as to the
ground that is appropriate to challenge the tribunal’s decision ex aequo et bono; the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge competes there with other more procedural grounds for
recourse (violation of due process). In France, notably, the mandate to decide ex aequo et
bono would be considered as a distinct type of mandate (see Article 1512 of the FCCP).
Consequently, the recourse against the violation of the mandate will be immediately
appropriate. In England, the “excess of powers” challenge will be available. Arguably,
however, it does not entail that deciding ex aequo et bono will be considered as a separate
type of mandate. In the U.S., apart from the “excess of powers” challenge, one should still
consider the availability of the “manifest disregard of the law” challenge (notwithstanding
its uncertain future), because in its traditional interpretation, it closely resembles the
instances where the tribunal usurps the power to decide ex aequo et bono.
The final important difference concerns the tribunal’s procedural decisions. They have
a special status because they are expressions of the tribunal’s managerial powers. If they
violate the parties’ freedom to shape the arbitral procedure, a party might be tempted to
invoke the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge against the tribunal’s allegedwrongdoing.
In theModel Law (and theNewYorkConvention) context such an argumentwill, arguably,
not survive, because non-compliancewith the procedure designed by the parties is classified
under a different ground for recourse. Conversely, under the French international
arbitration regime, it might be considered as the tribunal’s failure to comply with the
mandate. The English Arbitration Act designates a specific ground that deals with the
tribunal’s failure to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed by
the parties. Notwithstanding such a designation, the “excess of powers” ground and other
grounds defined as serious irregularities will remain of relevance at the post-award stage.
In the U.S. context, the “excess of powers” challenge proves to be, yet again, of practical
relevance.
All in all, users of international arbitration might find comfort in the fact that the
post-award review is guided by similar principles that favor arbitration. At the same time,
however, the successful application of the post-award’s regulation requires careful analysis
which is not limited to the pro-arbitration standards, but rather focused on details and the
intricacies of each system.
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5.2 Explaining the similarities
Below, the basic rationale will be explained for the high level of convergence that is achieved
on the post-award stage of arbitration. First, one may highlight the impact of the New
York Convention and the Model Law (section 5.2.1). Additionally, as has been observed
at the outset of this analysis,314 a number of theories have been advanced in an attempt to
define the nature of arbitration. Two “pure” theories (that compete with each other)
emphasize either the contractual or jurisdictional character of arbitration. The priority
given to one of these theories will have a direct impact on the scope of the tribunal’s
mandate and consequently on the test for its alleged excess. Therefore, the influence of
the contractual theory of international arbitration (section 5.2.2) and the jurisdictional
theory of international arbitration (section 5.2.3) need to be briefly analyzed.
5.2.1 Theharmonizing effect of theNewYorkConvention and theUNCITRAL’s
undertakings
The New York Convention has a strong position in the field of international trade law. As
many as 159 countries are a party to the Convention to date.315 It is generally recognized
that “[t]he purpose of the New York Convention is to promote international commerce and
the settlement of international disputes through arbitration.”316 The Convention’s core aim
therefore is to ascertain that international arbitral awards are enforced and that the judges
are driven by the Convention’s pro-enforcement sentiment.Much effort has been put into
ensuring such an approach, including enhancing public availability of the information on
theNewYorkConvention (both on its interpretation and case law)317 and educating actors
(judges in particular) involved in international commercial arbitration.318
314 See Chapter I.
315 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html [last accessed
29 April 2018].
316 See (ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook for Judges, 2011)
pp.14-15.
317 See, for example, UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/
2016_Guide_on_the_Convention.pdf [last accessed 27 April 2018] or ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation
of the 1958 New York Convention available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/1/13890217974630/
judges_guide_english_composite_final_jan2014.pdf [last accessed 27 April 2018]. See also
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/ [last accessed 27April 2018], and http://newyorkconvention1958.org/
[last accessed 27 April 2018], http://www.kluwerarbitration.com/CommonUI/NYC.aspx [last accessed
27 April 2018].
318 Apart from the guides enumerated above (fn.317), see also, i.a., http://www.uncitral.org/
uncitral/en/publications/online_resources.html [last accessed 27 April 2018]. Additionally, see also “the
New York Convention Roadshow” – series of colloquia for judges on the New York Convention organized
by the ICCA. For further reading, see http://www. arbitration-icca.org/NY_Convention_Roadshow.html
[last accessed 27 April 2018].
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Arguably, the success of the 1958 New York Convention is one of the main reasons
for the high level of convergence in the shape of the post-award recourse in the
contemporary practice of international arbitration. The Convention is informative that
the grounds for a successful challenge against an arbitral award are limited and exhaustive
and that no review on the merits should be allowed. Additionally, it is straightforward in
setting the maximum standards to the procedure of recognition and enforcement.319
The solutions introduced first in the New York Convention, intended to apply at the
enforcement stage, were further developed by UNCITRAL in its subsequent undertaking
– theModel Law. TheModel Law includes, i.a., the same limited list of grounds to challenge
the award at the setting-aside proceedings and follows the same pro-arbitration principles
as set out in the New York Convention. Consequently, the Model Law further enhances
a harmonized application of the same principles as set out in theNewYork Convention.320
Additionally, UNCITRAL makes every effort to inform and educate how the Model Law
should be applied and how it is applied.321 Importantly, theModel Law has a harmonizing
effect not only on the states that have decided to adopt it, but also on the non-Model Law
jurisdictions like England and the U.S.322
All in all, the states that are willing to adhere to theNewYorkConvention’s underlying
policies (and/or those of the Model Law), are also likely to follow the same
non-interventionist approach as a fundamental structure to their own international
arbitration regimes.323 Consequently, the basic rules and procedures governing the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge are largely similar. It also explains why the same “excess of
mandate” type of challenge can be invoked.
5.2.2 The importanceof party autonomy in structuring the adjudicativemandate
Earlier in this chapter the limits to the “arbitral tribunal’s mandate” have been explained.324
As one may readily observe, the tribunal’s adjudicative authority will be only as broad as
parties would allow it to be. It is so, because modern arbitration statutes emphasize the
role of party autonomy – instead of providing a “one size fits all” statutory mechanism,
they give parties a great freedom to tailor the arbitral process in accordance to their needs.
As explained by Kröll: “[f]rom a purely rule based legal perspective, the statutory (public)
sources are of primary importance, since they determine how much room is left for party
319 See Art. III of the NYC.
320 See also (Kröll, Arbitration, 2012) pp.90-91.
321 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html [last accessed
27 April 2018]. In particular, see UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration and the CLOUT database therein.
322 See further section 1.3.
323 See also (Sanders, Arbitration, 1996) pp.35-36.
324 See section 3.1.
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autonomy. In practice, however, the contractual sources are of greater importance, since
modern arbitration laws now clearly embrace the principle of party autonomy. The role of
party autonomy receives further protection from the international and regional conventions,
where they apply.”325 This holds true for all the analyzed systems, including the New York
Convention at the enforcement stage. Consequently, it explains why the contractual
component is essential for defining the structure of the adjudicative mandate.
It can be observed therefore that the starting point for ascertaining if the tribunal indeed
exceeded its adjudicative mandate is an interpretation of the initial agreement to arbitrate
and the parties’ subsequent agreements. In principle, all reviewed systems recognize this
approach; what may differ, however, is the degree of deference that is given to the parties’
choice when a court needs to balance in between the parties’ and the tribunals’ autonomy.
As explained already in the introduction,326 the parties use their autonomy to contract
out from the court system and to delegate dispute resolution functions to the tribunal. The
mechanics of adjudication remain the same, however. Therefore, arbitration relies on the
adversarial character of resolving disputes, where the parties’ requests are essential.
Consequently, all systems recognize that the tribunal’s mandate to adjudicate is framed
by the parties’ dispositions (even though there is no consensus on whether this constitutes
a mandate or a jurisdictional aspect of the tribunal’s role).
Additionally, it is undisputed that party autonomy is also relevant when shaping the
procedure. All systems are similar in the sense that they intentionally include only limited
directives on how the procedure should be conducted and protect the parties’ right to
tailor the arbitral process by allowing recourse at the post-award stage in cases where the
tribunal does not comply with the parties’ joint (procedural) instructions.
Yet, it should be underlined that there is no convergence whether alleged
non-compliance with the parties’ joint (procedural) instructions should be considered
under the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. Arguably, if one considers that the
functional (thus adjudicative) aspect of themandate ismore important than the contractual
element, then the failure to comply with the parties’ procedural wishes may escape the
scope of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
5.2.3 The tribunal’s autonomy: the significance of the arbitral tribunal’s
managerial toolbox
The arbitral tribunal, similar to the parties, has its own autonomy. One may identify it,
while observing the mandate from a functional (rather than a contractual) perspective.
Consequently, onemay argue that the tribunal’s autonomy has its roots in the jurisdictional
nature of arbitration, where the function (i.e. to adjudicate, to render a binding and
325 (Kröll, Arbitration, 2012) p.92.
326 See Chapter I.
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enforceable award upon the parties) is the most important element of the mandate.
Arguably, and in certain (procedural) aspects only, the tribunal’s autonomymay even take
over the parties’ autonomy the moment the tribunal is constituted.
The tribunal’s autonomy is relevant, because it allows the tribunal to properly fulfill
its adjudicativemandate. Put differently, the tribunal requires a certainmanagerial flexibility
in order to render an enforceable award. The arbitration regimes that have been analyzed
recognize the necessity of allowing the tribunal adequate freedom in presiding over
proceedings. The “special status” of the tribunal’s decisions on costs, interest and procedure
evidence that. Consequently, one may argue that the analyzed legal systems accept not
only the contractual underpinning of the tribunal’s mandate, but also the jurisdictional
nature of the mandate.
5.3 Explaining the differences
Notwithstanding the harmonizing efforts on the transnational level and a number of
similarities between the systems, the “excess of mandate” type of challenge is still applied
differently. This trend can be explained by the competition between “arbitration-friendly”
systems (section 5.3.1) and the autonomous development of the system (section 5.3.2).
5.3.1 The ongoing competition between the leading arbitral centers
It is undisputed that at a macro level all reviewed systems share a similar pro-arbitration
philosophy.327 At the same time, however, each jurisdiction is active in regulatory
competition between states in attempts to attract actors active in arbitration. Consequently,
these centers are not interested in the full harmonization of the arbitration regulations.
Instead, they are likely to cultivate the unique features they offer and the divergence in
their approach to arbitration.328 It will equally hold true to theModel Law and non-Model
Law jurisdictions.329 It is important to note, however, that this reasoning is applicable on
the national level of the comparison (thus excluding the New York Convention’s
enforcement stage).
327 See further section 5.2.1.
328 See also (De Ly, Paradigmatic Changes – Uniformity, Diversity, Due Process and Good Administration of
Justice: The Next Thirty Years, 2016) pp.21-23 (p.23: “Notwithstanding the major breakthrough brought
about by the Model Law, the picture remains one of divergence in the western world with major arbitration
centres in London, Paris, New York, Zurich or Geneva having arbitration laws based on different traditions,
assumptions, approaches and rules. No substantial modification of the Model Law being contemplated and
nomajor changes to be expected in non-Model Law countries, an alignment between these two families cannot
be expected in the near future.”).
329 The Model Law does not have to be adopted in verbatim which makes room for introducing the unique
features of an arbitration regime.
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Arguably, this ongoing competition also explains the dissimilarities between the
approaches to the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge.330 It has been explained that there
is no uniformity in interpretation of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge throughout
the jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Law. Likewise, the failure to comply with
the mandate as used in France is not the same concept as the “excess of powers” used in
England or in theU.S. Notably, the discrepancy exists also between the two latter common
law jurisdictions, notwithstanding the fact that the terminology (“excess of powers”) is, in
principle, the same.
Unsurprisingly, the scope of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge will depend on
the meaning of “the mandate” itself. Consequently, yet again, one should reflect which
aspect of “the mandate” (the contract or the function) is prioritized. Arguably, it leads to
more theoretical reflections on the nature of arbitration (contractual or jurisdictional).
Neither of the (analyzed) post-award systems, however,may be analyzedwith the reference
to one of those theories alone, albeit one of them might be more useful than the other in
certain cases. In general, the review against the alleged excess of the tribunal’s mandate
should be always based on the balancing exercise between party autonomy and tribunal’s
autonomy.
5.3.2 Historical development and legal heritage
Another reason why the systems differ is rooted within their heritage and historical
development. As highlighted immediately above,331 each system is eager to preserve its
competitive edge developed over the years or eventually reverse the trend, which is
considered unattractive for international arbitration users. It means that the legal heritage
and the development remain important factors explaining distinctive views on the “excess
of mandate” type of challenge. With that in mind, one should reflect on the evolution of
the Model Law and the English and the U.S. arbitration systems.
For example, the Model Law is a product of an extensive debate under the auspices of
the UnitedNations. In turn, thanks to the contribution of representatives of different legal
cultures, the application of the Model Law is, in principle, universal. Yet, since it is “only”
a model legislation, it naturally evolves in different ways in each country where it is
implemented. Consequently, it is possible, that depending on the legal culture of the
adopting country, the “excess ofmandate” type of challengemight be interpreted differently
by the courts which, in turn, hinders the level of uniformity in the application of this
mechanism of recourse.
330 As well as the post-award architecture at large. For example, two separate lists of grounds that have to be
raised by the parties and ex officio by the court itself under the Model Law and the New York Convention;
three separate challengemechanisms (substantive jurisdiction, serious irregularities and an appeal on point
of law) under the English Arbitration Act etc.
331 See section 5.3.1.
445
VII The Comparative Law Analysis
Arguably it is the English regime that transformed the most by overcoming historical
hostility towards arbitration. Notably, however, even after modifications, it remains the
system with a rather unique structure of three separate challenge mechanisms, including
an (opt-out) appeal on point of law. In any event, the pro-arbitration drive of the 1996
Arbitration Act does not leave room for doubt that the recourse against an arbitral award
is exceptional.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the Federal Arbitration Act has been introduced
in the U.S. at the beginning of the early twentieth century to defy infamous (judicial)
hostility towards arbitration. Nowadays, however, the value of this statutory framework
is limited, because the U.S. Supreme Court, through its decisions, effectively creates the
arbitration system anew. The degree of deviation from the statutory framework is unique;
at the same time, theU.S. SupremeCourt’smodification of the system is used to (repeatedly)
confirm the federal policy favoring arbitration and to evidence the great deference given
to arbitrators’ findings. Consequently, U.S. courts tend to hold parties to their arbitration
bargain and rarely accept arguments that the tribunal exceeded its powers. Another layer
of the evolution of the U.S. systemmay be added by the ALI Restatement on International
Commercial Arbitration. It remains to be seenwhether the Restatement triggers structural
(statutory) changes of the system or by means of its persuasive force impacts the system.
All in all, the development of the arbitration system(s) inevitably has an impact on the
interpretation of the individual elements of the post-award architecture, including on the
“excess of mandate” type of challenge.
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VIII Conclusions and recommendations
1 Conclusions
1.1 Preliminary observations
The purpose of this study was to identify the similarities and differences between different
concepts of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge and to determine how the national
courts review arbitral awards on the basis of “excess of mandate” (and, consequently, in
what instances they accept that a tribunal violated itsmandate). Following the introductory
chapter, the book has been divided into two parts.
The first part included reflections on three national legal regimes (i.e. France, England,
and the U.S.) as well as on the UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention.
The international instruments (the Model Law and the New York Convention) were
introduced respectively in Chapters II and VI of Part I, whereas the national statutory
frameworks of France, England and the U.S. were presented in Chapters III, IV and V.
The second part was comprised of the preliminary remarks togetherwith a comparative
law analysis, including an explanation for the (leading) similarities and differences of the
studied systems in Chapter I and the general research conclusions, propositions and the
directions for further research in Chapter II.
As a final preliminary observation, one should be reminded that the structure of the
comparative law chapter (Chapter I of Part II)mirrored the structure of each of the chapters
of Part I. It means that the first part of each chapter was dedicated to discussing the general
rules governing the challenge at the post-award stage, whereas the second part dealt with
the application of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge to different decisions made
by arbitral tribunals. The division of the arbitral tribunal’s decisions into several types was
aimed at pinpointing a potential rationale for successful challenges against the “excess of
mandate”.1
1.2 Pro-arbitration standard eliminating the possibility of review on the
merits
At the outset, it is necessary to recap that all systems are driven by a pro-arbitration (or
pro-enforcement in the case of theNewYorkConvention) thrust. Itmeans, amongst other
1 See also below sections 1.6-1.10.
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things, that all elements of the statutory architecture of arbitration regimes are set to
enhance the finality of arbitral decisions. All systems recognize the exceptional character
of the post-award recourse against the award.Moreover, the list of the setting-aside grounds
is exhaustive and interpreted narrowly. Additionally, the national courts have ample tools
to save at least a part of the award in case some deficiencies are found which, however, do
not warrant a full set aside or full refusal to enforce.
Most importantly, however, the pro-arbitration policy reinforces the deference to the
finality of the tribunal’s award. Consequently, it is repeatedly confirmed that no review of
the merits is possible. The courts may not, and should not, get involved in reassessing the
tribunal’s conclusion on the level of the substantive dispute between the parties. Deference
intends to avoid that the tribunal’s decision on the merits would be nothing else than the
adjudication of the first instance subject to an ordinary appeal to a court of higher instance.
The “no review on the merits” principle is particularly relevant in the context of the
“excess of mandate” type of challenge if one considers that this recourse gives a court an
opportunity to evaluate how the tribunal exercised its adjudicative function. This may, in
turn, attract a closer look at the “correctness” of the tribunal’s decisions. In any event, the
courts to date restrict the review undertaken and defer to the tribunal’s findings.
1.3 Two dimensions of the “tribunal’s mandate” and limits that might be
exceeded
The analysis of Chapter I of Part II (the comparative law chapter) confirmed a hypothesis
presented in the introduction that the arbitral tribunal’s mandate has two dimensions and
the alleged excess of themandate is to be considered in each of these dimensions. The first
dimension is a contractual one, whereas the second one focuses on the adjudicative function
delegated to an arbitral tribunal. Consequently, all analyzed systems recognize the
importance of three elements in defining the tribunal’smandate: an agreement to arbitrate,
the parties’ subsequent submissions and fundamental rules of public policy.
In the contractual dimension, the tribunal’smandate is shaped by the parties themselves.
Therefore, it is an agreement to arbitrate that (initially) plays a key role in structuring the
scope of the tribunal’s mandate, because in an agreement to arbitrate parties convey their
intention to resolve their disputes in arbitration. In other words, they consent to vest the
adjudicative mandate in an arbitral tribunal (and not in a court). Additionally, they are
able to express their expectations (usually by a reference to the arbitration rules) on how
the arbitration is to be conducted.
The abstract scope of the mandate outlined in the agreement to arbitrate, however,
needs to be supplemented by the parties’ submissions when the dispute arises. It is only
then that the tribunal is given the power to adjudicate in concreto. Importantly, themandate
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in the first dimension might be a dynamic concept when introduced claims change or
parties reach an agreement modifying the way the arbitration is conducted during the
proceedings. The question that remains open is whether the tribunal that is unwilling to
accept these dynamics may be found in excess of its mandate.
The second dimension focuses more on the tribunal’s adjudicative function and as
such it is perhaps better to refer to the tribunal’s mission rather than the mandate. As
explained above, it is the parties that agree to defer to the tribunal’s (and not a court’s)
resolution of their disputes. It is only possible, however, because states themselves delegate
their monopoly to adjudicate to arbitral tribunals. Parties are therefore just the agents
through which states empower tribunals with their adjudicative function.
Arguably, the power to adjudicate is also a duty to resolve the dispute. Consequently,
it requires that the tribunal should be granted access to certain (procedural) tools and
powers that ensure that the obligation to resolve a dispute is fulfilled.2 As a result, one
might reason that there are few limits on the tribunal’s adjudicative powers imposed by
states. In principle, the constraints are limited to compliancewith the rules of (international)
public policy of the seat (or, in the case of the New York Convention, of the enforcement
state). Consequently, these limitations are far more static and predictable than the
limitations introduced by the parties.
Both dimensions are relevant in an assessment of the proper fulfillment of a tribunal’s
mandate. Consequently, both dimensions will be relevant when the mandate is reviewed
at the post-award stage. The distribution of accents between them, however,might influence
the way the “excess of mandate” type of challenge is applied. Put differently, depending
on if the court is willing to accept that the “excess” refers more to one of the dimensions
of the mandate than the other (contractual or functional), its choice will likely influence,
in turn, the way it approaches the challenge itself.3 This would be particularly true in the
context of a tribunal’s non-compliance with the parties’ agreement to modify the scope of
the dispute or with their procedural directives advanced after the constitution of the
tribunal.
2 It is closely linked with the tribunal’s managerial authority over the procedure. For further reading see
section 4.5.3 of Chapter VII.
3 Arguably, if the court is prone to look at the “excess of mandate” type of challenge in the contractual
dimension it would be close to what is being reviewed under the “excess of jurisdiction” challenge; if,
however, it will analyze the “excess of mandate” type of challenge in the functional dimension, it will likely
find similarities between themandate violations and due process violations. Additionally, since the functional
aspect refers to the decision-making process, the analysis runs the risk of a merits review.
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1.4 The use of the “mandate” in statutory frameworks in the analyzed
legal systems
The general conclusion is that there is no consistency in the use of the term “mandate” in
the statutory texts. TheModel Lawmakes use of the termonly as a definition of a timeframe
to the tribunal’s adjudicative powers. Only the French system refers to the “mandate” at
the post-award stage. Conversely, the common law jurisdictions prefer to apply “the excess
of powers” test. A detailed analysis of the terminology used in the selected systems has
been introduced above.4 In general, the discrepancy is evident, which leads to the conclusion
that one should be careful in assessing “excess ofmandate” challenges under the assumption
that the concept will be understood in an identical or similar fashion in the jurisdictions
reviewed.
1.5 Possible difficulties in selecting appropriate grounds to challenge
awards on the basis of “excess of the tribunal’s mandate”
The difficulties in applying the “excess of mandate” types of challenge arise, because the
same factual underpinning may trigger different avenues of recourse against the arbitral
award. As a consequence, it is occasionally difficult to identify which ground for challenge
is the most suitable one.
There are two areas in which the tension is visible: the first is between the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge and the excess of jurisdiction challenge; the second clash is
with due process violations. These have been discussed in detail in section 3.4 of the
comparative chapter.5 In principle, the application of an inappropriate groundmight have
a detrimental effect on the successfulness of the challenge.
These problems are related to the two dimensions of the tribunal’smandatementioned
above.6 Essentially, the jurisdictional and the mandate issues have their cause in the same
contractual bases for the tribunal’s activities, whereas due process and themission violations
arise from the way the adjudicative function is fulfilled by the tribunal. In turn, one may
wonder whether the “excess of mandate” type of challenge has added value, if the same
wrongdoings are covered by other grounds for challenge such as the violation of the
agreement to arbitrate or of due process.
4 See section 3.2 of Chapter VII.
5 See Chapter VII.
6 See section 1.3.
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1.6 Availability of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge against the
tribunal’s decisions on claims
In the previous chapters, claims have been differentiated and assessed separately. The aim
was to observe if the approach towards the relief granted differs depending, for example,
on the legal basis of the claim (contractual or not) and on the sequencing of the claims
(whether it is brought as a claim, counterclaim or a set-off etc.).
The analysis has shown that the “excess of mandate” type of challenge should be
available, irrespective of the abovementioned division, in instances where the tribunal
granted a claim that had not been requested, i.e. where the relief granted was higher or
even different than the one sought. Notably, if the award does not respond to all claims,
the annulment (on the basis of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge) will not be, in
principle, allowed in any of the (analyzed) legal systems (apart from England).7
That being said, a number of difficulties has been observed, particularly in cases where:
(i) the claims or counterclaims brought arise fromdifferent contracts, (ii) the set-off claims
are based on a different contract than the initial claim and, finally, (iii) the tribunal decides
to requalify the legal basis for the claim requested and granted the requested relief based
on such a recharacterization.
These instances might potentially be considered under the “excess of mandate” type
of challenge, because they relate to the relief granted by the tribunal and, more generally,
to the tribunal’s duty to adjudicate the dispute brought before it. It is likely, however, that
they would be nonetheless subsumed under other grounds, namely excess of jurisdiction
(in the case of multi-contract examples, where the jurisdiction of the tribunal to deal with
the issues arising out of different contracts is in question) and due process or public policy
violation (when the parties were not heard as to the requalification of claims and
consequently “surprises” them).
One additional conclusion should be given in the context of set-offs arising out of
different contracts. Although, on occasion, the jurisdiction (or themandate) of the tribunal
to decide on the set-off claimmight be questioned, there are strong arguments that justify
the tribunal taking upon its adjudicative mandate and including set-offs in calculations of
the final award.8 Considering, once again, that the ultimate goal of the arbitral tribunal is
to resolve the dispute between the parties, it should allow them to use all available
substantive defenses. Otherwise, instead of challenges of the “excess of mandate”, it may,
potentially, face the challenge of violation of a party’s right to present its case.
7 They do, however, offer other tools to remedy such an alleged failure. See section 4.2.6 of Chapter VII.
8 See also section 4.2.3 of Chapter VII.
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1.7 Availability of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge to the process
of application of law
By and large, it has been observed that the process of application of law by the arbitral
tribunal escapes a court’s scrutiny under the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge. Similar
to the tribunal’s decision on claims, the process of application of law has been also
deconstructed into smaller pieces, starting from the method of selection of the applicable
law through the choice of applicable law, with separate sections related to the application
of substantive law and the mandatory rules of law. Final reflections dealt with a tribunal’s
decision based on standards such as amiable composition or ex aequo et bono.
As already suggested, in general, a tribunal’s legal conclusions (even if deemed by the
court as “erroneous”) are largely safe, unless they violate the public policy of the seat (or
of the place of enforcement in the case of the New York Convention). It is so, because of
the fundamental principle of no review on the merits. It gives the much needed flexibility
to the arbitral tribunal, whose adjudicativemandate is inherently connected to the process
of application of law.
It is important to note, however, that in the context of the choice ofmethod of selection
of the applicable law (e.g. conflict of laws analysis or voie directe) or designation of applicable
law, the “excess of mandate” type of challenge (in non-Model Law jurisdictions) might be
available in cases where the parties’ mutual choice is disregarded by the tribunal. As always,
the parties’ disposition (especially a joint one) is paramount. If the tribunal deliberately
decides to ignore the parties’ choice, it will fail to comply with its mandate. Even more so,
if the parties were not heard on the tribunal’s findings on the applicable law. Although the
“excess of mandate” type of challenge might be available, it is likely to compete with other
grounds, such as violation of due process or public policy.
In order to properly fulfill its mandate, the tribunal should be able to rely on its own
legal expertise. It is also important that the tribunal addresses potential issues related to
the applicable mandatory rules. This does not change the fact, however, that the tribunal
needs to give parties a chance to comment on its legal analysis. It further means that the
tribunal cannot “surprise” the parties with its legal conclusions. Although it relates greatly
to the performance of the tribunal’s mandate, this violation is, again, more suitably
addressed under the due process or public policy grounds.
The last observation to be made deals with the tribunal’s decision ex aequo et bono. In
theModel Law systems (and under the New York Convention), deciding ex aequo et bono
without express authorizationmight be qualified under the two competing grounds, namely
the “excess of mandate” type of challenge and the violation of due process. At the same
time in other jurisdictions, the “excess of mandate” type of challenge alone would be the
most suitable. Especially in the French context, one could observe that, arguably, deciding
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ex aequo et bono constitutes an independent type of tribunal’s mandate and can be
challenged if not based on an authorization by the parties.9
1.8 Availability of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge to tribunal’s
decisions on remedies
Although separating “decisions on claims” from “decisions on remedies” (which usually
are the same decision granting/rejecting e.g. “claim for damages”) might be considered as
artificial, it was important in order to identify whether any emphasis is put on a type of
claim or on a type of remedy sought during the application of the “excess of mandate”
type of challenge.
The broad scope of the tribunal’s remedial powers is essential in the proper fulfillment
of its adjudicative mission. The analysis focused on the three (arguably) most common
categories of remedies sought in arbitration: damages, specific performance and contract
adaptation and gap-filling.
In principle, the standard constraints will apply, which means that the tribunal is only
allowed to use these remedial tools when parties request it to do so. Consequently, an
award granting damages higher or different than sought will be an adequate basis to invoke
the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.10 Similarly, if any remedial power is expressly
excluded by the parties in their agreement to arbitrate, the tribunal should respect such a
limitation.
It has been observed, however, that the courts will accept that the tribunal may have a
broader remedial discretion if it comes from the parties (either expressed in the contract
or coming from applicable substantive law). It means that there is no controversy in the
tribunal awarding specific performance (if asked) nor is there a controversy when the
tribunal awards the type of damages that are foreign to the place of arbitration (such as
punitive damages). In any event, it is sensible for the tribunal to sever them (e.g. punitive
damages) and include them as an independent part of the award in the anticipation of a
potential challenge.11
Finally, one should note that parties are well advised to be explicit in granting the
tribunal gap-filling authority. As long as the award might survive the “excess of mandate”
type of challenge, it will be more susceptible to a successful recourse without express
contractual provisions allowing the tribunal to fill the gaps. It is especially so considering
that none of the reviewed arbitration systems include a specific rule addressing the tribunal’s
power to fill the gaps.
9 See Art. 1512 of the FCCP.
10 It is likely that the annulment will affect only the amount that goes beyond the parties’ request.
11 This way there will be no problem in enforcing the remainder of the award.
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1.9 Availability of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge to tribunal’s
decisions accessory to the parties’ main submissions
The adjudicative process involves not only decisions on the parties’ main claims, but also
on interest (to main claims seeking monetary relief) and on the costs of the arbitration.
These decisions might be considered as inherent to the arbitral adjudicative process and
as such deserve separate attention.
In principle, the decisions on interest should be tested against the “excess of mandate”
type of challenge in the same fashion as any other decisions. It means that if parties agree
to limit the tribunal’s powers to award interest or the interest granted is higher or different
from the one sought, parties may have a legitimate reason to seek a recourse. Importantly,
however, on the occasionwhen themain claim is granted, the substantive lawmay authorize
the tribunal to award interest. If such a default mechanism is available, the tribunal’s
decision might be upheld even in the absence of the parties’ request. In any event, it is
better for the tribunal to be guided by the parties’ petitions.
Also a decision on costs has a special status, because of its important procedural function
of disciplining the parties. Consequently, the review of the “excess of mandate” should be
slightly modified. It does start with the traditional analysis, namely with a review whether
the parties did limit the power to award costs and a comparison between the parties’
requests on costs with the tribunal’s findings. An extra layer of deference, however, should
be given if the court finds that the tribunal had disregarded the parties’ instructions
regarding costs in order to penalize their conduct during the proceedings. In principle,
such a disciplining mechanism should be well within the tribunal’s adjudicative mandate
even if it does not correspond to the parties’ petita (thus, arguably, the mandate in its
contractual dimension). Therefore, it should survive the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge.
1.10 Application of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge to the
tribunal’s procedural decisions
One of the undisputed values of arbitration is that the parties are able to shape the
proceedings in accordance with their preference instead of following the procedural
structure of a certain legal system. When the tribunal is given its adjudicative mandate, it
is expected to follow the parties’ procedural demands. Consequently, if the tribunal does
not comply with these procedural instructions, its decision might be challenged at the
post-award stage.
At first, it is important to highlight that the tribunal’s decisions on procedure do not
have an adjudicative function. Instead, they are rather managerial tools at the disposition
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of the arbitral tribunal. If one considers the two dimensions of the mandate, one should
conclude that these decisions should not fit comfortably with the scope of the “excess of
mandate” type of challenge. This is not to say, however, that parties should be barred from
raising objections at the post-award stage. The only concern regards too broad an
interpretation of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
Consequently, the research has shown that all the systems recognize that the parties
should be able to challenge such a tribunal’s decision. Importantly, however, the Model
Law and the New York Convention systems designate a separate ground for the tribunal’s
decisions that do not follow the procedure, whereas other jurisdictions (France, England
and the U.S.) will consider such a violation under the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge.12 At the same time, it is recognized that not every deviation from the prescribed
procedures will suffice to successfully challenge the award – it has to be material. Taking
into account the functional dimension of the tribunal’s mandate,13 it has been argued that
such a procedural deviation should also be connected with the adjudication of the parties’
claims in order to be subsumed under the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
As highlighted above,14 the tribunal’s mandate in a contractual dimension might be
considered as a dynamic concept, i.e. exposed to potential alterations made by the parties.
In the context of the adjudicative function of the tribunal, it relates to modifications of
claims brought by the parties. The question is whether, and if so, to what extent, parties
may modify the procedural conduct. Put differently, does the tribunal (that has accepted
its mandate) put its award at risk if it refuses to comply with the joint procedural request
(e.g. an additional round of submissions made by the parties during the arbitral process)?
Possibly, the answer to this question is the most controversial issue related to the
tribunal’s procedural decisions. It shows the tension between party autonomy (and its
limits) and the tribunal’s autonomy to properly fulfill its adjudicative function. It has been
concluded that the tribunal should be able to refuse to follow the parties’ procedural
instructions that are given after the tribunal’s acceptance of the mandate without putting
its award at risk. That being said, the tribunal should not make use of such a power lightly.
It should only be available at the tribunal’s disposal if the parties’ joint request imperils
the fulfillment of the adjudicative function. In most instances, however, the performance
of the adjudicative function will not be endangered. Additionally, the tribunal should be
able to persuade the parties of its vision of the procedural conduct or at least to convince
12 Although in England a separate ground for the “failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in
accordance with the procedure agreed by the parties” exists (see Section 68(2)(c) of the EAA), due to its
limited practical significance, it is possible that other heads from the list of serious irregularities will apply.
See further Chapter VII.
13 See section 1.3.
14 See section 1.3.
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them of a solution that is satisfactory to all. Consequently, disregard of a joint procedural
agreement should be allowed, but only in exceptional circumstances.
1.11 Looking at the concept of the tribunal’s mandate through lenses of the
post-award challenge against its excess
A closer look at the “excess of mandate” type of challenge made it possible to identify
several conclusions regarding the nature and the concept of the arbitral tribunal itself. It
holds true, even though the “excess of mandate” type of challenge is not understood
everywhere in the same fashion and that different accents may play a role.
At the same time, however, it remains undisputed that the tribunal’s findings on the
merits escape the court’s control (no review on themerits). It is important because it shows
that the dispute resolution function is truly delegated outside the court system. In turn,
the courts have no intention of reclaiming their dispute resolution power and they are
generally satisfied with their supervisory role over the arbitral process.
Additionally, it is concluded that both dimensions of the tribunal’s mandate, namely
its contractual nature and adjudicative function are relevant in addressing the tribunal’s
potential violation at the post-award stage. It further means that the definition of the
tribunal’s mandate should not only be limited to either of those dimensions. Moreover,
because of these two dimensions, a number of frictions may occur. These are related to a
competition between party and tribunal’s autonomy.
Another finding deals with the “dynamics” of the concept of the mandate. In other
words, the question is whether the mandate can be altered during the proceedings, and
who has the power tomodify it. Obviously, it is the parties that are able to change the scope
of the mandate by modifying the scope of their submission. In principle, however, this
should be allowed only with the permission of the tribunal. Notably, it is less clear, if the
same principle would apply to the control over the procedure. Arguably, after themandate
is accepted, the tribunal should be able to reject the parties’ procedural instructions if they
threaten the fulfillment of the adjudicative function. In any event, in the context of the
“excess of mandate” type of challenge, it might be relevant to identify if the concept of the
mandate is dynamic or static.
1.12 Potential changes in the shape of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate
Traditionally, international arbitration has been valued for its informal and confidential
character, for the possibility of the proceedings to be tailor-made to the parties’ needs and
for the ease of enforcement of the arbitral award. In this matrix, the adjudicative mission
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affected only the parties involved and could be reasonably analyzed in its contractual
dimension.15
It is yet to be seen, however, if the ongoing developments in international arbitration
will not or should not affect the shape of the tribunal’s mandate. If one considers the
increased judicialization and formalization of the arbitral process, the phenomenon of a
“due process paranoia” and the abuse of process, onemaywonder if the parties’ continuous
influence on the shape of the tribunal’s mandate should not be constrained and the power
over the procedure not be given to the tribunal (after it is constituted). At the same time,
one may reflect if the impact of the development of investor-state arbitration may have
on international commercial arbitration (together with an increased number of
stakeholders) will not result in a different understanding of the tribunal’s mandate in its
adjudicative dimension.
It brings potential risks at the post-award stage, considering that new arguments against
the “excess of mandate” will be brought and it will be up to the courts of each individual
jurisdiction to decide as to the scope of the tribunal’s autonomy. Consequently, instead of
a common framework for this basic notion, the approaches might increasingly diverge.
2 Recommendations
Based on the abovementioned conclusions, the research offers a few propositions addressed
to the parties in arbitration (section 2.1), for arbitrators and judges (section 2.2) and for
legislators/UNCITRAL (section 2.3). These will be presented below.
2.1 Recommendations for parties
Since arbitration is contractual by nature, the best way to influence the mandate is to do
so by the parties’ consent, shaped and controlled. By means of the agreement, therefore,
the parties may tailor the tribunal’s mandate to its needs (section 2.1.1) or try to exclude
the possibility of the “excess of mandate” recourse (section 2.1.2). Whatever they decide,
it is preferable that they undertake a more conscious choice of what they expect from
arbitrators.
2.1.1 Shaping the mandate
The first solution available for the parties is to be more attentive to the tribunal’s rights
and obligation at the outset of the proceedings or even at the stage of drafting their
15 See section 1.3.
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agreement to arbitrate. This way, the parties’ choices will be controlling to the tribunal,
and, at the same time, it will give a clear(er) structure of what parties expect from the
tribunal and the arbitral process itself. Arguably, it holds true particularly if parties wish
to narrow the mandate of arbitral tribunal.
If arbitrators learnwhat “type” ofmandate will be entrusted to them before they accept
their function, it is less likely that they will “exceed” (in the eyes of the aggrieved party)
the mandate at the later stage. Therefore, even in cases where the agreement to arbitrate
is broad, parties may supplement it with additional provisions on the tribunal’s rights and
obligations. This may include (or expressly exclude) for example:
1. The tribunal’s powers regarding set-off,
2. The tribunal’s powers to perform independent legal research,
3. The scope of the tribunal’s remedial powers (especially in the context of filling gaps),
4. The scope of the tribunal’s sanctioning authority,
5. The tribunal’s sovereignty over the proceedings.
Of course, such inclusionswill become a “double-edged sword” thatwill limit the availability
of the recourse at the post-award stage. This, however, is the goal of the “one-stop shop
for arbitration”, the notion that has the finality of the arbitral award at heart.
2.1.2 Exclusion agreements
In principle, parties wishing to ensure the finality of the arbitral award have yet another
option, namely, theymay try to contract out of the (part of) post-award reviewmechanism,
by way of an exclusion agreement in their contract. Unsurprisingly, the purpose of the
exclusion agreement is to agree that the tribunal’s decision is final and that the post-award
recourse is excluded. It is also, at least theoretically, possible that parties instead of
completely excluding the post-award recourse, narrow it. Limiting the scope of the
post-award recourse might be a particularly useful tool especially in the context of the
challenge against the alleged “excess ofmandate”. At the same time, however, it is necessary
to note that the construction of the international arbitration regime at the arbitral seat
might not allow the parties to contract out from the post-award judicial control.
In general, the setting-aside provisions in the reviewed systems constitute their integral
part designed to tackle only a limited number of serious violations. Because of this
exclusivity, the setting-aside provisions will likely be considered as a mandatory part of
the arbitration law. Consequently, the parties’ agreement to modify the structure of the
post-award review might not be allowed or be allowed only in a specific form. For the
research at hand, it is therefore relevant to reflect whether it is possible to eliminate the
“excess of mandate” type of challenge.
No uniform answer can be given in theModel Law context. The problem arises, because
“[m]ost national arbitration statutes do not contain provisions expressly addressing the
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validity or enforceability of agreements excluding annulment rights. That is true, in particular,
of the UNCITRALModel Law, where neither Article 34 nor any other provision of the statute
addresses the issue.”16 Additionally, the Model Law courts reach different conclusions as
to the validity of the exclusion agreements.17 Therefore, parties are required to investigate
if the designated seat will enforce the exclusion agreement. For example, in Belgium
according to Article 1718 of BJC the explicit exclusion agreement made in the agreement
to arbitrate or later will be enforceable provided that none of the parties is connected to
Belgium.18Moreover, in Germany it seems that opting-out of the “excess ofmandate” type
of challenge would be possible, but only after the award is rendered.19 These conclusions
may not apply, however, to other Model Law jurisdictions.20
As explained in the Chapter on the French system, after the 2011 reform, parties may
contractually waive their rights to seek annulment of the arbitral award.21 Importantly,
however, the policy choice made by the French legislator entails that “[e]ither the parties
choose not to have any right to seek a set-aside in France, or they maintain the review by
the French courts as provided for under French law.”22 It means that excluding Article
1520(3) of the FCCP alone will not be possible.
Similar difficulties will appear under the English system, because the “excess of powers”
challenge is included in the list of serious irregularities of Section 68 of the EAA. Since
Section 68 of the EAA is amandatory provision,23 the parties’ agreement to narrow (Section
68) post-award recourse will not be enforceable. Also in the U.S. it will not be possible to
enforce the agreements that narrow the scope of the post-award review. The Restatement
concluded that “[p]arties may not by agreement reduce or eliminate the grounds for vacating
or denying confirmation of a U.S. Convention award or for denying recognition or
enforcement of a foreign Convention award, including by agreeing to subject their dispute
to the arbitration law of a state within the United States that allows reduced review or
provides fewer grounds for such relief than those provided in the applicable Convention.”24
This is also in line with the Supreme Court decision in Hall Street Assocs, LLC v. Mattel,
16 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) p.3368.
17 (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3368-3367.
18 See Art. 1718 of the BJC. For further reading, see also (Verbruggen, Commentary on Part VI of the Belgian
Judicial Code, Chapter VII: Article 1718, 2016) pp.489-494.
19 (Kreindler,Wolff, & Rieder, Commercial Arbitration inGermany, 2016) p.329. (Scherer, The fate of parties’
agreements on judicial review of awards: a comparative and normative analysis of party-autonomy at the
post-award stage, 2016) p.444.
20 For further reading, see also (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3364-3378.
21 Art. 1522 of the FCCP. For further reading, see Chapter III.
22 (Scherer, The fate of parties’ agreements on judicial review of awards: a comparative and normative analysis
of party-autonomy at the post-award stage, 2016) p.443.
23 See Schedule 1 of the EAA.
24 The Restatement (second tentative draft) p.304.
459
VIII Conclusions and recommendations
Inc.25 Although itmight be difficult to enforce such an agreement under the current system,
the use of party autonomy at the post-award stage is increasingly endorsed by scholars
which may change the dominant approach.26
2.1.3 Inclusion of the appeal mechanism
Instead of limiting the scope of the post-award review, parties may also wish to broaden
it. Similar to the narrowing of the post-award review, however, in many jurisdictions
expanding the scope of the post-award judicial control might not be possible. That being
said, partiesmay contemplate introducing an arbitral appealmechanism instead. This way
they will be able to control any potential mistakes the tribunal made and will not need to
disguise its merits review with the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
2.2 Recommendations for arbitrators and judges
Another groups of actors that are affected by the concept of the mandate are arbitrators
during the proceedings and judges at the post-award stage. Recommendation for each of
the group will be presented in the separate sections below (section 2.2.1 and section 2.2.2).
2.2.1 Active participation of the tribunal in structuring the mandate
As explained above, arbitrators should feel comfortable in fulfilling their mandate and
have a right to expect that their adjudicative function comes with degree of autonomy
which inherently includes managerial powers over procedure, thus also over the parties.
This autonomy should be used with care, however.
Arbitrators can benefit from employing the two-dimension concept of their mandate
in order to better understand their role as arbitrators. Additionally, defining dimensions
would allow both the parties and the arbitrators to better communicate their expectations
during the lifecycle of the arbitral proceedings. Arguably, it would in turn enhance efficiency
of the proceedings and reduce the likelihood of the post-award challenge.
Therefore, it is recommended that tribunals take an active role in defining (or clarifying)
their mandates (in both dimensions) at the outset of the proceedings.
2.2.2 Following “no review on the merits” approach by judges
The undertaken analysis has shown that the reviewing courts are not easily persuaded by
the arguments raised against the tribunals’ decisions on the basis of the “excess ofmandate”
25 Hall Street Assocs, LLC v. Mattel, Inc. 552 U.S. 576, 128 S. Ct. 1396, 170 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2008).
26 See (Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2014) pp.3364-3378, and (Scherer, The fate of parties’
agreements on judicial review of awards: a comparative and normative analysis of party-autonomy at the
post-award stage, 2016) pp.437-457.
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type of challenge. This position should be complimented. Consequently, the
recommendation that can be given to the judges continue to apply the pro-arbitration
design of arbitration laws.
Additionally, the study shows that looking at the mandate from the two-dimension
perspective (by identifying the adjudicative and contractual aspect of the tribunal’s
mandate)27 helps to conceptualize what authority is given to the tribunal. In turn, it
facilitates explaining what aspects of the tribunal’s decision should be actually controlled
by the court at the post-award stage. Consequently, using the two-dimension of the
tribunal’s mandate can be a useful tool for the courts when deciding on the “excess of
mandate” challenge.
In particular, the court is facedwith “excess ofmandate” type of challenge and required
to review at the adjudicative dimension of themandate, should always remember to refrain
from acting as an appeal body for the arbitral tribunal’s decision.28
It all leads to the conclusion that the courts should not allow the parties to use the
“excess of mandate” type of challenge as a disguised vehicle for reviewing themerits of the
arbitral tribunal’s award.
2.3 Recommendations for legislators/the UNCITRAL
The study have shown that there is a room for improvement for each of the analysed
systems in the context of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge. There are several ways
the policy makers can address this post-award mechanism. One is to abolish (if existing)
the reference to themandate (section 2.3.1), the second is to follow the Swissmodel (section
2.3.2). Thirdly, one should consider the formula created by van den Berg for the purpose
of the amendment of the New York Convention (or its variation) (section 2.3.3). Finally,
the UNCITRAL may address interpretative difficulties in the Recommendation (section
2.3.4).
2.3.1 Abolishing the reference to the tribunal’smandate at the post-award stage
As explained above, the “excess ofmandate” type of challengemay at times create difficulties
in interpretation, because it refers to the tribunal’s mandate in two dimensions: the first
one relates to the contractual aspect of themandate, whereas the second to the (adjudicative)
function of the tribunal.29
27 See also section 1.3 of Chapter VIII (on the dimensions of the tribunal’s mandate).
28 See also section 1.2 of this Chapter.
29 See section 1.3.
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As for now, the courts are willing to limit their inquiry and not review the merits of
the case.30 It means that the “excess of mandate” type of challenge is, in principle, limited
to a review of the award against the ne ultra petita principle which prohibits the tribunal
to grant a relief beyond what was requested. At the same time, however, this ground for
recourse has the potential of accommodating many more prospective challenges: on the
one hand challenge those of procedural nature, on the other hand attractingmerits review.
Moreover, it often competes with other grounds for recourse – the excess of jurisdiction
and violation of due process. It means that it does create confusion in its application, and,
arguably is not needed considering that other grounds may be invoked.
All in all, instead of referring to the tribunal’smandate, the post-award recourse should
only address decisions that grant more than has been requested. In the alternative, the
statutory frameworks should be more explicit on what the mandate entails (and, in turn,
which dimension of the mandate is relevant).31
2.3.2 The Swiss model
As explained immediately above, one of the solutions preventing the interpretative
difficulties regarding the “excess ofmandate” type of challenge is (simply) to avoidmaking
reference to the tribunal’s mandate at the post-award stage.32 This is precisely the solution
enacted in the Swiss Private International Law Act (“PILA”).33
Pursuant to Article 190(1)(2) of the Swiss PILA:
The award may only be annulled:
a. if the sole arbitrator was not properly appointed or if the arbitral tribunal
was not properly constituted;
b. if the arbitral tribunal wrongly accepted or declined jurisdiction;
c. if the arbitral tribunal’s decision went beyond the claims submitted to it, or
failed to decide one of the items of the claim;
d. if the principle of equal treatment of the parties or the right of the parties to
be heard was violated;
e. if the award is incompatible with public policy.
One should observe that instead of a reference to the elusivemandate, ground (c) operates
with the notion of claims submitted (petitum). This way, it easily addresses only the
instances where the tribunal decision exceeds the relief sought or when the decision fails
30 See section 2.2.
31 See also section 2.3.2.
32 See section 2.3.1.
33 Switzerland’s Federal Code on Private International Law (1987), translation available at
https://www.swissarbitration.org/files/34/Swiss%20International%20Arbitration%20Law/IPRG_english.pdf
[last accessed 19 January 2019].
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to address all of the claims submitted. Additionally, it fits well with the remaining grounds
for recourse under the Swiss PILA, and arguably, without overlap. Such a limited recourse
is to be preferred and recommended to be followed as a model construction for the
post-award relief.
2.3.3 The “van den Berg formula”
Almost ten years ago, at the ICCACongress in Dublin that celebrated the fiftieth birthday
of the New York Convention, van den Berg in his keynote speech proposed a hypothetical
draft Convention focused on enforcement of arbitral awards, which was later echoed as
the “Dublin draft”.34 It was intended to modernize and improve the functioning of the
New York Convention. In his proposal, among other things, van den Berg had modified
the wording of Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention.
The draft text of said provision reads that the enforcement of the award shall be refused
if “the relief granted in the award is more than, or different from, the relief sought in the
arbitration and such relief cannot be severed from the relief sought and granted […].”35
This research shows that, the formula used by van den Berg, as an alternative to the
Swiss model, should be endorsed. It is clear and addresses only the instances where the
tribunal goes beyond its adjudicative authority. Although van den Berg’s proposal did not
gain sufficient momentum to change the New York Convention, it remains a valuable
piece of draft legislation.
Consequently, policy-makers should take benefit from its coherence. They can do so
in a number of ways.
One is to consider the Miami draft (at least in the context of the “excess of mandate”
type of challenge) as an interpretative tool for the New York Convention.36 Since the
mechanism of the New York Convention was later included in the UNCITRAL Model
Law, the Miami Draft may serve in a similar capacity for Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model
Law as well.
Secondly, the UNCITRAL may take upon the draft as the basis for its future work. As
explained above, even if it is concluded that the New York Convention is not ripe for a
change, the van den Berg’s proposal may easily be adopted for the purposes of the Model
Law. This way, it might become a drive behind the change of the post-award mechanism
offered in the Model Law itself and it might even trigger the “bottom-up” reform of the
(New York Convention) enforcement system. Even if the consequences will not go as far,
it will still provide an improvement for the modern model legislation.
34 See also Chapter VI. The “Dublin draft” was subsequently dubbed the “Miami draft”.
35 See Art. 5(3)(c) of the Miami Draft.
36 (Paulsson M. R., 2012) p.12. See also section 2.3.4.
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If (the modified version of) van den Berg’s proposal were to be included in the Model
Law, it may look as follows:
Article 34 – Application for setting-aside as exclusive recourse against arbitral
award
1. An arbitral award shall only be set aside on the grounds expressly set forth
in this article.
2. An arbitral award shall be set aside on the grounds set forth in this article in
manifest cases only.
3. An arbitral award may be set aside if, at the request of the party against
whom the award is invoked, that party asserts and proves that:
a. there is no valid arbitration agreement under the law of the country to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing indication thereon under
the law of this State; or
b. the party against whom the award is invokedwas not treatedwith equality
or was not given a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case; or
c. the relief granted in the award is more than, or different from, the relief
sought in the arbitration and such relief cannot be severed from the relief
sought and granted; or
d. the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or in the absence of such an agreement, not in
accordance with this Law; or
e. the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, or in the absence of such an agreement, not in accordance with
this Law; or
f. the award is subject to appeal on the merits before an arbitral appeal
tribunal or a court in this State; or
g. the award would violate international public policy.
4. The court may on its own motion set an arbitral award aside on ground (g)
of paragraph 3.
5. The party against whom the award is invoked cannot rely on grounds (a) to
(e) of paragraph 3 if that party has not raised them in the arbitrationwithout
undue delay after the moment when the existence of the ground became
known to that party.
6. (optional) By way of a specific agreement the parties may, at any time,
expressly waive their right to bring an action to set aside on grounds (a) to
(f) of paragraph 3.
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The necessary changes have been made to fit in the context of the setting-aside and not
the enforcement procedure.Additionally, the provision addressing the exclusion agreements
has been added. For the sake of convenience, the comparison table is presented below.
Table 7
The proposal for the new Article 34 of the
Model Law
Article 5 of the Miami Draft
Application for setting-aside as exclusive recourse
against arbitral award
Article 5 – Grounds for Refusal of Enforcement
1. An arbitral award shall only be set aside on the
grounds expressly set forth in this article.
1. Enforcement of an arbitral award shall not be
refused on any ground other than the grounds
expressly set forth in this article.
2. An arbitral award shall be set aside on the
grounds set forth in this article in manifest cases
only.
2. Enforcement shall be refused on the grounds set
forth in this article in manifest cases only.
3. An arbitral award may be set aside if, at the
request of the party against whom the award is
invoked, that party asserts and proves that:
3. Enforcement of an arbitral award shall be
refused if, at the request of the party against whom
the award is invoked, that party asserts and proves
that:
(a) there is no valid arbitration agreement under
the law of the country to which the parties have
(a) there is no valid arbitration agreement under
the law of the country where the awardwasmade;
or subjected it or, failing indication thereon under
the law of this State; or
(b) the party against whom the award is invoked
was not treated with equality or was not given a
reasonable opportunity of presenting its case; or
(b) the party against whom the award is invoked
was not treated with equality or was not given a
reasonable opportunity of presenting its case; or
(c) the relief granted in the award is more than,
or different from, the relief sought in the
(c) the relief granted in the award is more than,
or different from, the relief sought in the
arbitration and such relief cannot be severed from
the relief sought and granted; or
arbitration and such relief cannot be severed from
the relief sought and granted; or
(d) the composition of the arbitral tribunal was
not in accordance with the agreement of the
(d) the composition of the arbitral tribunal was
not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties, or in the absence of such an agreement,
not in accordance with this Law; or
parties, or in the absence of such an agreement,
not in accordance with the law of the country
where the award was made; or
(e) the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, or in the absence
(e) the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, or in the absence
of such an agreement, not in accordance with this
Law; or
of such an agreement, not in accordance with the
law of the country where the award was made; or
(f) the award is subject to appeal on the merits
before an arbitral appeal tribunal or a court in
this State; or
(f) the award is subject to appeal on the merits
before an arbitral appeal tribunal or a court in
the country where the award was made; or
(deleted)(g) the award has been set aside by the court in
the country where the award was made on
grounds equivalent to grounds (a) to (e) of this
paragraph; or
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The proposal for the new Article 34 of the
Model Law
Article 5 of the Miami Draft
(g) the award would violate international public
policy.
(h) enforcement of the award would violate
international public policy as prevailing in the
country where enforcement is sought.
4. The courtmay on its ownmotion set an arbitral
award aside on ground (g) of paragraph 3.
4. The court may on its own motion refuse
enforcement of an arbitral award on ground (h)
of paragraph 3.
5. The party against whom the award is invoked
cannot rely on grounds (a) to (e) of paragraph 3
5. The party against whom the award is invoked
cannot rely on grounds (a) to (e) of paragraph 3
if that party has not raised them in the arbitrationif that party has not raised them in the arbitration
without undue delay after the moment when thewithout undue delay after the moment when the
existence of the ground became known to that
party.
existence of the ground became known to that
party.
(optional) 6. By way of a specific agreement the
parties may, at any time, expressly waive their
right to bring an action to set-aside on grounds
(a) to (f) of paragraph 3.
Arguably, this mechanism will also fit comfortably with the architecture of both Model
Law and non-Model Law jurisdictions and it will not conflict with the New York
Convention.
2.3.4 The UNCITRAL Recommendation regarding the interpretation of its
instruments
As an alternative for the modification of Article 34 of the Model Law, the UNCITRAL
may also introduce a recommendation regarding the interpretation of Article 34(2)(a)(iii)
of the Model Law in its current shape.37 If such a recommendation was to be drafted, its
operative part should include the following:
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
[…]
Taking into account the finality of the arbitral tribunal’s decision and exclusive
character of article 34 recourse
[…]
1. Recommends that article 34(2)(a)(i) of the Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration be applied to any and all jurisdictional objections,
including those considering the scope of the agreement to arbitrate,
37 Arguably, the recommendation may also cover other parts of the setting-aside provision.
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2. Recommends that article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration be applied only to objections that concern the tribunal’s
relief granted that is higher or different from the relief sought.
There is an obstacle for release of such a recommendation related to the UNCITRAL’s
own undertakings. The recently publishedUNCITRAL Secretariat Guide to theNewYork
Convention seems to interpret the “excess of mandate” type of challenge available in the
text of the Convention as referring to the challenge to the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction
and not to the issues related to the parties’ petita.38
Arguably, even if the UNCITRAL will not release any interpretative recommendation
for Article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law, van den Berg’s proposal may still be used as a
persuasive authority.39
3 Directions for further research
Considering an ongoing development in the field of investor – state arbitration, it might
be interesting to see whether the concept of themandate and its excess differ in the context
of international commercial arbitration and investor – state arbitration.
Taking into account the number of stakeholders in investor – state arbitration, arguably,
statesmight be eager to increase the control over the tribunal’s adjudicative function, either
by introducing some form of review on the merits or by improving the statutory structure
of the tribunal’s adjudicative mandate (which in turn would limit the parties’ authority to
do so). Consequently, onemight further inquire if the adjudicativemandate of the arbitral
tribunal in the international commercial arbitration context can be distinguished from its
counterpart in investor – state arbitration.
4 Concluding observations
In the era of an increased judicialization and formalization of international arbitration,
parties need to be prepared that the balance between their autonomy and the autonomy
38 See (UNCITRAL Secretariat, 2016) p.174 (“Consequently, where an arbitral tribunal has rendered an award
which decides matters beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement, there is a ground for refusing to enforce
an award under article V (1)(c).”), p.175 (“[t]hough some authors have argued that article V (1)(c) provides
a second, separate ground for refusal to enforce an award rendered ultra petita, courts have rejected challenges
to recognition or enforcement under article V (1)(c) based on the fact that the arbitrators had exceeded their
authority by deciding on issues or granting forms of relief beyond those pleaded by the parties.”).
39 See section 2.3.3.
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of arbitratorsmay shift for the benefit of the latter. This consequentlymay push the parties
to apply ever more often for the “excess of mandate” type of challenge.
If this ground for recourse remains available, it will be up to the courts to decidewhether
the contractual or adjudicative aspect of themandate should be prioritized. If the statutory
framework changes, however, in order tomake clear that onlyultra or extra petita violations
should be set aside, it will require the parties to shape the tribunal’s mandate carefully
already at the eve of the arbitral proceedings, knowing that it is their initial responsibility
to do so at the outset and bearing the consequences at the later stage. It will also be clear
for the tribunals that it is their responsibility to manage the proceedings.
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1 Annex 1
Annex 1 Translations of the French setting-aside provision regarding the excess of the
tribunal’s mandate
Art 1520 of the
CCP
Art. 1518 of the
Proposed CCP
Art. 1502 of the
Old CCP
Translations
Le tribunal arbitral
a statué sans se
le tribunal arbitral
a statué sans se
Si l’arbitre a statué
sans se conformer
conformer à laconformer à laà lamission qui lui
avait été conferee mission qui lui
avait été confiée
mission qui lui
avait été conférée
ou après
l’expiration de
cette mission
--If the arbitrator
decided in a
(France, Decree no. 81-500 of May 12,
1981, inserting Arts. 1442-1507 into
mannerthe New Code of Civil Procedure
(English translation), 1982) p.281. incompatible with
the mission
conferred upon
him
if the arbitrator
has not rendered
(Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV,
Arbitration, 1984) p.10
his decision in
accordance with
the mission
conferred upon
him
the arbitral
tribunal ruled
(Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV,
Arbitration, 2011)
without complying
with the mandate
conferred upon it
the arbitral
tribunal ruled
http://www.parisarbitration.com/
wp-content/uploads/2014/02/French-
Law-on-Arbitration.pdf without complying
with the mandate
conferred upon it
the arbitral
tribunal ruled
(Bensaude, 2015) p.1176
without complying
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Art 1520 of the
CCP
Art. 1518 of the
Proposed CCP
Art. 1502 of the
Old CCP
Translations
with the mission
conferred upon it
that the arbitral
tribunal decided
(Rouche, Pointon, & Delvolvé, 2009)
p.203
the case otherwise
than in accordance
with the terms of
the mandate
conferred on it
The arbitrator has
decided without
(Craig W. L., The arbitrator’s mission
and the application of law in
respecting theinternational commercial arbitration,
2010) p.265 mission which had
been given to him
2 Annex 2
Annex 2 Remedies at the English court’s disposal when faced with a challenge
Appeal on point
of law under
Section 69 of the
Act
Challenge against
serious
irregularityunder
Section 68 of the
Act
Challenge to
substantive
jurisdictionof the
arbitral tribunal
under Section
67(1)(b) of the
Act
Challenge to
substantive
jurisdictionof the
arbitral tribunal
under Section
67(1)(a) of the
Act
X--XConfirm the
award
X--XVary the award
XX-XSet aside the
award in whole
XX-XSet aside the
award in part
X--Remit the award
in whole
X--Remit the award
in part
XRemit the award
to the tribunal in
whole for
reconsideration in
the light of the
court’s
determination
XRemit the award
to the tribunal in
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Appeal on point
of law under
Section 69 of the
Act
Challenge against
serious
irregularityunder
Section 68 of the
Act
Challenge to
substantive
jurisdictionof the
arbitral tribunal
under Section
67(1)(b) of the
Act
Challenge to
substantive
jurisdictionof the
arbitral tribunal
under Section
67(1)(a) of the
Act
part for
reconsideration in
the light of the
court’s
determination
-X--Declare the award
to be of no effect
in whole
-X--Declare the award
to be of no effect
in part
-X-Declare the award
on themerits to be
of no effect in
whole
-X-Declare the award
on themerits to be
of no effect in part
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Abstract
Arbitration and excess of mandate
The idea of arbitral tribunal’s mandate remains an elusive concept lacking any legal
definition despite the frequent use in the international arbitration scholarship. Often
associated with other notions such as the tribunal’s mission, powers, authority or even
jurisdiction, the meaning of arbitral tribunal’s mandate remains a moving target and
escapes easy classification.
Importantly, however, non-compliance with the arbitral tribunal’s mandate provides
a basis for a challenge of the arbitral award at the post-award stage – either during
setting-aside proceedings or at the enforcement stage. Considering that the concept of the
tribunal’smandate is vague, it attracts, in turn, a broad interpretation of the ground leading
to a frustration of the fundamental value of arbitration – the finality of the arbitral award.
It is therefore essential to determine how national courts review arbitral awards on the
basis of “excess of mandate” and consequently in what instances they accept the argument
that the tribunal acted in violation of its mandate. This study aims at recognizing the
similarities and differences of the “excess ofmandate” type of challenges in France, England,
and the U.S., as well as in the UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention.
Looking through the eyes of what the selected legal systems consider to be an “excess
of mandate” and identifying common features contributes to a better understanding of
the concept of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate itself. Accordingly, this research’s aims at
adding a building block to the definition of the tribunal’s mandate.
Mandate is for the final resolution of the dispute
It is generally accepted that the pro-arbitration policy of courts reinforces the deference
to the finality of the tribunal’s award. Consequently, it is repeatedly confirmed that no
review of the merits is possible. The courts may not, and should not, get involved in
reassessing the tribunal’s conclusions on the substance of the dispute between the parties.
As highlighted above, the “no review on the merits” principle is particularly relevant
in the context of the “excess of mandate” type of challenge because this recourse gives a
court an opportunity to evaluate how the tribunal exercised its adjudicative function. In
turn, this may attract the reviewing courts to have a closer look at the “correctness” of the
tribunal’s decisions. However, courts generally restrict the review of a tribunal’s conclusion
and defer to the tribunal’s findings.
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Functional and contractual dimension of the tribunal’s mandate
International arbitration has two dimensions, a functional and a contractual one. Arguably,
these two dimensions are equally relevant when assessing the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s
mandate. A closer examination of both dimensions therefore facilitates explaining the
meaning of the tribunal’s mandate.
In principle, the functional dimension concentrates on the arbitral tribunal’s role,
namely, to resolve the dispute between the parties. As such, the arbitral tribunal’smandate
is similar to the duty of a judge to resolve disputes. This means that themandate to resolve
the disputes should be seen as the arbitral tribunal’s duty. Importantly, the arbitral tribunal’s
mandate in its functional dimension stresses the importance of the tribunal’s autonomy,
including a catalogue of powers to resolve the dispute between the parties.
The second dimension focuses on the contractual framework of the arbitral tribunal’s
mandate. After all, the arbitral tribunal can only undertake its judicial function when it is
contractually entrusted with such a mandate by the parties themselves. It entails therefore
that by resolving the dispute, the arbitral tribunal only renders a service and fulfills its
contractual obligations vis-à-vis parties. In turn, the parties are left with the power to shape
and (potentially) modify the scope of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate and its autonomy
(even at the later stage of the proceedings). The contractual dimension emphasizes the
primacy of the party autonomy over the tribunal.
In the lifecycle of any arbitration process, it is critical to strike a balance between
tribunal’s and party autonomy, thus, to align both dimensions of the tribunal’s mandate.
Considering that it does not always happen it is necessary to examine carefully how both
dimensions of the tribunal’s mandate are intertwined, and how they affect the perception
of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate at large.
Both dimensions are relevant at the post-award stage
At the post-award stage, both dimensions are relevant when themandate is being reviewed.
The distribution of accents between themmay influence the way the “excess of mandate”
type of challenge is applied. Put differently, if the court is willing to accept that the “excess”
refers more to the one of the dimensions of mandate than the other, its choice will likely
influence, in turn, the way it approaches the challenge itself.
For example, if the court is prone to look at the “excess of mandate” type of challenge
in the contractual dimension, it would be close to what is being reviewed under the “excess
of jurisdiction” challenge; if, however, it will analyze the “excess of mandate” type of
challenge in the functional dimension, it will likely find similarities between the mandate
violations and due process violations. Additionally, the court’s analysis that focuses on
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functional aspect of the tribunal’s mandate runs the risk of a merits review – which is not
allowed.
Concluding remarks
The reference to the mandate at the post-award stage creates unnecessary uncertainties in
interpretation of the mandate and its two dimensions. At the same time this ground for
recourse often competes with other grounds for recourse. It shows that the tribunal’s
compliancewith themandate can be reasonably evaluated under the excess of jurisdiction,
violation of due process or (international) public policy grounds.
Consequently, instead of referring to the tribunal’s mandate, the post-award recourse
should only address decisions that grant more than has been requested. In the alternative,
the statutory frameworks should be more explicit on what the mandate entails (and, in
turn, which dimension of the mandate is relevant).
If, however, this ground for recourse remains available, it will be up to the courts to
decide whether the contractual or adjudicative aspect of themandate should be prioritized.
In the era of an increased judicialization and formalization of international arbitration,
parties need to be prepared that the balance between their autonomy and the autonomy
of arbitratorsmay shift for the benefit of the latter. Thismay consequently push the parties
to apply ever more often for the “excess of mandate” type of challenge at the risk of slow
expansion of the scope of the review of the arbitral award.
525
Abstract

Samenvatting
Inleiding
Hoewel in de internationale arbitragewetenschap ‘de opdracht van het scheidsgerecht’ een
alledaags begrip is, blijft het een moeilijk te beschrijven concept waarvoor een juridische
definitie ontbreekt. Het wordt vaak geassocieerd met andere begrippen als de missie,
bevoegdheden, autoriteit of zelfs jurisdictie van het scheidsgerecht. Daardoor blijft de
betekenis van ‘de opdracht van het scheidsgerecht’ ongrijpbaar en ontkomt het aan simpele
classificatie.
Misschien is het daarom toch enigszins verrassend dat het niet naleven van de opdracht
van het tribunaal een basis vormt om de scheidsrechterlijke uitspraak aan te vechten in de
fase na de uitspraak (hetzij tijdens vernietigingsprocedures, hetzij tijdens de
tenuitvoerlegging). Aangezien de opdracht van het scheidsgerecht een vaag begrip is, is
het gevolg dat het breed wordt geïnterpreteerd en dit ondermijnt de fundamentele waarde
van arbitrage - de onherroepelijkheid van de scheidsrechterlijke uitspraak.
Het is daarom van essentieel belang om te bepalen hoe nationale rechtbanken arbitrale
uitspraken beoordelen op basis van “overschrijding van de opdracht" en vervolgens in
welke gevallen zij het argument aanvaarden dat het tribunaal in strijd met zijn opdracht
heeft gehandeld. Deze studie verkent de overeenkomsten en verschillen bij vorderingen
tot vernietiging op basis van “schending van de opdracht" in een aantal geselecteerde
rechtssystemen. Dit zijn de UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, de Conventie van New York (ook bekend als het Verdrag tot erkenning en
tenuitvoerlegging van buitenlandse arbitrale vonnissen) en het rechtsbestel in Frankrijk,
Engeland en de VS.
Door te kijken naar de aspecten van wat de geselecteerde rechtssystemen als een
“schending van de opdracht" beschouwen en het identificeren van gemeenschappelijke
kenmerken wordt een bijdrage geleverd aan een beter begrip van het concept van de
opdracht van het scheidsgerecht. Het doel van dit onderzoek is dan ook om een bouwsteen
toe te voegen aan de definitie van de opdracht van het scheidsgerecht.
De opdracht is voor de definitieve oplossing van het geschil
Er wordt geconcludeerd dat het pro-arbitragebeleid van de rechtbanken het eerbiedigen
van de onherroepelijkheid van het oordeel van het tribunaal versterkt. Omdie redenwordt
herhaaldelijk bevestigd dat een inhoudelijke beoordeling niet mogelijk is. De rechtbanken
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mogen niet en moeten niet worden betrokken bij het heroverwegen van de conclusie van
het scheidsgerecht op het niveau van het inhoudelijke geschil tussen de partijen. Met het
eerbiedigen van de onherroepelijkheid wordt voorkomen dat de beslissing van het
scheidsgerecht over de inhoud van de zaak niets anders is dan geschilbeslechting in eerste
aanleg die is onderworpen aan een gewoon beroep bij een hogere rechtbank.
Zoals hierboven wordt benadrukt, is het beginsel van “geen beoordeling van de grond
van de zaak” bijzonder relevant in de context van “overschrijding van de opdracht”, omdat
dit een rechter de mogelijkheid biedt om te evalueren hoe het scheidsgerecht zijn
adjudicatieve functie heeft uitgeoefend. Daardoor kan vervolgens de ‘juistheid’ van de
beslissingen van het scheidsgerecht nader worden bekeken. In elk geval perken de
rechtbanken zich tot nu toe in bij hun beoordeling en leggen ze zich neer bij de bevindingen
van het scheidsgerecht.
De opdracht heeft twee dimensies: functioneel en contractueel
Internationale arbitrage heeft standaard een tweeledig karakter. Verschillende
rechtstheoretici benadrukken óf de juridische component óf juist de contractuele
component ervan. Het is duidelijk dat deze twee ‘dimensies’ - de functionele en de
contractuele - even relevant zijn voor de beoordeling van de reikwijdte van de opdracht
van het scheidsgerecht. Nader onderzoek van beide dimensies vergemakkelijkt daarom de
uitleg van de betekenis van de opdracht van het scheidsgerecht.
In principe richt de eerste dimensie - de functionele - zich op de rol van het
scheidsgerecht, namelijk om het geschil tussen de partijen op te lossen. Als zodanig wordt
de opdracht van het scheidsgerecht opgevat als een opdracht dat dicht bij dat van een
rechter ligt. Daaruit volgt dat de opdracht om het geschil op te lossen ook de plicht van
het tribunaal wordt. Belangrijk is dat de opdracht van het scheidsgerecht in zijn
adjudicatieve dimensie vereist dat het tribunaal autonoom is (en het belang hiervan
benadrukt), inclusief een (niet altijd expliciete) inventarisatie van de bevoegdheden die
onmisbaar zijn om het geschil tussen de partijen op te lossen.
Tegelijkertijd concentreert de tweede dimensie zich op het contractuele kader van de
opdracht van het scheidsgerecht. Het tribunaal kan immers alleen zijn gerechtelijke functie
uitoefenen wanneer het door de partijen zelf contractueel met een dergelijk opdracht is
belast. Dit houdt dus in dat het scheidsgerecht door het oplossen van het geschil alleen
een dienst verricht en zijn contractuele verplichtingen jegens partijen nakomt. Op hun
beurt behouden de partijen het recht om de reikwijdte van de opdracht van het
scheidsgerecht en zijn autonomie vorm te geven en (mogelijk) te wijzigen (zelfs in een
latere fase van de procedure). Deze tweede dimensie benadrukt daardoor het primaat van
de autonomie van de partijen boven die van het scheidsgerecht.
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In de cyclus van elk arbitrageproces is het van cruciaal belang om een balans te vinden
tussen de autonomie van het scheidsgerecht en dat van de partijen om zo beide dimensies
van de opdracht van het scheidsgerecht op één lijn te brengen. Aangezien dit niet altijd
gebeurt, is het steeds nodig zorgvuldig te onderzoeken hoe beide dimensies van de opdracht
van het scheidsgerecht met elkaar zijn verweven en hoe ze de perceptie van de opdracht
van het scheidsgerecht in het algemeen beïnvloeden.
Beide dimensies zijn relevant in de fase na de uitspraak
In de fase na de uitspraak zijn beide dimensies relevant wanneer de opdracht wordt
beoordeeld. De verdeling van de accenten over de twee aspecten kan echter van invloed
zijn op de manier waarop een vordering tot vernietiging op basis van ‘overschrijding van
de opdracht’ wordt toegepast. Anders gezegd, afhankelijk of het gerecht bereid is te
accepteren dat de ‘overschrijding’ meer naar de ene dan naar de andere dimensie verwijst
(contractueel of functioneel), zal zijn keuze waarschijnlijk weer van invloed zijn op de
manier waarop het de vordering zelf benadert.
Bijvoorbeeld, als de rechtbank een vordering op basis van ‘schending van de opdracht’
in de contractuele dimensie bekijkt, zou dit dicht in de buurt komen van wat wordt
beoordeeld in het kader van een vordering op basis van ‘de onbevoegdheid van het
scheidsgerecht’; als de vordering echter in de functionele dimensie wordt beschouwd, zal
de rechtbank waarschijnlijk overeenkomsten tussen schending van de opdract en
procesovertredingen vinden. Aangezien het functionele aspect verwijst naar het
besluitvormingsproces, loopt de analyse van de rechtbank bovendien het risico van een
beoordeling op inhoudelijke gronden, die - zoals hierboven aangegeven - niet is toegestaan.
Conclusie
De verwijzing naar de opdracht in de fase na de uitspraak leidt tot onnodige onzekerheden
bij de interpretatie van de opdracht en de twee dimensies ervan. Tegelijkertijd concurreert
deze grond vaak met andere gronden voor vernietiging. Het laat zien dat de naleving van
de opdracht door het scheidsgerecht redelijkerwijs kan worden geëvalueerd als
overschrijding van bevoegdheid, schending van een eerlijk proces of (internationale)
redenen van openbaar beleid.
In plaats van te verwijzen naar de opdracht van het scheidsgerecht dient een vordering
tot vernietiging alleen betrekking te hebben op beslissingen die meer toestaan dan is
gevraagd. Als alternatief zouden de wettelijke kaders explicieter moeten zijn over wat de
opdracht inhoudt (en vervolgens over welke dimensie van de opdracht relevant is).
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Als deze rechtsgrond voor vernietiging echter nog beschikbaar is, is het aan de rechter
om te beslissen of het contractuele dan wel het adjudicatieve aspect van de opdracht
prioriteit moet krijgen. In een tijdperk van toegenomen legalisering en formalisering van
internationale arbitrage moeten partijen erop zijn voorbereid dat de balans tussen hun
autonomie en de autonomie van arbiters kan verschuiven ten voordele van laatstgenoemde.
Dit kan het gevolg hebben dat partijen worden gedwongen om steeds vaker een aanvraag
in te dienen voor een vernietigingsvordering op basis van overschrijding van de opdracht,
met het risico dat het bereik van de herziening van de scheidsrechterlijke uitspraak langzaam
wordt uitgebreid.
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